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This thesis investigates the links between politics and the press during the crisis of the liberal 
state in Europe. During the 19th century, one of the biggest challenges facing the liberal state 
was how to give voice to local concerns. In countries with a centralised state-model and 
where liberal principles coexisted with other forms of authority that originated in the Old 
Regime, local elites (or “notables”) emerged as intermediaries between the state and the 
territory. However, while the literature has emphasised that these elites secured their position 
via patron-client relationships, little is known about how they also used the public sphere as a 
way to reinforce their legitimacy.  
 Focusing on the press as one of the strategies used by elites to secure their advantaged 
position in society and embrace new spheres of influence, this thesis will focus on the Godó 
family, a dynasty of politicians, manufacturers and press proprietors who founded what is 
Spain’s oldest (still active) newspaper and Barcelona’s top-selling paper today: La 
Vanguardia.  
 Divided into three parts, the thesis will first examine the role of newspapers in 
political systems where clientelism was the main means of distributing public office. The 
case of the Godó family and La Vanguardia is used to throw light on this, and on the 
importance of transnational media transfers in transforming the newspapers’ raison d’être. 
The second part explores how the Godó family tried to engineer public opinion to advance 
their private agenda during the colonial wars in Morocco and Cuba. The family underwent a 
serious reversal of fortune in the early 20th century, when the demise of the Spanish empire 
and the ensuing climate of national introspection led journalists to be accused of wilfully 
misguiding the public and denounced as collaborators in the corrupt regime of elections. Yet 
contrary to the “downfall of the notables” narrative, which sees the demise of Europe’s 
traditional elites as the outcome of the crisis of liberal politics, this thesis shows that elites 
had a wide room for manoeuvre to maintain their influence in the new mass society. The final 
part of the thesis examines the strategies the Godó family designed to adapt to this new 
scenario, and the function that the press played in them.  
 Drawing on the emerging field of media history, the interdisciplinary perspective 
adopted here will redress the traditional lack of dialogue between historians and media 
scholars, providing a novel perspective on the crisis of liberalism in Europe – where press 
editors are interpreted as political actors, and changes in communicative channels are 
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“Estudiad la psicología actual del pueblo español, 
penetrad en los repliegues de su cerebro, y os parecerá por 
un momento que nos hallamos en los días de Carlos II, 
salvo que el poseído, que el hechizado, no es ya el rey, sino 
la nación misma. ¿Por quién? Por la prensa diaria.” 
  Joaquín Costa, Oligarquía y caciquismo 1 






 One of the key intellectuals of Modern Spain, Joaquín Costa (1846-1911), wrote the 
bitter observation opening this thesis shortly after his country had lost the remnants of its 
empire in a war against the United States, in 1898. In Costa’s view, Spain’s loss of the 
colonies culminated a process of national decay that had a clear explanation: the country was 
in the hands of a small but powerful “oligarchy” that controlled public office through the 
systematic rigging of elections. This method of controlling elections, known in Spanish as 
“caciquismo”, is commonly known in the scholarly literature as “clientelism”.2 
 As well as blaming the ruling classes, Costa also blamed the so-called “press 
oligarchy” (“oligarquía periodística”) for its role in caciquismo. Drawing on the popular 
currency of Social Darwinism to measure the condition of nations, Costa metaphorically 
compared Spain’s current situation with the reign of Charles II (1661-1700). The physical 
condition of this king had been so poor that it prevented him from ruling well and plunged 
the country into one of the harshest struggles for the succession to the throne. While Charles’ 
physical state was said to be the result of a curse, Costa considered that in 1898 the Spanish 
had also been bewitched, this time by the influence of the press. According to Costa, this 
influence was so pernicious that even the fullest renewal of the political class would not 
suffice to achieve the nation’s recovery: the replacement of the “press oligarchy” was also an 
indispensible condition to achieve it.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Joaquín Costa, Oligarquía y caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España: urgencia y modo de 
cambiarla, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1998 [1st ed. 1901], p. 217. English translation [E.T.]:                 
“Examine the current psychology of the Spanish people, penetrate into the recesses of its brain, and it will 
appear to you for a moment that we find ourselves in the days of Charles II, except he who is possessed, he who 
is bewitched is not the king, but the nation itself. By whom? By the daily press”.  
2 “Clientelism” can be defined as “the trade of votes and other types of partisan support in exchange for public 
divisible benefits.” Simona Piattoni (ed.), Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. The European 
Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, p. 4.  
3 “La rehabilitación nacional, he dicho, será imposible, aun dando que nos asista el factor tiempo, con los 




 This thesis will focus on the “press oligarchy” to which Costa referred during 
Europe’s crisis of liberal politics. The years prior to the First World War (1914-1918) have 
traditionally been considered to be a turning point in the history of the Continent. In the 
political field, two elements started challenging the socially restrictive politics of liberalism. 
First, the growing demands to expand democracy (by establishing universal manhood 
suffrage, in countries that did not have it, and by making elections “transparent”, in countries 
where clientelism was widely extended); and second, the emergence of new professional 
politicians and large-scale organisations with the capacity to mobilise thousands of supporters 
through new forms of action (e.g. political rallies, new spaces of sociability, direct political 
affiliation, etc.). This “new era” also entailed a substantial change in the composition of 
elites, often described as the “end of the notables” and the emergence of a new “professional” 
class of politicians.4  
 Recent comparative analysis has revealed that in most European countries the social 
composition of elected representatives started changing in the 1880s.5 The common trend was 
a declining presence of the traditional upper classes (the so-called “notables”), whose sources 
of authority originated from an advantageous position in society (such as a well-off 
background, title of nobility or patronage networks), and its replacement by a new “class” of 
professional politicians, whose election was more dependent on political organisations than 
on a privileged status.6 The characteristics and chronology in the turnover of elites varied 
noticeably according to the specificities of each country, and in most cases was not 
consolidated until the destabilising experience of the First World War.7  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ellos y sustituidos por otros nuevos inculpables y preparados para la gobernación, si hubieran de subsistir las 
actuales oligarquías periodísticas. La renovación de la prensa se impone como otra condición sine qua non.” 
Ibidem, pp. 218-219. [E.T.]: “The rehabilitation of the nation, I said, will be impossible, despite the fact that the 
current situation favours us, with the governments of the last twenty five years in power; I would add that it 
would also be impossible if they were to be substituted for new ones, blameless and prepared for government, 
unless the current newspaper barons are replaced. The renovation of the press is an imperative sine qua non for 
this condition [i.e. the renovation of the government]. 
4 This change in the composition of elites arguably resulted in the redefinition of politics. As Alan S. Kahan has 
observed, “the traditional political explanation for the decline of liberalism, sometimes given in tandem with 
arguments about the decline of the middle classes and sometimes independent of them, is based on the decline 
of “the politics of the notables”, and its replacement by “mass politics”. Alan S. Kahan, Liberalism in 
Nineteenth-century Europe: the Political Culture of Limited Suffrage, Basingstoke-New York, Palgrave 
McMillan, 2003, p. X. 
5 Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta, “Elite Transformation and Modes of Representation since the Mid-
Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Considerations”, in: H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary 
Representatives in Europe 1848-2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries, 
Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-28. 
6 Ibidem, p. 21. 





 However, far from being a top-down process or a pre-determined process of change, 
the democratisation of politics implied a new competition for the sources of political 
legitimacy. In the Mediterranean area, this competition was characterised by the efforts of 
new political movements (like the Republicans, Socialists and Nationalists) to overthrow the 
political system and undermine the privileged position of liberal elites. Whether in the form 
of clientelist practices (in the case of Italy, Portugal and Spain) or in the disclosure of 
successive scandals (in the case of France’s Third Republic), accusations of corruption 
became part of the political struggle and contributed to discrediting the parliamentary 
system.8 In parallel, these countries experienced a series of adversities in their plans of 
colonial expansion that intensified the feeling of national decay.9 A new intellectual discourse 
influenced by biological terminology fostered public concerns about the nation’s future, and 
was often referred to as the decadence of the Latin race and the rising dominance of the 
“Anglo-Saxons”.10   
 In this regard, what makes Joaquín Costa’s remarks particularly valuable is that he 
considered newspaper proprietors to be both to blame for Spain’s decay and its potential 
saviours. Costa’s testimony evoked the impression that the newspaper editors were decisive 
actors in directing public affairs. That perception – which was shared by some of his 
contemporaries – was influenced by the transformation of the press into the main form of 
mass communication. From the last quarter of the 19th century, the press underwent a series 
of deep transformations across Europe, epitomised in the expansion of the consumer market, 
the growing circulation of commercial newspapers and the rise of new ethic codes in the 
journalistic profession (such as impartial reporting and a public service vocation). However, 
although 19th-century commentators often observed that newspaper editors had a powerful 
influence over public affairs, scholars toady have rarely bothered to test those impressions. 
One explanation for this is that in the study of elites, journalists are rarely regarded as 
political actors. Another reason is that the growing specialisation of academia has often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Olivier Dard, Jens Ivo Engels, Andreas Fahrmeir et Frédéric Monier (eds.), Scandales et corruption à l’époque 
contemporaine, Paris, Armand Colin / Recherches, Col. Les coulisses du politique dans l’Europe 
contemporaine, vol. 3, 2014; and Jean Garrigues, La république des hommes d’affaires : 1870-1900, Paris, 
Aubier, 1997. 
9 France’s crisis in Fashoda, 1898; Italy’s defeat in Adowa, 1896; the British “ultimatum” to Portugal, 1890; and 
Spain’s loss of the empire, 1898. 
10 See, for instance, Edmond Demolins, A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons? 1899; Giuseppe Sergi, 
Origine e diffusione della stirpe mediterranea, 1895. On the alleged decay of Mediterranean countries: Lily 
Litvak, Latinos y anglosajones: orígenes de una polémica, Barcelona, Puvill, 1980; and Paul Aubert (ed.), Crise 
espagnole et renouveau idéologique et culturel en Méditerranée. Fin XIXe-début XX siècle, Aix-en-Provence, 




resulted in a lack of interdisciplinary work between fields of research.11 While historians 
mostly use the press as a historical source, but rarely see it as an “agent of change”,12 media 
scholars rarely make efforts to integrate press transformations into the broader history of 
society. The result is two separate narratives that focus on different aspects of the same 
picture but fail to provide an entangled view. 
 As the first study about the changing relations between politics and the press in the 
crisis of liberalism, this thesis will focus on the Godó family, a dynasty of press proprietors 
from the northeast of Spain. In 1881, two members of this family established a newspaper in 
Barcelona called La Vanguardia (“the Vanguard”), which became one of the most influential 
papers in the history of Modern Spain. La Vanguardia is still in print today, in fact it is 
Barcelona’s leading paper, and ranks third in the country in total print sales. However, and in 
sharp contrast with other big dailies in Europe that also have a long-standing presence, there 
are no scholarly studies on the history of La Vanguardia, or on the family that founded it. As 
the first in-depth study of the Godó family, this thesis will use their history as a case study to 
examine how the changing relations between press and politics became closely entwined in 
the re-definition of elites. In so doing, this thesis will seek to provide new perspectives on the 
crisis of liberal politics in Europe. 
 
 
I. STATE OF THE ART: CLIENTELISM, ELITES AND THE “END OF THE 
NOTABLES” IN EUROPE 
 
 From a broad perspective, the literature on clientelism is far from being 
homogeneous. In countries like France, and especially in Germany, it is a minor and 
relatively new topic of historical research.13 In contrast, in countries like Italy, Portugal and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Asa Briggs & Peter Burke, A Social History of the Media. From Gutenberg to the Internet, Cambridge, Polity, 
2002, p. 2. 
12  Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The printing press as an agent of change. Communications and cultural 
transformations in early modern Europe, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979; Sabrina 
Alcorn Baron, Eric N. Lindquist, Agent of change. Print culture studies after Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, Amherst, 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2007. 
13 In these two countries the attention of scholars has mostly been addressed to studying other forms of 
corruption, especially short-lived events known as “scandals”. Jens Ivo Engels, Frédéric Monier and Natalie 
Petiteau (eds.), La politique vue d’en bas: pratiques privées, débats publics dans l’Europe contemporaine 
(XIXe-XXe siècles), Paris, Armand Colin / Recherches, vol. 1, 2011, pp. 133-139. Some exceptions to this trend 
are: Frédéric Monier, La politique des plaintes. Clientélisme et demandes sociales dans le Vaucluse d’Édouard 
Daladier (1890-1940), Paris, La Boutique de l’histoire, 2007; Alain Garrigou, “Clientélisme et vote sous la IIIe 
République”, Jean-Louis Briquet and Frédéric Sawicki (eds.), Le clientélisme politique dans les sociétés 
contemporaines, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, pp. 39-74 ; Julie Bour et Voker Koehler, 




Spain, there is a long tradition of studies.14 Although the term “clientelism” carries a series of 
different connotations, depending on the language, it can broadly be defined as “the trade of 
votes and other types of partisan support in exchange for public divisible benefits”.15  
 If clientelism has received so much attention for the case of Southern Europe it is 
because it has been considered a crucial element in the difficult transition of the countries in 
this area from liberalism to democracy at the beginning of the 20th century.16 During the last 
quarter of the 19th century, the Mediterranean area saw the consolidation of a centralised 
liberal-state model and a progressive – though complex – process of democratisation. Despite 
the particularities of each country, the exercise of “politics without democracy” became a 
common practice in all of them. The fear of the leading groups about widening the social 
bases of the political system led to a strong restriction of suffrage (only around 2% to 5% of 
the population) and the establishment of clientelist procedures (“sistema del turno”, in Spain; 
“rotativismo”, in Portugal; “trasformismo”, in Italy) for the rigging of elections. By means of 
these procedures public office remained concentrated in the hands of liberal parties and the 
vast majority of the population was excluded from it.17 
 As a result of this, instead of holding elections to choose the ruling party, the liberal 
parties in all these countries controlled the government. In the case of Portugal and Spain, 
this was through the alternation in power between two Liberal parties,18 whereas in Italy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
de Weimar”, Frédéric Monier, Olivier Dard et Jens Ivo Engels (ed.), Patronage et corruption politiques dans 
l’Europe contemporaine, Paris, Armand Colin / Recherches, vol. 2, 2012, pp. 185-201 (see esp. pp. 185-189). 
14 In contrast, far less attention has been paid in these countries to other forms of corruption. A good example is 
the case of Spain, where a recently edited dictionary on political concepts of the 19th century contains the 
Spanish expression for clientelism (“caciquismo”), but it does not contain an entry for “corruption”. This word 
only had an entry in the edition of the same dictionary corresponding to the 20th century. See: Javier Fernández 
Sebastián and Juan Francisco Fuentes (eds.), Diccionario político y social del siglo XIX español, Madrid, 
Alianza Editorial, 2008. Some exceptions that specifically deal with corruption for the case of Spain are: Javier 
Moreno Luzón, “La corrupción en Madrid: crisis política y regeneracionismo antes del Desastre (1888-1898)”, 
Juan Pablo Fusi and Antonio Niño (eds.), Antes del desastre: orígenes y antecedentes de la crisis del 98, 
Madrid, Universidad Complutense, 1996, pp. 99-110; Mercedes Cabrera, “Los escándalos de la Dictadura de 
Primo de Rivera y las responsabilidades en la República: el asunto Juan March”, Historia y política. Ideas, 
procesos y movimientos sociales, nº 4, 2000, pp. 7-30; and Fernando Jiménez Sánchez, Detrás del escándalo 
político. Opinión pública, dinero y poder en la España del siglo XX, Barcelona, Tusquets, 1995. 
15 Simona Piattoni (ed.), Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. The European Experience in 
Historical and Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 4. In English speaking-
countries, “clientelism” is often used as a synonym of “patronage”; while in Portuguese and Spanish it is 
commonly known as “caciquismo”. The origin of this expression comes from “cacique”, the word used in the 
Spanish Empire of the Early Modern period to refer to Native American’ leaders.  
16 Manuel Suárez Cortina (ed.), La crisis del Estado liberal en la Europa del Sur, Santander, Sociedad 
Menéndez Pelayo, 2000; Silvana Casmirri & Manuel Suárez Cortina (eds.), La Europa del sur en la época 
liberal. España, Italia y Portugal. Una perspectiva comparada, Santander-Publicaciones de la Universidad de 
Cantabria, Cassino-Università di Cassino, 1998. 
17  “Partido Conservador” and “Partido Liberal”, in Spain; “Destra” and “Sinistra”, in Italy; “Partido 
Regenerador” and “Partido do Progresso”, in Portugal. 
18 Javier Tusell, “Dos formas de liberalismo oligárquico: rotativismo y turnismo”, DDAA, Los 98 Ibéricos y el 




clientelism took the form of broad government coalitions.19 Despite the differences in the 
methods,20 in all these countries elections became a formality, designed to confirm the results 
the liberal parties had agreed upon beforehand. Therefore, these countries had parliamentary 
systems but not democratic ones, because they were based on the systematic manipulation of 
elections. The rest of the political parties (e.g. Republicans, Socialists and Catholics) were 
systematically excluded from power.21  
 Contemporaries were the first to criticise the liberals’ monopoly of public office. 
Particularly at the turn of the 19th century, the climate of national introspection became 
common to Southern European countries and gave place to a rich literature that denounced 
the clientelism on which the liberal politicians based their monopoly of government.22 
Historians, however, have often assumed the views of these contemporaries (like Joaquín 
Costa or Antonio Gramsci) as well as their interpretative framework. A clear example is the 
definition that the Spanish dictionary gave of the word “cacique” in the 1970s, when it 
defined it as “someone of a town or region that exerts an excessive influence on political and 
administrative matters”.23 This definition does not just define the cacique (or local boss) on 
the basis of his main source of power (namely, his influence), but contained an implicit moral 
judgment: the cacique’s influence was considered to be “excessive”. Something similar 
happened with the term “notable”, which despite containing differing connotations depending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Almeida & Javier Moreno Luzón (ed.), Das urnas ao hemiciclo: eleições e parlamento em Portugal (1878-
1926) e Espanha (1875-1923), Lisboa, Assembleia da República, 2012 [the Spanish edition, 2015]. 
19 Manuel Suárez Cortina, “Trasformismo y Turno: dos versiones latinas de la política liberal europea de la 
“Belle Epoque”, Silvana Casmirri y Manuel Suárez Cortina (eds.), op. cit., pp. 225-249. 
20 It must be stressed that in the Italian case, the political system proved to be more open to integrating other 
parties, and the government intervention in elections was less widespread than in Spain; and manifested with 
particular intensity in the Mezzogiorno. For comparisons between the Italian and Spanish case, see: Gabriele 
Ranzato, La forja de la soberanía nacional: las elecciones en los sistemas liberales italiano y español, Ayer, 3, 
1991, pp. 115-138; M. Suárez Cortina, op. cit.; and Renato Camurri, “La Italia liberal y la España de la 
Restauración: una perspectiva comparada”, Rosa Ana Gutiérrez, Rafael Zurita y Renato Camurri (eds.), 
Elecciones y cultura política en España e Italia (1890-1923), València, Publicacions de la Universitat de 
València, 2003, p. 21. 
21 Maurizio Ridolfi, “Republicanos y socialistas en la Italia y en la España liberal (1890-1923), R. A. Gutiérrez, 
R. Zurita y R. Camurri (eds.), op. cit., pp. 49-69. 
22 Examples for the case of Spain were the intellectuals attached to “regeneracionismo”, an intellectual 
movement that saw the eradication of “caciquismo” as the indispensible condition for the country’s recovery. 
For the case of Italy, well-known examples are Francesco de Santis, Marco Minghetti and Gaetano Mosca. For 
an overview of this literature for the Italian case, see: Alberto Mario Banti, Retoriche e idiomi. 
L’antiparlamentarismo nell’Italia di fine Ottocento, Storica, 1995, nº 3, pp. 7-41; Jean Louis Briquet, “Les 
infortunes de la vertu. La critique des moeurs parlementaires en Italie (1860-1890)”, Jean-Louis Briquet and 
Frédéric Sawicki (eds.), op. cit., pp. 251-276. 
23  In Spanish: “persona que en un pueblo o comarca ejerce excesiva influencia en asuntos políticos o 
administrativos”. Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Madrid, RAE, p. 219. In Portuguese the “cacique” was 




on the country was used to refer to an “old way” of doing politics before the birth of mass 
politics.24  
Indeed, the majority of historians writing in the 1960s and 1970s considered 
“clientelism”25 to be a distinctive feature of backward societies, in which a powerful 
“oligarchy” used it as an instrument to maintain a privileged position and subjugate the 
majority of the population. This socio-economic interpretation, inspired in Marxist theory, 
presented clientelism as a sign of “failure” in historical development: first in the 1970s, from 
a paradigm of “bourgeoisie revolution” (“rivoluzione mancata”, in the Italian case), and later 
in the 1980s from a paradigm of “failed modernisation”. Clientelism was thus interpreted as a 
feature of rural and underdeveloped countries that differed from the rest of Europe because of 
the weakness of their middle classes and the consequent failure this caused in the transition to 
democracy.26 
Indeed, European democratisation was understood at the time according to ideal 
models of development.27 While the early extension of the franchise, in countries like France 
and England, was portrayed as a process inexorably leading towards the full democratisation 
of politics, the presence of patron-client relationships in Mediterranean countries was 
regarded as a sign of backwardness. Something similar happened in other countries like 
Germany and Austria, where the role that corporate representation played in elections was 
regarded as a special path in historical development (Sonderweg). This perspective fostered a 
fruitful controversy in the 1980s and 1990s about the role of the “bourgeoisie” (and about the 
meanings and limitations of using this term) in European societies.28   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 On the different connotations the term historically had in Italy, France, Spain and Germany, and their use in 
the historiography, see the monograph edited by Renato Camurri, Notabili e sistemi notabiliari nell'Europa 
liberale, Ricerche di storia politica, Nuova Serie, December 2012, vol. 3. 
25 It must be noted that neither historians working in Spain or Portugal used the term “clientelism”, but 
“caciquismo”.  
26 An overview of the historiography for the Italian case in: Paul Corner, The Road to Fascism: an Italian 
Sonderweg? Contemporary European History, Volume 11, Issue 2, May 2002, pp. 273-295; Nick Carter, 
Rethinking the Italian Liberal State, Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2011, pp. 225-245. For the 
Spanish case, examples of this interpretation were: Antonio Ramos Oliveira, Historia de España, México, 
Compañía General de Ediciones, 1952, 3 vol.; Manuel Tuñón de Lara, La España del siglo XIX (1808-1914), 
París, Librería Española, 1961; Richard Herr, “La élite terrateniente española en el siglo XIX”, Cuadernos de 
Investigación Histórica, Madrid, Fundación Universitaria Española, Seminario Cisneros, 1978, nº 2. 
27 Raffaele Romanelli (Ed.), How did they become voters? The History of Franchise in Modern European 
Representation, The Hague, Boston, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 5. See also: Isabel Burdiel, Myths of 
Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism, Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. 70, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 892-912. 
28Raffaele Romanelli, “Introducción”, Salvador Forner Muñoz (ed.), Democracia, elecciones y modernización 
en Europa: siglos XIX y XX, Madrid, Cátedra, 1997, pp. 25-26. A synthesis of the mentioned historiographical 
controversy, in: Jürgen Kocka and Allen Mitchell (eds.), Bourgeois society in Nineteenth-century Europe, 
Oxford, Providence, Berg, 1993. See also the different contributions to the monograph: Juan C. Gay Armenteros 




 In the meantime, an alternative historiographical trend (the so-called “functionalist 
perspective”), which did not escape from the idealised models of democratisation either, 
started explaining clientelism as an essentially political and administrative phenomenon. This 
trend focused mostly on elections, with the aim of providing an explanation about the 
mechanisms liberal parties implemented to control public office.29 The scholars attached to 
this trend – here presented from a broad perspective, even though they adopted a national 
perspective – shared a basic conception of clientelism as a form of patronage, in which the 
control (or privatisation) of public office was considered to be the mechanism to control a 
vast network of supporters.30 Indeed, and as a new stream of works published in the 1990s 
explained with further precision, the liberal parties’ monopoly of public office did not 
necessarily mean that the political systems of the Mediterranean area were entirely 
disconnected from society, because larger numbers of people besides the local bosses also 
benefited from it. 
 As a result of this new interest in delineating the social roots of clientelism, a crucial 
step was made in the redefining of the terminology used for the social actors who benefited 
from clientelistic practices. While local bosses were firstly referred to (in the Spanish case) as 
a “block of power” or as an “oligarchy”, two expressions that implied a closed social group 
who monopolised both economic and political power, scholars subsequently started referring 
to them as “bourgeois”, and later on as “elites”. The latter expression was used for the first 
time in Spain in the late 1960s and in Italy in the 1970s and has arguably remained the more 
common term until nowadays.31 Although the decision to use the term “elites” is often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Burgesies de les «professions» a l’Europa del segle XIX, Recerques. Història, economia, cultura, 28, 1999, pp. 
23-41. 
29 In this respect, Javier Tusell’s theory of the “encasillado” deserves special mention. Focusing on the case of 
Andalusia, Tusell provided a detailed analysis of how the central parties in Madrid and the local “caciques” 
agreed the results of elections, explaining how the “encasillado” (as the executive’s candidate was referred) 
repeatedly succeeded in winning elections. Javier Tusell, Oligarquía y caciquismo en Andalucía (1890-1923), 
Planeta, 1976. 
30 In the case of Spain, at the forefront of this interpretation there was a group of historians, like José Varela 
Ortega and Joaquín Romero Maura, who were influenced by the work of British anthropologists such as Ernest 
Gellner and the teachings of Raymond Carr at Oxford. Additionally, the works José María Jover had great 
influence, for instance in the crucial work of Javier Tusell. See: Revista de Occidente, nº 127, February 1973; 
José Varela Ortega, Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración, 1875-1900, 
Madrid, Marcial Pons, Junta de Castilla y León, 2001 [first ed. 1977]. Javier Tusell, op. cit. 
31 As Javier Moreno Luzón has observed, in the case of Spain the work of Manuel Tuñón de Lara became 
decisive in spreading the use of this term. Inspired in the work of US sociologists like Charles Wright Mills, 
Tuñon defined “elite” [in Spanish] as: “un grupo reducido de hombres que ejercen el Poder o que tienen 
influencia directa o indirecta sobre...”. Quoted in: Javier Moreno Luzón, “La historiografía sobre las elites de la 
España liberal”, Rafael Zurita, Renato Camurri (eds.), Las elites en Italia y en España, València, PUV, 2008, p. 
28. Still, and as the same author has observed, the term “elite” was not introduced in Spain’s dictionary of the 
Royal Academy until 1984 (p. 30). For the Italian case, Renato Camurri, “Las elites  italianas: estado de los 




justified on the grounds of using a less politically connoted terminology, historians have 
often noted that this term is also deeply entrenched in the liberal tradition of Italian 
sociology, as Pedro Carasa has discussed.32  
 In recent years, some historians have started vindicating the epistemological value of 
the term “notable”.33 While this term has traditionally been associated with the social group 
that dominated politics during the first half of the 19th century, more recently it has also 
started being used to encompass the period until the First World War, especially for the case 
of France and Italy.34 One of the reasons behind the recovery of this term is the interest to 
challenge the prevailing narrative about the “end of the notables”. This expression was 
popularised by the work of Daniel Halévy,35 even though the interpretation lying behind it 
corresponded to Max Weber. In Weber’s theory, the “bureaucratization” of the state and the 
“professionalization” of politics were presented as two steps towards the democratisation of 
society and to the birth of mass politics. The limitation of Weber’s theory, however, is that it 
fostered a gradualist understanding of democratisation, whereby the “notables” and the 
practices they used (such as clientelism) were depicted as an “old way” of doing politics 
doomed to disappear with the advent of “modernity”.36 In this respect, by recovering the term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Above all, the works of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. See: Pedro Carasa, De la burguesía a las élites, 
entre la ambigüedad y la renovación conceptual, Ayer, 42, 2001, pp. 213-214. 
33 Luigi Musella, “Elite y notables. Reflexiones sobre categorías e interpretaciones a propósito del siglo XIX 
italiano”, R. Zurita, R. Camurri (eds.), op. cit., pp. 135-144. 
34 According to the classic definition of André-Jean Tudésq, the notables in Europe shared three main 
characteristics: an affluent position, a prominent role as members of the ruling class, and an adscription to the 
family milieu. A.J. Tudésq (1964), Les Grands Notables en France (1840-1849). Étude historique d'une 
psychologie sociale, Presses Universitaire de France, Paris, 1964, p. 10, quoted in Renato Camurri, I tutori della 
nazione..., op. cit., p. 263. Luigi Musella, op. cit.. Some of the scholars that have used this term in Spain to 
study the first half of the 19th century are: Isabel Burdiel, La política de los notables. Moderados y avanzados 
durante el Régimen del Estatuto Real, 1834-36, València, Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 1987; and Jesús Cruz, 
Los notables de Madrid. Las bases sociales de la revolución liberal española, Madrid, Alianza, 2000. An 
overview on the meaning of the term for the case of this country, in: Juan Antonio Inarejos Muñoz, I notabili 
nella Spagna liberale: dagli esordi del costituzionalismo alla crisi del sistema dei partiti, Ricerche di storia 
politica, 2, December 2012, pp. 315-326.  
35 Daniel Halévy, La fin des notables, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1970 [1st ed. 1970]. Further attention will be paid 
to these questions in the section of this introduction dedicated to Methodology. 
36 According to Weber [here quoted in Spanish]: “La democracia de masas, que elimina en la administración los 
privilegios feudales y —cuando menos por la intención— los plutocráticos, debe sustituir por un trabajo 
profesional irremisiblemente pagado de la administración tradicional ejercida al margen de toda profesión por 
los honoratiores. No es ninguna casualidad que justamente los partidos democráticos de masas (en Alemania, la 
socialdemocracia y el movimiento agrario de masas; en Inglaterra el partido Gladstone-Chamberlain, 
organizado desde Birmingham a partir de 1870; en los Estados Unidos, los dos partidos tradicionales desde el 
gobierno de Jackson) hayan roto completamente, en su organización interna, con el dominio tradicional de los 
honoratiores basado en las relaciones personales y el prestigio que todavía predomina en los partidos 
conservadores y en los antiguos partidos liberales, y que se hayan organizado burocráticamente bajo la dirección 
de funcionarios de partido, secretarios de partido y de sindicato, etc. En Francia ha fracasado siempre el intento 
de formar una sólida organización de partidos políticos exigida por el sistema electivo, y ello fue debido 
principalmente a la resistencia opuesta por los círculos de ‘notables de la localidad’ contra la burocratización el 




“notable”, historians are making an attempt to challenge unidirectional explanations about the 
history of democratisation and to embrace complexity in the explanation of historical 
change.37 
 Besides the different terminology chosen, local bosses were crucial actors in linking 
the liberal parties and the local communities, for they acted as intermediaries between the 
centre and the periphery.38 This intermediary function was structured according to networks 
of personal dependence, referred to in sociology as “Patron-Client Relationships” (PCR). To 
put it briefly, these relationships consist of asymmetric, but mutually beneficial transactions 
between at least two actors holding different positions in society.39 On the one hand, there is 
a “patron” who provides privileged access to a “client” to certain public resources he 
controls. The nature of these public resources might be material (such as jobs or 
administrative concessions), but they might also encompass human resources (like 
protection). In return, the client provides his support (in the form of votes and partisan 
loyalty), reaffirming the patron’s preeminent position in society. For this reason, besides 
assuring the monopoly of power of liberal parties, clientelism also represented a way of 
distributing resources to a vast network of clients scattered around the national territory. For 
the case of Spain, for instance, between 1,000 and 5,000 administrative positions (in 
institutions that spanned from city councils to judiciary courts, as well as other positions in 
public bodies) were redistributed after each election through patron-client channels.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
de Cultura Económica, 2014 [1st ed. in German, 1922], p. 1174. “Honoratiores” is the German expression word 
for “notables”. 
37 Alain Garrigou, op. cit., p. 65.  
38 Indeed, scholars have started to explore “clientelism” in terms of administrative efficiency and legitimate 
demands from the periphery and the margins of society. See: Raffaele Romanelli, Il comando impossibile, stato 
e società nell’Italia liberale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988; Simona Piattoni, Le virtù del clientelismo. Una critica 
non convenzionale, Bari, GLF-Editori Laterza, 2007. For the Spanish case, María Sierra, writing about the 
Conservative Party in Seville, has argued that clientelism gave access to power to people located at the margins 
of society. Maria Sierra, La política del pacto. Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla-Servicio de Publicaciones, 1996, p. 
85. Mercedes Cabrera is another scholar that has placed an emphasis on the capacity of the Restoration system 
to generate a certain consensus. Mercedes Cabrera, Con luz y taquígrafos. El Parlamento en la Restauración 
(1913-1923), Madrid, Taurus, 1998. 
39 An accessible definition of the main traits of clientelism can be found in the entry of Luis Roniger for the 
term “Patron-Client Relationships, Anthropology of”, in: Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds.), International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Oxford, New York, Elsevier, 2001, pp. 1118-1120. For a 
more in-depth and complex definition, see some of the classic accounts on the topic: Jean François Médard, Le 
rapport de clientèle du phénomène sociale à l’analyse politique, Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. 26, 
pp. 103-131; S. N. Eisenstadt & Luis Roniger, “Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social 
Exchange”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1980, Vol. 22, Nº 1, January, pp. 49-51; and the 
chapter of the same two authors in: Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of 
Trust in Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 48-49; Javier Moreno Luzón, Teoría del 
clientelismo y estudio de la política caciquil, Revista de Estudios Políticos, nº 89, July-September, 1995. The 
above-provided definition is based on a combination of all these works. 
40 Georgina Blakeley, “Clientelism in the Building of State and Civil Society in Spain”, in S. Piattoni, 




 Such emphasis on the notion of transactions, however, should not sideline the fact that 
patron-client relationships marginalised those who were not part of such networks (which, as 
a matter of fact, was the vast majority of the population), nor overlook the fact that liberal 
politicians often showed little interest in reinforcing anti-corruption laws.41 Additionally, the 
work of historians like Raffaele Romanelli has shown that the central government often faced 
serious difficulties to impose its will in the territory, and often clashed with the highly 
localised interests of elites.42 In other words, before each election a complex process of 
negotiation between central government and local bosses took place.43 
 Moreover, in the last two decades it has been demonstrated that clientelism was 
neither a distinctive element of Mediterranean countries, nor of so-called “backward” regions 
(like South America or the Third World). Instead, patron-client relationships have started 
being referred to as a widely extended phenomenon, spanning across time and space.44 As a 
consequence, the majority of scholars no longer refer to clientelism as a sign of deviance in 
historical development; and they avoid viewing it through the lens of modernisation theories. 
Instead, historians are showing growing interest in exploring the different characteristics that 
clientelism presented in each society, as well as how it was re-adapted to change.45 Indeed, 
the question at stake is why some elites in certain countries saw clientelism as the best way to 
promote their private interests, especially during periods of transition (e.g. state-building 
processes), and why in other countries this was not the case. This approach has the advantage 
of broadening the frame of analysis, thus allowing for a comparative perspective and the 
introduction of new geographical areas.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Moreno Luzón has estimated that this man had 6,000 jobs and favours at his disposal, which he distributed to 
his clients in his electoral fief in Guadalajara. Javier Moreno Luzón, Romanones. Caciquismo y political liberal, 
Madrid, Alianza editorial, 1999.  
41 M. Teresa Carnero Arbat, “Ciudadanía política y democratización. Un paso adelante, dos pasos atrás”, in 
Manuel Pérez Ledesma (ed.), De súbditos a ciudadanos. Una historia de la ciudadanía en España, Madrid, 
Centros de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2007, pp. 223-250. An opposing interpretation, in: Javier 
Tusell, “La crisis del liberalismo oligárquico en España. Una rivoluzione mancata a la española”, E. Acton, I. 
Saz (ed.), op. cit., pp. 21-36. 
42 Raffaele Romanelli, Il comando impossibile..., op. cit.  
43 Marco Severini, La rete dei notabili. Clientele, strategie ed elezioni politiche nelle Marche in età giolittiana, 
Venezia, Marsilio, 1998; and M. Sierra, op. cit. 
44 See: Jean-Louis Briquet and Frédéric Sawicki (eds.), op. cit. 
45 Jean-Louis Briquet and Frédéric Sawicki (eds.), op. cit.; and Jens Ivo Engels, “La modernisation du 
clientélisme politique dans l’Europe du XIXe et du XXe siècle. L’impact du capitalisme et des nouvelles formes 
d’organisation politique”, Frédéric Monier, Olivier Dard et Jens Ivo Engels, Patronage et corruption politiques 
dans l’Europe contemporaine, Paris, Armand Colin / Recherches, Col. Les coulisses du politique à l’époque 
contemporaine XIXe-XXe siècles, vol. 2, pp. 33-50.  
46 Silvana Casmirri & Manuel Suárez Cortina (eds.), La Europa del sur en la época liberal: España, Italia y 
Portugal. Una perspectiva comparada, Universidad de Cantabria-Università di Cassino, 1998; José Varela 
Ortega, Elecciones, alternancia y democracia España-México: una reflexión comparativa, Madrid, Biblioteca 




II. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS: CLIENTELISM AND THE PRESS 
IN THE BIRTH OF MASS POLITICS 
 
 In my view, one of the limitations for the case of liberal Europe is that while 
historians have explained in great detail the functioning of clientelism at a personal level – 
i.e. between individuals, little attention has been paid to the role the public sphere played in 
the legitimation of elites. In fact, the public dimension of power is an aspect that – with few 
exceptions – often goes unnoticed in the mainstream of Modern history. 47  Historians 
traditionally pay little attention to how the changes in communicative conditions affect the 
nature of power.48 This is particularly the case of the historiography about liberal elites in 
Mediterranean countries. Scholars tend to assume that the social pre-eminence of the elites in 
this area was exclusively based on their capacity to control the mechanisms of influence; that 
is to say, on the capacity of elites to act as the local representatives of liberal parties by means 
of clientelist methods. This idea is based on the assumption that the low levels of 
politicisation of society, the importance of the rural world, and the capacity to manipulate 
elections guaranteed their social supremacy. The problem with that assumption, however, is 
that it overlooks the public dimension of power. In fact, and as Max Weber noted, the pre-
eminent position of the “notables” was not only dependent on material sources (being well-
off) but also depended to some extent on the recognition from society.49 The reason for this is 
because in all societies, the exercise of power is a public issue implying a minimum degree of 
social consent.50 
 In fact, it can be argued that in those societies where public resources were distributed 
according to patron-client channels, the symbolic legitimation of elites was of particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Tavares de Almeida (ed.), Das urnas ao hemiciclo: eleições e parlamento em Portugal (1878-1926) e Espanha 
(1875-1923), Lisboa, Assembleia da República, 2012. 
47 Some of these exceptions are: Isabel Burdiel, Isabel II. Una biografía (1830-1904), Madrid, Taurus, 2010; 
Lucy Riall, Garibaldi. Invention of a hero, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007. Early Modern historians 
have paid more attention to the public legitimation of power. To mention a well-known work: Peter Burke, The 
Fabrication of Louis XIV, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992. 
48 Frank Bösch & Norman Domeier, Cultural history of politics: concepts and debates, European Review of 
History / Revue européenne d'histoire, 2008, 15:6, pp. 577-586. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: 
A Social Theory of the Media, Cambridge, Polity, Stanford University Press, 1995; Political Scandal: Power 
and Visibility in the Media Age, Cambridge, Polity, 2000. 
49 In Max Weber words, the “notables” were [quoted in Spanish]: “los que obtienen los ingresos sin tener 
(relativamente) necesidad de trabajar o los que obtienen ingresos de tal forma que pueden desempeñar las 
funciones de gobierno al margen de su (eventual) actividad profesional, en tanto que al mismo tiempo (...) 
adoptan, en virtud de su posición económica, un modo de vivida que les otorga el ‘prestigio’ social de un ‘honor 
estamental’ y los destina al ejercicio de la dominación.” Max Weber, op. cit., pp. 1080-1081.  
50 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991, 1st ed. in German, 1962]. A valuable example of the 




importance.51 The fact that patron-client relationships were neither legal nor contractual, but 
consisted of informal agreements based on the capacity of the patron to provide resources to a 
series of clients, implied that the position of the patron was never totally guaranteed. This 
lack of legal guarantee implied that the position of the patron was subject to competition from 
other elites aspiring to dispute his role as mediator between the liberal parties and the 
territory. To give an example of this, in local communities various prominent families might 
have competed for the position of official interlocutor with the state. 
 For that reason, what I propose in my research is to study the press as one of strategies 
through which elites sought to build their legitimation in public and aspired to encompass 
wider spheres of influence, besides the traditional channels based on patron-client 
relationships. In so doing, I will argue against the theories of modernisation that give a 
picture of the notables as an old way of doing politics, and depict them as social actors that 
were disconnected from society. Thus, a well-off position was certainly indispensable to run 
for office in liberal politics, but the legitimacy that elites could not obtain from the elections – 
since they were based on fraud – would have been cultivated in public. In other words, the 
public sphere became an alternative dimension for the notables to invest in different forms of 
reputation (symbolic capital) and built their image as the natural representatives of local 
interests, as well as a space to promote their private interests. 52 
 Family often acted as the primary unit through which the elites managed to 
concentrate power in all its diverse forms – economic, political, but also symbolic – across 
time and space. This implied the promotion of strategies on a collective basis, both from a 
synchronic perspective – different members of the same family acting through common aims, 
benefiting each member of the family; as well as from a diachronic perspective – since the 
family name, memory and tradition were transmitted between generations. Particularly in 
local communities, the continuous presence of the same surname across time contributed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 “Symbolic legitimation” can be defined as the “investments on the part of the dominant class in reproducing a 
set of symbols and meanings, which are misrecognized and internalized by the dominated class as their own”. 
Nan Lin, Karen Cook, Ronald S. Burt (eds.), Social Capital. Theory and Research, New York, Aldine de 
Gruyter, 2001, p. 6. John B. Thompson has defined “symbolic power” as “the relative estimation or esteem 
accorded to an individual or institution by others”. John B. Thompson, Political Scandal. Power and Visibility 
in the Media Age, Cambridge, Polity, 2004, p. 246. This definition is slightly different to that of Pierre 
Bourdieu: “Symbolic capital, that is to say, capital – in whatever form – insofar as it is represented, i.e., 
apprehended symbolically, in a relationship of knowledge or, more precisely, of misrecognition and recognition, 
presupposes the intervention of the habitus, as a socially constituted cognitive capacity”. Pierre Bourdieu, The 
forms of capital, J. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, New 
York, Greenwood, 1986, pp. 241-258 (footnote n. 3). 
52 According to John B. Thompson, “reputation” is a form of symbolic capital that can be defined as “the 
relative estimation or esteem accorded to an individual or institution by others”. John B. Thompson, Political 




reinforcing the public legitimation of successive members of the same family. 
 However, the public sphere did not only constitute the space where elites sought to 
reproduce their pre-eminent position in society. It was also a space open to contest from other 
social actors aspiring to dispute the “legitimate discourse”.53 Indeed, and as Hilda Sábato has 
argued, the low participation of elections does not necessarily imply the complete 
demobilisation of society.54 Besides the institutional framework (elections), other channels of 
political participation existed, like the press. Especially since the last quarter of the 19th 
century, newspapers experienced an exponential growth – both in terms of circulation and 
number of publications – that ran parallel to an expansion of the reading market (fall of 
illiteracy levels and new reading practices). This situation reached the point that every 
political party and organisation of any type had its own mouthpiece. In the case of heavily 
populated cities, with very active labour organisations, and, ultimately, being better 
connected to current thinking in Europe, maintaining a parliamentary system that 
marginalised large sections of the population became a goal that was much more difficult to 
achieve.  
 Therefore, the main objective of this research will consist in exploring the function of 
the press in the process of self-perpetuation of family elites; but also as an instrument that 
other actors used to undermine the sources of authority of liberal institutions. This implies an 
understanding of public opinion that is not socially limited to Habermas’ bourgeois sphere; 
and where communication is not a top-down process, but rather a multidirectional one.55 
Thus, the focus will be on the Godó family, a dynasty of Catalan manufacturers, politicians 
and newspaper proprietors, between 1850 and 1918. This chronology embraces two 
generations of the family that will be used as a case study, and provides the opportunity to 
study both the emergence of new liberal elites in the mid-19th century and their crisis by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 This can be defined as “(...) the social-historical conditions which have established a particular set of 
linguistic practices as dominant and legitimate”. John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction”, Pierre Bourdieu, 
Language and symbolic power, Oxford, Polity Press, 1991 [1st ed. in French, 1982], p. 5. 
54  Hilda Sábato, The Many and the Few. Political Participation in Republican Buenos Aires, Stanford 
University Press, 2001. See also: Borja de Riquer, “Los límites de la modernización política. El caso de 
Barcelona, 1890-1923”, José Luis García Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la modernización de España. Los 
decenios interseculares, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1992, p. 23.  
55 The argument presented here reflects some of the critiques made of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. 
The argument of Sábato can be regarded as representative of the scholarship that vindicated the presence of 
subaltern actors (like women, the working classes and minorities) in Habermas’ “bourgeois” public sphere. Still, 
this does not imply that all social actors accessed the public sphere in the same way, for the different forms of 
capital they command (economic, social and symbolic) were unequal. These points will be examined in further 
detail in the section dedicated to methodology. An overview of the critiques made of Habermas’ highly 
influential work, in: Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992. See also: 
François Bastien et Erik Neveu (eds.), Espaces publiques mosaïques. Acteurs, arènes et rhétoriques des débats 




time of the First World War. 
 Originally, the Godó family was native to Igualada, a major industrial city of inner 
Catalonia. Favoured by the great expansion cotton manufacture experienced in this city, the 
family founded a number of commercial establishments, some of which were among the 
oldest and most important in Catalonia (by then Spain’s most dynamic and industrialised 
region). The Godó’s process of upward mobility led some of its members to see politics as an 
important way to promote their private interests. The brothers Carlos (1834-1897) and 
Bartolomé Godó Pié (1839-1894) started a political career based on a combination of 
clientelist practices and their entry into journalism. The establishing of the newspaper La 
Vanguardia, in 1881, allowed them to compete with other elites for the position of official 
interlocutor of the Liberal party in Barcelona; and to turn their hometown of Igualada into the 
family’s political domain. For an almost uninterrupted thirty-year period (1880-1916), the 
different members of the Godó family managed to monopolise political representation in the 
constituency of Igualada.  
 Eventually, the wish to promote the family business in the Spanish colonies of Cuba 
and Puerto Rico, as well as in the North of Africa, led the Godó brothers to attempt to use 
public opinion to expand their influence beyond the limits of the Liberal Party. As part of this 
effort, the brothers transformed La Vanguardia from a partisan newspaper into a commercial 
one. Although this was a risky strategy, La Vanguardia started experiencing a remarkable 
growth and by the outbreak of the First World War its circulation had reached 120,000 
copies. Thus La Vanguardia had the highest circulation in the country (together with 
Madrid’s ABC) and had become the indisputable leader in Barcelona’s press market.  
 However, the Godó’s social prominence started suffering a serious setback by the 
beginning of the 20th century. As a consequence of the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain 
fell into a national crisis of conscience that resulted in the discredit of liberal elites. Catalonia 
became the first place in Spain where new political organisations, the Republicans and the 
Catalan nationalists, put an end to the traditional hegemony of liberal parties. Amidst the 
novel forms of political action that these new political movements put forward, the 
denouncing of clientelism in public became a strategy they used to undermine the authority 
of liberal elites. The second generation of the Godó family became an example of those elites 
who started facing the direct competition of these new political movements. The outcome 
was the crisis of the family’s traditional pre-eminence and the emergence of tensions between 




 The case of the Godó family consequently raises a series of new questions about the 
“end of the notables” in Europe. For instance: what functions did public opinion play in the 
legitimation of elites, in those societies where power was structured according to patron-
client relationships? What role did the press play in the competition between different elites 
to act as the interlocutors between central government and local communities? Furthermore, 
and in relation to the crisis of liberal politics: in which ways did the changes in the press 
contribute to discrediting clientelism in public? How did liberal elites seek to adapt to 
changes in society once politics became more competitive and clientelism started to be more 
difficult to implement?  
 Providing an answer to all these questions represents a dual attempt: first, to meet the 
calls of historians to renovate the studies of liberal elites from the cultural perspective of 
power;56 and second, to adopt an interdisciplinary perspective where media studies and 
historical analysis is merged. To explain how this thesis will do so, the following section will 
be devoted to discussing the methodology used. This section will be divided in two parts: 
first, analysing the case of the Godó family from the perspective of group biography; and 
second, by examining the different ways in which historians and communication scholars 







- GROUP BIOGRAPHY 
  
 
 Examining the Godó’s trajectory along two generations implies examining the 
strategies they implemented to achieve and maintain an advanced position in society. In all 
the spheres where the Godó family participated – whether in the world of business, politics or 
the press – they never did so alone but were always working according to certain common 
goals. Therefore, writing the biography of the Godó family appears as one of the best ways to 
examine the nature of their collective action. 
 Nowadays biography is a consolidated field of research. Evidence of this is the 
continuous flow of works dedicated to this topic, as well as the references to the so-called 
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“biographical turn”.57 The contributions of the scholarly community in this field have not 
been limited to the life of single individuals, but have also embraced the lives of different 
individuals examined together. This approach can be referred to as “collective biography”. 
This implies understanding individuals as part of a group: individuals are not studied per se, 
but in their interactions and links with each other. The final goal is to shed light on a series of 
perspectives that would otherwise be impossible to uncover if only individuals are studied 
alone. The links between individuals can encompass a wide set of forms, and include 
individuals who lived in the same historical period, shared an affiliation to the same social 
group, or held some form of personal connection (blood ties or friendship, among others). 
The key point, in consequence, is the type of link the historian chooses to illuminate, this 
being a decision that includes a broad range of possibilities: from the case of individuals 
whose link was clear and manifest (such as in the case of siblings or spouses, for instance), to 
the case of those individuals who never met in person but shared some kind of connection 
that is of interest to the historian.  
 Still, it is precisely because “collective biography” encompasses a broad range of 
possibilities that this expression has not always been used in the same manner in the scholarly 
literature.58 This might be one of the reasons, in fact, why collective biography is not always 
referred to as such in the work of many historians. In fact, some of the different forms of 
approaching collective biography, like “prosopography” and “group biography”, have 
enjoyed far wider recognition. As will be argued in the following pages, using one or the 
other (prosopography or group biography) implies a whole set of methodological choices 
when it comes to studying liberal elites in Europe.  
 Prosopography is, by far, the most popular way of writing collective biography and 
has been in use since the 1960s. In a seminal article, Lawrence Stone defined it as “the 
investigation of the common background of characteristics of a group of actors in history by 
means of a collective story of their lives”.59 Thus, prosopography consists in framing a 
particular space and then creating a set of questions – on social origins, political affiliation, 
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Biography”, American Historical Review Roundtable (June 2009), vol. 114, nº 13, pp. 573-630; “Biography and 
History”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Volume 40, Number 3, Winter 2010. 
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economic position, etc. – to be addressed. The information obtained from the different 
individuals is later compared in order to establish similarities and patterns, with the aim of 
delineating specific group characteristics. This interest in representative social behaviour 
explains why prosopography has also been referred to as “modal biography” and “social 
quantitative history”.60 Indeed, the prime goal of prosopography is to illuminate general 
patterns, which means that the lives of individuals are interesting in so far as they reflect what 
are considered to be the representative elements of a social group, or some differentiated 
pattern. For this reason, prosopography has been of great use to trace the main features of 
social groups in given periods. Liberal elites have been no exception in this regard, and 
numerous analyses (both regional and national) have been published in recent decades. It 
must be noted that prosopography had a longer tradition in France than in countries like Italy 
or Spain.61  
 More recently, there have also been different attempts at comparative analyses of 
liberal elites at a European scale. This has been the case, among others, of the work 
coordinated by Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta.62 The principal merit of this work is that 
by building on a long tradition of studies about continuity and rupture in the composition of 
elites, it has provided a broad overview about the crisis of liberal elites at a continental 
scale.63 Indeed, by means of large cross-checked data of different countries, these authors 
have delineated the chronology and the changes in the social composition of Europe’s elected 
representatives. They have concluded that the period spanning between the 1880s and the 
1920s was characterised “by the decline of the traditional components of the social and 
political establishment, that is, of privileged social status (particularly aristocratic 
background), land-ownership, state officialdom, and university education”.64 Additionally, 
the replacement of traditional elites with professional politicians proved to be – with 
important and sometimes “unexpected” variables – rather slow, thus confirming some of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Giovanni Levi, “Les usages de la biographie”, Annales ESC, nº 6, November-December, 1989, pp. 1329. 
61 Even if there are still many sources and aspects for the French case that need further study, as noted in 
Christiane Demeulenaere-Douyère et Armelle Le Goff, Histoires individuelles, histoires collectives. Sources et 
approches nouvelles, Paris, Éditions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2012. Some examples 
for the Spanish case are: Pedro Carasa (ed.), Elites. Prosopografía contemporánea, Valladolid, Secretariado de 
Publicaciones, Universidad de Valladolid, 1995; P. Carasa (ed.), Élites castellanas de la Restauración, 
Valladolid, Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 1997, 2 vol. Further insights in 
prosopography studies, from a European perspective, in: Renato Camurri, op. cit., pp. 12-15. 
62 H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000, op. cit.. See also: H. Best 
and Ulrike Becker, Elites in Transition. Elite Research in Central and Eastern Europe, Opladen, Leske-
Budrich, 1997. 
63 Like Juan José Linz, among others. JJ. Linz, “Continuidad y discontinuidad en la elite política española: de la 
Restauración al régimen actual”, C. Ollero (ed.), Estudios de ciencias política y sociología. Homenaje al 
profesor Carlos Ollero, Madrid, Gráficas Carlavilla, 1972, pp. 361-472 




hypothesis of Arno Mayer.65  
 The problem, however, is that prosopography has led to explaining historical change 
from a swinging perspective of decline and rise in the social composition of elites. This has 
been the result of the tendency among scholars (and especially among sociologists and 
political scientists) to focus on the quantitative and sociological dimension of power for the 
sake of representativeness. Liberal elites are presented, in consequence, as a static group that 
was seemingly bound to disappear, and opposed democratisation by sticking to “autocratic” 
means.66 In recent years, however, some scholars have started demonstrating the limitations 
of exclusively using prosopography by adopting a more qualitative and dynamic 
perspective.67 Hence, it has been shown that the European aristocracy that Arno Mayer 
presented as a “feudal vestige” was, in reality, a social group whose internal composition had 
been thoroughly redefined after the French and the Industrial revolutions of the 18th 
century.68  
 In a similar vein, historians like Renato Camurri and Jean Louis Briquet have recently 
demonstrated that, in reality, the crisis of liberal elites was far more complex than a simple 
substitution of one social group by another.69 These two authors have shown, for the case of 
Italy and France, that the new professional politicians often adopted some practices 
traditionally associated with the notables (such as the role of broker between the state and the 
territory, the holding of personal links with the electorate, and clientelist practices).      
In parallel, the same authors have shown the capacity of some notables to adapt to the 
new mass politics by “recycling” their sources of legitimation.70 All these works have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 One of these “unexpected” variables is the case of Nordic countries, where “the primary sector, far from 
declining, managed to maintain a strong role in parliamentary representation. (...) These conditions enabled 
agriculture to preserve a significant influence well into the age of full democratization”. In Germany “nobility 
fell from 35% to less than 5%” between 1880 and 1920. In the case of Italy there was a “decline” of traditional 
elites (like landowners and nobility) and the growing importance of lawyers. Ibidem, p. 513, p. 514, 
respectively. Arno J. Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime. Europe to the Great War, New York, Pantheon 
Books, 1981. 
66 John Garrard, “The Democratic Experience”, Stefan Berger (ed.), A Companion to Nineteenth-century 
Europe, 1789-1914, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, p. 149. 
67 Pedro Carasa, “La historia de las elites políticas en el Parlamento español: de la prosopografía a la historia 
cultural”, R. Zurita, R. Camurri (eds.), op. cit., pp.113-134.  
68 Ewald Frie & Jörg Neuheiser, Introduction: Noble Ways and Democratic Means, European Journal of 
Modern History, Volume 11, November 2013, pp. 433-453 (p. 441). 
69 An analysis about Pareto’s theory on the “circulation of elites”, see: Pedro Carasa, op. cit., pp. 221-223. 
70 Renato Camurri, I tuttori della nazione: i «grandi notabili» e l’organizzazione della politica nell’Italia liberale; 
Jean-Louis Briquet, Notabili e processi di notabilizzazione nella Francia del diciannovesimo e ventesimo secolo, 
Ricerche di storia politica, Nuova Serie, December 2012, vol. 3, pp. 261-278 and pp. 279-294, respectively. See 
also the two special issues about the “Trajectoires de la notabilité”, in the journal Politix. Revue des sciencies 
sociales du politique, vol. 17, nº 65 and 67, 2004. For the case of Spain some historians have also stressed the 
capacity of adaptation of liberal parties, though in a less systematic manner than the authors above commented; 




demonstrated that in order to fully grasp the crisis of liberal politics, it is not sufficient to 
simply focus on the social composition of elites but it is also necessary to examine what the 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called the “strategies of social reproduction” of elites.71 
 In line with this argument, and with the aim of exploring in which ways the Godó 
family built their position in liberal Spain, this thesis will adopt the “group biography” focus. 
According to Barbara Cain, this can be defined as the type of biography that examines those 
“who are closely connected to each other through marriage, blood ties, friendship or 
involvement in a particular set of activities or ideas. The concern of these biographies is 
often to delineate the nature of this connection and to explore the relationships or the shared 
ideas and activities of the group, paying much less attention to those aspects of the lives of 
each member of the group which occur outside its ambit”.72 Therefore, and in contrast to the 
case of prosopography, in the case of “group biography” the connections between individuals 
are not used to elaborate the picture of a collective but rather constitute the main point of 
analysis.73 
 Family and parenthood will be two major points of concern to examine the strategies 
of collective action of the Godó family. This means that instead of focusing solely on the 
separate agency of each individual, we will examine how the collaboration – and the potential 
disagreements – between the members of the family became central in their continuous 
redefining of power strategies. In this regard, historians of European family have traditionally 
argued that the crisis of the Ancien Régime and the beginning of a “modernisation” process 
(understood here as the combined processes of industrial revolution, the rise of the nation-
state and the configuration of a new civil society) in the late 18th century produced a major 
transition in kinship patterns. This transition would have resulted in the organisation of 
individuals in smaller family units (nuclear) and the triumph of “individualism” over 
collective action.74 More recently, however, scholars have challenged the supposed decline of 
kinship ties during the modern era. David Warren has argued rather the opposite: kinship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Luzón, Political Clientelism, Elites and Caciquismo in Restoration Spain, European History Quarterly, July 
2007, vol. 37, no. 3, p. 429. 
71 These strategies can be defined as [in Spanish] “las estrategias, conscientes o no, que en diferentes campos 
procuran la reproducción de una clase o de una fracción de clase, es decir, la conservación o la mejora de sus 
condiciones de vida y de su posición respecto de otros grupos”. Pierre Bourdieu, Las estrategias de la 
reproducción social, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 2011. This book is a compilation of some of Bourdieu’s classic texts 
and has been edited by Alicia B. Gutiérrez. 
72 B. Caine, op. cit., p. 47 and p. 61. 
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biography”. Birgitte Possing, “Biography: Historical”, International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral 
Sciences, Oxford-Nueva York, Elsevier, 2001, p. 1216. 
74 David Warren Sabean and Simon Teuscher, John Mathieu (eds.), Kinship in Europe. Approaches to Long-




became one of the central strategies of elites in moments of change, like the period following 
the Napoleonic Wars.75 In a similar vein, Jorge Luengo has shown from a comparative 
perspective that both in mid-19th century Valladolid (Spain) and Magdeburg (Germany) 
kinship alliances stood at the centre of the social configuration of liberal elites.76  
 This thesis will build on this line of argument to demonstrate how kinship alliances 
became central in the process of upward mobility of the Godó family. This became 
particularly clear for the case of the first family generation. Two brothers named Carlos and 
Bartolomé Godó migrated to Bilbao (in the Basque Country) in the mid-19th century to 
promote the family business and expand it to the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. None of 
these achievements can be fully understood without taking into account the Godó brothers’ 
strategies of “sibling cooperation”.77 Consequently, kinship will be considered in this thesis 
as a key element in the social cohesion of elites; not only in biological terms, but also in 
relation to the different elements individuals shared with each other (such as information, 
influence, and social credentials) to improve their respective positions in society.78 
 
 
- MEDIA HISTORY  
 
 The reason the Godó family managed to reach a prosperous position in Modern Spain 
was that they were able to combine clientelism with the entry into journalism. Still, none of 
the family members ever saw this as a professional vocation, but rather as a way to promote 
their private interests – to the point that not one member of the Godó family ever signed a 
single article that was published in La Vanguardia. However, between the inauguration of 
this newspaper, in 1881, and the outbreak of First World War, in 1914, La Vanguardia 
underwent a series of drastic transformations that radically altered the newspaper. From being 
the organ of the Liberal Party in Barcelona and having an early circulation of 1,400 copies, 
by 1918 the newspaper had reached a circulation of 120,000 and was one of the finest 
examples of journalism in Barcelona. This transformation was neither casual nor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 This scholar has even referred to Europe during the modern era as a kinship “hot” society. David Warren 
Sabean, Kinship in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
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València, PUV, 2014. 
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predetermined, but evoked the changing strategies of the family to promote their private 
interests – both in politics and in colonial trade – by appealing to new publics beyond the 
Liberal Party. Explaining these transformations in La Vanguardia, and examining in which 
ways they were connected to Godó’s political career, will constitute an additional major goal 
of this thesis. 
 The Godó family thus constitute a valuable opportunity to challenge some of the 
major trends in both the literature on elites and the literature on press history. Although the 
new political history has contributed to widening the limits of “the Political”, this perspective 
has not been fully exploited in the history of elites. Ministers, intellectuals, military men and 
businessmen are among the most studied elites. Journalists, in contrast, have rarely attracted 
the interest of historians – either in Italy or in Spain.79 To a considerable degree, this lack of 
attention is because historians tend not to see journalists as political actors.80 This is 
surprising if we take into account that in the liberal era many renowned politicians started 
their political careers by writing for newspapers; and that parliaments were full of journalists 
that were also deputies. What makes journalism interesting is precisely the wide camp it 
covers: from the newsroom as a school for future politicians, to journalism as a form of 
action that elites combined with others fields of action (like business, politics, and intellectual 
commitment); as well as newspapers as a central element in the organisation of cadre parties. 
 On the other hand, communication scholars have rarely been concerned about the 
links between clientelism and the media, as Daniel Hallin and others have noted.81 In other 
words, little is known about how the media historically contributed to sustaining clientelist 
practices. The reason the literature has not reflected on these questions is because an “ideal-
type” of journalism – the so-called “liberal narrative” – has left a powerful legacy among 
communication scholars. According to this narrative, the press is bound to play a public 
mission in democratic societies.82 This mission consists in the defence of the common good 
by reporting any abuse of power, like corruption, and is referred to as acting as the fourth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Javier Moreno Luzón, “La historiografía sobre las elites de la España liberal” and Renato Camurri, “Las elites 
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op. cit., p. 32 and p. 22, respectively. Exceptions to this lack of studies are: Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, Prensa y 
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state or as the watchdog of democracy. In parallel, journalists are expected to be as neutral as 
possible in their reporting of events, for their duty is to provide an “objective” account of 
reality. As a result, the transition from a partisan press model towards a commercial and 
politically independent one is often regarded as a history of progress towards the fulfilment 
of the supposed duties of the press.83  
 The problem with this approach, however, is that it fails to explain the historical 
development of the press in Mediterranean countries. As Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini 
have explained, in Mediterranean countries the press has presented a series of distinctive 
features that distinguished it from the evolution of the press in other parts of Europe.84 Some 
of these differentiated features were a remarkably low circulation (in part resulting from the 
structural features of the these countries, like the important presence of the rural world and 
the high illiteracy levels); a slow path of transition between the partisan press model towards 
a commercial and politically independent one; and the limited professionalisation of 
journalism, resulting from the tight links between press and politics. Until the work of Hallin 
and Mancini, the major features of the press in Mediterranean countries were often seen as a 
sign of “backwardness” in historical development.85 The press in these countries was 
considered to have “failed” to evolve towards the commercial press model and to the 
professionalisation of journalism.86 
 However, a growing number of scholars have demonstrated that this understanding of 
the press is, in reality, influenced by a liberal tradition of thought that goes back to 18th-
century thinkers (like Edmund Burke and John Locke), and became very influential in 
shaping the “journalistic culture” of certain countries (like England and the United States) 
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York, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 89-142. 
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models of media and politics to explain the existence of different patterns of historical development. These 
models correspond to geographical areas sharing similar structural patterns and cultures. They are: the “Liberal 
Model” (Great Britain, Ireland and North America); the “Democratic Corporatist Model” (Northern Continental 
Europe) and the “Polarized Pluralist Model” (Southern Europe). D. Hallin and P. Mancini, op. cit. 
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during the 19th and 20th centuries.87 The problem is that until recently, the liberal narrative 
was the normative model against which the historical development of the press in other 
countries was evaluated.88 
 To a considerable extent, this approach in the study of the press is also the result of 
the traditional lack of dialogue between historians and communication scholars. As James 
Curran put it, “historical research has tended to be the ‘neglected grandparent’ of media 
studies”.89 This is because communication scholars tend to study the press through the lens of 
a highly normative scheme. Instead of studying what the press was like, media scholars are 
more interested in what it should look like. The result is a highly normative scheme that pays 
little attention to the epistemological contributions of history.90 Historians, for their part, tend 
to adopt a more empirical approach but mostly use the press as a historical source. The reason 
for this is that many of them see newspapers as a (supposed) mirror of reality.91 The 
consequence is that printed opinion is sometimes mistaken as public opinion. This 
misconception often runs parallel to another extended practice among historians, which 
consists in presenting press content from a top-down perspective, whereby readers are viewed 
as passive actors. Conversely, communication scholars are more aware of the importance of 
taking reception into account, and about the need to challenge the alleged “almighty” power 
of the press in society.92 
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 For all the reasons mentioned above, the methodological approach of this thesis in 
regard to La Vanguardia will be that of “media history”. Although scholars do not agree on 
whether this has become a distinct field of research or not, this expression refers to the 
growing awareness among scholars about the need to establish an interdisciplinary approach 
between historians and communication scholars in the study of the press.93 While this 
perspective is attracting growing attention in countries like England and Germany, it is harder 
to notice in other national historiographies, like Spain or Italy.94 
 In practice, to adopt the perspective of media history implies that instead of 
examining to what extent the history of La Vanguardia matched the liberal narrative or not, 
emphasis will be placed on making an entangled analysis between changes in the press and 
broader changes in society (and politics especially). Hence, the case of the Godó family will 
be used to argue that the changes in communicative conditions, resulting from the changes in 
the press, contributed to making the corrupt practices of liberal politics (“clientelism”) more 
visible to the public, thereby rendering them subject to new criticism. The Godó family, 
whose social prominence relied on these types of corrupt practices, will be used as a case 
study to examine how the liberal elites reacted to this criticism. It will be argued that while 
contributing to democratisation, the new mass press also opened new channels for traditional 
elites to maintain their influence in society. The Godó family therefore constitutes a valuable 
case study to explore the changing relations between corruption and the media in modern 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Michael Schudson, op. cit.; James Curran, op. cit. An example of this new field is the academic journal called 
“Media History”. Previously known as “Newspaper and Periodical History”, in 1998 it was renamed to promote 
the dialogue between the two disciplines. Further examples of this growing concern are the establishing of new 
media history centres, mostly in English speaking countries (Aberystwyth, 2005; Macquarie University, 2007; 
University College Dublin, 2009; Sheffield, 2009) and in Germany (Hamburg). More recently, a “New 
International Research Network in Media History” has been created. Niels Brügger & Søren Kolstrup (ed.), 
Media History. Theories, Methods, Analysis, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2002. 
94 For the British case, an overview of some works that are representative of this field, examined from a national 
perspective: Mark Hampton, op. cit. For the case of Germany, see: Bernhard Fulda, Press and Politics in the 
Weimar Republic, Oxford, 2009; Karl Christian Führer, Mass media, Culture and Society in Twentieth-century 
Germany, New York, Palgrave, 2006. A state of the art for the German case, in: Corey Cross, Writing the Media 
into History: Recent Works on the History of Mass Communications in Germany, German History, Vol. 26, No. 
2, 2008, pp. 299-313.  
95 Jean-Claude Passeron et Jacques Revel (ed.), Penser par cas, Paris, Éditions de l’École des hautes études en 






 Since its foundation in 1881, and to this very day, La Vanguardia has remained the 
property of the same family. Only during the period of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), 
when the current owner of the newspaper (Carlos Godó Valls) fled to Genoa, did the 
newspaper briefly escape from the control of the family. Paradoxically, the long history of La 
Vanguardia and its enduring position as Barcelona’s top-selling newspaper are in sharp 
contrast with the scarcity of studies about its origins and the family who founded it. In the 
last years some works have been dedicated to examining La Vanguardia in recent periods of 
Catalan and Spanish history,96 but the trajectory of the Godó family and the origins of the 
newspaper remain largely unknown. Only three authors have approached these questions, 
with hardly satisfactory results.97  
 But what explains the lack of studies on what can be considered as “the most 
significant editors and the most significant newspaper in Catalonia”? This was the question 
that the scholar Daniel Jones posed in 2006, during the 125th anniversary of the foundation of 
La Vanguardia.98 He coined two hypotheses to answer it. The first regarded the influence the 
political agenda arguably had in the preferences of Catalan scholars. According to Jones, the 
majority of the research has been conducted from a “nationalistic and ethnocentric 
perspective” which led to prioritising those newspapers that were published in Catalan, to the 
detriment to those published in Spanish, like La Vanguardia. The second hypothesis is that 
the long ownership of the newspaper in the hands of the same family is what prevented 
historians from accessing the Godó’s private archive. In fact, none of the authors mentioned 
(Voltes, Huertas and Molina) made use of archival sources. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Rafael Aracil, Andreu Mayayo, Antoni Segura (eds.), Diari d’una postguerra. La Vanguardia Española 
(1939-1946), Catarroja-Barcelona, Afers, 2010; Anna Nogué, Carlos Barrera, La Vanguardia. Del franquismo a 
la democracia, Madrid, Fragua, 2006; Francesc Vilanova, La guerra particular de Gaziel i el comte de Godó 
(1940-1945), Barcelona, Ploion, 2004; Jaume Busqué, “El Cànem: de fàbrica dels Godó a presó de Franco”, 
L’Avenç, desembre 2012; gener-febrer 2013. 
97 These three authors are: Pedro Voltes Bou (1926-2009), Josep Maria Huertas Clavería (1939-2007) and Vis 
Molina. In the case of Voltes, he was a journalist of La Vanguardia who wrote two voluminous (and apologetic) 
works that were never published. Huertas wrote the first synthesis of the history of La Vanguardia; while the 
journalist Vis Molina published the first account specifically dedicated to the Godó family. The book of Molina 
was written on the occasion of La Vanguardia’s 125 anniversary and can be considered the “official” (indeed 
commissioned) history of the Godó family. In practice, it is a book that consists of a description of various 
family members (mostly based on anecdotes regarding marriages, hobbies, special events, etc.), but does not 
contain any clarifications on the origins of La Vanguardia – nor the motive behind its foundation. See: Pedro 
Voltes Bou, “Vida y obra de don Ramon Godó y Lallana, primer conde de Godó” (Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona, “Tesina de licenciatura”, 1980, 343 pages) and “Historia de La Vanguardia” [manuscript]. Josep 
Maria Huertas, Una història de «La Vanguardia», Barcelona, Angle Editorial, 2006; Vis Molina, Los Godó. Los 
últimos 125 años de Barcelona, Madrid, Martínez Roca, 2005. 




 Obviously, the first question I took into consideration before even starting this thesis 
was the existence of archival sources about the Godó family. In this regard, I had the 
opportunity of discussing the possible existence of a family archive with the current director 
of La Vanguardia (Màrius Carol) and with the archivist of this newspaper (Carles Salmurri). 
Both of them confirmed the same point that Pere Voltes had already stated in his manuscript: 
no archive of the Godó family was ever preserved. This was also the case of the newspaper’s 
historical archive, which was destroyed during La Vanguardia’s confiscation during the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). 
 Therefore, the lack of private sources has been one of the biggest impediments in the 
writing of this thesis; all the more when the purpose is to write the biography of a family. 
These circumstances also carried important consequences for the methodological framework: 
the lack of private correspondence, for instance, implied that reconstructing the clientelist 
network of the Godó family would be a much more difficult goal to achieve. Yet at the same 
time, the lack of a private archive also represented a stimulus to approach the study of liberal 
elites in Europe from a new perspective, as explained in the section dedicated to 
Methodology. Indeed, the long and rich trajectory of the Godó family in different spheres 
(politics, business and journalism) implies that they left many traces in other types of archival 
sources. These can be classified in two different types: newspaper copies and private-public 
sources. 
 In the first case, the lack of a private archive about the Godó family is somehow 
compensated for by the long history of La Vanguardia. This newspaper often contained 
numerous references to its owners, yet at the same time constituted the instrument of their 
power strategies. This double dimension in the case of La Vanguardia (both “source” and 
“object of study”) is one of the main perils this thesis has faced, and an effort has been made, 
throughout the thesis, to differentiate between the two. That being said, the content of La 
Vanguardia is now available via the newspaper’s current webpage and contains a research 
engine. Needless to say, this has been of great use for this research (although printed copies 
of this newspaper have also been consulted). Another valuable source of information was the 
press published in different cities: Igualada, Barcelona and the rest of Spain. Some of the 
main newspapers in these three spheres are also available on the internet, and have 
contributed significantly to this research. 99 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 “Hemeroteca Digital. Biblioteca Nacional de España”; “Biblioteca Virtual de Prensa Historica”; “Fons locals 




 Archival sources have constituted the second pillar of this thesis. Historians interested 
in the history of the Godó family and La Vanguardia have largely overlooked the fact that the 
lack of a private archive is not an impediment to reconstruct the trajectory of this family. All 
the more, because the family’s rich trajectory implies that there are numerous archives where 
information could be found: in some cases just one letter, in others a wide range of 
documents. Below is the list of the archival sources that have been used: 
  
- Notary archives (containing information about business, wills, and politics): Arxiu Notarial 
d’Igualada; Arxiu Històric de Protocols de Barcelona; Archivo Histórico de la Diputación Foral de 
Bizkaia (Bilbao); Archivo Histórico de Protocolos de Madrid. 
  
- Parochial archives (births, marriages, and deaths): Arxiu Parroquial d’Igualada; Archivo Histórico 
Eclesiástico de Bizkaia (Bilbao). 
 
- Local, Provincial and State archives (information about political activity): Arxiu Històric Municipal 
d’Igualada; Arxiu Històric de la Diputació de Barcelona; Arxiu Històric de Foment del Treball 
Nacional (Barcelona); Archivo Municipal de Bilbao; Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados 
(Madrid); Archivo General de Palacio (Madrid); Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de 
Henares). 
  
- Private archives (personal correspondence): Arxiu-Biblioteca Museu Víctor Balaguer (Vilanova i la 
Geltrú, Catalonia); Archivo Fundación Antonio Maura (Madrid); Archivo Romanones (Real 
Academia de la Historia, Madrid); Archivo del Marqués de la Vega de Armijo (Museo de Pontevedra, 
Galicia); Archivo Urgoiti (Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid, Madrid).  
 
- Archives in other countries besides Spain: the National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom. Contains 
some references about the Godó’s colonial business); Archives Nationales (Paris, France. Contains 
the private archives of the news agency “Havas”; the main international news supplier of La 
Vanguardia); Archivo de la Misión Franciscana en Marruecos (Tangier, Morocco. Contains 
information about the Godó’s colonial business in the North of Africa); Instituto Cervantes-Biblioteca 
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 In 2006, La Vanguardia celebrated its 125th anniversary, marking the foundation of 
the oldest (and still active) newspaper in Spain; indeed it is the top-selling newspaper in 
Barcelona today. The anniversary was also used as an occasion to highlight the paper’s strong 
historic links to the Godó family.100 Since its foundation in 1881, and with the sole exception 
of the Spanish Civil War period (1936-1939), La Vanguardia has remained the exclusive 
property of the same family. This exceptional continuity in the ownership of the newspaper (a 
rarity among Europe’s big dailies) is recalled by the motto incorporated on the front page of 
La Vanguardia – “Fundada en 1881 por Don Carlos y Don Bartolomé Godó”.101 
 Surprisingly, the long history of La Vanguardia has generated very little scholarly 
interest regarding its origins or its founders. Those works that are available tend to be, at best, 
broad historical overviews.102 This lack of interest, however, has not prevented historians 
from portraying La Vanguardia as one of the newspapers that better symbolised the birth of 
“modern journalism” in Catalonia and Spain in the late 19th century; 103  namely, the 
association of the newspaper with editorial independence and commercial success. In my 
view, this interpretation is highly restrictive, since it is a retrospective image of the 
newspaper as it is today. And, more importantly for the aims of this thesis, it has prevented 
historians from noticing in the case of La Vanguardia a crucial moment in the history of the 
press in Western societies. Namely, the long and uneven transition from the partisan press 
model towards a commercial and politically independent one.104 In fact, the founding of La 
Vanguardia as the mouthpiece of a political party has been largely overlooked. This was not 
a hidden function, but was stated clearly on the front page of the newspaper when it was 
established in 1881: “La Vanguardia. Diario político y de avisos y noticias. Órgano del 
Partido Constitucional de la Provincia”.105 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Vis Molina, Los Godó: los últimos 125 años de Barcelona, Madrid, Martínez Roca, 2005. Among the 
different commemorative events in 2006, an exhibition called “The pulse of the days. 125 years of ´La 
Vanguardia´” was held at the “Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona” (CCCB).  
101 English translation [E.T.]: “Established in 1881 by Mr. Carlos and Mr. Bartolomé Godó”. See Annex n. 1. 
102 Vis Molina, op. cit.; and Josep Mª Huertas Clavería, Una història de «La Vanguardia», Barcelona, Angle 
Editorial, 2006.  
103 Josep Mª Casasús, “La vida de un gran diario europeo 1881/1981 La Vanguardia”, Historia y Vida, March 
1981, nº 156, pp. 32-49. 
104 An example of a work that focuses on this historical phenomenon, for the case of another country, is: 
Stephen E. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, London, Hamilton, 1981, 2 vol. 
105 [E.T.]: “The Vanguard. Political and “Advice” Newspaper. Spokesman of the Constitutional Party of the 




 This chapter will examine the motives that led two businessmen of humble origins, 
Carlos (1834-1897) and Bartolomé Godó (1839-1894), to establish La Vanguardia in 1881 as 
the organ of the Constitutional Party in Barcelona. This question will lead us to analyse the 
social and economic origins of these two brothers in order to understand why they saw the 
founding of a political newspaper as a worthwhile investment. From a historical perspective, 
such a question implies focusing on the origins of the liberal state in Europe and the role the 
press played in the power strategies of liberal elites. To do so, this chapter will be structured 
in two main parts.  
 The first part (sections 1.1. and 1.2.) will trace the historical origins of the Godó 
family. Between the last quarter of the 18th century and first half of the 19th century, 
significant parts of the continent underwent a series of structural transformations 
(demographic growth, urbanisation and industrious revolution) that radically transformed the 
patterns that had characterised society during the early modern era. This transformation went 
hand in hand with the drastic changes – triggered by the Napoleonic Wars and the Liberal 
Revolution – in the way power was structured in European societies. The Godó family 
symbolised the new social class of traders and manufacturers that emerged in Europe amid 
the dwindling control of the guilds and the new freedom of trade. This section will focus on 
the importance that kinship cooperation and being deeply rooted in the local community had 
for the members of this family to reach an advantaged position in society. 
 The second part of the chapter (sections 1.3. and 1.4.) will examine why the Godó’s 
saw the press as a new avenue for promoting their private interests. Across Europe, one of the 
biggest challenges the liberal-state faced was how to represent the interests of local elites. In 
the case of those countries where a centralist state-model was implemented, and where the 
legal-rational principles of liberalism coexisted with other forms of authority that came from 
the Ancient Régime, patron-client relationships became the central pillar through which 
parliamentary representation was organised.106 The political career of Carlos and Bartolomé 
Godó will allow examining the functioning of these mechanisms from an innovative 
perspective. Thus, while clientelism has usually been studied through single political periods, 
especially for the case of last quarter of the 19th century,107 less is known about how it was 
transformed in times of political transition. The career of the Godó brothers, which embraced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Simona Piattoni, (ed.), Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. The European Experience in 
Historical and Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 4.  
107 The literature has privileged a narrow understanding of political clientelism, based on the procedures liberal 
elites implemented in the last quarter of the 19th century to control public office. These procedures were: 
“rotativismo” in Portugal (since 1878); “trasformismo” in Italy (since the Parliamentary revolution of 1876, 




two different periods (the “Democratic Sexennium”, 1868-1874; and the “Bourbon 
Restoration”, 1874-1923), will provide an opportunity to adopt an intra-period perspective 
and thus to shed light on the changing nature of clientelism. Special attention will be paid to 
the strategies elites developed to adapt during these moments of political transformation and 




1.1. THE ORIGINS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY  
  
  
 The Godó name has traditionally been associated with Igualada, an industrial town of 
inner Catalonia located 60 km northwest of Barcelona. The roots of this family go back to the 
early 18th century when, on 20 January 1716, Oleguer Godó, a man from the neighbouring 
town of Esparraguera, married Caterina Gomà in the church of Santa Maria.108 The wedding 
seemed to have been rooted in a commercial strategy: like Oleguer, Caterina’s father worked 
as a “paraire” – as the various procedures involved in the spinning of wool were referred to 
in Catalan.109 The wool industry was, in fact, the town’s most important industry and 
employed many people.110 However, despite the fact that Igualada attracted numerous 
migrants at the time, only a few of them were recruited as “paraires”.111 Marrying the 
daughter of a guild member is presumably what secured Oleguer’s acceptance into the guild. 
Hence, two years after his wedding Oleguer passed the examination of the guild of “Sant 
Joan Baptista” and joined it bearing the name “GO”. 112 
 From that moment on the successive generations of the Godó family maintained and 
reinforced their link with Igualada. Their activities, whether in the world of commerce, 
family, or politics, cannot be fully understood without taking into account the importance that 
“localism” played in the agency of the family members. The peculiar way in which Igualada 
experienced industrialisation in the 19th century directly affected the expectations of the Godó 
family and conditioned their strategies of action – including the foundation of La 
Vanguardia.  
 Igualada became a paradigmatic example of the proto-industrialisation process that 
Europe underwent in the 18th century, to the point of becoming one of the most industrialised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Arxiu Històric Comarcal d’Igualada-Arxiu Parroquial d’Igualada (AHCI-API), Llibre de matrimonis (1684-
1726), any 1716, fol. 181.  
109 Jaume Torras Elias, Fabricants sense fàbrica. Els Torelló, d’Igualada (1691-1794), Vic, Eumo, 2006, p. 23. 
Note: “Paraire” is the Catalan term; “pelaire” in Spanish and “wool carder” in English. 
110 During the first third of the 17th century, as many as four in every ten couples that married in Igualada had a 
husband working as a “paraire”. Ibidem, p. 53. 
111 Jaume Torras Elias, “Gremio, familia y cambio económico. Pelaires y tejedores en Igualada, 1695-1765”, 
Revista de Historia Industrial, nº 2, 1992, p. 23.  
112 “Y lo dit Olaguer Gudó accepta lo ésser mestra y confrare de dita confraria, y estarà als manaments dels 
cònsols que vuy són y per temps seran, en quant als càrrechs de dita confraria, y en pagar los talls y càrrechs de 
aquella, lo bé y profit de aquella. Y promet exercir lo càrrech de andador fins y atant ni haurà de altra. Y per ser 
casat ab filla de mestre paga per lo examen quinse reals, los quals li done de comptans als dits cònsols. Y ab 
jurament llargament”. Montserrat Duran Pujol (ed.), Llibre de la confraria y offici de Perayres de la vila de 
Igualada, en lo qual estan continuadas las ordinacions y determinacions de dit offici, tretas del llibre de la 
confraria de perayres de la ciutat de Barcelona (1614-1887), Barcelona, Fundació Noguera, 2011, vol. I, 




places in Catalonia (by then Spain’s most dynamic region). Indeed, and as Jaume Torras has 
studied in detail, throughout the 18th century growing numbers of “paraires” in Igualada 
started to spin cotton outside the control of the guild by relying on the “putting-out” system 
and the introduction of foreign manual spinning machines.113 The result was the growing 
specialisation of this town in the cotton textile industry and the mushrooming of factories. By 
1841 there were as many as 481 factories dedicated to the cotton industry in Igualada, 
making it the second most important centre in Catalonia, both for the spinning process and in 
the total volume of wages paid. Only Barcelona fared better in both cases.114 
 The Godó family played an active role in the expansion of Igualada’s cotton industry. 
Ramón Godó Llucià (1801-1862), the father of La Vanguardia’s future founders, was a 
textile manufacturer who inherited a set of spinning machines that were installed in the same 
building in which he and his family lived – number 10 on the “Rambla Nova”. Ramón’s 
workshop was founded in 1808 and was the third oldest in Igualada. By 1845 the factory had 
been relocated in a new building and employed 120 people.115 Annual production amounted 
to 75,000 pesetas, making Ramón the sixth largest manufacturer in town. In 1835 he was 
ranked 28th on Igualada’s taxpayers list.116 
 The building that Ramón owned on the Rambla Nova was to hold long-lasting 
symbolism for the Godó family. Besides being the first setting for the factory, at least four 
future generations of the family were born and raised in this household. The building thus 
symbolised the continuity of the family lineage across time, as well as the place where 
different generations lived side by side. This can be seen in Table 2, which contains the name 
of all the family members that lived in the building in 1849. The data come from Igualada’s 
municipal census of 1849. In order to highlight the coexistence of different generations of the 
family in the same household, the data of Table 2 is displayed in the form of a family tree.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Jaume Torras, “Fabricants sense fàbrica. Estudi d’una empresa llanera d’Igualada (1726-1765), Recerques 
19, Homenatge a Pierre Vilar, vol. I, 1987, 145-160; Àngels Solà, “Filar amb berguedanes. Mite i realitat d’una 
màquina de filar cotó”, La indústria tèxtil. Actes de les V Jornades d’Arqueologia Industrial de Catalunya, 
Barcelona, Marcombo, 2002, pp. 143-68. 
114   Monthly value production          Wages paid  Capital investment 
Barcelona  638,000           1,120,000        68,500,000 
Igualada                309,000              543,000        10,300,000 
Mataró   138,000              211,000        11,300,000 
Manresa                125,000              196,000        12,700,000 
Berga     78,000              169,000          5,100,000 
Vic     53,000              105,000          2,700,000 
Note: The monthly value production is in “lliures catalanes”, the rest of the figures are in “rals de billó”. Table 
reproduced in: J.M. Torras i Ribé, “Trajectòria d’un procés d’industrialització frustrat”, Miscellanea 
Aqualatensia, nº 2, 1974, p. 181. 
115 Pere Pascual i Domènech, Els Torelló..., vol. 1, p. 67. 











 As Table 2 shows, in 1849 three generations lived together in the Godó’s household. 
The names marked with a blue box correspond to the eldest son of each generation and 
indicate, also, the hereditary line within the Godó family. The coincidence between age and 
line of transmission is because in Catalonia, in contrast to other parts of Spain, an impartible 
system of family inheritance prevailed.118 The raison d’être of this system was to prevent the 
dispersal of family assets and to maintain the economic status. Accordingly, the first-born son 
(called “hereu”) was bestowed with the lion’s share of the inheritance (around 80 per cent of 
the total), while the younger sons and daughters (called “cabalers” and “cabaleres”), in 
contrast, only received the remaining 20 per cent, which was divided into equal parts.  
 This uneven inheritance system was symbolically reinforced in child-naming customs. 
The Godó family first sons were usually christened “Ramón”, as Table 2 shows. The name 
thus provided a regular and unified identity among the members of the Godó family, but also 
constituted one of the clearest mechanisms of an “institutionalized relationship” within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117  Arxiu Comarcal de l’Anoia-Arxiu Històric Municipal d’Igualada (ACAN-AHMI), Padró municipal 
d’habitants d’Igualada, nº 2070. 
118 For a comparison between the partible and impartible systems of inheritance in Spain, see: Llorenç Ferrer, 





















































household. 119  This was manifest in various ways. One example was the children’s 
upbringing. The heir was given special attention and enjoyed a number of privileges that 
were not extended to his brothers and sisters. An illustration of this was the fact that Ramón 
Godó Pié, the family’s future heir, had chocolate for breakfast everyday, carefully prepared 
by his mother; while the rest of his siblings went without this luxury.120 A second example of 
such preferential treatment was the fact that Ramón, together with his wife (Bonaventura 
Llucià) and their son, lived in the family home. In contrast to this, the remaining brothers 
were expected to move elsewhere. 121 Still, families developed different strategies that 
facilitated the departure of cadets while assuring the preservation of their economic status, 
such as sending second sons to religious institutions. An alternative strategy can be observed 
in the case of the Godó family: the eldest daughter of Ramón Godó Llucià, Manuela (1843-
1903), was sent to Madrid to join the “Amiga de la Juventud” – an insurance company in 
which the families invested the dowry of their daughters with the expectation of increasing its 
value.122 The final goal was to improve the daughter’s chances of upward mobility by means 
of marriage. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that Manuela returned from Madrid and 
married in Igualada in 1866.123 
 The prevailing of an impartible inheritance system in 19th-century Catalonia is a 
crucial element to understand why the two founders of La Vanguardia, Carlos (1801-1862) 
and Bartolomé Godó Pié (1839-1894), decided to leave Igualada and move to the Basque city 
of Bilbao, in the north of Spain. Both of them were cadets and unlike their oldest brother 
Ramón, who inherited the house and the family business, they only received a dowry. 
According to the will their father signed in 1851 this consisted of 1,500 “lliuras catalanas” 
each.124 Still, if the existence of highly institutionalised relationships within the Godó family 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Pierre Bourdieu, The forms of capital, in John Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, New York, Greenwood, 1986, pp. 241-258. 
120 Vis Molina, op. cit., p. 26. 
121 Although in practice this was not always the case. One of those exceptions was the case of unmarried 
brothers. This was the case of Magí Godó Llucià [see Table 2], who stayed in the family home. This strategy 
presented two advantages to the family: first, it allowed another family member to work in the business; and, 
second, it allowed the family to save on one dowry.  
122 For further information on the functioning of this society see: Wenceslao Ayguals de Izco, María la hija de 
un jornalero, historia-novela original, Madrid, 1847, vol. 1, pp. 214-215 [reference taken from Colette Rabaté, 
¿Eva o María? Ser mujer en la época isabelina (1833-1868), Ediciones Universidad Salamanca, 2007, p. 118]. 
123 As Ramón Godó Llucià established in his will, written on 21st June 1851: “Ytem a Manuela Godó y Pie sa 
filla comuna al testador y á sa muller Rita Pie, inscrita en la societat anomenada Amiga de la Juventud resident 
en Madrid; li llega mil lliuras catalanas, à mes de lo que li correspondra per lo Reglament de dita Societat (...)”. 
ANI, Testaments, 1851, expedient 278. The society “Amiga de la Juventud” was established in Madrid in 
December 1845.  
124 “Ytem deixa y llega per iguals drets de llegitimas, á Anton, Joseph, Carlos y Barthomeu Godó y Pie fills 




helps explain the path that Carlos and Bartolomé followed, the immediate reason for their 
departure to the Basque Country was linked to Igualada’s economic development. 
Furthermore, a considerable amount of the activities that Carlos and Bartolomé pursued in 
the future, both as deputies and press proprietors, were addressed at solving the deep 
economic crisis into which Igualada had fallen since the mid 19th century. 
 In fact, if Igualada had once exemplified the early burgeoning of industrialisation in 
Catalonia, years later it illustrated the downside of this economic revolution. The historian 
Vicens Vives identified Igualada as an example of those prosperous towns that failed to adapt 
to the changes in the industry.125 The first reason for this crisis was a total lack of water 
resources: after the 1840s, the Catalan textile industry underwent a series of deep 
transformations in which the instalment of steam engines became central for the mechanising 
of production. The low volume of water of Igualada’s main river, however, prevented the 
adoption of these technical advances. Another problem that worsened the situation was the 
poor state of the land connections, which prevented the import of coal from coastal cities. In 
consequence, obtaining a railway connection with Barcelona was soon seen as the only 
possible remedy to Igualada’s industrial crisis.126 This explains why the Godó brothers soon 
became the standard bearers of this cause, both from their seats in the Spanish Congress (in 
Madrid) as well as from the pages of La Vanguardia in Barcelona. 
 The immediate consequence of Igualada’s failure to adapt to the mechanisation of the 
textile industry was a traumatic process of de-industrialisation that started in 1850 and had 
profound social consequences. Within a few years, factories in Igualada lost their capacity to 
compete with neighbouring towns like Manresa and Mataró.127 The lack of water resources 
prevented businessmen from adopting the new models of spinning machines and forced them 
to rely on the so-called “bergadana” – a (by then old-fashioned) manual spinning machine. 
This problem of outdated machinery was coupled with the worsening of working conditions: 
in the 1850s, the working day in Igualada’s textile industry lasted between 13 and 16 hours. 
Women and children formed the vast majority of the workforce so as to keep salaries as low 
as possible, and the majority of working families could barely pay the rent and survived on an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
igual de la sua germana Manuela Godo y Pie, pagadoras per son hereu en fer e acomodo [...]”. Ramón Godó 
Llucià’s will (21st June 1851), ANI, Testaments, 1851, expedient 278. 
125 Jaume Vicens Vives i Montserrat Llorens, Industrials i Polítics (segle XIX), Barcelona, El Observador de la 
Actualidad, ‘Col·lecció Història de Catalunya. Biografies catalanes’, vol. 11, pp. 17-18. 
126 Miquel Térmens i Graells, “El ferrocarril a Igualada: la lluita pel progrés (1852-1893)”, Miscellanea 
Aqualatensia, 1983, num. 3, pp. 215-245. 
127 While Manresa relied heavily on water as an energy source (43.8%), and Mataró did the same with steam 
(11%), Igualada was restricted to the use of hand-labour as the main source of energy – this accounted for 




extremely poor diet.128 The economic crisis had two immediate consequences for Igualada’s 
social sphere: the exacerbation of social conflict and a continuous loss of population due to 
the lack of job opportunities. Table 3 illustrates this second point.  
 
Table 3. Demographic development in Igualada 129 
 
            Year   Number of inhabitants                Growth rate                 
1797  6,494    100 
1812  7,295    112 
1819  9,000    138 
1830             11,043    170 
1838             12,779    196 
1857             14,000    215 
1860             11,896    183 
1877             11,879    182 
1887             10,201    157 
1897             10,419    160 
1900             10,442    160 
 
 As is clear in Table 3, the year 1857 marked a turning point in the demography. 
During this year Igualada reached its highest number of inhabitants (14,000), but then started 
suffering drastic demographic loss. In the worst moment of the crisis the town lost as many as 
3,000 inhabitants in less than three years (1857-1860). This population decline would 
continue during the second half of the 19th century, to the point that it was not until 1936 (that 
is to say, more than 70 years later) that Igualada reached again a population of 14,000 
souls.130 Moreover, the social origins of the people who departed proved to be highly diverse. 
As well as the numerous textile workers that emigrated there were many businessmen who 
abandoned Igualada due to the lack of entrepreneurial opportunities.131  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Between 1868 and 1881 salaries in Igualada’s textile industry were lowered by 25%. Jorge Pablo Martínez 
de Presno, Moviments socials a Igualada al segle XIX: anys 1854-1890, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de 
Montserrat, 1993, p. 18. 
129 Source: Josep Maria Torras Ribé, op. cit., p. 164. 
130 Ibidem. 
131 Such as the brothers Muntadas, who founded “La España Industrial”; or Nicolau Tous Soler, who moved to 
Barcelona and participated in the “La Barcelonesa” and “La Maquinista Terrestre i Marítima”. These factories 




 The future founders of La Vanguardia Carlos and Bartolomé Godó Pié were another 
example of well-positioned elites who abandoned Igualada in the mid-19th century. The two 
brothers emigrated in 1856, during the worst years of the crisis. Apparently, it was a violent 
incident involving the Godó family that triggered their abrupt departure: the strike of July 
1855 – the first general strike in Spanish history. The context behind this strike was the 
“democratic” revolution of 1854, a military coup d’état that brought the progressive sectors 
of Spanish liberalism into power.132 While the strike first erupted in Barcelona, it soon spread 
to Igualada. At the forefront of the protests stood the workers of the textile industry, who 
since the 1830s were grouped into unions with a mutualistic character (like the “Asociación 
Mutua de Obreros de la Industria Igualadina”). Their demands were for limiting the 
workday to 12 hours, increasing salaries, and abolishing arbitrary dismissal.133 
 While all the businessmen in Igualada eventually came to accept some of the workers’ 
demands, Ramón Godó Llucià was the only manufacturer in town to reject them.134 
According to one contemporary, Godó’s singular stance had to do with his traditional 
opposition to the workers’ demands, an attitude for which he was already well known.135 In 
response to Godó’s refusal to negotiate, numerous textile workers attacked his house in the 
street of Rambla Nova. In the struggle that followed, Ramón and his wife Bonaventura were 
stabbed repeatedly and a fellow-employee was shot. The young family heir (Ramón Godó 
Pié) managed to escape by hiding in a neighbouring house.  
 The details of the assault on the Godó’s household vary notably depending on the 
source. According to some testimonies, it was Godó’s wife who first insulted and provoked 
the workers; other sources, by contrast, claim that it was the workers who came intent on 
attacking the house.136 Besides other small contradictory details that are hard to verify, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 This revolution prompted the birth of a short-lived political system called “Bienio Progresista” (1854-1856). 
This symbolised the coming into power of the progressive circles of the Liberal revolution. Josep Fontana, “La 
época del liberalismo”, in J. Fontana and Ramón Villares (dir.), Historia de España, Barcelona-Madrid, Crítica-
Marcial Pons, 2007, vol. 6, pp. 267-277. 
133 Joan Ferrer Farriol, Costa amunt. Elements d’història social igualadina, Terra Lliure, Choisy-le-Roi, 
Imprimerie des Gondoles, 1975, p. 10; and J. P. Martínez de Presno, op. cit., p. 47 
134 Francisco Olaya Morales, Historia del Movimiento Obrero Español..., p. 189, n. 38. 
135 “L’actitud més forta resultaria la del fabricant Godó, ja llavors coordinador de les resistències i agressions 
patronals.” J. Ferrer Farriol, op. cit., p. 13. 
136 “Fourteen or fifteen delegates marched to Godó's house, with a large group of comrades shouting 
encouragement from the street. They came to the door, and the maid tried to stop them from entering. Then Mrs. 
Godó shouted, "Get those deadbeats out of here! They don't belong here!" Then Godó himself appeared. That's 
when the lady really got furious and threw herself at the delegates with her claws drawn. The one closest to her, 
seeing that he was about to be attacked by that fury, pushed her back, and maybe he did scratch her up a bit.” 
Baltasar Porcel, La revuelta permanente, Barcelona, Planeta, 1978  [translated into English by John L. Getman 
as The Permanent Revolution, Seattle, Recollection Books, 1999. The fragment here reproduced has been 
extracted from the editorial’s webpage: www.recollectionbooks.com]. Other sources portraying a similar view 




assault on the Godó’s household reveals the context of extreme social violence in which 
Igualada was immersed. In fact, the attacks on the Godó family were mentioned in the press 
of Madrid and Barcelona.137 The reaction of the authorities, however, did little to bring peace. 
In the trial that followed, where the Godó’s heir testified, six workers were condemned to 
more than two years imprisonment. In practice, however, only two workers eventually 
returned. The other six disappeared during their imprisonment and it is not known what 
became of them. 
 The news about the disappearance of these six workers created the “black legend” of 
the Godó family in Igualada. For the working class in this town, this incident equated the 
Godó name to despotic rule and labour exploitation. In 1916, that is to say 61 years after the 
incidents took place, the Republicans celebrated the end of the Godó family’s political career 
right in front of their house. Asked for the reasons behind this animosity, people noted that 
the grievances against the Godó dated back to 1855.138 These incidents are crucial to 
understand the context in which the political career of the Godó would develop in the future. 
In contrast to the vast majority of the literature on corruption, which often attributes the 
persistence of clientelist practices to popular indifference, in Igualada an active (though 
highly divided) political opposition would confront the Godó’s political career. For this 
opposition movement, the strike of 1855 became a symbolic reference of their social and 
political struggle. These kinds of references evoke the importance that memory played in the 
highly localised dynamics that characterised liberal politics in Europe. Newspapers were a 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 “Al presentarse los obreros de la fábrica del Sr. D. Ramón Godó á hacer aceptar á este las nuevas tarifas que 
decían debían regir en sustitucion de las acordadas, le presentaron un puñal que cayó sobre aquel al momento de 
haber negado su conformidad, dejándole tendido en su despacho bañado en un mar de sangre. Pasaron los 
mismos á la habitacion de la señora y la dieron (sic) once puñaladas en el pecho y la espalda y en el mismo acto 
otros herian de un pistoletazo al mayordomo de los telares. Afortunadamente no murieron los consortes Godó, 
aunque los facultativos desconfian de su salvacion; pero han podido declarar los nombres de sus agresores.” La 
Época, 06/07/1855, p. 3. In the case of Barcelona, La Crónica de Cataluña provided a similar account. 
138 “That narrow-minded attitude was personified by the Godós of Igualada, who became the caciques, or 
bosses. (...) For years and years they were the most hated of all bosses, and that came about as a result of the 
very hard strike of 1854 (sic).” Baltasar Porcel, op. cit.  




1.2. BUILDING THE FAMILY NETWORKS: BUSINESS, MARRIAGES, AND THE FIRST 
YEARS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN BILBAO AND BARCELONA  
 
 It was amidst the economic and social crisis in which Igualada fell in the mid-19th 
century that Carlos and Bartolomé Godó Pié emigrated. First they settled in Barcelona and 
shortly after in Bilbao (1856).140 The two brothers were still young (Carlos was 21 and 
Bartolomé was only 16 years old) and were seemingly in a precarious situation. The few 
sources that have been preserved speak of two men of humble origins who made a fortune 
thanks to their effort and persistence, despite the difficult circumstances.141  
 Some of these testimonies, however, need to be interpreted with caution because they 
were written as obituaries that celebrated the image of the “bourgeois self-made man”. In the 
case of Bartolomé, for instance, his obituaries stressed his initiative, honesty, and love of 
work. These were portrayed as commendable social qualities. In fact, Bartolomé himself 
apparently “liked to boast, when he was among friends, about the innumerable pieces of cloth 
that he had loaded on his robust shoulders during his youth”.142 The praise of such values, 
which placed the emphasis on the right to control one’s own destiny, exemplified the growing 
criticism that the Catalan inheritance system began to undergo during the second half of the 
19th century.143 Meritocracy, rather than birthright, started to be presented as the guiding 
pattern in the life of an individual. Obituaries thus constituted one of the rituals where the 
Catalan bourgeoisie constructed and redefined its public values as a social class.144 As part of 
this meritocratic discourse, the departure of cadets was presented as a sign of determination 
to control one’s future, as the case of the Godó brothers illustrates.145 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Unfortunately, very little information has been preserved about the stay of the two brothers in Barcelona and 
therefore it is hard to precise their date of arrival. One of the possible reasons for the settlement in this city could 
be the fact that the entire family Godó took refuge in the city after the aggression of 1855.  
141 “Porque D. Carlos Godó, que en su juventud fué simple obrero, llegó, gracias á sus extraordinarias 
condiciones de actividad y de talento, á poseer un capital de los primeros de Barcelona”. La Correspondencia de 
España, 10/07/1897, p. 1. 
142 “La actividad, la constancia, el amor al trabajo, el espíritu de empresa, la inteligencia aplicada á los negocios 
y la honradez y formalidad de sus tratos son condiciones que poseía don Bartolomé en grado sumo, y con ellas 
se abrió camino en la vida”. LV, 28/01/1894, p. 2. 
143 “Don Bartolomé Godó, prototipo de los hijos segundones de nuestra Cataluña, donde subsiste todavía la 
institución del heréu, todo cuanto fué, su representación y su fortuna, se lo debió á si mismo”. LV, 28/01/1894, 
p. 2.  
144 Cemeteries and mausoleums were another example of the construction of these values. See: Gary Wray 
McDonogh, Good families of Barcelona: a social history of power in the industrial era, Princeton University 
Press, 1986. 
145 “Fue éste [Carlos], como su hermano D. Bartolomé, uno de los hombres más espléndidos y más caritativos 
que se han conocido en Cataluña. Vino de Igualada á Barcelona sin más medios de desenvolvimiento que los 
naturales; aprendió a negociar en una casa de comisiones de Bilbao, al lado de su hermano mayor; desenvolvió 
luego ese mismo negocio en Barcelona, y después se hizo fabricante y hombre opulento, sin más esfuerzos y sin 




 In fact, the understanding of migration as a sign of individualism has also been 
present in the work of scholars. Historians of European family have often interpreted the 
departure of cadets as the rupture of kinship ties. According to this view, departure was the 
result of an individual choice where cadets sought to escape the control of the family and 
seek a better future. In other cases, departure was regarded as a mechanism to regulate 
demographic phenomenon, for instance the overpopulation of given societies.146 In both 
explanations, migration is seen as part of a process of “modernisation” taking place in 
Western Europe since the late 18th century: the rise of the nuclear family. 147 
 However, and contrary to the assumptions above, the settlement of the Godó brothers 
in Bilbao did not imply the breaking of kinship ties. The situation was rather the opposite: the 
two brothers maintained a strong link with their family in Igualada and collaborated in the 
family business. In fact, the departure of Carlos and Bartolomé was part of the family’s 
commercial strategy. The first evidence of this dates back to 1856, when Carlos Godó 
appears for the first time as a citizen of Bilbao, where he worked as “textile tradesman”.148 
The municipal census indicates that Carlos was sharing an apartment with his brother Josep 
Godó Pié, at number 47 on the street named “Ronda”. Apparently, Josep had moved to 
Bilbao two years earlier, in 1854, and also worked as a textile tradesman.149 The fact that 
Carlos settled in Bilbao, following the same path as his brother, doing the same work, 
suggests that the Godó family operated according to a “migration chain” basis.150 Hence, and 
in contrast to spontaneous mobility, the family marked the route of the cadets leaving 
Igualada. This point is confirmed by the arrival of a third member of the Godó family in 
1869.151  
 The second evidence of a collective family strategy was sibling-cooperation. 
Although the name of Bartolomé does not appear in Bilbao’s municipal census, it was he, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Laurence Fontaine, Kinship and Mobility, in David Warren Sabean, Simon Teuscher and Jon Mathieu, 
Kinship in Europe. Approaches to long-term development (1300-1900), New York-Oxford, Berghan, 2007, p. 
194. 
147 David W. Sabean, S. Teuscher and J. Mathieu, op. cit., p. 20. 
148 Archivo Histórico Foral de Bizkaia (AHFB). Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, Sección primera, c. 261, leg. 1; 
Libros de padrón, año 1871, Padrón 0003. 
149 Ibidem, c. 259, leg. 1; and c. 254, leg. 5. For the case of Josep Godó Pié, see Table 2. 
150 This can be defined as “that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided 
with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social 
relationships with previous migrants.” John S. MacDonald and Leatrice D. MacDonald, “Chain Migration 
Ethnic Neighborhood Formation and Social Networks”, The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1 
(Jan., 1964), p. 82. 
151 This was the case of a boy called Antonio Godó (1858-?), who arrived in Bilbao at the age of 11 and 
appeared in the municipal census as a “student”. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to determine to which 





not Josep, who became Carlos’ main business partner.152 On December 1864 the two of them 
established a new business called “Godó hermanos” (“Godó brothers”) with the declared 
purpose of “buying and selling textile goods, both National and Foreign”. The legal domicile 
was in Bilbao, but the company considered “the opening of a branch in Barcelona as soon as 
possible” to be a priority. The capital of the company amounted to 1,300,000 “reales de 
vellón” and was provided in equal parts between the two partners.153 The two brothers 
seemingly relied on the dowry of their sister Manuela (estimated at 80,000 “r.v.”) and the 
assistance of their brother Ramón to raise the capital needed to establish the company.154 This 
point would confirm the humble origins of the two brothers, and it reveals the importance 
that kinship ties had in the context of setting up a new business.  
 The work of the Godó brothers consisted in selling and distributing all types of 
textiles, as is confirmed by the information contained in a commercial guide.155 Even though 
the founding status clearly stated that “Godó hermanos” dealt with textile goods of different 
origins (both Spanish and foreign), the Godó brothers seemed to give preference to Catalan 
goods. This is shown by the company’s goal of establishing a new branch in Barcelona; the 
opening a new shop in Bilbao called “Ciudad Condal”;156 and by the import of workers from 
Catalonia.157 All this suggests that the migration of the Godó brothers to Bilbao was part of a 
family strategy, consisting in the distribution and selling of the family’s production from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Josep ran his own company, called “José Godó y Compañía”. From 1860 onwards, Josep disappears from the 
municipal census. This might indicate his departure from Bilbao (perhaps replaced by Carlos?). 
153 Archivo Histórico Provincial de Vizcaya, Protocolos, Notario Blas de Onzaño, 9 de diciembre 1864, pp. 480-
482. 
154 “(...) en cuanto á los 60,000 [r.v.] restantes los ha pagado el propio D. Ramon por sus hermanos D. Carlos y 
D. Bartolomé, á cuenta de los 80.000 que los mismos prometieron tambien en dote en la propia escritura de 
cartas datales á dicha Doña Manuela, en cuatro plazos de 20.000 cada uno, revistiendo la espresada suma de 
60.000 en pago de los tres primeros plazos”. AHCI, Fons família Godó, carp. 104, doc. 6, “Capítols 
matrimonials entre Manuela Godó i Francisco Coma”. 
155 “Ronda, 25 y 27, Godó Hermanos. —Almacén al por mayor de géneros nacionales y extranjeros en tejidos 
de seda, lana, hilo, algodon, tapicerías, alfombras y pañolería. ―Casa de comision de compra y venta y 
transportes. —Géneros de punto. Sres. Godó hermanos.” Luis Marty Caballero, Anuario General del 
Comercio..., Madrid, Imprenta Oficinas del Anuario, 1863, p. 46 (“Bilbao”). 
156 This is the name traditionally given to Barcelona. AHFB, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, “Expediente 
tramitado por el Ayuntamiento de Bilbao en virtud de instancia presentada por Justo Violet en nombre de Godó 
Hermanos solicitando permiso para colocar un toldo en el establecimiento de tejidos de la calle Ascao titulado 
“Ciudad Condal””. Sección Bilbao primera, caja 73, legajo 77. 
157 The company usually “imported” the workers from Catalonia (e.g. from the town of Olesa de Montserrat, 
located 30 km from Igualada). The company covered all the travel expenses between Catalonia and the Basque 
Country and offered a ten-years contract, with a salary of 6,000 “r.v.” annually, plus a five per cent commission 
upon benefits, to be paid once the contract finished. The recruitment of workers from the same place origin is a 
good example of the close networks on which mercantile diasporas relied. In fact, the workers even shared an 
apartment with the Godó. This strategy was not exempt, however, from tensions. In 1864 the Catalan workers of 
“Godó brothers” denounced the company. AHFB, Archivo del Corregimiento, Legajo 2108, nº 7, “Pleito 
promovido por Fulgencio de Segurola y Juan Matas, vecinos ambos de Bilbao y Tarrasa, dependientes en la 
sociedad “Godó Hermanos”, de Barcelona y Bilbao, contra la misma sobre incumplimiento del compromiso 




Igualada and complemented with the selling of other manufactures, mostly from Barcelona. 
In short, everything indicates that the Godó brothers were a typical example of the so-called 
“Catalan mercantile diaspora”.  
 Historians have coined this expression to refer to the presence of small communities 
of Catalan merchants across Spain since the 18th century. While different trade diasporas 
existed in Spain (e.g. the French diaspora), what makes the case of Catalan tradesmen 
interesting is their perception among local communities as a “differentiated community” – 
despite their status as nationals. The perception of Catalan traders as a separate group was the 
result of differentiated customs (like the use of a different language) and, above all, of the 
close nature of their commercial networks (endogamic practices included). The Catalan trade 
diasporas were commonly organised along two axes. On one hand there was the textile 
company, which was located in the diaspora’s place of origin; on the other, there was a group 
travellers who were in charge of distributing and commercialising the cotton manufactures in 
targeted markets. The case of the Godó family fits with this structure of a trade diaspora: 
while the eldest son (Ramón Godó) ran the textile factory in Igualada, the cadets Carlos and 
Bartolomé settled in Bilbao to commercialise the family’ cotton manufactures.158 
 Still, if the study of the Catalan mercantile diaspora has been studied in great detail,159 
the case of the Godó family presents a singular characteristic. That is, the extremely small 
number of Catalans that settled in the Basque country – during the period 1825-1932 there 
were only 382 Catalans in a region of 490,192 inhabitants.160 Therefore, the Godó brothers 
moved to a place where the presence of other Catalans was negligible (barely 0.08% of the 
total population, between 1825-1935).161 Probably as a result of this, the Godó brothers 
behaved slightly differently than most migrants we know about. Thus, while the integration 
of Catalan traders in local communities tended to be a “slow process”, which usually required 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Hence, there is evidence that as early as 1857, Carlos Godó represented the family economic interests in 
Santander (a city 100 km north-west of Bilbao). “(...) Don Ramon Godo (...), fabricante natural y vecino de la 
presente [Igualada] (...) da todo su poder ó sea el del ante dicho su Sor Padre, cumplido y tan bastante cual por 
derecho se requiera y sea menester á D. Carlos Godó su hermano vecino y del comercio de la Ciudad de Bilbao 
para que por el otorgante en dicho nombre pueda pedir percibir y cobrar de D. Joaquin Arregui vecino y del 
comercio de la Ciudad de Santander la cantidad de trece mil cuatrocientos ciento y seis reales vn (...)”. ACAN-
Arxiu de Protocols d’Igulada (API), Notari F. Especier, 1857, pp. 556-559. 
159 The state of the art that frames this topic in a broader perspective, in: Cosme Jesús Gómez Carrasco, 
“Comercio, burgueses y redes mercantiles en las ciudades españolas a finales del Antiguo Régimen. Un análisis 
historiográfico”, Revista de Historiografía, nº 16, IX (1/2012), pp. 119-128 (esp. p. 122). 
160 Manuel González Portilla and Karmele Zarraga Sangroniz, “Catalanes en el País Vasco 1821-1935”, in M. T. 
Pérez, A. Segura and Ll. Ferrer (eds.), Els catalans a Espanya, 1760-1914, Barcelona, Centre d’Història 
Contemporània de Catalunya, 1996, pp. 135-138. 
161 Ibidem. Catalan traders usually represented between the 1 and 2% of the population in the towns where they 




more than one generation,162 in the case of Carlos and Bartolomé they managed to integrate 
themselves into Bilbao’s elites rather quickly. Hence, the two brothers married local women, 
incorporated the local population in their business, and entered into municipal politics.  
 That reality obliges us to reflect on the strategies that Carlos and Bartolomé used to 
integrate themselves in the local community, at a time when urban ruling elites were being 
redefined across Europe.163 The turning point that the building of the liberal-state represented 
in many fields (especially in the legal and institutional framework) opened up a series of 
possibilities for upward mobility. The result was a complex process of social integration and 
exclusion between old and new elites that redefined the nature of municipal power in 
Europe.164 The case of the Godó brothers can be regarded, therefore, as a case study of a 
broader process of elite reconfiguration that took place in mid-19th century Europe.165 
Additionally, the brother’s emigration to Bilbao is central to this thesis. In this city, they 
improved their social status (upward mobility), accumulated a small capital that allowed them 
to return to Barcelona in the 1870s and build new business alliances related to the trade with 
Cuba. The need to defend all the commercial interests created in Bilbao became one of the 
most powerful reasons to found La Vanguardia [see Chapter 4]. Still, if the Godó made such 
a success of their stay it was because they proved capable of integrating into the Bilbao’s 
elite. The following pages will argue that marriage became their principal mechanism of 
social integration.  
 Shortly after moving to Bilbao (by then a city of 20,000 people) Carlos and Bartolomé 
both married. They did so in the same year (1860) – within a few months of each other, and 
in the same church (“Basilica de Santiago el Mayor”); but most importantly, they both 
married Basque women. In the case of Bartolomé, he married as many as three times.166 The 
repetition of the same pattern of behaviour — marrying local women — is all the more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Mª T. Pérez Picazo, op. cit., p. 73. 
163 Ralf Roth and Robert Beachy, Who Ran the Cities? City Elites and Urban Power Structures in Europe and 
North America, 1750-1940, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007; William B. Cohen, Urban Government and the Rise of 
the City. Five Municipalities in the Nineteenth Century, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998. 
164 An example of this process, from a comparative perspective, is: Jorge Luengo, Una sociedad conyugal. Las 
élites de Valladolid en el espejo de Magdeburgo en el siglo XIX, València, PUV, 2014. 
165 It is not the goal of this chapter to enter into the historiographical debate about the controversial “bourgeois” 
character of the liberal revolution. On the limitations of this debate, see: Isabel Burdiel, Myths of Failure, Myths 
of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism, The Journal of Modern History 70 
(December 1998), pp. 892-912; José Álvarez Junco, “Sobre el concepto de revolución burguesa”, in: Carlos 
Moyá Espí, Luis Rodríguez de Zúñiga and María del Carmen Iglesias Cano (coord.), Homenaje a José Antonio 
Maravall, CIS, 1985, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 135-149. See also: J. Luengo, op. cit., pp. 18-20. 
166 Felipa Belaunzaran Hormaza (Bilbao, 1839-?); Dolors Brunet Cucurull (La Habana, ? – Barcelona, 1871); 
and Gloria Eguía de Muruaga (Bilbao,1842-Barcelona, 1908). The marriages took place in 07/11/1860; in 1870 
(?) and in 16/11/1872, respectively. Archivo Histórico Eclesiástico de Bizkaia (AHEB), Registro de 




revealing if we take into account that in 1864 Bartolomé had moved back to Barcelona. Yet 
despite living in the Catalan city, Bartolomé always married Basque women.167 Besides their 
place of origin, two of Bartolomé’s wives had one element in common that is of special 
importance: they came from families with business interests in Cuba. This island was one of 
the few colonies that were left of Spain’s former empire (after the independence of the South-
American dominions in the 1820s and 1830s) and also the most valuable one. Indeed, as a 
prosperous agro-export economy based on slave labour and the favourable rights of entry to 
Peninsular goods, Cuba was a highly attractive market for Spanish manufacturers. The Godó 
brothers saw Bilbao’s well-established maritime connections with the Antilles as a potential 
market for Catalan cotton fabrics.168 To do so, establishing commercial alliances with local 
businessman, both in Cuba and Bilbao, was crucial. And marriage became the way in which 
the Godó brothers would establish such alliances. 
 The evidence that best supports the above-mentioned hypothesis is the wedding of 
Bartolomé with Dolors Brunet Cucurull (? – 1871). Dolors was born in La Habana (Cuba)169 
and was the descendant of a Catalan family who had migrated to San Sebastián in the 18th 
century. Indeed, the Brunet family had been — like the Godó family — part of the 
(numerically small) Catalan mercantile diaspora in the Basque Country. The Brunet family 
had specialised, since the late 18th century, in the imports of colonial goods for the Spanish 
market. By the mid-19th century they complemented these activities with a successful entry 
into the banking business, which allowed them to make a fortune and gain a notable 
reputation.170 From the perspective of the Godó’s strategies of social integration, the Brunet 
family present three elements that are of interest. The first one is that Dolor’s family 
originally came from Copons, a small town located 12 km from Igualada.171 It is hard to 
accept that a marriage between two people who shared such close geographic origins, yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 In this city Bartolomé made his first will. To Barcelona’s notary Ferran Moragas, Bartolomé declared: “Yo 
D. Bartolomé Godó y Pié natural de Ygualada y vecino de esta Ciudad [Barcelona], Comerciante, de edad de 
veinte y cinco años y de estado casado (...).” AHPB, Notari Ferran Moragas Ubac, Vol. 1, 14/03/1864, fols. 
412-413.  His third (and final marriage) took place in 1872, in Bilbao. 
168 Natividad de la Puerta Rueda, El puerto de Bilbao como reflejo del desarrollo industrial de Vizcaya, 1857-
1913, Bilbao, Autoridad Portuaria de Bilbao, 1994. 
169 “(...) d. Bartolomé de Godó, del comercio, de edad de treinta y tres años, natural de Igualada, y vecino de 
Barcelona, viudo de d.ª Dolores Brunet, que lo fue de la Habana (...)”. AHEB, Marriage between Bartolomé 
Godó and Mª Gloria de Eguía, Registro de Matrimonios, p. 144-145. 
170 On the Brunet family, see: Montserrat Gárate Ojanguren, “De los catalanes en Gipuzkoa (siglos XVIII-
XIX)”, in M. T. Pérez, A. Segura and Ll. Ferrer (ed.), op. cit., pp. 139-147; and Carlos Larrinaga Rodríguez, 
“Los comerciantes banqueros y la industrialización guipuzcoana a mediados del siglo XIX”, Historia 





lived in the Basque Country, was a coincidence.172 The second element that needs to be 
stressed is the marriage patterns the Brunet family followed. As Montserrat Gárate has noted, 
the majority of the descendants of this family married people who lived in San Sebastian, but 
who were of foreign origin. This peculiar pattern of marriage was related to the Brunet’s 
business alliances. 173  Finally, and most importantly, Dolor’s father (José Brunet) had 
business interests in the jute textile industry.174 This was the same industrial sector in which 
the Godó brothers would later specialise, once they came back to Barcelona. This business 
consisted in the export of jute bags to Cuba [see Chapter 4]. 
 Therefore, it can be concluded that Bartolomé’s marriage to Dolors Brunet formalised 
an alliance between two families who shared commercial interests; namely, the trade between 
Catalonia and the Spanish Antilles through the Basque Country.175 The sharing of the same 
geographic origins also played an important part in the wedding. Scholars have repeatedly 
noted that endogamy between “migrant communities” brought a series of positive advantages 
for business. 176  Still, marriage according to geographic origins did not seem to be 
Bartolomé’s only guiding pattern. His first and third marriages were to women who had no 
Catalan origins but were from the Basque Country. However, the connection with Cuba was 
also present in his first marriage. Hence, Bartolomé’s first brother-in-law (Felipe 
Belaunzarán) became the legal representative of “Godó hermanos” in Cuba. The strong 
commercial alliance that marriage provided is revealed by the fact that these alliances 
continued after the death of the married couple. As late as 1897 (when Bartolomé was 
already dead) the Godó still relied on the Belaunzarán family to represent their interests in 
Cuba.177 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 All the more reason if we take into account that the Godó family had economic interests in Copons. 
173 Only in the late 19th century did the Brunet start marrying into the “old” local elites. In the words of 
Montserrat Gárate: “La integración de estos catalanes en la sociedad donostiarra no fue rápida.  (...) los 
matrimonios de los distintos miembros de la familia Brunet muestran en pleno siglo XIX, algo de lo que ocurría 
en los negocios: eran sobre todo los Bermingham, Collado-Echagüe o Balbás, es decir, gentes de origen no 
necesariamente donostiarra, los que emparentaron con la familia catalana”. Ibidem, p. 145. 
174 On May 3 1888 the company “Sociedad José y Francisco Brunet” requested in Guipúzcoa a patent of 
invention consisting in a “Machine to weave jute for shoe soles”. Archivo histórico de la Oficina Española de 
Patentes y Marcas (OEPM), patente número 8207.   
175 This route was an alternative to the one Catalan merchants followed during the 18th century, who sought to 
connect with the Antilles through Andalucía (this explains the large Catalan community living in Cadis). 
Montserrat Gárate, op. cit., p. 139. 
176 Like the sharing of the same economic interests or the importance of trust in business transactions, especially 
in contexts where high levels of uncertainty existed.  
177 “(...) Que dan y confieren poderes tan hastantes como en derecho se requiera á Don José Feliciano de 
Belaunzarán y Hormaza, mayor de edad, del comercio, vecino de la Habana, para que en nombre y 
representación de los Señores comparecientes y de la sociedad “Godó y Compañia sociedad en comandita”, 
pueda usar y ejercer en la Ysla de Cuba las facultades siguientes (...)”. AHPB, Notari Josep Ferrer Bernadas, 




 In the case of Carlos Godó, his wedding provided alternative (though complementary) 
benefits to those of his brother Bartolomé. Carlos married Antonia Lallana Azpe (1836-1924) 
on June 30th 1860.178 Antonia was originally from the Basque city of Vitoria and had moved 
with her family to Bilbao two years before the wedding.179 According to contemporaries, 
Antonia was a woman with a strong character. She had a close bond with her son, the future 
owner of La Vanguardia (Ramón Godó Lallana), to the point that upon her request, this 
newspaper stopped publishing reports on bullfighting (which she abhorred) despite it being 
the most popular sport in Spain at the time.180 Another example of Antonia’s imprint on the 
Godó family is that after their marriage Carlos apparently started using Spanish as his 
customary language – not just in Bilbao, but also when the couple moved to Barcelona.181 
The adoption of Spanish (instead of Catalan) in the private sphere became a common practice 
among the Catalan bourgeoisie, and was a marker of “social distinction”.182 
 Moreover, the case of Antonia Lallana sheds light on the role of women in business 
strategies. In 1870 Antonia granted a loan of 168,647 “r.v.” to the company “Godó 
hermanos”. This amount corresponded to her dowry and was duly certified in a legal contract 
establishing that Carlos and Bartolomé would compensate Antonia with an annual rate of six 
per cent and promised to repay the loan punctually.183 These types of financial arrangements 
reveal the importance that marriage played as a financial source for newly created companies, 
especially for capital increase and long-term loans. But women’s contributions to family 
businesses did not stop there: marriage also opened the doors to valuable business alliances. 
Antonia’s unmarried brother (Vicente Lallana) became the sales representative of “Godó 
hermanos” in Oviedo, a city located 280 km north-west of Bilbao.184 Additionally, Vicente 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 AHEB, Registro de matrimonios, p.  250. 
179 Antonia’s parents were Luciano Lallana (Vitoria) and María Angela Azpe (Orduña). AHEB, op. cit. 
180 Agustí Calvet, Història de «La Vanguardia» (1881-1936) i nou articles sobre periodisme, Barcelona, 
Empúries, 1994 [1st ed. Paris, 1976] , p. 42.  
181 “Familia Godó, empresarios del textil de Igualada, ¿cuándo perdieron el idioma como lengua familiar? 
“Quizás con el bisabuelo Carlos, que se casó con una vasca con gran personalidad, y cambió el idioma”. 
Interview to Javier Godó, “El ADN de 'La Vanguardia' es catalán”. LV, 01/05/2011. 
182 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power, Oxford, Polity Press, 1991. 
183 “D. Carlos y D. Bartolomé Godó y Pié en nombre propio y como á únicos Socios de la indicada Sociedad de 
Godó hermanos, de su espontanea voluntad confiesan deber y querer pagar á la espresada Dª Antonia Lallana 
de Godó vecina de Bilbao Consorte del otorgante D. Carlos Godó y Pié la cantidad de ciento sesenta y ocho mil 
seiscientos cuarenta y siete reales (...) que les presta de procedencias de las cantidades que tiene recibidos á 
cuenta de sus legitimas paterna y materna (...) que le pagarán el interés anual del seis por ciento por anualidades 
vencidas (...). AHPB, Notari Ferran Moragas Ubac, vol. 1, 01/01/1870, fols. 223-226. 
184 To spread the commercialising of cotton fabrics to Oviedo, the Godó brothers founded a new company called 
“La Asturiana”. AHPV, Notario Blas de Onzoño, 22/11/1864, pp. 431-435. There is evidence that Igualada’s 
cotton goods were consumed in Oviedo, thanks to the intermediary role that “Godó brothers” played. See: José 
Ramón García, “Notas sobre la presencia de comerciantes catalanes en Oviedo en el siglo XIX”, Instituto de 




Lallana (who lived with the married couple)185 contributed to the company’s capital increase 
with 42,243 “r.v.”; and occasionally acted as the company’s lawyer.186 Consequently, Carlos’ 
marriage with Antonia Lallana provided the Godó brothers with access to new capital, legal 
representation, and valuable connections to expand the company’s sphere of action.        
 Last but not least, Carlos’ wedding also favoured what is, in my opinion, the clearest 
sign of the Godó’s successful integration into Bilbao’s elites: his entry into municipal 
politics. Between 1869 and 1871 Carlos became a member of the city council.187 This period 
corresponded with the establishing of a new parliamentary system in Spain, the so-called 
“Democratic Sexennium” (1868-1874). This new political system, founded after the 
overthrow of Queen Isabella II and the introduction of universal male suffrage, replaced the 
liberal-conservative model that had dominated the construction of the nation-state in Spain 
since 1843. A coalition of liberal-progressive and democratic elites seized power and put an 
end to the monopoly of power that one single party (the “Moderados”) had exercised until 
then. The outcome was the introduction of the most progressive legislation in Spain’s recent 
history: i.e. the establishing of a democratic monarchy under a new foreign dynasty (the 
Italian house of Savoy), and the granting of extensive individual rights (like freedom of 
religion, assembly and press).188 
 At first glance it would seem as if Carlos Godó’s entry into public office was the 
outcome of a new parliamentary system and of the new electoral rules (universal suffrage). In 
practice, however, things proved to be rather different. If Carlos managed to get a seat in the 
town council it was not so much as a result of the new democratic system, but rather of his 
capacity to integrate himself into Bilbao’s elites. Indeed, the political life of this town did not 
really reflect that of the national landscape. In Bilbao, as in much of the Basque Country, but 
contrary to most parts of Spain, the Revolution of 1868 awoke little excitement. The reason 
for this is that during the reign of Isabella II (1856-1868) the Basque Country managed to 
preserve its tradition of self-government (the so-called “fueros”).189 This autonomy spared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 In 1871, up to 11 people lived in the same apartment (“Calle de Bidebarrieta, 12, 2ndo piso derecha”): the 
married couple (Carlos Godó Pié and Antonia Lallana Azpe); the children of the marriage (Ramón, María and 
Antonio); two store clerks, recruited in the Catalan town of La Pobla de Claramunt, close to Igualada (Jaume 
and Francesc Figueras Mercader; both unmarried and aged 20 and 17, respectively); and three maiden women 
(names unknown). AHFB, Libros de padrón, 1872, Padrón 0003. 
186 AHFB, Archivo del Corregimiento, Legajo 2108, nº 7. 
187 AHFB, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao, Libro de actas municipales, nº 302, sesión 1 de enero 1869. 
188 General overviews on this period, in: José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (eds.), Spanish history since 
1808, London, Arnold, 2000; and J. Fontana and Ramón Villares (dir.), op. cit. 
189 On this issue, see the two chapters of Enriqueta Sesmero Cutanda and Coro Rubio Pobes in S. Calatayud, J. 
Millán, M. C. Romeo, (eds.), Estado y periferias en la España del siglo XIX. Nuevos enfoques, València, 




the Basque people from suffering the grievances that had contributed to the triumph of the 
Revolution in 1868, like the abolition of consumption taxes and the uneven system of 
military conscription.190  
 Consequently, while most Spanish cities saw the traditional ruling elites (the 
“Moderados”) being replaced by the new revolutionary elites, in Bilbao the traditional elites 
managed to remain in power regardless of the change in the political system. This was 
because a coalition was created between the moderate Catholics and the various liberal trends 
with one sole purpose: to defend the region’s traditional autonomy against any centralist 
reforms the new government might seek to implement.191 Therefore, Carlos Godó’ election 
took place in a local context characterised by the on-going entanglement between the old and 
the new liberal elites. This became possible due to the common front the elites created to 
preserve regional autonomy and their shared desire to resist the threat that Catholic 
fundamentalists represented for the liberal order in this city.192 
 It was in the above-mentioned context that Carlos was elected during the municipal 
elections of December 1868. The fact that his name had already been added to the list of 
liberal candidates was proof of Carlos’ successful integration, since Bilbao’s Liberal party 
explicitly forbade foreigners from being nominated.193 Soon afterwards, elections took place 
according to universal male suffrage. Compared with the political system under Queen 
Isabella II (1856-1868), the new franchise implied a substantial widening in the number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Núñez, La Diputación Foral de Vizcaya. El régimen foral en la construcción del estado liberal (1808-1868), 
Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales-UAM, 1996, pp. 495-644. 
190 Mikel Urkijo, La Gloriosa en el País Vasco: ¿revolución o contrarrevolución?, Ayer 44, 2001, pp.  113-114. 
191 This agreement manifested in the provincial administration: the “Diputación de Bizkaia” changed its name to 
“Junta de Bizkaia”. That is to say, the institution was renamed to adapt it to the new political system, but in 
practice it remained the same. See: Mikel Urquijo Goitia, Liberales y carlistas. Revolución y fueros vascos en el 
preludio de la última Guerra Carlista, Leioa, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco, 1994, pp. 17-
20. 
192 The Basque Country was the place where the opposition of Catholic fundamentalists to the liberal-state 
project enjoyed more popular support. This turned the region into one of the main scenarios of the three civil 
wars that took place in the last quarter of the 19th century between liberals and Catholic fundamentalists in 
Spain. As a result of this, Bilbao’s political struggle followed a differentiated pattern: while most of Spanish 
cities saw electoral competition taking place between the political forces that brought down Queen’s Isabella’s 
throne (namely, the Liberal Progressives, the “Unión Liberal”, the Democrats) as well as the Republicans; in 
Bilbao, in contrast, elections were reduced to two opposing sides: the liberal supporters versus the Catholic 
fundamentalists. See: M. Urquijo, op. cit., 1994 and 2001.  
193 Unfortunately, little information has been preserved about the activities of the Liberal Party in Bilbao during 
the Sexenio (as noted by M. Urquijo, op. cit.). The best source is the newspaper the party had published since 
1850, called Irurac-Bat. I consulted this newspaper in the Archivo Histórico Provincial de Vizcaya. For a later 
period, see: Javier Real Cuesta, Un ejemplo de caciquismo electoral en el País Vasco: el comité liberal de 




voters.194 In practice, however, little changed during elections: as in Isabella’s reign, the 
government of 1868 intervened in elections. Such intervention was justified by the need to 
secure the new political system (only four months had passed since the revolution of 
September 1868). Likewise, local elites in the Basque Country made use of provincial 
administrations (the so-called “diputaciones”) to exercise influence over elections.195 As a 
result of the authorities’ intervention (both from above and below) elections in Bilbao 
attracted little interest: electoral turnout was only 28% and Godó was elected with barely 323 
votes.196  
 Therefore, Carlos Godó’s election as alderman was not so much the result of the 
voter’s support, but rather of his capacity to integrate into Bilbao’s small ruling elite. His 
marriage to Antonia Lallana proved decisive in this regard. Hence, Carlos’ brother-in-law 
and new business partner (Vicente Lallana) acted as town councillor immediately before him, 
during the period spanning between the end of the Moderate period and the birth of the new 
political system in September 1868.197 One hypothesis can be drawn from this: that Carlos 
replaced his brother-in-law as alderman. Carlos’ election thus illustrates the entanglement 
that took place in Bilbao between traditional elites (those who held public office during the 
Moderate period), and the new elites that gained access to power during the Democratic 
Sexennium.  
 Moreover, an analysis of the Godó’s acquaintances in Bilbao sheds light on the close 
connections they had with both the old and the new political elite [see Table 4]. Some of 
these relationships were built through professional networks and everyday contact. A good 
example is the case of Bilbao’s new mayor, Felix Aguirre (1807-1871), who lived in Carlos’ 
building and was his landlord.198 On other occasions, these relationships were built through 
family associations, as in the case of the different brothers-in-law the Godó brothers had in 
the town council. The adaptation of older elites to the new political system does not imply 
that Bilbao’s bourgeoise was a hegemonic social group, but rather that a wide consensus 
existed among them on the need to preserve regional autonomy and to fight the Catholic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 In the last elections of Isabella’s reign (1856), the number of voters was limited to 302. On December 18, in 
contrast, the new electoral law widened the number to 3,382 voters. Joseba Agirreazkuenaga (dir.), op. cit., p. 
194. 
195 Mikel Urquijo Goitia, op. cit., 1994. 
196 Joseba Agirreazkuenaga (dir.), Bilbao desde sus alcaldes. Diccionario biográfico de los alcaldes de Bilbao y 
gestión municipal en tiempos de revolución liberal e industrial, Bilbao, 2002, vol. 1, p. 194. 
197 Vicente Lallana acted as town councillor between January 1867 and October 1868. Ibidem, p. 388. 




fundamentalists.199 In conclusion, it can be affirmed that if Carlos Godó managed to integrate 
into the small elite that continued to dominate Bilbao’s political realm, despite his foreign 
origins and the introduction of universal suffrage, it was thanks to his marriage with Antonia 
Lallana and the valuable acquaintances that stemmed from it. 
 
Table 4. The Godó brothers’ connections with Bilbao’s political elites 200 
 
Name Political office Period  
(year of election) 
Relationship to the Godó brothers 
Hermenegildo Belauzaran Alderman 1843 Bartolomé’s brother-in-law 





Felix Aguirre Mayor 1841; 1854; and 1868. Landlord of Carlos’ first apartment 
Nicolás Lapeira Alderman 1854; 1857-1861. Landlord of Carlos’ second apartment 
José María de Gurtubay Alderman 1867; 1872. Godfather of Carlos’ children 
Serapio Hormaza Alderman 1840; 1843. Relative of Bartolomé’s first wife (?) 
José Hormaza Alderman 1857  Relative of Bartolomé’s first wife (?) 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 As the French consulate in Bilbao stated: “El terreno neutral en que se reúnen la democracia moderna y el 
absolutismo ultramontano es el Fuero; una afección común confunde sus sentimientos y sus aspiraciones y es el 
amor a esta tierra privilegiada (... )”. Quoted in Mikel Urkijo, op. cit. 1999, p. 113, n. 23. 
200 Sources: Joseba Agirreazkuenaga, op. cit.; AHFB (padrón habitantes); AHEB (registro bautismos). 





Picture 1. Bartolomé Godó with his brother-in-law Pantaleón Belaunzarán and his two daughters Florinda and Amalia Godó 
Belaunzarán.  
 
       
     
Picture 2. Antonia Lallana Azpe (Vitoria, 1836 – Barcelona, 1924). Wife of Carlos Godó and mother of Ramón Godó 
Lallana (future owner of La Vanguardia). 202 
     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




1.3. CLIENTELIST METHODS IN COMPETITIVE POLITICS  
 
 In 1864, as Carlos Godó entered Bilbao’s municipal politics, Bartolomé moved back 
to Barcelona. His return followed the business strategy the two brothers had established: 
Carlos would be in charge of the Bilbao office and Bartolomé would be responsible for the 
new Barcelona branch.203 This task consisted in purchasing all the fabrics that the Oviedo 
branch required, as well as taking charge of all company matters. For this work Bartolomé 
received an annual salary of 12,000 r.v., plus a two per cent commission.204 And the “Godó 
brothers” business seemed to be going well: in 1864 the company reported a profit of 
329,470 r.v.205      
 Besides running “Godó brothers” from Barcelona, Bartolomé also began a political 
career in the city. Like his brother Carlos, the first position that Bartolomé held was in the 
lower ranks of political representation: in 1869 he was appointed alderman in Barcelona’s 
city council.206 Yet contrary to Carlos, whose involvement in Bilbao’s politics was rather 
low-key (he attended few council meetings and generally participated infrequently),207 
Bartolomé’s entry into Barcelona’s city council marked the beginning of a more ambitious 
political career: soon after receiving his position of alderman, Bartolomé was elected deputy 
in Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation (“diputación provincial”), a position that he held 
between 1871 and 1878; and, in 1881 he was elected deputy in the Spanish Congress, in 
Madrid.  
 However, Bartolomé’s political promotion was not a smooth path. It would be 
simplistic to depict his career as that of a “bourgeois conquérant” who climbed the state’s 
ladders with ease, namely, because liberal elites were neither a unified class nor a “block of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 “D. Carlos Godó y Pié continuará en la direccion de la casa de Bilbao como lo ha hecho hasta el día (...) La 
casa de Barcelona continuará corriendo á cargo del Socio D. Bartolomé Godó y Pié el cual queda encargado de 
la compra de los géneros ó mercancias para la casa de Oviedo y de hacer todas las demás diligencias que sean 
necesarias tanto á dicha casa de Oviedo como la de Bilbao. En remuneracion de sus trabajos la Sociedad 
abonará á D. Bartolomé Godó doce mil reales anuales y a más el dos por ciento de comision de todas las 
mercancias y géneros que compre para la casa de Oviedo (...).” AHPB, Notari F. Moragas Ubac, Vol. 1, 
01/02/1870, fols. 219-222. 
204 Ibidem. This salary was double the amount that the company’s store clerks in Bilbao received. 
205 AHFB, Archivo del Corregimiento, Legajo 2108, nº 7.  
206 Cèlia Cañellas & Rosa Toran, “Dominis socials i poder local a Barcelona. Del Sexenni democràtic a la 
Restauració borbònica”, Afers, 16 (1993), pp. 439-454 (p. 447). 
207 According to Bilbao’s municipal minutes, Carlos did not even attend the session when the new aldermen 
were officially appointed. Such repeated absence probably had to do with his frequent journeys as a tradesman. 




power”. 208 The vast majority shared a well-off background, but their private interests were 
not always comparable.209 Moreover, the political career of Bartolomé was not an ascending 
path but was suddenly interrupted in 1874, when a new political system (“the Bourbon 
Restoration”) replaced the Democratic Sexennium. That Bartolomé managed to resume his 
political career in this new political context and eventually reach the Spanish Congress in 
1881 was thanks to the founding of La Vanguardia. The case of this newspaper constitutes, 
therefore, a valuable opportunity to shed light on the role that the press played in the 
patronage networks of liberal elites; this being part of a broader issue – namely, the links 
between journalism and clientelism – that scholars have largely neglected. To fully grasp the 
advantages that having a newspaper could bring, the following pages will first examine 
Bartolomé Godó’s mechanisms of influence during the Sexenio. Then, the ways this 
influence was interrupted by the Restoration and subsequently redefined through the 
founding of La Vanguardia will be examined. 
 Bartolomé’s career during the Sexenio relied primarily on political clientelism. His 
political promotion was not so much dependent on the voters’ support, but rather on his 
capacity to rig elections in his favour. Indeed, despite the fact the Sexenio was born with the 
aim of breaking the monopoly of power that one single party had enjoyed during Isabella’s 
reign (1833-1868), the establishing of universal suffrage in 1868 did not imply the full 
democratisation of politics.210 First, the revolutionary forces that dethroned Queen Isabella in 
1868 (the Liberal Progressives, the “Unión Liberal” and the Democrats) formed a 
heterogeneous coalition with different political worldviews. The understanding that these 
forces had of political representation and the state model was very different. The Republican 
Federals, for instance, rejected the replacement of the Bourbon dynasty with a foreign one 
(Amadeo I of Savoy), and argued instead for a Republican and highly decentralised state-
model.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 “Bourgeois conquérant” (“the conquering bourgeois”) became a common expression among Marxist 
historians (though not only) to refer to the assault of power by one single class (“the bourgeoisie”) after the 
French Revolution (1789). See: Charles Morazé, The Triumph of the Middle Classes, New York, Anchor 
Books, 1968 [original edition in French: Bourgeois conquérants]; Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-
1875, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975, p. 2. This interpretation has been deeply challenged in the last 
two decades. See: Jerrold Seigel, Modernity and Bourgeois Life. Society, Politics and Culture in England, 
France and Germany since 1750, Cambridge, CUP, 2012, pp. 2-4. 
209 As evidenced, for instance, by the difficulties of the Italian state to meet the different needs of local elites. 
See: Rafaele Romanelli, Il commando impossible. Stato e società nell’Italia liberale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988. 
In the case of Spain, the fierce debate between free-traders and protectionists (an issue that will be studied in 
this thesis) provides further evidence of competing interests between liberal elites. 
210 In fact, historians have pointed out the misleading connotations that the term “Democratic Sexennium” 
implies. For a renewed outlook on this period, see: Rafael Serrano García (dir.), España, 1868-1874. Nuevos 
enfoques sobre el Sexenio Democrático, Valladolid, Junta de Castilla y León, 2002; and the monograph edited 




 The liberal-progressives like Bartolomé Godó, in contrast, saw the monarchy as a 
source of stability. In 1872 they had been renamed the “Partido Constitucional” 
(“Constitutional Party”) in reference to the document comprising their ideological principles: 
the Constitution of 1869.211 This constitution was one of the landmarks of the Sexennium and 
established the following principles: the constitutional monarchy was the base of Spanish 
sovereignty; the franchise was based on universal manhood suffrage; and wide individual 
rights (freedom of assembly, freedom of press and popular juries) should be granted. Still, the 
advocacy of popular sovereignty did not prevent the Constitutional Party from distrusting the 
mobilisation of popular classes, which both the Democrats and the Republicans sought; and 
considered that freedom was inseparable from political order. In parallel to this, the 
Constitutionals defended the right of private property, the preservation of good relations with 
the Church and a limited administrative decentralisation.212  For all these reasons, the 
Constitutional Party of Bartolomé Godó was among the most conservative movements of the 
Sexenio Democrático.  
 Furthermore, the political principles of the Constitutional Party did not prevent them 
from rigging elections on repeated occasions. Indeed, political clientelism was deeply 
embedded in the political culture of Spanish liberalism. Liberal politicians considered it their 
moral obligation to assure the interests of what they variously described as “the general 
interest”, the “nation”, or “the public opinion”.213 For the most conservative liberal trends, 
elections should reaffirm the existing social order. The “nation”, rather than the rights of the 
individual, should come first. The liberal-progressives, by contrast, believed in citizenship as 
the expression of popular sovereignty, but circumscribed this category to the “discourse of 
capacity”. In their view, voting was a social responsibility — rather than an individual right 
— that consequently required certain conditions to be exerted. According to the “discourse of 
capacity”, gender, wealth and education were the conditions distinguishing those who were 
suitable to enjoy political rights (“active citizens”) from those who were not. This restrictive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 The immediate reason behind the founding of this party was the murder of General Prim, the historic leader 
of the Liberal Progressives, Spain’s Prime Minister and the most important supporter of Spain’s new king 
(Amadeo I of Savoy). On the origins of this new party, see: Jorge Vilches, Progreso y libertad. El Partido 
Progresista en la revolución liberal española, Madrid, Alianza, 2001. On the Liberal-Progressive tradition, 
from which the Constitutional Party mainly originated, see (among a vast bibliography): Javier Moreno Luzón, 
Progresistas. Biografías de reformistas españoles (1808-1939), 2005; Manuel Suárez Cortina (ed.), La 
redención del pueblo. La cultura progresista en la España liberal, Santander, Universidad de Cantabria, 2006. 
212 Jorge Vilches, op. cit., p. 170-1; and Ángel Bahamonde, Historia de España: siglo XIX, Madrid, Cátedra, 
2007, pp. 547-549.   
213 María Sierra, María Antonia Peña y Rafael Zurita, Elegidos y elegibles. La representación parlamentaria en 
la cultura del liberalismo, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2010, pp. 411-450; Gonzalo Capellán de Miguel, “Los 
intérpretes de la opinión”. Uso, abuso y transformación del concepto de “opinión pública” en el discurso político 




understanding of citizenship, coupled with the submission of political rights to broader 
conceptual entities (like the “nation”), is what ultimately justified the rigging of elections — 
a principle that was morally defended at the time as the “legitimate influence” (“legítima 
influencia”) of the government in elections.214   
 Even the Republicans and the Democrats, who argued for a more equalitarian model 
of political representation than the liberals and who defended voting as an individual right, 
sometimes rigged elections too.215 The reason is that clientelism also became a way of coping 
with political instability. In its five-year existence the Sexenio had countless governments and 
saw the state model changed on repeated occasions.216 In parallel, the political system was 
confronted with the armed opposition of Catholic fundamentalists (1872) and a separatist 
insurrection in Cuba (“Ten Years War”, 1868-1878). These circumstances explain why all 
parties – even the most advanced, like the Republicans and the Democrats – saw the rigging 
of elections as a way to control public office in times of political instability. 
 The extended presence of political clientelism during the Sexenio Democrático, 
however, should not be regarded as a sign of “backwardness” in historical development. In 
fact, when compared to most European countries, the Sexenio had one of the most 
progressive systems of political representation at the time. While the curtailing of political 
rights according to the “discourse of capacity” was a common trend across most of the 
Continent at the time,217 Spain was the only country – other than France and the German 
Empire – in which universal suffrage existed.218 Furthermore, clientelism also proved to be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Still, liberals argued in favour of using the legitimate influence in a “discreet” way. Discretion was needed in 
order to prevent social unrest and to make the government’s intervention in elections less intrusive. María 
Sierra, Rafael Zurita & María Antonia Peña, La representación política en el discurso del liberalismo español 
(1845-1874), Ayer, 61, 2006, pp. 30-31.  
215 G. L. de la Fuente Monge, op. cit. In Republican thought, voting represented the popular idea of national 
sovereignty. In parallel, the fight against corruption was part of an imaginary community of virtuous citizens 
who had the duty of controlling their representatives. On the political culture of Republicanism, see: Javier De 
Diego Romero, Imaginar la República. La cultura política del republicanismo español, 1876-1908, Madrid, 
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2008, pp. 107-161; and Román Miguel González, Las 
concepciones de la representación política en la democracia republicana española del siglo XIX, Ayer, nº 61, 
2006, pp. 139-162. 
216 Namely: Parliamentary monarchy between 1871-1873; Federal Republic in 1873; and a “conservative” 
Republic in 1874. 
217 See: Alan S. Kahan, Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe. The Political Culture of Limited Suffrage, 
Basingstoke-New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; and Raffaele Romanelli, How did they become voters? The 
history of franchise in modern European representation, The Hague, Boston, Kluwer, 1998.   
218 This does not mean that all the elements of this discourse were eliminated during the Sexenio. Gender, for 
instance, remained an element of political exclusion. For the electoral reforms in France, see: Raymond Huard, 
“Las prácticas del sufragio universal en Francia entre 1848 y 1914. Avances pioneros, novedades provisionales, 
proyectos inacabados”, in Salvador Forner (coord.), Democracia, elecciones y modernización en Europa. Siglos 
XIX y XX, Madrid, Cátedra,1997, pp. 47-72; and Gilles Le Béguec, “Il caso francese”, Maria Serena Piretti (ed.), 




widely extended practice in France. The literature usually neglects the case of this country 
because it is regarded as an “ideal-type” of democratisation. However, the fact is that 
clientelism proved to be a deeply-rooted practice in France too – even if it mutated under 
successive political systems. Instead of the traditional manipulation of elections based on the 
arbitrary use of electoral rules that characterised clientelism under the Restoration (1815-30) 
and the July Monarchy (1830-48), the introduction of universal suffrage in 1848 transformed 
clientelism through a practice aimed at influencing the voters’ behaviour.219  
 Besides the progressive legislation it introduced, the Sexenio also represented a 
novelty for the popular expectations it awoke (at least during its first stages). In Barcelona, 
for instance, the revolution of 1868 was warmly welcomed and led to some of the traditional 
demands of the working classes being satisfied, like the indirect tax on good’s consumption 
and the city’s duties of entry.220 In parallel, the Sexenio renewed the political system in this 
city and opened decision-making positions to the most progressive elites. For the first time 
the Republicans won the control of Barcelona’s city council and obtained the best electoral 
results between 1868-1874 – a complete novelty in Barcelona’s politics. Moreover, as much 
as 75% of the elected representatives in this city had never held public office before, and they 
came from a more varied social background compared to the politicians of Queen Isabella’s 
era.221 
 The case of Bartolomé Godó illustrates well these two sides of the Sexenio 
Democrático. On one hand, his case is an example of the positive effects the new political 
system had in terms of widening representation. Bartolomé became one of those progressive 
elites who gained access to public office for the first time and replaced Barcelona’s 
traditional ruling elites. On the other hand, Bartolomé’s story also illustrates how the routes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Anderson, Practicing Democracy. Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany, Princeton University 
Press, 2000. 
219 In the words of Marcus Kreuzer: “Corruption assumed its more modern means of buying, intimidating or 
coercing voters by using illicit financial incentives or retributions”. M. Kreuzer, Democratisation and changing 
methods of electoral corruption in France from 1815 to 1914, Eduardo Posada Carbó, Political Corruption in 
Europe and Latin America, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 98. See also: Alain 
Garrigou, Le vote et la vertu. Comment les français sont devenus électeurs, Paris, Presses de la Fondation 
National des Sciences Politiques, 1992. 
220 Even if these measures became temporary. Marició Janué, Els polítics en temps de revolució. La vida política 
a Barcelona durant el Sexenni Revolucionari, Vic, Eumo, 2002, pp. 88-92 and pp. 111-117.  
221 As much as 11% of the new ruling elites were manual workers (“menestrals”) and 6% were workers and 
clerks. Although this was a low percentage, it stood in marked contrast with both Isabella’s period and the 
Restoration (when no single worker or clerk gained access to government). The vast majority of the ruling elites 
in Barcelona were businessmen (49%) and liberal professionals (42%). The majority were of Republican 
adscription (62%). Only 8.5% of the total ruling elites had held public office during Isabella’s reign. Therefore, 
it is clear that in Barcelona the “Sexenio” implied a clear renewal of the ruling elites. Ibidem, p. 14, p. 221 and 




into public office often continued to rely on clientelism, despite the introduction of universal 
suffrage. The fact that Bartolomé was able to take advantage of clientelism was based upon 
two factors. The first one was the control of local politics: Bartolomé always ran in the 
Igualada elections, where the Godó family lived and had numerous supporters. The second 
source of influence was the personal acquaintances he had in various institutions, especially 
with the leaders of the Constitutional Party. These acquaintances allowed Bartolomé to 
intercede in far-flung places like Madrid, where the most important decisions concerning the 
private interests of the Godó family were made.222 
 In local politics, Igualada became the first source of influence for Bartolomé Godó. 
The prominent position the Godó family held in this town allowed him to mobilise a network 
of friends, relatives and supporters – this being a form of social capital that was of prime 
importance to manipulate elections. Second, Igualada had a series of administrative features 
that made it a valuable gateway to various political posts. Under the Democratic Sexennium, 
this city was the head of a judicial district in charge of electing one representative for 
Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation and one for the Spanish Congress.223 These two elements 
– local supporters and Igualada’s administrative position – explain why the Godó family 
sought to turn Igualada’s constituency into its personal political domain. In fact, in the long-
lasting political trajectory of the Godó family (spanning from 1869 to 1914) none of their 
members would ever run for any other constituency.224 “Localism” became the first and most 
important source of political power of the Godó family. 
 Indeed, the desire to protect the family’s interests in Igualada was a major reason for 
Bartolomé to stand for this constituency, even though he now lived in Barcelona. At a time 
when Igualada was suffering a major economic downturn, due to the city’s inability to adapt 
to the mechanisation of the textile industry, Bartolomé’s political career became a way for the 
Godó family to cope with the industrial crisis. The case of Bartolomé thus illustrates a 
common trend among the European petite bourgeoisie: namely, the entry into municipal 
government to protect private interests. Still, and as Geoffrey Crossick and Gerhard Haupt 
have rightly noted, the entry into local politics was also “an expression of their social and 
cultural, as much as of their economic, concerns”.225 In other words, the elites’ entry into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 This point will be examined in further detail in Chapter 4. 
223 Marició Janué et al. (eds.), La diputació revolucionària: 1868-1874, Barcelona, Diputació de Barcelona, 
2003. 
224 The only two exceptions are the position of alderman that Carlos and Bartolomé held in Bilbao and 
Barcelona’s city councils, respectively. 
225 Geoffrey Crossick and Gerhard Haupt, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe, 1780-1914. Enterprise, family, and 




municipal politics was not limited to a defensive strategy, but was part of a highly localised 
identity.  
 However, while some European elites could rely on the municipal government to 
defend their private interests (in the case of Prussia, for instance, where municipal 
governments enjoyed wide autonomy), this was not the case of Spain, as a highly centralised 
state-model was implemented during Queen Isabella’s reign (1833-1868).226 Since 1833 the 
“Moderados” implemented a new territorial organisation inspired by the French-model that 
was based on three levels: municipal, provincial and central. The outcome was a highly 
centralised model where the president of the Provincial Deputations (the so-called “Jefe 
político” or “political boss”) concentrated all the attributions of municipal government. In 
fact, the Jefe político had a tight grip over the elections, to the point that this figure became 
the backbone of political clientelism during Isabella’s reign: he was “in control of the process 
of voter registration, the creation of voting lists, the nominations of those who would 
supervise the polling locations on election day, and the validation of the electoral rules”.227 
This control of electoral procedures by state officials, coupled with an extremely limited 
franchise (limited to 1 per cent of the total population) explains how clientelism worked 
during Queen Isabella’s reign (1833-1868).228 
 Under the Sexennium, by contrast, progressive elites like Bartolomé Godó saw the 
Provincial Deputation as a new way of promoting their private concerns. Indeed, while these 
institutions had a very restricted room for manoeuvre during Isabella’s reign, during the 
Sexennium they gained new importance. In line with the liberal-progressive decentralised 
state-model, Provincial Deputations were entrusted with the administration of public funds 
and gained new executive functions, mostly concerned with education, charity, and 
infrastructure. Additionally, deputies started to be elected on the basis of a universal suffrage, 
including the position of president.229 As a result of these new attributions, Provincial 
Deputations became one of the key institutions where local elites sought to defend their 
respective local interests. This was the case of Bartolomé Godó, who devoted most of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 A comparative analysis between the different attributions that municipal governments had in Prussia and in 
Spain, in J. Luengo, op. cit., pp. 97-109; and David Blackbourn and James Retallack, Localism, landscape, and 
the ambiguities of place: German-speaking central Europe, 1860-1930, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
2007. 
227 Quoted in Jesús Cruz, “The Moderate ascendancy, 1843-1868”, in J. Álvarez Junco and A. Shubert, op. cit., 
pp. 33-47 (p. 43). 
228 Clientelism during this period has still received little attention. A recent valuable contribution is: Juan 
Antonio Inarejos Muñoz, Ciudadanos, propietarios y electores en la construcción del liberalismo español. El 





time in Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation (between 1870 and 1874) to fulfilling some of 
Igualada’s most urgent needs. These needs consisted, above all, in the lack of overland 
connections, which were vital for the economic recovery of this city. The archives of 
Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation reveal that Bartolomé always opted to be part of the 
commission in charge of promoting new infrastructures.230 In September 1874, for instance, 
he was part of a commission that went to Madrid to solve various issues concerning the 
province. The outcome of that visit was the approval of a new road between Igualada and the 
neighbouring town of Santa Coloma de Queralt – a connection that Igualada had long 
requested.231  
 Bartolomé managed to promote these types of infrastructures thanks to the position he 
held in Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation by means of political clientelism. The provincial 
elections of March 1872 constitute a valuable case to examine how clientelism worked at a 
micro-scale. These elections had great symbolic relevance, since they were the first 
provincial elections of the Sexenio that were open to universal male suffrage.232 On this 
occasion Bartolomé stood for Calaf, one of the three districts into which Igualada’s 
constituency was divided at the time, which comprised a total of 18 small rural towns.233 
Bartolomé won the election with 1,014 votes to 519 (his opponent was Antoni Romà Feliu, a 
candidate for the Republican party).234 The analysis of the electoral results shows that 
Bartolomé’s victory became possible due to the high percentage of votes he obtained in key 
places. In the town of Prats de Rei, for instance, Godó obtained all 241 votes of the electoral 
roll, despite the fact that half of the electorate did not vote. Likewise, Godó obtained all the 
votes in another town called La Llacuna (245 in total) despite the fact that the electoral roll in 
this town was never created. Apparently, the local mayor of La Llacuna decided to relocate 
the polling station to his own house, at very short notice. Although this was against the 
electoral law, which stipulated that any relocation must be publicised eight days in advance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Arxiu Històric de la Diputació de Barcelona (AHDB), Llibre de registre de diputats (1812-1890), fols. 247-
249. See also Annex n. 4. 
231 The commission went to Madrid in September 1874. AHDB, op. cit., p. 247; and El Eco del Noya, 
08/09/1878, p. 3. 
232 All men over the age of 25 were entitled to vote. In Barcelona’s province this represented a total of 180,070 
people. Borja de Riquer, “La Diputació de Barcelona i la lluita per la democràcia durant el Sexenni 1868-1874”, 
in B. de Riquer (dir.), Història de la Diputació de Barcelona 1812-2005, Barcelona, Diputació de Barcelona, 
1983, vol. I, p. 224. 
233 The towns forming this constituency were: Calaf, Rubió, Jorba, Castellfollit de Riubregós, Copons, Calonge 
de Segarra, Sallavinera, Prats de Rei, Sant Martí de Sesgueioles, Pujalt, Veciana, Argençola, Tous, Santa 
Margarida de Montbui, Santa Maria de Miralles, Montmaneu, Bellprat and La Llacuna. AHDB, Eleccions 
provincials, Lligall 207, exp. 19. 
234 AHDB, op. cit. The complete results of Barcelona’s province, in: Marició Janué, Borja de Riquer, Pere 
Gabriel, Josep Pich and Isidre Molas, La Diputació revolucionària, 1868-1874, Barcelona, Diputació de 




no action was taken. Consequently the mayor held the ballot in his own home, to the voters’ 
complete ignorance.235 The examples mentioned here are indicative of how clientelism 
worked. If Godó managed to obtain a wide margin of votes it was because he counted on a 
network of local supporters in charge of rigging the elections in his favour. Popular 
indifference and the low voter turnout helped make the rigging of elections easier.236  
 Still, what adds further interest to the provincial elections of March 1871 is the 
evidence revealing that some voters actively opposed Godó’s electoral corruption. Thus, a 
group of sixteen people from the town of Calaf contested the electoral results by submitting a 
formal protest to the Provincial Deputation.237 According to a memorandum, they claimed 
that “large number of voters” had voted for the Republican candidate, but their votes were 
never counted. These kinds of protests demonstrate that despite the low electoral turnout and 
the rural character of the majority of Igualada’s constituency, a segment of the population (no 
matter how small) opposed to the clientelistic practices of the Godó family.  
 The response of state authorities to the formal protest of the Calaf voters, however, 
reveals the little interest of liberal elites to promote electoral accountability. The electoral law 
of 1870 stated that in case elections were protested, the Provincial Deputation would appoint 
a commission of three deputies in charge of reviewing the results. 238  Accordingly, 
Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation created a commission to examine the memorandum of 
Calaf voters on April 14 1871. Although the commission formally acknowledged that Godó’s 
victory in this town was obtained through illegal means, it concluded that the number of 
votes involved was not sufficient to modify the results. In consequence, the electoral 
commission gave the green light to Godó’s appointment as provincial deputy, despite 
formally acknowledging the electoral irregularities.239 The case of the Calaf voters thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 “(...) el Alcalde para poder obrar mas á sus anchas, no tuvo reparo en mandar hacer un pregon á las nueve y 
cuarto del primer dia, anunciando la traslacion del primer colegio á su propia casa, infringiendo así el artº 101 
de la ley que ordena la publicacion con ocho dias de anticipacion. En una palabra en La Llacuna todo se ha 
hecho en secreto hasta el punto de que á nadie le ha sido dado ver las listas de los votantes”. AHDB, Ibid. 
236 The average electoral turnout in Barcelona’s province was low (35%). In rural towns, in contrast, it turned 
out to be higher than the average (over 50%). Borja de Riquer, op. cit., p. 224. The supposed higher 
participation in rural areas was indicative of clientelism. 
237 AHDB, Ibid. The signatories of the protest were: J. Millás i G., Josep Torras i Tort, Josep Torreguitart, Felip 
Torreguitart, Ramon Sala, Jaume Casanovas, Anton C.[?], Ramon Calvet, Josep Casapomer, Ramon Forn, 
Antoni Closa, Ramon Closa, Bartomeu Canet, Antoni Jordana, Jaume Llansà i Joan Mensa. Unfortunately no 
further information on these individuals could be found. 
238 As established in article 26, and successive articles, of the electoral law passed on August 20 1870. Manuel 
Santana Molina, “La Diputación Provincial en la España decimonónica”, Universidad de Alicante [thesis 
manuscript], 1989, p. 338. 
239 “Diose cuenta de un dictámen de la comision de actas emitido sobre la de escrutinio general del distrito de 
Calaf, por el cual fué proclamado diputado D. Bartolomé Godó y Pié, y cuya acta se habia declarado grave en 




demonstrates that the electoral law granted few rights to those who would contest electoral 
fraud – especially when the members of the electoral commission belonged to Godó’s own 
party.240  
 Viewed from an alternative perspective, the provincial elections of 1871 also shed 
light on the second source of influence that Godó possessed in the clientelist politics of the 
Sexenio. Namely, the electoral support he obtained from state institutions. The value of this 
support became apparent when a group of voters referred to the support the Civil Governor 
gave to Godó’s candidacy. Apparently, a letter was circulated around all the towns of the 
district in which the state’s provincial representative (the Civil Governor) “recommended” 
that votes were cast for Godó and voters who refused to do so were threatened. More 
precisely, the threat consisted in the state’s rejection of any future requests coming from the 
towns concerned. According to some witnesses, this threat made a great impression on the 
voters, most of whom preferred to follow the “official recommendation” rather than to assert 
their political rights.241  
 The above-mentioned incident demonstrates to what extent the state’s prerogatives 
were used to satisfy partisan goals. Indeed, this incident shows that in parallel to the rigging 
of elections on a bottom-up basis (namely by Godó’s local supporters), political clientelism 
also worked in a top-down direction – that is to say, by state intervention in local elections. 
Moreover, the coercion that state officials exerted on the voters shows that clientelism was 
not a practice limited to the rigging of elections but also contained a violent dimension. In the 
elections of 1871 symbolic violence – namely, threats – proved enough to coerce the voters’ 
free will.  
 Godó’s membership of the Constitutional Party is what granted him the support of the 
government. This became evident in the elections of March 1871 (during which the 
Constitutionals were in power), and during the periods of political instability in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fué aprobado dicho dictámen en votacion ordinaria”. AHDB, Libro de Actas 1871, 8 April, fol. 169; and 14 
April, fol. 203-204.  
240 Ibidem. 
241 “Público y notorio es que por los pueblos comprendidos en este distrito se ha circulado una carta, cuyo 
presentador ó presentadores afirmaban al exhibirla que la firma puesta á su pie era la de la digna persona que 
ejerce el cargo de Gobernador de esta Provincia, en cuya carta se recomendaba la candidatura que indicaba su 
presentador. (...) No se ha omitido medio para hacer comprender á los electores que dejando de votar al 
candidato recomendado podían sufrir perjuicios por aquella gastada y trivial razon de que así á los pueblos 
como á los particulares les interesa tener propicias á las Autoridades para la resolucion de cualquier asunto que 
ofrecerseles pueda (...). Ello es, y triste es confesarlo, que se ha producido el efecto deseado entre un buen 
número de electores, cuya sencillez y escaso conocimiento que tienen de la libertad é independencia con que 
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Autoridad, sea esta del rango que fuese”. AHDB, Ibid. The last part of this testimony is of great value, for it 




governments became responsible for directly appointing political posts. The appointment of 
political posts by the authorities was, in fact, the alternative means Godó used to build his 
political career.242 The use of this strategy to reach public office stood in contrast with the 
behaviour of other parties, like the Republicans, who always refused to hold political office if 
it was not through elections. Even some Constitutionals in Barcelona (half of them, to be 
precise) refused to hold political posts through the authorities’ direct appointment.243 This 
was not the case of Bartolomé Godó, who had no qualms about accepting the authorities’ 
support – indeed he actively looked for it. 
 The way Godó managed to gain the support of the authorities – this being the second 
source of influence he possessed during the Sexenio – was through his acquaintance with 
Víctor Balaguer (1824-1901), the leader of the Constitutional Party in Catalonia. Balaguer 
was a renowned writer and historian, and one of the main leaders of the Progressives in this 
region. During the Sexenio Balaguer started holding important political posts in Catalonia 
(among which, the presidency of Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation) and in 1869 he settled 
in Madrid, where he held important government positions and became the main 
representative of Catalan economic interests.244 Bartolomé Godó was one of the contacts 
Balaguer used to stay abreast of the political situation in Catalonia. The relation between the 
two men, however, was not a relation between equals but operated on a patronage basis. This 
can be seen in the letter Godó wrote to Balaguer on 7 October 1871. The aim of the letter was 
to inform Balaguer about the divisions existing between the Constitutionals of Barcelona. As 
the letter went: 
   
“Muy señor mio, y amigo (...) Supongo enterado por cartas que abrá recibido de esta 
[Barcelona], que estamos los amigos politicos divididos, los unos á favor de Sagasta y 
otros á favor de Zorrilla, y estos tratan á Sagasta á V y demas amigos muy duramente [,] 
llegando las cosas á tal punto que puede que el circulo se divida, pero somos unos cuantos 
amigos que lo sostendremos cueste lo que cueste, y tarde ó temprano tengo confianza que 
les haran justicia  (...). No dudo que le habrá hecho pasar malos ratos estos disgustos que 
se puede llamar de familia, pero tenga la seguridad que la mayoria sensata estan á su favor 
(...). pero lucharemos, y espero que venceremos. Si en este terreno ó cualquier otro cree V. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 As in the case of Barcelona’s city council, in 1869, when he was appointed by the provisional authorities, 
and to Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation (in February 1870; and February 1874) by the Provincial Governor. 
These appointments corresponded to moments of political instability, when elections were cancelled. Further 
details on this appointment, in: B. de Riquer (dir.), op. cit., pp. 213-244. 
243 M. Janué, B. de Riquer, P. Gabriel, J. Pich and I. M., La Diputació revolucionària..., p. 19. 
244 The best study on Balaguer is: Joan Palomas Moncholí, Víctor Balaguer. Renaixença, Revolució i Progrés, 




que le puedo ser util, no tiene mas que mandar que tendré con gusto particular en servirle. 
BG.” 245 
 
 The numerous grammatical mistakes throughout the letter reveal Godó’s poor 
education – another sign of his (relatively) humble origins. Additionally, this letter is the 
clearest testimony to Godó’s political commitment and reveals the way political parties 
worked at the time — this being a crucial element to understand the reasons behind the 
founding of La Vanguardia. Although Godó introduced himself as a “sincere friend” 
(“verdaderos amigos”) the letter was not written in an informal way, but has a tenor of 
reverence. This is because Godó’s purpose was to reaffirm his commitment to Balaguer in the 
face of the division among the Constitutionals. Indeed, in 1871 the Constitutional Party 
became divided on a national scale into two opposing camps: the group of Mateo Práxedes 
Sagasta and the group of Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla. Two factors explain this division: the lack of 
a clear leadership, especially after the murder of General Prim (the leader of the liberal 
progressives); and the different understandings of the Constitution of 1869 held by the two 
aspiring leaders (Sagasta and Zorrilla).246 When this division was echoed in Barcelona’s local 
branch, Godó hurried to reassure his allegiance to Balaguer.247 This loyalty was expressed in 
the letter above quoted and implicitly linked Godó with the candidate that Balaguer supported 
at a national scale: Sagasta.  
 This evidence reveals how parties functioned at the time: through personal allegiance, 
instead of regular membership. Godó referred to the division of the Constitutionals in 
Barcelona as a “family dispute” (“disgustos de familia”) and referred to the other party 
members as “political friends” (“amigos políticos”). This language evokes a political culture 
where the holding of public office was still the concern of a social minority. Indeed, the 
personal bonds that Godó held with the leaders of the Constitutional Party is a revealing 
example of “cadre parties” (also-called “notable parties”), the party organisation that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Biblioteca Museu Víctor Balaguer (BMVB), Vilanova i la Geltrú, Private correspondence of Víctor Balaguer 
(1842-1876), letter nº. 7103131. [E. T.]: “My good sir and friend (...) I assume that you know, from the letters 
you have received from here [Barcelona], that we the political friends are divided, some in favour of Sagasta 
and the others in favour of Zorrilla [;] [the latter] treat Sagasta and his friends in very harsh terms […], to the 
point that the committee might become divided, but we are some friends who will sustain its unity [the 
committee] whatever it takes, and sooner or later I am convinced that justice will be done (...). I can imagine the 
bad moments that what can be called family disputes have caused you, but I can assure you that the majority are 
prudent and they are on your side (...). We will fight and I hope we shall win. If I can be a resource for you in 
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246 Jorge Vilches, op. cit., op. cit., pp. 170-180. 




prevailed in Europe during most of the 19th century.248 The socially restricted levels that 
official politics had during most of the century, coupled with the liberal’s political culture of 
limited suffrage, left public office in the hands of a tiny minority. For the people who 
belonged to this minority, like Bartolomé Godó, public office was not a professional career, 
but represented a secondary activity.249 Consequently, “cadre parties” had a low number of 
supporters and instead of having a regular membership they were structured around 
patronage networks.  
 Patronage networks are the key concept that one historiographical trend uses to 
explain the functioning of political clientelism.250 According to this approach, which can be 
called the functionalist perspective, personal bonds were the guiding principle in the 
distribution of public resources through clientelist methods. In contrast to the Marxist 
perspective, which explains clientelism as a sign of class exploitation, the functionalist 
perspective puts the emphasis on the notion of patron-client “transactions”. The case of Godó 
shows how these transactions worked: Godó provided Balaguer with the support that 
reasserted his leadership in the Catalan branch of the Constitutional Party; while Balaguer, in 
turn, granted Godó access to a series of public resources. These resources were linked to the 
trade with Cuba, especially after Balaguer’s appointment as “Minister of Ultramar” (the 
ministry in charge of the Spanish colonies) in 1871. Indeed, Cuba started gaining increasing 
importance for the Godó family business and politics became a way of promoting the 
family’s interests them (as will be explained in Chapter 4). What needs to be stressed, at this 
point, is that Balaguer was the channel that Bartolomé Godó used to expand his sphere of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 The description of cadre parties provided here relies on the classic works of Maurice Duverger, Los Partidos 
Políticos, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1979 (first ed. in French, 1951), and Angelo Panebianco, 
Modelos de partido: organización y poder en los partidos políticos, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1990 (first ed. in 
Italian, 1982); as well as the work directed by Michel Offerlé, La profession politique. XIXe-XXe siècles, Paris, 
Belin, 1999. 
249 In Max Weber’s words, politicians at that time “did not live from politics but for politics”. The difference 
between both concepts was the privileged economic position that most politicians shared in the system of 
limited suffrage. This advantaged position is what provided them with the “autonomy” (time and resources) to 
dedicate themselves to politics, in contrast to other social classes. Max Weber, Política y ciencia, Buenos Aires, 
La Pleyade, Editorial Elaleph, pp. 19-22. 
250 José Varela Ortega, Los amigos políticos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración (1875-1900), 




1.4. THE FOUNDING OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’ AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
SOURCES OF SYMBOLIC POWER 
 
 The instalment of the Bourbon Restoration in 1875 toppled the channels of influence 
that Bartolomé Godó had built up during the Sexenio Democrático. A military coup d’état put 
an end to the Sexenio and set the ground for the change of political system. The outcome was 
a complete redefinition of the party system and of the clientelist methods. In this new 
political system the Constitutional Party of Godó fell on the losing side. The last part of this 
chapter will examine how the founding of La Vanguardia allowed the Godó family to 
confront this adverse situation and recycle its power strategies. 
 The Bourbon Restoration was a political system that went in line with the 
conservative reaction that took place in Europe after the Paris Commune (1871). The main 
individual responsible for organising the Restoration was Antonio Cánovas del Castillo 
(1828-1897), a liberal-conservative politician. Since 1873 Cánovas had been the leader of 
Madrid’s “Partido Alfonsino”, a movement in support of the Bourbon dynasty that gained 
popularity in the last years of the Sexenio, especially among the aristocracy and the army.251 
Taking the British system of representation as a reference model, Cánovas prepared the 
return of the Bourbon dynasty in 1875, in the shape of Isabella’s son (Alfonso XII), and 
based the new political system upon the joint sovereignty between the Crown and the 
parliament (divided into Congress and Senate).252  
 If Cánovas was the intellectual architect of the Restoration, the new Constitution of 
1876 reasserted the new political system. For the most part, this constitution represented a 
substantial step backward in relation to the Sexenio Democrático. The new constitution 
granted basic individual rights but made them subject to different restrictions. In practice, this 
meant that basic rights like freedom of expression, association and union became restricted. 
For instance, censorship was imposed on newspapers, and Catholicism became the only 
religion that could be practiced in public. The passing of additional policies, like the abolition 
of civil marriage, or the restriction of academic freedom in universities, was a further step 
directed at reasserting the new conservative shift. In the field of political representation, the 
passing of a new electoral law in 1878 limited the franchise drastically. From this moment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 In fact, the great popularity of “Alfonsismo” in aristocratic circles led the return of the Bourbon dynasty to be 
popularly referred to as the “Ladies revolution”. Before obtaining the control of the “Partido Alfonsino”, in 
1873, Cánovas and his followers had participated in the Sexenio, albeit from a safe distance. See: J. Varela 
Ortega, op. cit., pp. 25-93. 
252 María Sierra, “El espejo inglés de la modernidad española: el modelo británico y su influencia en el concepto 




onwards only 5% of the population had the right to vote. Additionally, the King was granted 
a series of important attributions, like the capacity to appoint the mayor of cities with over 
30,000 inhabitants.  
 In conclusion, the Constitution of 1876 and the electoral law of 1878 became the two 
legislative pillars of a new political system that was clearly more restrictive than the Sexenio 
Democrático. However, the Restoration system did not imply a return to Queen Isabella’s 
political model. Although some of the new laws were inspired in this period,253 Cánovas was 
fully aware that the monopoly of power by one single party had been the main reason behind 
the downfall of Isabella II in 1868. To avoid the same mistake, Cánovas wished to integrate 
the most conservative parties of the Sexenio into the new Restoration. His hope was to 
establish a two-party system similar to the English model, where the “Partido Alfonsino” 
would play the role of the Liberal-conservative party, and the most conservative members of 
the Sexenio would form the party on the left (or Liberals). In this way, Cánovas aspired to 
consolidate a new political system based on the alternation in power between two liberal 
parties; and the King would play a stabilising role through the wide political attributions that 
the Constitution granted to the Crown.254 Ideally, this political system would assure the 
stability of the Restoration, while excluding the most radical parties both on the left 
(Republicans and Democrats) and on the right (the Moderates and the Carlists). 
 The founding of La Vanguardia obeyed the Godó’s wish to join the Restoration. Not 
by coincidence, the newspaper was published for the first time on February 1st 1881; that is to 
say, one week before the most conservative elements of the Sexenio reached power for the 
first time in the Restoration. They did so as a new party called “Partido Liberal Fusionista” 
(in its abbreviated name, “Liberal Party”) and under the leadership of Sagasta (one of the 
heads of the Constitutional Party).255 However, the founding of this party did not take place 
until 1880, after the five-year period that the Constitutionals spent in the opposition (1874-
1881). This means that the integration of this party into the Restoration was not an automatic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 This was particularly the case of the Constitution of 1876. The majority of the articles were inspired by the 
Moderate constitution of 1845. Remedios Sánchez Ferriz, Génesis del proyecto constitucional: la comisión de 
los notables, Revista de Derecho Político, nº 8, 1981, pp. 33-54. 
254 The Constitution of 1876 granted wide prerogatives to the Crown. The King was responsible for appointing 
the ministers and had the power to dissolve the parliament. Consequently, the King controlled the central 
elements of political life, including the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers, and the 
leadership of the two main parties. 
255 This party was created in 1880 through the joining of members from the Constitutional Party, the Radicals 
and the “posibilistas” of Emilio Castelar. Unfortunately, there is no monograph on the history of the Liberal 
Party. The best account is: Carlos Dardé, “El Partido Liberal de la Restauración, 1875-1890”, Madrid, 




process; it only took place after much hesitation and a strong intra-party confrontation that 
lasted for half a decade.256  
 Indeed, between 1875 and 1881 the Constitutionals became deeply divided on how to 
react to the new political system. For the most progressive sector of the Constitutionals, 
headed by Víctor Balaguer, accepting the Restoration was a betrayal of the democratic 
principles that had inspired the Sexenio. The shared sovereignty between the Crown and the 
parliament of the Restoration went against the principle of popular sovereignty that the 
Constitutionals defended. Likewise, the new political system did not assure the political 
rights (freedom of expression, press, and assembly) that were the banner of the 
Constitutionals. For all these reasons, Víctor Balaguer stood at the head of those 
Constitutionals who rejected both the integration in the Restoration and the need to create a 
new Liberal Party.257 This position contrasted with that of Sagasta, who already admitted the 
legitimacy of the new political system in 1875; and to another group of Constitutionals that 
immediately joined the Restoration.258 
 In Barcelona, too, the local branch of the Constitutionals became divided on how to 
react to the new political system. The outcome of this division was the emergence of a new 
faction that was willing to join the Restoration system and, in consequence, started 
challenging Balaguer’s traditional leadership in the party. The leader of this new faction was 
a man called Pedro Collaso Gil (?-1887).259 Collaso was a close friend of the Godó brothers 
and counted on their total support. Indeed, both Carlos and Bartolomé signed a memorandum 
in 1875 in which the Constitutional Party publically accepted the legal bases of the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 On the integration of the Constitutionals in the Restoration, see: José Ramón Milán García, “Los liberales en 
el reinado de Alfonso XII: el difícil arte de aprender de los fracasos”, Ayer, 52, 2003, pp. 91-116; and 
“Conspiración, conciliación y turno: Sagasta y la formación del liberalismo dinástico (1875-1881)”, Madrid, 
Universidad Complutense, 1998 [“Tesis de licenciatura”]. 
257 Joan Palomas Moncholí, op. cit., pp. 456-457. As soon as the Sexenio fell, Cánovas invited Balaguer to join 
the new political system. Balaguer, however, refused the offer with the following words: “siento en el alma que 
mis sagrados deberes de hombre político y de hombre público, á los cuales jamás faltaré, me impidan á mí, 
monárquico de convicción y de sentimiento, ocupar un puesto oficial al lado de varones que valen y representan 
lo que V.”. This letter was written on 1st January 1875. Quoted in: José Ramón Milán García, “Conspiración, 
conciliación y turno: Sagasta y la formación del liberalismo dinástico (1875-1881)”, Madrid, Universidad 
Complutense, 1998 [Thesis manuscript], p. 63, n. 116; and p. 108. 
258 This was the case of the faction led by Alonso Martinez, who separated from the Constitutionals and created 
a new organisation called “Centro Parlamentario”; and the faction of Francisco Santa Cruz, who joined the 
ranks of Cánovas’ Conservative Party. J. R. Milán García, op. cit., 2003, 95-96. 
259 Collaso was a rich landowner (in 1875 he was the 14th highest taxpayer in Barcelona) who had made a 
financial contribution to the success of the Revolution of 1868. During the Sexennium he had been Senator and 
President of Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation. After the Sexennium, Collaso became responsible for the 
victory of the Constitutionals in Barcelona during the first elections of the Restoration (1876). As La 
Vanguardia recalled, this victory “placed him [Collaso] in a position to become the leader of the Liberal Party 
in Barcelona”. La Vanguardia, 07/01/1887, p. 5. For further information on Collaso, see: Marició Janué et al., 




Restoration system.260 The reason the Godó brothers decided to support the faction of Collaso 
and thus challenge Balaguer’s leadership (despite the valuable services that he had provided 
for the family interests in Cuba and Igualada) was related to their urgent need to reach public 
office again; a need that was geared towards protecting their commercial interests.261  
 However, the Godó brothers could no longer rely on the intermediary role of 
Balaguer. The self-exclusion of the Constitutionals from the Restoration that Balaguer 
advocated was of little help for the interests of the Godó, since it implied the self-exclusion 
from public office. The first strategy the Godó brothers devised to reach public office, now 
that they could not rely on Balaguer, consisted in ignoring the official position of the 
Constitutional Party of abstaining from power. Instead, in 1876 Bartolomé Godó decided to 
run in the elections for the Congress without party support. Immediately, both Balaguer and 
Sagasta (the main leaders of the party in Catalonia and in Spain, respectively) wrote to 
Bartolomé ordering him to abstain from standing for election.262 Bartolomé, however, 
showed his independent character and ignored the recommendations of the party leaders.263 
Apparently, he was confident that his supporters in Igualada would suffice to win the 
elections. To increase his chances of success, Godó also hired new people to manipulate 
elections in his favour.264  
 However, the elections of 1876 proved to be a stark lesson for Bartolomé Godó. 
Contrary to what he expected, his resources of influence proved to be insufficient to win. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 This was made official in the meeting held at the “Teatro-Circo del Príncipe Alfonso”, in Madrid. The 
majority of the Constitutional Party of Barcelona supported this decision (Balaguer included). Further details, 
in: Juan del Nido Segalerva, Historia política y parlamentaria del Excmo. Sr. don Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, 
Madrid, Imp. de Ramona Velasco, 1915, p. 572; La Iberia, 24/07/1875, pp. 1-2. 
261 As already noted, the commercial interests of the Godó in Cuba will be studied in Chapter 4. 
262 “La cosa está en que como ahora se presenta también Bartolomé Godó quieren ver la forma de que desista y 
ceda á García Martino su influencia y la de sus amigos. Al efecto Estruch le hablará hoy de una manera 
indirecta sobre el particular, me ha dicho, y y si no puedo sacar partido podras tú, me dijo, que tienes con el mas 
confianza entrarle de frente en el asunto. Me han asegurado, dijo Estruch, que Sagasta y Balaguer han escrito á 
Godó para que ceda en Ygualada y apoye á Garcia Martino. ¿Es cierto este extremo? ¿Estais vosotros en que 
Martino sea el diputado por Ygualada?” Correspondence between Teodoro Baró (director of the newspaper La 
Crónica de Catalunya) and Balaguer. BMVB, Epistolari Víctor Balaguer (1842-1876). Nº. 7500896, 
24/09/1875. 
263 “Veré si ha recabado algo de Godó, que lo dudo, pues yo le hable ya hace unos dias, y me manifestó que ya 
lo había dicho, que queria ir à la lucha y que consideraba no podria sacar partido Martino. Como yo podia 
hablarle del rente en favor de este ultimo pues quizá creyendo se le queria suplantar hubiera sido peor, atendido 
al caracter de Godó”. Ibidem, Nº. 7500923, 29/11/1875. There are other sources that confirm Godó’s stubborn 
character: “De arraigadas convicciones, y carácter independiente, [Bartolomé Godó] nunca rindió vasallaje sino 
á los dictados de su recta conciencia, y tan inflexible solía mostrarse en este punto, que una de las veces que 
representó en Cortes el distrito de Igualada, ganó el acta luchando contra el candidato oficial impuesto por su 
partido (...).” J. Roca i Roca, LV, 28/01/1894, p. 2. 
264 “No hay que pensar ya en este [García Martino] por Ygualada, porque Godó ha soltado demasiadas prendas 
y ha tomado la cosa con demasiado empeño adelantando mucho los trabajos para que pueda retirarse. Esta es la 





contrast to the Sexenio, Godó could no longer rely on the state’s support to rig the elections. 
As a result of this, the same clientelistic methods that he had used to build his career during 
the Sexenio were now used against him.265 The elections of 1876 thus demonstrated that 
having a network of supporters in Igualada was important but not sufficient to fight against 
the state’s intervention in elections. 266  The new political system had redefined the 
functioning of patron-client networks and Godó had fallen on the losing side. In the face of 
this failure, founding a newspaper became a way of pressing for the Constitutional’s 
integration to the Restoration – thus challenging the party’s official position. 
 Despite historically being one of the most influential newspapers in Spain – and it 
remains so today – the origins of La Vanguardia remain controversial. According to the 
official account, the brothers Carlos and Bartolomé Godó founded the newspaper in February 
1881. This point, however, has never been empirically demonstrated.267 In fact, there is an 
alternative account arguing that the Godó brothers did not in fact establish the newspaper, but 
rather purchased it in 1887.268 Unfortunately, the historical document that could resolve this 
controversy – the registry of foundation – has been lost.269 Still, there are some alternative 
sources that historians have not consulted that can shed new light on the origins of La 
Vanguardia. These sources are the press of Madrid and Igualada, which historians, in their 
attempt to explain the history of a newspaper from Barcelona, have neglected. 
 In fact, one of these sources about the origins of La Vanguardia is the information 
that La Correspondencia de España – a Madrid newspaper – published on the 13th of 
November 1880. The value of this document is that that it mentions La Vanguardia three-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Prior to the elections the state’ provincial officer (Mr. Villalba) removed the city mayors of Igualada’s 
constituency and replaced them with new mayors that were favourable to the government’s candidate. “En el 
distrito de Igualada, para contrarestar la influencia del candidato constitucional señor Godó, hijo de la villa que 
da nombre al distrito, y rico fabricante en ella, tambien ha considerado necesario el señor Villalva (sic) cambiar 
algun ayuntamiento de poblaciones importantes, entregando la administracion municipal á los partidarios del 
pretendiente y á los federales.” La Iberia, 07/01/1876, p. 2. 
266 Godó’s eagerness to gain power is demonstrated by the fact that in 1880 he considered the possibility of 
running in the elections for another constituency (Manresa) without a clear political affiliation. According to the 
Republican newspaper La Montaña, Godó made contact with various political forces (including the 
Constitutionals, the Carlists and the Democrats) about the possibility of running for this constituency. Quoted 
in: Maria Gemma Rubí Casals, “El món de la política en la Catalunya urbana de la Restauració. El cas d’una 
ciutat industrial. Manresa: 1875-1923”, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – École des Hautes Études en 
Sciences Sociales de Paris, 2003 [Thesis manuscript], p. 176.  
267 There is no archival proof or official account to confirm this. Vis Molina, op. cit. 
268 Joan Torrent and Rafael Tasis, Història de la premsa catalana, Barcelona, Bruguera, 1966, vol. I, p. 140. 
269 To establish a newspaper, permission was needed from the “Gobierno Civil”, and according to Juan Givanel, 
Bartolomé Godó received such permission. Unfortunately, Givanel’s claim is difficult to substantiate as no 
evidence attesting to this has been found. Both Pere Voltes and myself have searched for such evidence at the 
historical archives of the “Gobierno Civil” in Barcelona, and in the Archivo General de la Administración 
(AGA), in Madrid, without success. Joan Givanel y Mas, Materials per a la bibliografia de la premsa 




months before it was founded. More precisely, the information in La Correspondencia 
referred to the division of the Constitutionals in Barcelona into the party’s official committee 
of Rius i Taulet (Balaguer’s man in Barcelona), on the one hand, and the rebel faction of 
Collaso, on the other, which was planning to establish its own newspaper. As La 
Correspondencia stated: 
 
“Tan lejos está de reinar entre los constitucionales de Barcelona la armonía política que 
(...) segun una carta de aquella ciudad que publica La Correspondencia, los amigos del Sr. 
Collaso y Gil piensan fundar un periódico, que se llamará La Vanguardia, que estará enfrente 
de La Crónica de Cataluña, que como es sabido respresenta á la fraccion del señor Rius y 
Taulet.  Dos circunstancias importantes hay que notar en la noticia que antecede; la primera, 
que la inauguracion de ese periódico —que será en breve, porque ya hay reunidos los fondos 
necesarios— se verificará con un banquete en el Tívoli, al cual no asistirán ni el Sr. Balaguer 
ni los amigos del Sr. Rius y Taulet; y segundo, que se encargará de la direccion del citado 
periódico el diputado por Tarragona D. Pedro Antonio Torres, es decir, el firmante de aquel 
comunicado en que se decia que el banquete dado al Sr. Balaguer no habia sido una fiesta 
constitucional, y que en Barcelona hay constitucionales vencedores y vencidos, incluyéndose 
él en este número. No hay por qué consignar aquí la política que hará La Vanguardia y las 
relaciones de este periódico con La Crónica de Cataluña (...)”.270 
 
 The information given in La Correspondencia was predicting what was going to 
happen three-months later, on the 2nd February 1881: the appearance of La Vanguardia as the 
hobbyhorse of the Collaso faction to challenge the leadership of Rius. As part of this 
enterprise, Bartolomé Godó became the owner (and therefore the founding partner) of La 
Vanguardia. There are at least three different pieces of evidence to support this statement. 
The first is the state’s authorisation to establish the newspaper bearing Bartolomé’s name.271 
The second is Bartolomé’s obituary, in which La Vanguardia referred to him as the sole 
founder.272 The last, but most important piece of evidence, comes from the Semanario de 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 La Época, 13/11/1880, p. 2. This newspaper quoted the news published by La Correspondencia.  
271 Joan Givanel Mas, op. cit. 
272 “Este periódico debe su fundación a Bartolomé Godó. Periódico de lucha en un principio, para defender á un 
partido, hubo de sufrir hace años una modificación radical y absoluta, por iniciativa de su mismo fundador, 
cuando éste se propuso desligarlo de todos los partidos, y crear un elemento imparcial en el estadio de la prensa, 
que no conservara de la significación del antiguo periódico más que el nombre. Este hecho, aventurando una 
parte de su capital en la creación y afianzamiento de un elemento de cultura pública, con los riesgos que una 
obra semejante tiene en España, es otro rasgo del carácter del fundador y de su cariño á Cataluña”. Jordi Roca 




Igualada - the newspaper published by the political rivals of the Godó family in Igualada. As 
the Semanario commented, on two different occasions: 
 
 “(...) La Vanguardia es un diario que sale también en Barcelona, órgano de D. Bartolomé 
Godó y que corre á cargo del mismo en la parte del estipendio (...).” 273  
 
 
“Godò (sic) para encaramarse un dia al poder fundó La Vanguardia en Barcelona 
sirviéndose de escritores diversos para llenar sus columnas, (...) para formar atmósfera y 
presentarse al pueblo grande como Rigoleto.” 274 
 
 All this seems to confirm that Bartolomé Godó became both the owner and founding 
partner of La Vanguardia. The name of his brother, Carlos Godó, in contrast, does not appear 
anywhere. This new hypothesis – namely, that Bartolomé founded the newspaper alone – 
challenges the official version about the origins of La Vanguardia. From the perspective of 
the relations between the media and political clientelism, what makes the founding of this 
newspaper interesting is that it reveals the role the press played as an instrument to both 
legitimise and dispute the “authorized discourse” of cadre parties.275 The weak organisational 
structure of cadre parties implied that besides an electoral committee, these parties usually 
lacked a permanent structure. This was the case of the Constitutional Party in Barcelona. 
When this local branch was created in January 1871, it made a public call for the creation of a 
cohesive party structure.276 In practice, however, it failed to do so and the local branch 
became limited to a small electoral committee. As their political enemies rightly pointed out, 
the Constitutionals were a group of dispersed people with vague political principles.277  
 Within this weak party structure, the only permanent organ of the Constitutionals in 
Barcelona was a newspaper called La Crónica de Cataluña. This newspaper acted as the 
party’s mouthpiece and reaffirmed its principles against the attacks of its adversaries. The 
press thus acted as a channel of communication between the members of a political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 “Recortes” Semanario de Igualada, 26/10/1884, p. 1. English translation [E.T.]: “(...) The Vanguard is a 
newspaper that is also published in Barcelona, and it is the mouthpiece of Mr. Bartolomé Godó Pié, who covers 
its expenses (...)”.  
274 “Á las urnas!!!” Semanario de Igualada, 04/04/1886, p. 1. [ET]: “With the aim of climbing the ladders of 
power, Godò (sic) founded La Vanguardia in Barcelona by relying on writers to fill the columns of this 
newspaper (...) to create an atmosphere and present himself to the people as big as Rigoletto”.  
275 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power..., op. cit.  
276 The details of this public call can be found in: Diario de Barcelona, 26/01/1871 (Morning ed.), p. 933. 
277 Ibidem. The Diario de Barcelona can be regarded as an example of the conservative streak of liberalism that 
the Constitutionals failed to attract. Borja de Riquer, “El conservadorisme català: del fracàs del moderantisme al 





community and gave it a vital sense of group cohesion. Against the constraints of physical 
distance, the newspaper became the main platform for the circulation of information and 
ideas. No matter where the reader lived, the act of buying La Crónica de Cataluña 
demonstrated the reader’s predisposition towards a certain vision of the world; and it 
reinforced the notion of an imagined community. Moreover, La Crónica de Cataluña was 
charged with the vital task of publicising the party’s “authorized discourse”. Thus the 
newspaper was the official representative of the party in Barcelona, meaning that it also had 
the task of publishing the official list of candidates. The control of La Crónica de Cataluña 
was, in consequence, the “source of delegated power” (to use the terminology of Pierre 
Bourdieu) that made Rius the official interlocutor of Sagasta in the city.278 This explains why 
Rius, together with Balaguer and the director of La Crónica (Baró), had been responsible for 
distributing public office during the Sexenio.  
 The founding of La Vanguardia undermined the traditional prevalence of La Crónica 
de Cataluña as the official mouthpiece of the Constitutional Party in Barcelona. The new 
journal of the Collaso faction emerged with the ambition of disrupting the “authorized 
discourse” monopoly that La Crónica possessed. This intention was made clear in the 
heading of the journal: “La Vanguardia. Diario político y de avisos y noticias. Órgano del 
Partido Constitucional de la Provincia”. In consequence, and contrary to what some 
historians have argued, the name chosen for the new journal (“La Vanguardia”; “the 
Vanguard”, in English) was not arbitrary.279 Instead, it reflected a clear strategy: the ambition 
of the Collaso faction to become the new “vanguard” (or the new “authorized 
representative”, in Bourdieu’s terms) of the Constitutional Party in Barcelona.280  
 As may be expected, Rius and his followers did not take long to respond to the threat 
that Collaso represented to their leadership. In November 1880 (shortly before La 
Vanguardia was created) the Constitutionals organised a political meeting at the Theatre 
Tivoli in Barcelona, where entry to the followers of Collaso was expressly forbidden.281 
Together with the exclusion of the rebel faction, further measures were taken so as to assure 
that the journalists of La Crónica and its affiliated correspondents were the only ones that had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 P. Bourdieu, op. cit., pp. 107-116 (“the social institution of symbolic power”). 
279 Joan Torrent and Rafael Tasis, op. cit., vol I, p. 141. 
280 Before this happened Collaso’s faction had already founded another newspaper (called Diario Liberal) that 
had disappeared shortly after being founded. La Correspondencia de España, 01/11/1880, p. 2; and La Época, 
05/11/1880, p. 2. 
281 As Madrid’s newspaper La Época noted, “Es de advertir que han sido inútiles los esfuerzos para reconciliar á 
los dos grupos [Rius and Collaso], aunque sólo fuera para comer, y esto no deja de ser significativo.” La Época, 




access to the meeting.282 These types of measures reveal to what extent contemporaries were 
aware of the importance of monopolising the party’s public discourse: only the newspapers 
that were under the control of the party direction were authorised to publish the official 
version of the event.283 Thus, La Crónica reported what was actually a small meeting of a 
local party (around 400 people attended) as a grand occasion where the audience applauded 
the speeches of Rius and Balaguer.284 Next to this favourable press coverage, newspapers 
loyal to the party leadership depicted the faction of Collaso as a small group of followers 
driven by selfish interests.285 The final indication of these intra-party struggles became 
evident when the faction of Collaso responded to these accusations by organising an 
alternative meeting. This meeting was also held in the Theatre Tivoli in Barcelona. The main 
purpose of the meeting was to announce the creation of a new journal called La Vanguardia, 
to the delight of Collaso’s supporters.286 
 Still, equally as important as the strategy used to dispute the “authorized discourse” 
was the audience to whom the discourse was addressed. The first copy of La Vanguardia 
reveals, in this respect, how extremely modest the origins of this newspaper were. At a cost 
of 5 cents, La Vanguardia had a circulation of only 1,500 copies. The newspapers were 
printed with a Marinoni rotating machine and the newsroom was housed in a dark and narrow 
apartment, number 8-10, on the street called Les Heures in Barcelona.287 From a European 
perspective, the characteristics of La Vanguardia in its early stage were in line with the press 
in other Mediterranean countries, like Italy and Portugal. These characteristics consisted in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 “No se admitirá en el mismo [banquete] ningun individuo de la fraccion Collaso, ni ningun representante de 
la prensa liberal. Estas intransigencias han producido en el público mala impresion. Se sabe que los 
organizadores del banquete han tomado grandes precauciones para que no asista ninguno de los excluidos. Se 
quiere que solo La Crónica de Cataluña y La Bomba den cuenta de lo que ocurre.” “El banquete de Barcelona”, 
in El Liberal (Madrid), 01/11/1880, p. 1. 
283 See for instance: “Balaguer en Barcelona” and “El banquete de Barcelona”, in El Liberal (Madrid), 
01/11/1880, p. 1; and the Diario Oficial de Avisos de Madrid, 01/11/1880, p. 2. 
284 Ibidem. 
285 Diario Oficial de Avisos de Madrid, 05/08/1880, p. 2. 
286 “Desahuciado el Diario Liberal por los amigos del Sr. Collaso y Gil, (...) ha nacido y está en vias de 
realizacion la idea de fundar un nuevo periódico, que estará enfrente de la Crónica de Cataluña. Todo está ya 
dispuesto; se han nombrado director de la nueva publicación al Sr. D. Pedro Antonio Torres, diputado por 
Tarragona, y se inaugurará el periódico que llevará por título La Vanguardia con un gran banquete que se dará 
tambien, como el dedicado al Sr. Balaguer, en el teatro del Tivoli. Reina con este motivo gran animacion en el 
circulo del Pasage del Crédito, y los iniciadores del banquete se proponen contrarestar la conducta del señor 
Rius y Taulet, invitando á la prensa y á un gran número de personas. Sirva esta noticia de contestacion á la 
Crónica de Cataluña que doy y tiene en realidad esta disidencia (...). Diario Oficial de Avisos de Madrid, 
12/11/1880, p. 2. 




very small number of copies, limited circulation – usually restricted to the local or to the 
provincial sphere – and strongly partisan-oriented content.288  
 In contrast to the press model of Mediterranean countries, other countries in Europe 
(like France and England) had seen the development of a commercially-oriented press since 
the second half of the 19th century. Indeed, both the “presse à bon marché” (in France) and 
the “penny press” (in England) followed a business-model based on the drastic lowering of 
prices. The outcome of this model were newspapers that were capable of providing profits to 
their owners, thanks to the massive audience they reached through their low price and the 
increase of advertising revenues. Compared to this commercially-oriented press model, the 
1,500 copies of La Vanguardia hardly made it a profitable business. In fact, there is evidence 
to suggest that this newspaper became a longstanding source of economic loss for the Godó’ 
brothers.289 
 However, it would be misleading to interpret the paper’s financial losses as a failed 
investment. The reason for this is that in the beginning of La Vanguardia, partisan goals 
prevailed over commercial ones. When Bartolomé Godó invested in the founding of this 
journal his ambition was neither to reach a massive audience, nor to make profits, but rather 
to gain public visibility. This strategy was acknowledged at the time with the expression “to 
create an atmosphere” (“crear atmosfera”) and consisted in gaining the attention of a target 
audience.290 In 1880, this audience was not the public of Barcelona, but the directors of the 
Constitutional Party in Madrid, headed by Sagasta. The creation of the new “Partido Liberal 
Fusionista” (“Liberal Fusionist Party”) in 1880 had showed that this politician had been the 
main promoter of merging the Constitutionals with the other conservative elements of the 
Sexenio, with the goal of holding the principles of the Constitution of 1869 in the new 
Restoration. The strategy behind the founding La Vanguardia was, in the face of these 
events, to stop Collaso’s faction being regarded as a small rebel faction within the 
Constitutionals and to become the legitimate interlocutor of Sagasta in Barcelona. Therefore, 
the founding of La Vanguardia consisted in a strategy that was aimed at challenging the 
leadership of Rius by disputing the monopoly of authorized discourse that La Crónica de 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics, 
Cambridge-New York, CUP, 2004, p. 67; Valerio Castronovo, La stampa italiana nell’età liberale, Bari, 
Laterza, 1979, pp. 15-69; Ana Cabrera (ed.), Jornais, jornalistas e jornalismo: séculos XIX-XX, Lisboa, Livros 
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289 “(...) El fet és que aquella "Vanguardia" primerenca, creada pels germans Godó, perdia diners i que en va 
perdre sempre, mentre no fou altra cosa que l'òrgan del partit monàrquic liberal a Barcelona”; “(...) per aquells 
diariets polítics vuitcentistes, que publicaven molt poques pàgines, a penes tenien anuncis i estaven resignats a 
perdre sempre diners (...)”. Agustí Calvet, op. cit., p. 29 and p. 63. 




Cataluña had. The strongest sign of this intention was the first copy of La Vanguardia, in 
which the newspaper publically proclaimed its total commitment to supporting the 
Constitutional Party and the leadership of Sagasta: 
 
“ (...) Nuestro programa, pues, es preciso y terminante. Durante los últimos años de 
gobierno conservador, nuevo y prolongado paréntesis abierto al ejercicio de las libertades 
públicas (...) En aquel terrible naufragio, en aquel general desconcierto [e.g. end of the 
Democratic Sexennium], solo pudieron sobrenadar un partido y un hombre; (...) el partido 
constitucional, compacto alrededor de su jefe [Sagasta], no se alejaba ni un momento del 
sitio del combate, no cedia ni un palmo de tierra, sin librar sangrienta batalla, y en, seis años 
de porfiada lucha (...) ha reconquistado todos los dominios de la opinion pública. (...) A 
aquel jefe seguimos y á este partido pertenecemos. (...) Venimos, pues, al estadio de la 
prensa á defender los principios del partido constitucional dentro de la fusion por este 
aceptada y sostenida [e.g. creation of the new Liberal Fusionist Party]. Desde nuestro campo 
haremos la oposicion al Gobierno tan ruda é implacable como es implacable y rudo su 
propósito de combatirnos. (...) opondremos nuestro amor y nuestro entusiasmo por la 







 While official accounts attribute the foundation of La Vanguardia to Carlos and 
Bartolomé Godó, this chapter has shown that the origins of this newspaper were more 
complex. Rather than being founded as a family enterprise, La Vanguardia was the project of 
a political faction (the group of Collaso) aspiring to gain visibility in the eyes of the party 
leader (Sagasta) and to challenge the leadership of Rius i Taulet in the Constitutional Party of 
Barcelona. As part of this struggle for the sources of delegated power, Bartolomé Godó 
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became the founding partner of the new journal and consequently became its proprietor. That 
Godó, a man of humble origins, could afford to finance such an enterprise only became 
possible after his stay in Bilbao. For both he and his brother Carlos, this city became decisive 
for their upward mobility. Furthermore, some of the points that will be examined later on in 
this thesis, like the importance of Cuba for the Godó business, or their specialisation in the 
jute textile industry (Chapter 4), also came about as a result of their time in Bilbao. 
 At a time when urban ruling elites were being redefined across Europe, the migration 
of the Godó brothers to Bilbao shows the importance that marriage played for the merging of 
old and new elites.292 In fact, only five years after moving to Bilbao, Carlos Godó was elected 
as a member of the city council. This rapid integration into the local scene was rare according 
to studies on the Catalan trade diaspora, most of which speak of a slow process of integration 
that usually took more than one generation. The low number of Catalans in the Basque 
Country and the shared business interests between families explain the rapid integration the 
Godó brothers achieved through marriage. With one exception, the women they married were 
born in the Basque Country. Still, three of the four women came from families that had 
recently moved to Bilbao.293 This suggests that immigrants were more prone to marring into 
families that had recently arrived rather than long-established ones. 
 If Bilbao was a decisive period in the life of the Godó brothers, their hometown of 
Igualada shaped and motivated most of their activities. Contrary to what the literature would 
suggest, their departure as cadets did not imply the breaking of family ties. On the contrary: 
kinship was a crucial element to organise migration and prevented the loss of status in cadets. 
The Godó’s departure from Igualada according to a migration-chain basis supports this point. 
Moreover, cadets proved to be of great value in the expansion of the family business. In the 
northern strip of Spain, which included cities like Bilbao, Oviedo and Santander, the Godó 
brothers opened new markets for the textile goods that their father’s factory produced in 
Igualada. The selling of the family’s goods in the north of Spain must have been decisive at a 
time when Igualada was undergoing a traumatic process of de-industrialisation. The violent 
aggression aimed at some of the family members during the strike of 1855 demonstrates to 
what extent Igualada’s economic downturn directly affected the Godó family.  
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 Moreover, it can be argued that “localism” was decisive for Bartolomé Godó’s entry 
into politics. Although modest, his deeds in Barcelona’s Provincial Deputation demonstrate 
his desire to improve Igualada’s road connections. That interest would continue during the 
Restoration period, when he insistently requested a railway-connection for Igualada. In this 
respect, Bartolomé Godó exemplifies the case of those elites who saw in clientelism the best 
means of promoting their particular interests. For the liberal-progressive elites this strategy 
became possible after the Sexenio Democrático (1868-1874) put an end to the monopoly of 
power by one single party of Isabella’s reign (1833-1868) and opened public office to new 
parties. However, the more competitive and pluralist party system of the Sexenio and the 
introduction of a more progressive legislation (e.g. the introduction of universal male 
suffrage and the extension of political rights) did not erase political clientelism.  
 In this regard, the intra-period time frame adopted in this chapter has served to 
challenge traditional views on clientelism. Because patron-client relations are often 
associated to the political systems of the last quarter of the 19th century, they are often 
depicted as social relations that were embedded in the political culture of the limited suffrage, 
and were for the exclusive benefit of liberal parties. This perspective has reinforced the idea 
that the rigging of elections was a “pre-modern” practice, opposed to the democratisation of 
politics. In fact, nowadays many historians still present the introduction of universal suffrage 
and the emergence of competitive politics as the symptoms of a new era, characterised by the 
crisis of the liberal-state model, the demise of “notable politics” and its substitution by mass 
politics.294 This chapter, in contrast, has revealed that the introduction of universal male 
suffrage during the Sexenio did not erase political clientelism; nor were the liberal parties the 
only ones to take advantage from it. Both the Republicans and the Democrats, for whom 
popular sovereignty was a pillar of their political culture, also took advantage of clientelism – 
because clientelism became a way for these parties to promote their political projects and 
cope with the perennial institutional instability of the Sexenio.  
 Moreover, the fact that clientelism also existed in France challenges the understanding 
of democratisation according to ideal models.295 Clientelism was not the feature of an alleged 
special path of development of Southern European countries, like Italy, Spain or Portugal. 
Instead, what this chapter has shown is that clientelism was a ingrained and extensive 
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R. Romanelli, “Introducción”, in Salvador Forner Muñoz (ed.), Democracia, elecciones y modernización en 




practice, especially in those countries where a highly centralised liberal-state model existed, 
and where the legal principles of the liberal state coexisted with other forms of authority that 
came from the Ancien Régime. The result was a system of representation based on patron-
client relationships that was not static, but was re-defined in each political context. Indeed, as 
this chapter has shown, both for the case of France and Spain the introduction of universal 
suffrage and the rise of competitive politics did not remove clientelism, it just redefined the 
way it worked.  
 From a comparative perspective, the main difference between these two countries is 
that in France the introduction of universal suffrage in 1848 transformed clientelism into a 
practice aimed at influencing the voters’ behaviour. In Spain’s Democratic Sexennium, in 
contrast, the intervention of governments was more erratic and spontaneous (though equally 
persistent) than in France, and continued to rely on the arbitrary use of electoral rules (as in 
Isabella’s reign). Likewise, in Spain the rigging of elections continued to be justified by the 
principle of “legitimate influence”. 296  In France, however, such public justification of 
clientelism was no longer feasible since clientelism was already perceived as a “corrupt” 
practice by then, even by public officials.297  
 The provincial elections of 1871 demonstrate, nevertheless, that even in rural 
constituencies, like Igualada, some ordinary citizens actively tried to oppose the clientelist 
methods of the Godó. This suggests that in the case of Spain too, the extended nature of 
patronage did not prevent certain people from seeing clientelism as a corrupt practice. This 
change of perception of clientelism can be regarded as part of the long and uneven road on 
the construction of citizenship.298 
 This chapter has demonstrated the importance that newspapers had in the 
organisational structures of cadre parties. At a time when official politics remained the 
concern of a tiny minority, the press acted as an element of social cohesion and reinforced the 
sense of political community. Moreover, the case of La Vanguardia demonstrates that the 
press also constituted a valuable device in the struggle for the symbolic sources of political 
power. Even though the skirmishes between the faction of Rius and Collaso would drag on 
for many years, Bartolomé Godó soon started seeing the returns from his investment in La 
Vanguardia.  
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 Thus, in the days that followed the founding of this newspaper, his position within the 
Constitutional Party improved rapidly. On the 2nd of February 1881 (that is to say, the day 
after La Vanguardia appeared on the newsstands) Bartolomé was elected as vice-president of 
Barcelona’s Local committee of the Constitutional Party, and soon after he was made vice-
president of the party’s Provincial Committee.299 The crowning moment of his ascendant 
career took place in August 1881, when he was finally elected as deputy to the Congress. 
When Bartolomé finally reached the position he had sought so relentlessly (he failed to do so 
in the elections of 1876 and 1880) it was thanks to a new political situation: on the 8th of 
February 1881 the new Liberal Party of Sagasta took power for the first time in the 
Restoration. This event culminated in the integration of the most moderate participants of the 
Democratic Sexennium into the new political system. The fact that La Vanguardia started to 
be published five days before this happened demonstrates that this was a carefully planned 
strategy and reveals, in sum, the importance that newspapers had in the struggle for symbolic 
power of patron-client networks.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





CHAPTER 2. FROM A PARTISAN PRESS MODEL TOWARDS AN INDEPENDENT ONE: 
THE REDESIGN OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’  
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 2.2. CULTURAL TRANSFERS BETWEEN MEDIA SYSTEMS: ‘THE TIMES’ AS A 













“(...) The Vanguardia [is] (...) in size, seriousness, and 
circulation, as well as in completeness of organization, the most 
important paper in Catalonia, one might almost say in the 
whole of Spain.”  






 The observation opening this chapter was made by John Walter, the correspondent of 
the British newspaper The Times in Spain during the First World War (1914-1918).300 By 
then La Vanguardia enjoyed wide prestige and popularity, selling between 80,000 and 
110,0000 copies every day, which made it one of the two most successful newspapers in 
Spain.301 But how did a newspaper that was founded in 1881 as the organ of a political 
faction, and with a circulation of 1,400 copies, become one of the top-selling newspapers in 
the country – to the point that a foreign observer like John Walter could describe it as one of 
the finest exponents of journalism? 
 When historians look to explain the rise of a given newspaper they often identify it 
with the decisions of the owner. In this case, biographers tend to associate the “success” of a 
newspaper with the alleged clairvoyance of the proprietor. Although this is a valid argument, 
it is problematic when historians fall into a teleological narrative in which the sole 
protagonist is the “great man”. Various national historiographies contain examples of this 
type of perspective.302                  
The case of La Vanguardia is not an exception in this regard. There are, indeed, two 
different explanations pointing at different architects for the growth of this newspaper. 
According to Agustí Calvet (the editor of the newspaper between 1920 and 1936) the only 
person responsible for transforming La Vanguardia into a modern newspaper was a journalist 
called Modesto Sánchez Ortiz. This account, which detracts all merit from the Godó brothers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 John Walter (1873-1968) acted as The Times correspondent in Madrid between 1916 and 1918. His great-
great-grandfather had founded the newspaper in 1785. Further information in: William Halley, “John Walter 
(1873-1968)”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.eui.eu/view/article/36718, accessed 23 Feb 2015] 
301 According to the estimations of Nicolás Urgoiti (the director of the main newsprint supplier in Spain), in 
1918 the circulation of Madrid’s ABC and La Vanguardia stood at around 80,000 and 100,000 copies; and 
between 85,000-90,000 copies in the case of Madrid’s El Liberal. Archivo de la Comunidad de Madrid 
(ARCM), Fondo Urgoiti (FU), C-462101, exp. 2: “Tirada de los periódicos diarios españoles (octubre 1918)” 
[manuscript].  
302 For a critique of the view of press barons as “exceptional creatures”, for the case of England, the United 
States and France, see: Jean K. Chalaby, “No ordinary press owners: press barons as a Weberian ideal type”, 




in the newspaper’s expansion, has influenced historians like Jaume Vicens Vives.303 In 
contrast, the current owners of the newspaper have (obviously) proposed a second 
explanation, according to which Sánchez relied on the support of the Godó brothers to 
transform La Vanguardia.304  
 The common points between the two explanations are the important role that Sánchez 
played in the reforms, and the year 1888 as the turning point. During that year, which also 
saw Barcelona host its first World Fair, La Vanguardia formally ended its role as an organ of 
the Liberal Party and became an “independent” newspaper. This decision symbolised the 
beginning of a transition between a partisan press model towards a commercial one, where 
the wish to serve the public – rather than the political community – emerged as the 
newspaper’s primary aim. As a result of this transformation in the editorial line, the year 
1888 has been regarded as the birth of the “modern” Vanguardia as it is today.305 This 
argument is based on the growth in sales that the paper started experiencing after 1888, as 











	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 [In Catalan] “Però aquell “diari polític i d’avisos i notícies, òrgan del partit constitucional de la província”, 
muntat per defensar una posició familiar dintre del caciquisme imperant, havia de constituir ben aviat un 
excel·lent afer. Per què? Generalment s’afirma que això fou degut al tremp dels seus fundadors. En dubtem. És 
molt possible que intervingués decididament en l’èxit l’acció del director, Modest Sánchez Ortiz (...) [el qual] 
llevà a “La Vanguardia” el seu caràcter polític, el féu independent i informatiu i, per tant, l’encarà amb el poble 
i les seves realitats vives.” Jaume Vicens Vives i Montserrat Llorens, Industrials i Polítics (segle XIX), 
Barcelona, El Observador de la Actualidad, ‘Col·lecció Història de Catalunya. Biografies catalanes’, vol. 11, p. 
140. 
304 “Sánchez Ortiz ocupó la dirección de La Vanguardia desde 1888 hasta 1901, y durante aquellos casi catorce 
años, en estrecha colaboración con los propietarios, Carlos Godó y su hijo Ramón, dio al diario el primer gran 
impulso decisivo de su historia”, Josep Maria Casasús Gurí, “Estudio introductorio”, in: Modesto Sánchez Ortiz 
/ El Periodismo, Barcelona, Fundación Conde de Barcelona, La Vanguardia [Facsímil de la edición de 1903; 
introducción de J. M. Casasús Gurí], 1990, p. X. 
305 Francesc Espinet & Joan Manuel Tresserras, La gènesi de la societat de masses a Catalunya 1888-1939, 




Table 1. Circulation of Barcelona’s main newspapers (1886-1927), in thousands of copies 306 
 
Newspaper   1886     1888     1905      1913      1918     1920 
La Publicidad      2       11        7        25        27       85 
Las Noticias     - -       11      11        47        50       60 
La Vanguardia      1         1      18        58        95     100 
El Diluvio      2       12      10        - -        22       40 
ElNoticiero Universal     - -          9      10        - -         22       30 
Diario de Barcelona      2         8        7        - -         19       - - 
 
 
 Still, if 1888 marked a turning point in the history of La Vanguardia, no detailed 
explanation has been offered about how and in what manner this transformation took place. 
The aim of this chapter is thus to explain the transformation of La Vanguardia into a 
commercial and independent newspaper, as part of a broader process taking place in Europe 
and the United States during the second half of the 19th century: namely, the birth of a new 
mass media culture.307 Although national perspectives have been dominant in press history, 
in the last decade the comparative perspective has emerged with great impetus. While this is 
not to say that comparative media studies did not exist before,308 it can be argued that the 
publishing of Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini’s work in 2004 was decisive for triggering 
greater interest in this field of study.309 The main contribution of this book lies in challenging 
the Anglo-American or “liberal media model” as the norm against which the development of 
the media in other countries is analysed. Hallin and Mancini demonstrated that this model 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Source: María Carmen García Nieto “La Prensa diaria de Barcelona de 1895 a 1910”, Barcelona, Universitat 
de Barcelona, 1956 [thesis manuscript], p. 89; Francesc Espinet i Joan Manuel Tresserras, La gènesi de la 
societat de masses a Catalunya, 1888-1939, Bellaterra, UAB, p. 77. These circulation figures are based on 
stamp duties and therefore should be taken with caution. 
307 Jean-Ives Mollier, Jean-François Sirinelli et François Vallotton, Culture de masse et culture médiatique en 
Europe et dans les Amériques. 1860-1940, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2006; Richard L. Kaplan, 
Politics and the American Press. The Rise of Objectivity, 1865-1920, Cambridge-New York, CUP, 2002. 
308 Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, Four theories of the press: the authoritarian, 
libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet communist concepts of what the press should be and do, Freeport, 
Books for Libraries Press, 1973 [1st ed. 1956].  
309  Daniel Hallin & Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics, 
Cambridge, New York, CUP, 2004. See, for instance: Jane Chapman, Comparative Media History. An 
Introduction: 1789 to the Present, Cambridge-Malden, Polity, 2005. In the case of Catalan scholars there has 
been a certain tradition of comparative studies too. See: Josep Maria Casasús, Periodística catalana comparada, 
Barcelona, Pòrtic, 1993; and more recently: Jaume Guillamet, “Por una historia comparada del periodismo. 




was not universal, but was part of a certain way of understanding journalism (“journalistic 
culture”) common to certain countries (like the United States and the United Kingdom). In 
my view, the most valuable contribution of these two scholars has consisted in their proposal 
of a new theoretical framework for comparative analysis based on three media systems, each 
portraying three different ways in which the relation between the media and the political 
system was historically shaped in Western societies.310  
 While representing a remarkable step forward for our understanding of journalism 
from a comparative perspective, the framework of Hallin and Mancini is not without its 
limitations. The tracing of a comparative analysis based on “ideal types” has led to the 
neglect of the cultural transfers that historically took place between countries belonging to 
different media systems. These types of transfers have only been studied for the case of 
neighbouring countries, and only recently.311 Indeed, different cultural traditions and the 
great divergences that existed in historical development – in terms of urbanisation, economic 
development and the extension of literacy – between the United States and Northern Europe, 
on one hand, and Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, on the other, have blinded scholars to 
the transnational media exchanges occurring between these areas.  
 However, the existence of different rhythms of historical development in Europe was 
not necessarily an obstacle for the exchange of ideas across national boundaries. On the 
contrary, the growing awareness among some journalists about the divergences between 
countries, especially in the most dynamic urban centres, created a mounting interest in 
emulating what they perceived as the more developed style of journalism of other societies. 
La Vanguardia is an example of this phenomenon: while it was a genuine example of the 
strong partisan orientation the press had in Barcelona, in 1888 Sánchez Ortiz transformed the 
newspaper by taking The Times as a reference model. Indeed, when writing the lines that 
opened this chapter John Walter was probably unaware that the British newspaper he worked 
for had influenced the new look of the Godó brothers’ newspaper. Moreover, a glance at 
other cities of the Mediterranean reveals that cultural transfers in the journalistic field were 
not exceptional. In 1900 a young journalist called Luigi Albertini was appointed as the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 These three models of media and politics correspond to geographical areas sharing similar patterns of 
historical development. They are: the “Liberal Model” (present in Great Britain, Ireland and North America); 
the “Democratic Corporatist Model” (Northern Continental Europe) and the “Polarized Pluralist Model” 
(Mediterranean countries). For a detailed discussion of this book, see the Introduction. 
311 Joel H. Wiener, The Americanization of the British press, 1830s-1914. Speed in the age of transatlantic 
journalism, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; and J. H. Wiener and Mark 




director of Milan’s Il Corriere della Sera and he also took The Times as his model when 
redesigning the newspaper.  
 The main purpose of this chapter is to examine why the Godó brothers decided to 
transform La Vanguardia into an independent newspaper in 1888, and to examine why The 
Times became their source of inspiration to do so. If, as noted in Chapter 1, the founding of 
the newspaper allowed Bartolomé Godó to gain political prominence in the new Restoration 
system, then why did he and his brother Carlos feel the need to change the newspaper’s 
editorial line? How was this decision influenced by the development of the Godó’s political 
career and the struggle among the Constitutionals of Barcelona? Furthermore, was the fact 
that another newspaper with a strong political leaning (Il Corriere della Sera) took The Times 
as a reference a mere coincidence?  
 These are the questions that this chapter will address. To do so, it will be divided in 
two parts. The first part will examine the characteristics of journalism during the first years of 
La Vanguardia in relation to the political career of Bartolomé Godó. It will analyse in which 
ways journalism served Godó’s political ambitions. In so doing, it will examine the links 
between press and politics – a relationship that is considered to be particularly close in 
Mediterranean countries.312 The second part of this chapter will examine the circumstances 
that led the Godó brothers to end La Vanguardia’s official function as the mouthpiece of the 
Liberal Party in Barcelona. This decision implied a complete reversal of Godó’s power 
strategies, as it meant abandoning his struggle with the faction of Rius to be the official 
spokesman of Sagasta in the city. It will be argued that the Godó brothers took advantage of 
the changes that were taking place in Barcelona in 1888, particularly as a result of the World 
Fair, to redefine the editorial line of their newspaper. The way they would do so was by 
hiring a young journalist, Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, whom they tasked with transforming La 
Vanguardia into an independent and profit-oriented newspaper. By examining why and in 
what ways Sánchez used the example of The Times to redesign La Vanguardia, this chapter 
will adopt a transnational perspective to point to the limits of the media’s “ideal type” theory. 
In doing so, it will also shed light on the importance that cultural transfers between different 
media systems had in the creation of new journalistic codes. The case of Italy’s Il Corriere 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




2.1.  CLIENTELISM AND THE ADVOCACY FUNCTION OF THE PRESS  
 
 In December 1881 the Spanish Congress registered a request for the establishing of a 
new railway connection between the Catalan towns of Igualada and Balaguer. The man 
behind this request was the new deputy Bartolomé Godó, and this was to be his – rather 
discreet – debut in national politics.313 The idea of a railway connection had been a claim in 
Igualada since the mid-19th century, when the economic downturn of the textile industry put 
the town in an extremely vulnerable situation. As early as 1852 the first petition for 
Igualada’s railway connection was made, and in 1863 the Senate approved it – to the great 
delight of Igualada’s population. All this public expectation, however, rapidly vanished when 
a series of bureaucratic hurdles prevented the new railway from becoming a reality.314 The 
request that Godó made in December 1881 symbolised, in consequence, another step in 
Igualada’s long struggle to improve its overland connections (even though the railway did not 
become a reality until 1893). 
 In fact, the railway connection had already been a major topic of public debate in the 
elections of August 1881, when Bartolomé Godó was elected for the first time as deputy in 
Congress. The electoral campaign between him and the Conservative candidate did not 
consist in the confrontation of either ideas or political principles, but remained focused on the 
competition between the two companies that aspired to build Igualada’s future railway 
connection.315 The fact that Bartolomé Godó was a partner of one of these companies reveals 
to what extent politics was an extension of the struggle between the interests of different 
economic groups.316 La Vanguardia launched a campaign to support Godó and give further 
visibility to his infrastructure project. Still, when the time to vote arrived, clientelist methods, 
rather than public opinion, are what won Godó the election. Indeed, the local agents of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 This request was Godó’s only intervention during the plenary session. La Iberia, 06/12/1881, p. 3; La Época, 
07/12/1881, p. 2 and p. 3. 
314 1848 saw the inauguration of the line between Barcelona and Mataró, the first railway connection in Spain. 
This event was soon regarded as the best the solution to Igualada’s economic crisis. Miquel Térmens i Graells, 
“El ferrocarril a Igualada: la lluita pel progrés (1852-1893)”, Miscellanea Aqualatensia, 1983, num. 3, pp. 215-
245 (p. 219). 
315 “Dos distintas empresas se proponen construir un ferro-carril económico que tiene un mismo punto de 
partida y debe seguir un mismo trazado y como no es posible que el Gobierno, dado la legislación vigente, 
pueda otorgar dos concesiones iguales, es muy aventurado asegurar cuál de las dos obtendrá en definitiva dicha 
concesión”. “Á los habitantes de Igualada. Ayuntamiento Constitucional de Igualada (18/02/1881)”, quoted in: 
Joan Palomas i Moncholí, “El rerefons econòmic de l’activitat dels parlamentaris catalans (1876-1885), 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002 [PhD dissertation], p. 859.  
316 Godó was a partner of the company “Bové & Artés”, which gathered a group of Igualada’s businessmen. The 
Conservative candidate (Manuel Camacho), in contrast, sponsored a second company formed by a group of 





Godó brothers and the support they obtained from Sagasta’s new Liberal government are 
what ultimately defeated the Conservative candidate.317 
 As noted in Chapter 1, the foundation of La Vanguardia placed Godó in a favourable 
position to reap the benefits of the Liberal Party’s first seizing of power in the Restoration 
(February 1881). The coming into power of the Liberal’s fulfilled the goal that Cánovas del 
Castillo had been pursuing since the beginning of the new political system (namely, the 
integration of the most moderate participants of the Democratic Sexennium in the 
Restoration). The Liberal Party soon became one of the central pillars of the new political 
system: in 1885 Sagasta reached an agreement with the Conservative Party of Cánovas (the 
so-called “Pacto del Pardo”) according to which they would alternate in power successively. 
According to this agreement, reached under critical circumstances,318 instead of holding 
elections to choose the ruling party the two liberal parties would decide – with the decisive 
intervention of the King – when power was to be transferred between them.  
 The “Pacto del Pardo” set out the procedure through which the two liberal parties 
would monopolise public office during the Restoration period (1874-1923), while excluding 
from it the rest of the parties. In consequence, elections in Restoration Spain became a pure 
formality aimed at confirming the results the two parties had agreed beforehand; to the point 
that until the crisis of 1913, the two liberal parties managed to alternate in power without 
much difficulty.319 Caciquismo became the method the two parties used to impose electoral 
results, as well as the procedure to distribute public office to all the local bosses (“clients”) 
they had across the Spanish territory. It has been estimated that between 1,000 and 5,000 
administrative positions (in institutions ranging from city councils to judiciary courts, as well 
as other positions in public bodies) changed hands after each election.320 In this way, in 1885 
the Restoration implemented a procedure that was similar to that of Portugal: two parties 
agreed to rotate in power and secured this agreement through the rigging of elections. In Italy  
too, clientelism was the procedure liberal parties used to monopolise government, even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 As one opponent claimed, the supporters of Godó falsified the votes by adding the names of dead people to 
the ballot box. In parallel, the Civil Governor of Barcelona forced the mayors of Igualada’s constituency to 
support Godó’s candidacy. J. Palomas i Moncholí, op. cit., pp. 894-895. Between the 1st and the 20th of February 
La Vanguardia published an article almost every day supporting Godó’s railway project. 
318 The agreement was a way of assuring the stability of the political system after the death of King Alfonso XII 
(November 1885), and with a civil war (“Tercera Guerra Carlista”, 1872-1876) and a separatist insurrection in 
Cuba (“Ten Years War”, 1868-1878) going on. 
319 All the electoral results, in: José Varela Ortega (dir.), El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en 
España, 1875-1923, Madrid, Marcial Pons, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2001. 
320 Quoted in Georgina Blakeley, “Clientelism in the Building of State and Civil Society in Spain”, in S. 




though the procedure was slightly different: in this case, it consisted in the building of intra-
party coalitions (“trasformismo”) rather than in party rotation.321 
 Bartolomé Godó was an example of one of those local bosses (or “caciques”) who 
benefited from the two parties’ monopoly over public office. His election to the Spanish 
Congress for Igualada’s constituency became dependent on the alternation in power between 
the Conservatives and the Liberals. Thus, only when the Liberal Party seized power was 
Bartolomé elected as deputy, as Table 2 illustrates. It was not until more than a decade later 
that the political influence of the Godó family became powerful enough to impose its own 
candidate against the will of the government. By then, Bartolomé was suffering from an 
illness that had led his brother Carlos (who moved back to Barcelona in the 1870s) to assume 
the family’s candidacy for Congress, see Table 2. However, this did not take place until the 





















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 For a comparative perspective on these three countries see: Gabriele Ranzato, Gabriele Ranzato, La forja de 
la soberanía nacional: las elecciones en los sistemas liberales italiano y español, Ayer, 3, 1991, pp. 115-138; 
Silvana Casmirri y Manuel Suárez Cortina (eds.), La Europa del sur en la época liberal: España, Italia y 
Portugal. Una perspectiva comparada, Universidad de Cantabria-Università di Cassino, 1998; and Javier 
Moreno Luzón y Pedro Tavares de Almeida (eds.), De las Urnas al Hemiciclo. Elecciones y parlamentarismo 




Table 2. Electoral results of the Godó family during the period 1879-1897 322 
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Badia (C) 
 
Carlos Godó Pié (L) 
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 Still, the fact that Bartolomé Godó’s career echoed the alternation in power between 
the two liberal parties did not mean that his election was guaranteed when the Liberals were 
in power. The division within the Liberals of Barcelona between the Collaso and Rius 
factions meant that a struggle between the two factions to impose their respective candidates 
also existed. This means that despite the extant agreement between the two parties at a 
national level, the local elites competed amongst themselves to reach public office. The best 
example of this was the election of 1886. On this occasion, Godó was not the only candidate 
of the Liberal Party for Igualada’s constituency, but he competed with the candidate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Source: Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (ACD); Albert Balcells et al., Les eleccions generals a 
Catalunya de 1901 a 1923. Relació dels resultats electorals de 1869 a 1899, Barcelona, Fundació Jaume Bufill, 
1982, p. 521 and p. 628; Jordi Planas i Francesc Valls-Junyent, Cacics i rabassaires. Dinàmica associativa i 
conflictivitat social. Els Hostalets de Pierola (1890-1939), Vic, Eumo, Centre d’Estudis Comarcals d’Igualada, 




belonging to the faction of Rius – a man from Madrid named Vicente Romero Baldrich. This 
competition reveals that Godó’s involvement in the founding of La Vanguardia placed him 
on Rius’ list of enemies. This was not a trifling matter given that Rius was the leader of the 
party, and had been Barcelona’s mayor since 1881.  
 Consequently, during the elections of 1886 Igualada’s constituency became the scene 
of the Liberals’ intra-party struggle. Rius’ desire to prevent Godó from being elected was so 
intense that he made agreements with the Conservatives and the Catholic fundamentalists to 
make sure his candidate won. Rius also paid various men to rig the elections.323 In the end, 
only the support of a local network allowed Godó to win the elections – albeit also by rigging 
them. Indeed, Godó had a network of local supporters that included various family members, 
like his brother Carlos Godó (who had returned from Bilbao), and his cousin Juan Godó. This 
network of local supporters, formally structured since 1887 as the effective board of the 
“Centro Liberal Monárquico de Igualada y su Partido”,324 allowed Bartolomé to impose his 
control in Igualada, and to reject the entry of “foreign” candidates, like the one Rius 
sponsored. The case of Godó thus demonstrates that in order to influence public institutions, 
local elites could not rely solely on their contacts with national leaders (like Sagasta); but also 
depended on a local base of supporters (or “clients”) to manipulate elections. The presence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 “(...) hubo de luchar contra toda la fuerza moral y de otra índole de que disponía el cadí de Barcelona [Rius], 
que se había propuesto, costara lo que costara, derrotar al señor Godó. Al efecto celebró varias entrevistas con el 
alcalde conservador de Igualada; celebró una alianza ofensiva y defensiva con el mismo, como también se había 
aliado para un objeto análogo con los conservadores de Barcelona. Pusiéronse entonces en juego todos los 
medios para vencer al señor Godó; se echó mano desde los carlistas á los conservadores y empezó una cruzada 
terrible contra nuestro amigo”. LV, 12/04/1886, p. 4; 19/04/1886, p. 7. 
324 “Comité y Junta del Centro liberal monárquico de Igualada y su partido” [“Committee and Central Board 
of the Liberal Party’s branch in Igualada and its constituency”]: 
 
Honorary board: president, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta. Bartolomé Godó Pié, deputy in Congress. 
 Vice president: Carlos Godó Pié. 
 Spokesmen: José Collaso Gil, deputy in Congress; Sebastián Franch Jover, lawyer and former deputy; 
 Luis Matas Fontcuberta, lawyer and provincial deputy; Francisco Riba Lladó, lawyer. 
 
Effective board: president, Ramón Sistaré Gabarró, Igualada’s former mayor and propietor.  
 Vice president: Francisco Jover i Girbau, tradesmen. 
 Treasurer: Francisco Colomer Fortuny, proprietor. 
 Curator: Juan Godó Llucià, manufacturer. 
 Spokesmen: José Oliva Piqué, manufacturer; José Carulla Bover, proprietor; Ramón Tosal 
 Boladeras, manufacturer; Isidro Casellas Castellví, proprietor; José Riba Tous, tradesman; Salvador 
 Nadal Adzet, tradesman; Ramón Bassols Costa, “substitute” in the Property Registry; José Prats 
 Galtés, tradesmen; Juan Montaner Gabarró, manufacturer. 
 Secretary: Guillermo Dueñas. 
 Vice secretary: Juan Coca Calsina, proprietor. 
Source: LV, 04/02/1887, p. 9 i La Iberia, 23/02/1887, p. 2. The social-background of the Committee reveals that 




different family members in the circle of Bartolomé Godó reveals the importance of kinship 
ties in the social cohesion of patron-client networks.325 
 Nevertheless, Godó’s victory in the elections of 1886 did not signal an end to the 
struggle amongst the Liberals of Barcelona. La Vanguardia repeatedly proclaimed that it 
would always back the leadership of Sagasta but that it would never accept the authority of 
Rius.326 The instrumental value of the press in political struggle became evident when Rius, 
tired of the campaign of slander he received from La Vanguardia, established his own 
newspaper: “El Barcelonés”. The result was a long period of heated struggles between the 
two factions where the public space became the battleground.327 The blows exchanged 
through the press reveal the importance newspapers played in the competition between elites. 
Next to being an instrument to publicise particularistic views, newspapers were thus aimed at 
undermining the prestige of the opponent. This intra-party struggle did not spare personal 
attacks, to the point that Rius even sued La Vanguardia for slander.328 
 From a broader perspective, the skirmishes between El Barcelonés and La 
Vanguardia reveal the strong partisan character of the press at that time; not only in Spain but 
throughout Europe. In fact, attacks in the press were one of the main causes of duelling on the 
Continent. In Italy, for instance, journalism was the main reason for this kind of dispute 
between 1879 and 1895, while in Spain some partisan papers even took the precaution of 
recruiting swordsmen to pose as editors in case of future duels.329 Likewise, Germany and 
France became pioneers in establishing formal codes to settle press disputes in private; and 
the authorities faced enormous difficulties in preventing them.330 Still, while historians have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 This point will be examined in further detail in subsequent chapters. 
326 LV, 14/03/1885, p. 7-8. 
327 As Barcelona’s Conservative newspaper La Dinastía reported with amusement: “El mismo periódico, 
empuñando las disciplinas, arremete contra su correligionario La Vanguardia, y se expresa en estos términos: 
«¿Tiene La Vanguardia ninguno de los timbres de que blasona justamente El Barcelonés? No, ni de cien leguas. 
Un órgano que promete reirse de las decisiones de la más alta superioridad en el partido; un periódico que viene 
sosteniendo la discordia en el seno de la agrupación á que dice pertenecer; una publicación que sin justificado 
motivo viene haciendo coro á los más acérrimos adversarios del partido en que milita, ¿qué derecho ni qué 
autoridad ha de tener ante el público sensato, para lanzar recriminaciones ni aventurar juicios tan torcidos como 
pudieran formularlos los mayores enemigos de nuestro partido legalmente constituido en esta provincia?». La 
Dinastía, 03/02/1888, p. 1. 
328 “Nuestro respetado amigo el señor Rius y Taulet ha llevado á los tribunales al periódico La Vanguardia por 
injurias inferidas á su persona”. El Barcelonés, 13/06/1885, p. 1. 
329 Steven C. Hughes, Politics of the Sword. Dueling, Honor and Masculinity in Modern Italy, Columbus, Ohio 
State University Press, 2007, p. 77; and José Alvarez Junco, “Lerroux, El País y el periodismo de izquierdas”, in 
J. M. Martínez (ed.), Grandes periodistas olvidados, Madrid, Fundación Banco Exterior, Col. Seminarios y 
cursos, 1987, pp. 56-58 (the anecdote of the professional swordsmen, in pp. 57-58). 
330 To the point that France’s Third Republic has been described as a “duelling-abolitionist nightmare”. Spain’s 
Infante Don Alfonso de Bourbon even became the leader of an international Anti-Duelling League. See: Kevin 




mostly studied duelling as a way to assess the importance that cultural codes like honour and 
masculinity played in European societies (particularly in the 1990s, when this became a 
fashionable topic of research), less attention has been paid to what duelling reveals about 
print culture. In fact, and besides being an alleged vestige of the Old Regime, duelling was 
evocative of the strong partisan tradition that journalist culture had in Western societies.331 
This advocacy tradition was not restricted to an allegedly aristocratic Europe, but was a 
central feature of the press in the United States too.332  
 The clashes between the Collaso and Rius factions continued for a long time and they 
reached the point when two separate delegations visited Sagasta in Madrid, claiming to be the 
true representatives of Barcelona’s party branch.333 The fact that Sagasta received both of 
them symbolised the benefits that founding La Vanguardia had brought for Collaso’s group: 
they were not seen anymore as rebels, but Sagasta acknowledged them as one of the party 
representatives in Barcelona. At the head of the Collaso delegation was Pere Antoni Torres 
Jordi (1844-1901), the first editor in the history of La Vanguardia.334 The case of Torres 
illustrates the importance that journalism had in the organisation of cadre parties. The 
position of editor invested Torres with the symbolic authority to act as the spokesman of 
Collaso’s faction and allowed him to be received as a legitimate interlocutor by Sagasta. The 
political function that Torres played as editor of La Vanguardia reveals just how closely 
interlinked politics and journalism were at the time.  
 In fact, it can be said that Torres was recruited as the first editor of La Vanguardia 
because of his political affiliation. His political career spanned back to the Democratic 
Sexennium, when he founded various newspapers in his hometown of Tarragona to support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pp. 184-185; Robert Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France, Oxford, 1993; Kevin 
McAleer, Dueling: The Cult of Honor in Fin-de-Siecle Germany. 
331 As Steven C. Hughes has rightly noted for the case of Italy in, op. cit., p. 68. For duelling as an alleged sign 
of an aristocratic culture, see: Arno Mayer, The persistence of the Old Regime. Europe to the Great War, New 
York, Pantheon Books, 1981.  
332 As Richard Kaplan has explained for the city of Detroit during the Gilded age (1870-1890). Richard Kaplan, 
op. cit. A work that is fully devoted to the topic above mentioned (though it is less valuable in my view than 
Kaplan’s work) is: Ryan Chamberlain, Pistols, Politics and the Press. Dueling in the 19th Century American 
Journalism, Jefferson, McFarland, 2009. 
333 “Han venido á Madrid dos distintas comisiones de los constitucionales de Barcelona, una presidida por el Sr. 
Rius y Taulet y otra por el Sr. Torres. Ambos han pretendido representar la opinion de la mayoria de los 
constitucionales de aquella provincia, y la segunda ha mandado consignar en algunos periódicos, que no era 
exacto que el Sr. Sagasta reconociera en el Sr. Rius y Taulet la jefatura de sus amigos en la provincia de 
Barcelona.” La Correspondencia de España, 20/02/1881, p. 3. La Vanguardia did not lose the opportunity to 
reproduce the news of La Correspondencia. LV, 22/02/1881, p. 2. 
334 There is one biography available on this character, even though it is mostly concerned with his literary 
career. Josep Mª Vallès i Martí, De l'idealisme a l'oblit. Poesia i teatre de Pere Antoni Torres Jordi, Valls, 
Cossetània, 2007. Contrary to what some scholars have argued (like Tasis and Torrent), Jaume Andreu was not 
the first director of La Vanguardia, but its chief editor. Rafael Tasis i Joan Torrent, Història de la premsa 




the Constitutional Party.335 The activism in the press provided him with political contacts, 
among which his close friendship with Sagasta, as well as public positions like that of civil 
governor in Girona, Malaga, and Granada. Torres’ experience in founding newspapers was 
surely an added merit, but only second to his acquaintance with the leader of the Liberal 
Party. The case of Torres demonstrates that political affiliation, rather than professional 
value, was the guiding pattern in the recruitment of journalists. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that the first four editors in the history of La Vanguardia were all members of the Liberal 
Party – including Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, the man responsible for turning the paper into an 
“independent” newspaper.336 Therefore, the case of La Vanguardia reveals the lack of 
autonomy that journalism had in relation to politics; and its lack of differentiation as a 
distinctive professional field.337 
 The first consequence of the close links between the press and politics was that 
journalism often acted as a route into public office. Due to the extremely low circulation of 
partisan papers and the lack of professional recognition, the salaries of journalists were very 
low forcing most of them to take on other jobs to complement their incomes. These 
precarious working conditions meant that journalism was not regarded as a profession in 
itself, but as a springboard into public office. Indeed, for men of humble origins, journalism 
became a way to attain seats in parliaments, provincial administrations, and city halls. 
Governments took advantage of this situation and dedicated a special budget – the so-called 
“reptile funds” – to bribing journalists. Many journalists were on the payroll of the ministry 
of interior (under various guises – even as street cleaners), while others made their way into 
public positions thanks to their political contacts.338  
 The second characteristic that journalism had in Spain, besides the lack of autonomy 
from politics, was a strong literary profile. This was also a distinguishing feature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Named “La Prensa”, “La Prensa Libre” and “La Nueva Prensa”. Ibidem, p. 17. 
336 When Pere Antoni Torres Jordi was appointed editor of La Vanguardia he was also deputy in the Spanish 
Congress for the constituency of Gandesa. The following directors were: Alfredo García López (?-1906), who 
had been the director of the Madrid newspaper La Mañana (the mouthpiece of Víctor Balaguer in Madrid) and 
was a Liberal; Josep Roger i Miquel (1829-1892), who was the former director of the Liberal Barcelona 
newspaper La Bomba. For the political affiliation of Sánchez, see: “Los encasillados”, La Dinastía, 30/01/1893, 
p. 1. 
337 On Bourdieu’s field theory applied to journalism, see: D. Hallin and P. Mancini, op. cit., Chapter 4. 
338 The venality of the press was an extended phenomenon in Europe. The Times, for instance, received a £300 
annual subsidy from the Government, referred to by the newspaper’ owner (John Walter) as a “reward for the 
politics of the Paper”. Stanley Morison, The History of The Times, London, Office of the Times, 1935, vol. 1, p. 
213. The “reptile funds” were considered to be an invention of Bismarck. For the Spanish case, see: José 
Alvarez Junco, “Lerroux, El País y el periodismo de izquierdas”, op. cit., pp. 51-54 (for the street cleaner’s 
anecdote see p. 51); and Jesús Timoteo Álvarez, Restauración y prensa de masas. Los engranajes de un sistema, 




journalism in Italy, Portugal, and France.339 The entry into the newsroom allowed many men 
to satisfy their literary vocation, this being a tendency that was favoured by the strong 
commentary-oriented tradition that journalism had in the mentioned countries.340 As a result 
of this tradition, journalists often combined the writing of aggressive political editorials with 
the writing of literary works – sometimes published in the same newspaper. The first editor in 
the history of La Vanguardia (Torres) was the paramount example of this combination of 
self-education, literary vocation, and political ambition. Besides his affiliation to the Liberal 
Party, Torres was also a renowned poet and playwright. And he soon abandoned his position 
as editor of La Vanguardia for a new appointment, in 1882, as “Director General de 
Beneficiencia and Sanidad”, which he combined with his role of deputy in the Congress.341 
His case reveals to what extent journalism was regarded as a temporary stepping-stone to 
higher political positions, rather than as a profession in itself.   
 Therefore, it can be concluded that the main function journalism played in the early 
years of La Vanguardia was an advocacy function. The case of this newspaper was no 
exception, but went in line with the strong political content the press had in Barcelona, as 












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Adolfo Scotto di Luzio, “Tra campo letterario e politica: i giornalisti in età liberale”, G. Mellis (ed.), Le élites 
nella storia dell’Italia unita, Napoli, Cuen, 2003, pp. 195-211; Valerio Castronovo, La stampa italiana nell’età 
liberale, Bari, Laterza, 1979, pp. 62-68; Ana Cabrera (ed.), Jornais, jornalistas e jornalismo: séculos XIX-XX, 
Lisboa, Livros Horizonte, 2011; Marie-Ève Thérenty et Alain Vaillant (dir), Presse et plumes. Journalisme et 
littérature au XIXe siècle, Paris, Nouveau Monde Éditions, 2004. 
340 In countries like Great Britain, in contrast, journalism tended to be more oriented towards “news gathering” 
rather than commentary-oriented journalism. See: D. Hallin and P. Mancini, op. cit, p. 29. 
341 [E.T.]: “General Director of Health and Wellness”. J. M. Vallès i Martí, op. cit., p. 16. Torres acted as 
deputy in the Congress for the constituencies of Tarragona-Reus-Falset (1879 and 1886), Gandesa (1888 and 
1886), Puigcerdà (1893) and Valls (1896). Maria Gemma Rubí Casals y Josep Armengol Segú, “Cataluña”, in J. 

















Barcelona (1886) * 
 
Language 
El Diluvio Republican           12,000            1,571 Spanish 
La Publicidad Republican / 
Informative 
         11,000            1,649     “   “ 
El Noticiero Universal Conservative            9,000              - - -      “   “ 
Diario de Barcelona Conservative            8,000            1,875    “    “ 
El Correo Catalán  Carlist            5,000            1,945     “   “ 
Diario Mercantil Commercial             4,500             - - -     “   “ 
La Renaixensa Catalan nationalist and 
conservative 
           3,000              635 Catalan 
La Nación Reformist             2,500             - - -  Spanish 
El Suplemento Liberal             1,500             - - -    “   “ 
El Barcelonés Liberal (Rius)            1,400             372    “   “ 
La Vanguardia Liberal (Collaso)            1,400             363    “   “ 
El Monitor Conservative 
(R. Robledo) 
           1,050             - - -    “   “ 
La Dinastía Conservative             1,000             176    “   “ 
 
 
 Although the figures in Table 3 should be interpreted with caution – as they are based 
on stamp duty records – they do reveal the general features of Barcelona’s press. With a few 
exceptions,343 these general characteristics were: a highly politicised content, an extremely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Figures based on the quantity newspapers paid on stamp duties. These were only estimated figures. Sources: 
compilation based on the “Estadística de la Prensa Periódica” (Ministerio de la Gobernación, Madrid, 1889), 
reproduced in: DDAA, 200 anys de premsa diària a Catalunya, Fundació Caixa de Catalunya – Arxiu Històric 
de la Ciutat- Col·legi de Periodistes de Catalunya, 1995, p. 539. * The number of subscribers should be taken 
with extreme precaution, since they are estimations made by the journal La Campana de Gràcia based on the 
information of the government (“Delegación de Hacienda”). See: La Campana de Gràcia, 18/07/1886, p. 1. 
343 Amidst the widely extended partisan character there were some exponents of a more informative type of 
journalism, like El Noticiero Universal, which achieved a certain success in terms of circulation. Only the 
Republican press managed to sell more than 10,000 copies, something that reflected the strong roots this 





low circulation – mostly limited to the supporters of the political community, and the use of 
Spanish as the predominant language. Amidst the modest panorama the press offered in 
Barcelona, La Vanguardia was merely the mouthpiece of a political faction and had a 
circulation of 1,400 copies. This was, in sum, the precarious state in which Sánchez found La 




2.2. CULTURAL TRANSFERS BETWEEN MEDIA SYSTEMS: THE TIMES AS A 
REFERENCE MODEL IN THE REFORM OF LA VANGUARDIA (1888) 
 
 
 The strong partisan character of La Vanguardia’s journalism was suddenly put aside 
on January 1st 1888. On that day, and without prior notice, the newspaper published an article 
on its front page in which it announced the beginning of a series of drastic transformations. 
The article was entitled “A nuestros lectores” (“To our readers”) and introduced the changes 
of the editorial line of La Vanguardia, based on the following reasons: 
 
“Uno de los signos más seguros de la cultura y de la vida de un pueblo se ofrece en su 
prensa periódica. (...) Cualquiera que vea el ‘Times’, no necesita ver que está fechado en 
Londres para saber que es el periódico de una nación rica, poderosa y sabia. La vida de 
Inglaterra, tan vigorosa como se destaca en el cuadro de la historia contemporánea se refleja en 
el gran periódico, así en su texto escogido, variado y ameno, y siempre sesudo como en su parte 
material y tipográfica. 
Un periódico es la vocina (sic) de todos los ecos armónicos, es la repetición de todos los 
intereses legítimos; en él ha de encontrar cada clase su nota, cada lector su frase, y en este 
concepto y por este medio el periódico vendrá á ser el retrato exacto de la sociedad en cuyo 
seno y para quien se hace. No intentamos nosotros hacer un ‘Times’, sería pretensión vana y 
ridícula, pero si queremos que nuestro periódico, en compañía de los otros dignísimos colegas 
de esta capital refleje en primer término y con la mayor exactitud posible la vida de Barcelona, 
luego la de Cataluña, y por último, la de España entera, que constituyen las tres relaciones 
primordiales de nuestra existencia social. 
(...) Creemos que no se desprende de la prensa, obra fecunda para el público, si los 
periódicos no se inspiran en altos ideales y en los principios de una crítica severa. Estos serán, 
pues, nuestros principios de conducta. Imparcialidad y severidad. Aquellos actos que en nuestra 
conciencia sean acertados, tendrán en nosotros despiadados censores; para aquellos otros que 




en otro caso, en nuestra jurisdicción de críticos no caerá más que el acto criticable; jamás la 
persona que lo ejecute, respetable para nosotros siempre. Esta nos parece obra difícil porque al 
cabo como hombres también tenemos nuestras pasiones; pero es nuestra intención 
sobreponernos á las miserias humanas en interés general (...). Reciba, pues, la prensa de 
Barcelona un saludo cordialísimo de LA VANGUARDIA y préstennos nuestros lectores la 
ayuda que hemos menester en la empresa que en su obsequio acometemos.” 344 
  
 This new editorial line stood in clear contrast to the bellicose tone the newspaper had 
used until then.345 The audience La Vanguardia now addressed was neither Sagasta nor Rius 
but was generally referred to as “the readers”. Consequently, for the first time La Vanguardia 
did not define its readership according to political affiliation but as a notion surpassing the 
frontiers of opinion. As the newspaper put it, every “class” and “every reader” should now be 
capable of finding their own concept in La Vanguardia. Instead of the Liberal party, three 
elements now justified the raison d’être of this newspaper: Barcelona, Catalonia, and 
Spain.346 
 La Vanguardia’s statements did not go unnoticed among the Liberals of Barcelona. 
Some of Collaso’s supporters viewed these statements with disdain; some others were deeply 
disappointed by them. Still, the general impression was scepticism about the capacity of the 
newspaper to move away from its partisan origins.347 At this point we should ask: what was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 “A nuestros lectores”, LV, 01/01/1888, p. 1. [E. T.]: “One of the clearest signs of culture in every people is 
its periodical press. (...) Any one who sees the Times does not need to know that it is printed in London to know 
that this is the newspaper of a rich, powerful and wise nation. The rich life of England in modern history is 
reflected in this great newspaper, through its select writing, which is always varied and entertaining, as well as 
accurately made in its material and tipographical dymension. Every newspaper is the loudspeaker (...) of 
legitimate interests; every reader must find in it its own sentence and concept, and in this way the newspaper 
will come to be the exact portrait of the society where it is published. We do not pretend to emulate The Times, 
for this would be a vain pretension, but we do want to make of our newspaper, together with our distinguished 
colleagues in this city, to reflect as exactly as possible the life of Barcelona, then Catalonia and finally Spain, for 
these constitute the three raison d’être of our existence.  (...) We are convinced that the press only provides a 
public service when it is inspired in high ideals and the principles of severe criticism. This shall be, therefore, 
our guiding patterns. Impartiality and severity. (...) This aim appears to be difficult to us, for at the end as all the 
men we too have our passion; but our will is to overcome human petty miseries for the sake of the general 
interest (...) A warm greeting to all the press in Barcelona from LA VANGUARDIA and shall our readers 
support us in this task to which we are now committed for their service.” 
345 For instance if compared with the first editorial in the history of La Vanguardia (01/02/1881): “Tenemos que 
aprestarnos al combate; la reaccion avanza; prepárase al Gobierno á la resistencia y no hemos de ser nosotros los 
últimos que aceptemos en la lucha el puesto de honor que, de derecho, nos corresponde. Nuestro programa, 
pues, es preciso y terminante”. The full editorial is reproduced in Chapter 1. 
346 “(...) la vida de Barcelona, luego la de Cataluña, y por último, la de España entera, que constituyen las tres 
relaciones primordiales de nuestra existencia social”. “A nuestros lectores”, op.cit. 
347 “Alguien asegura que algunos respetables fusionistas disidentes de esta ciudad, están muy disgustados de la 
nueva actitud adoptada, al parecer, por La Vanguardia. Se añade que este periódico dejará de hacer la oposición 
al señor Rius y Taulet á quien tanto y tan sañadamente han combatido, y que esto se debe á altas influencias de 
la Corte. Nos resistimos á creer estas noticias, principalmente la última, porque vivas están en la memoria de 




really behind this drastic transformation in the editorial line of Godó’s newspaper? 
Contemporaries pointed at the influence that Sagasta had presumably exerted. These rumours 
were about the victory Collaso had seemingly achieved against Rius; and about the 
transformation of La Vanguardia into an “independent” newspaper as part of a plot to gain 
Sagasta’s favour.348 However, the supposed defeat of Rius proved to be a simple rumour. 
Rius continued to be the leader of the Liberals and ruled as Barcelona’s mayor between 1885 
and 1889. The death of Pedro Collaso, in 1887, was probably the real trigger behind Godó’s 
decision to turn La Vanguardia into an independent newspaper. Collaso was the indisputable 
leader of the faction that challenged the leadership of Rius, and his death left his followers 
(amongst whom, Bartolomé Godó) without a patron that assured their position. The elections 
of 1886 (discussed at the beginning of this chapter) already demonstrated Rius’ determination 
to combat Godó’s election in Igualada. The death of Collaso further deteriorated Godó’s 
situation within the Liberals. In the face of such a delicate position, Godó’s response 
arguably consisted in seeking new sources of influence beyond the members of the Liberal 
Party – and the way to do so consisted in having a politically independent newspaper. To 
pilot this transformation the Godó brothers hired a young journalist named Modesto Sánchez 
Ortiz (1858-1937).349 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
señor Rius y Taulet ni con sus actos. Y recientemente ha declarado que no ponía á su conducta anterior ni un 
solo tilde. Por consiguiente... Pero el tiempo nos sacará de dudas.” “Impresiones”, La Dinastía, 10/01/1888, p. 
1. 
348 “Formen ustedes corro, caballeros, y escuchen atentamente. Va de noticia. Hace ya bastante tiempo que se 
trabajaba por lo hondo entre los fusionistas de esta ciudad para apear de su pedestal al que hasta ahora había 
sido jefe discutido pero inconmovible de todos ellos en esta provincia [Rius i Taulet]. Nosotros teníamos 
noticias de estos trabajos, pero no quisimos divulgarla prefiriendo esperar el resultado del asunto. Hoy parece 
que este resultado se ha obtenido, tan completo, que ya el aludido jefe de los fusionistas no será en adelante otra 
cosa que un individuo mas entre las filas. En cambio se asegura que le sustituirá el designado por los antiguos 
disidentes representados por la antigua Vanguardia – no sabemos si tambien por la nueva – los cuales han 
obtenido la más completa victoria sobre la fracción representada por El Barcelonés. Atribúyese este resultado á 
las gestiones practicadas en Madrid desde hace bastantes días, se supone que á su preparación ha respondido el 
cambio operado en La Vanguardia y se cree que si el jefe destituido no se somete á los decretos que en la Córte 
se han promulgado, se armará gran zambra en el seno del fusionismo de esta provincia. Añádese tambien que el 
descalabrado ex-jefe está dispuesto á sobrellevar con resignación el sacrificio. Esto se assegura, caballeros; y 
nosotros rogamos á La Vanguardia que al parecer es de los que triunfan, á El Barcelonés que es de los que 
pierden (...) que se sirvan sacarnos de dudas, diciéndonos qué hay de cierto en lo que acabamos de relatar.” 
“Impresiones”, La Dinastía, 28/01/1888, p. 2.. 
349 As Sánchez himself would declare: “Dos grandes fomentadores de la riqueza material y moral de Cataluña, 
los hermanos Godó, jamás bastante llorados por mí, me encomendaron hace catorce años, la tarea de regenerar 
ó rehacer su periódico, de su propiedad, La Vanguardia, entregándome para ello, con la direccción del 
periódico, sus capitales, y lo que es aun más inapreciable, su confianza. He respondido á aquel compromiso 
conforme he podido, procurando suplir con mi voluntad, jamás vacilante ni tacaña, las otras condiciones que la 




 Indeed, in December 1887 Sánchez was appointed as the new editor of La 
Vanguardia, shortly before the reforms started taking place.350 Sánchez was born in the 
Andalusian town of Aljarque (Huelva), in 1858, to a well-off peasant’s family. Like many 
other men from rural Spain, he migrated to Madrid to become a journalist.351 He started 
publishing comedies to make a living (this being another pattern of the journalists’ literary 
vocation) and in the meantime he acquired an education in an autodidactic way: he showed 
an interest in literature and the arts, and also learned English and French. In 1881 he joined 
the Liberal paper El Correo de Madrid and seven years later, at the age of 30, began his role 
at La Vanguardia where with the trust and the money of the Godó brothers352 he initiated a 
new plan of reforms by taking a foreign newspaper as inspiration. 
 Any attempt to examine the influence of The Times for the redesign of La Vanguardia 
risks the peril of exaggerating the similarities between the two newspapers, and lessening 
their differences. It must be stressed, in this regard, that the two newspapers were – and 
would continue to be – different in many ways. By 1888 The Times was the oldest still-active 
newspaper in Europe and arguably the most reputed one.353 It was established in 1785 by 
John Walter (1739-1812) as The Daily Universal Register and rechristened as The Times in 
1788. Walter’s son (John Walter II, 1776-1847) was responsible for turning the newspaper 
into London’s top selling paper during the period 1815-1840. The principal reason for this 
success was Walter II’s advocacy of an editorial line based on independence – this being 
understood as the need to avoid the interference of political parties in news. As The Times 
stated, its objective was “not the prying into private life (...) but the full and fearless 
investigation of all public acts of public men”. The second ambition of this newspaper was to 
record – or to “register”, as its original name suggested – all the news and commercial 
transactions that might be of interest for the widest audience possible.354 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 “Dice La Vanguardia que desde el dia 1.º de año se encargará de su dirección el señor Sánchez Ortiz”. La 
Dinastía, 29/12/1887, p. 1. 
351 José Simón Díaz, “Madrid, polo de atracción de la intelectualidad a principios de siglo”, in: Ángel 
Bahamonde Magro & Luis Enrique Otero Carvajal (eds.), La Sociedad madrileña durante la Restauración, 
1876-1931, Madrid, Consejería de Cultura de la Comunidad de Madrid, 1989, vol. II, pp. 139-162. 
352 “El Señor Sánchez Ortiz”, op. cit. 
353 There are different accounts on the history of this newspaper. The ones used here are: Oliver Woods & James 
Bishop, The Story of the Times. Bicentenary edition, 1785-1985, London, Michael Joseph, 1985; and especially 
Stanley Morison, The History of The Times, London, Office The Times, 1935-1952, 5 vols. 
354 S. Morison, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 20-25 (esp. p. 24). The person responsible for this new line was The Times’ 
editor Thomas Barnes (1817-1841). It must be stressed that The Times’ stance for independence did not prevent 
this newspaper from explicitly supporting different political parties throughout its history (especially the 
Tories), nor did it prevent Walter from entering politics and being elected deputy on repeated occasions. The 





 To this end, John Walter II developed a business strategy based on three points, the 
first of which was to treat news as a commodity. This implied that news needed to be 
gathered as fast as possible, no matter where it took place; an objective tightly connected to 
England’s expansion as a colonial power.355 Thus The Times established a wide network of 
foreign correspondents and started using alternative means to transmit news.356 Some of the 
earliest achievements that resulted from this strategy allowed the newspaper to gain an 
important reputation for international coverage, to the point that the British government 
proposed this newspaper an agreement to exchange foreign news.357 Second, The Times 
became a pioneer in introducing new technical developments in the printing industry. The 
most famous was the invention of the first steam-printing machine, a contraption that allowed 
the newspaper to print more than 1,100 copies per hour in 1814.358 The third point of 
Walter’s business strategy consisted in making the newspaper profit-oriented. Together with 
a selling price that was substantially higher than that of its competitors, which was a strategy 
that aimed at targeting an elite audience, The Times started placing advertisements in two of 
the four columns into which the text of the front page was divided; while the third and fourth 
pages were completely filled with advertisements.359 All these improvements made The 
Times London’s top-selling newspaper from the first third of the 19th century and the most 
prestigious one both at a national and international level. In 1882 it printed 100,000 copies.360 
 When compared with the above-mentioned characteristics of The Times, La 
Vanguardia had little to boast about. The Godó brothers’ newspaper had a far lower 
circulation (1,400 copies in 1888) and its readership was limited to a faction of the Liberal 
Party of Barcelona (no more than a few hundred people). Thus the differences between The 
Times and La Vanguardia were enormous; they also echoed the significant differences 
between England and Spain in terms of economic development, literacy rates, and the 
emergence of a new mass audience. Indeed, by the mid-19th century over half of England’s 
population lived in cities. Illiteracy rates were around 20% in 1870 and had dropped to 3% in 
1900. Additionally, the development of a mass culture, between 1820 and 1850, based on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 For an example of the close links between news and colonial rule in The Times see: Tim Pratt, “Ernest Jones’ 
Mutiny: The People’s Paper, English Popular Politics and the Indian Rebellion, 1857-58”, in: Chandrika Kaul 
(ed.), Media and the British Empire, Basingstoke, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, pp. 88-103. 
356 Like the use of fishermen’ boats to bring news from France. Further details on the use of new means of 
transmission, in: S. Morison, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 96-108. 
357 Ibidem, esp. p. 100-101.  
358 Ibidem, pp. 109-119. 
359 Ibidem, p. 24; and Carlos Barrera (ed.), Historia del periodismo universal, Barcelona, Ariel, p. 95. 
360 In 1850 The Times “sold four times more copies than its main rivals put together, accounting for 80 per cent 
of circulation in Britain (...)”. Quoted in: Jane Chapman, Comparative Media History. An Introduction: 1789 to 




popularity of religious books and cheap novels among the English popular classes, set the 
ground for the growth of the press in the second half of the century. The outcome was a large 
reading public that allowed popular newspapers like the Daily Mail to sell as many as 1 
million copies in 1901. This was only possible in a country where one in five adult men read 
a newspaper on a daily basis, with one in three reading the Sunday papers.361  
 The structural characteristics of England stood in clear contrast to those of Spain.              
In 1877, Spain’s illiteracy rates were 72% and the vast majority of the population still lived in 
rural areas (only 10% lived in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants). At that time there 
was only one newspaper per 43,000 people and the top-selling papers had a circulation 
limited to 90,000 copies by 1898.362 Illiteracy rates, the urban world, and the number of 
readers were, in consequence, far lower in Spain than in England. This does not mean, 
however, that Spain’s case was “unique”. The characteristics of this country were similar, for 
instance, to those of Italy;363 and between 1850 and 1883 Spain’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per inhabitant grew faster than the European average.364 Furthermore, scholars have 
demonstrated that in Spain too a mass culture started emerging after the first third of the 19th 
century. As Jean François Botrel has argued, if one focuses on oral culture, represented in 
different types of spectacles (like theatre, singing or bullfighting) and in various forms of 
sociability, then “millions of illiterate Spaniards turn all of a sudden into participants of 
mass culture”.365 In consequence, if regarded from the perspective of oral culture, then the 
country’s public life was indeed massive and dynamic.  
 However, if regarded from the perspective of print culture, the emergence of a mass 
press clearly took longer to emerge in Spain than in England. There is wide consensus among 
scholars that, when it comes to circulation, it was not until the First World War that a mass 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 In 1828 the confession of a murderer sold as many as 1.16 million copies and in 1849 a report about the 
execution of a criminal sold 2.5 million copies (in a country of 20 million people). Additionally, in 1840 there 
were between 1,400 and 1,600 coffee houses were workingmen could read a newspaper for free. Ibidem, p. 98-
99 and p. 102, respectively. 
362 Juan Francisco Fuentes & Javier Fernández Sebastián, Historia del periodismo español. Prensa, política y 
opinión pública en la España contemporánea, Madrid, Síntesis, 1997, p. 147. 
363 The first census in unified Italy recorded an illiteracy rate of 74% (1861). The figures varied greatly 
depending on the region (e.g. 90% in Sardinia, 54% in Piedmont). David Forgacs, Italian Culture in the 
Industrial Era, 1880-1980. Cultural industries, politics, and the public, Manchester-New York, Manchester 
University Press, 1990, pp. 17-18. 
364 Leandro Prados de la Escosura, El progreso económico de España, 1850-2000, Bilbao, Fundación BBVA, 
2003, pp. 171-172. 
365 In 1867 as many as 8 million theatre tickets were sold, Jean-François Botrel, “Entre imprimé et oralité: 
l’essor de la culture de masse en Espagne (1833-1936)”, in: J. Mollier, J. Sirinelli et F. Vallotton, op. cit., pp. 
143-156 (p. 143). See also: Susan Larson and Eva Woods, Visualizing Spanish Modernity, Oxford-New York, 
Berg, 2005; and Jorge Uría (ed.), La cultura popular en la España contemporánea. Doce estudios, Madrid, 




press emerged in Spain.366 Similarly, the 1880s are generally acknowledged as the period 
when the early roots of this mass press were established. The passing of a new press act in 
1883 triggered a substantial growth in the number of newspapers: from approximately 500 in 
1879 to 1,300 in 1900 – an increase of about 240%.367 This growth of the press was 
concentrated in the most dynamic urban centres of the country (Madrid and Barcelona) while 
rural and provincial areas were excluded.368 These two cities had substantially higher literacy 
figures than the Spanish average 369 and saw the emergence of a new consumer culture – 
symbolised in the creation of the first department stores and new retail shops – that went in 
line with other European capitals, as Jesús Cruz has examined.370 As a consequence of the 
more developed characteristics of Madrid and Barcelona, some newspapers based in these 
two cities started adapting to the changes journalism was undergoing in Europe. For the case 
of Madrid, Jesús Timoteo Álvarez has examined the reforms that the five top-selling 
newspapers of this city started implementing in the 1880s. These reforms consisted in the 
new commercial orientation of newspapers and their progressive detachment from parties. 
The creation of the first news agencies, the growing importance of advertising as a source of 
income, and the growth of sensationalism were other symptoms of broader changes in the 
Madrid press.371 
 La Vanguardia represents an opportunity to examine the birth of the mass press from 
a new perspective. Instead of focusing on the new mass press that emerged in Europe to 
evaluate the Spanish case in terms of “failure” or “success” – as scholars have usually done – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 Josep Lluís Gómez Mompart, “Existió en España prensa de masas? La prensa en torno a 1900”, Jesús 
Timoteo Álvarez, Historia de los medios de comunicación en España. Periodismo, imagen y publicidad (1900-
1990), Barcelona, Ariel, 1989, pp. 27-40. 
367 In fact, in the 1880s Madrid had as many political newspapers as Paris, despite its population being five 
times smaller. This figure demonstrates the new vigour of the Spanish press industry, even though it also 
uncovers the pervasive partisan orientation the vast majority of them still had. María Dolores Sáiz y María Cruz 
Seoane, Historia del periodismo en España, Madrid, Alianza ed., Vol. 2: “El siglo XIX: 1898-1936”, p. 254. In 
1886, Madrid officially had a total of 328 newspapers (277 at the end of the year). M. Tuñón De Lara, A. 
Elorza, M. Perez Ledesma, Prensa y sociedad en España (1820-1936), Madrid, Cuadernos para el diálogo, 
1975, p. 30.  
368 Josep Lluís Gómez Mompart has coined the expression “unstructured cultural system” (in Catalan, “sistema 
cultural invertebrat”). Josep Lluís Gómez Mompart, La gènesi de la premsa de masses a Catalunya (1902-
1923), Barcelona, Pòrtic, 1992, pp. 32-37. 
369 Whereas the average literacy figures in Spain stood at around 30% in 1875, in Madrid they were the 54.27% 
and in Barcelona the 50.03%. Quoted in: Angela Ena Brodonada, “La literatura y la sociedad madrileña en la 
Restauración”, in: A. Bahamonde Magro & L. E. Otero Carvajal (eds.), op. cit, vol. II, p. 165. 
370 See: Jesús Cruz, El surgimiento de la cultura burguesa. Personas, hogares y ciudades en la España del siglo 
XIX, Madrid, Alianza, 2014, esp. Chapter 5 “La ciudad burguesa” [first ed. in English: The Rise of Middle-Class 
Culture in Nineteenth-Century Spain, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2011].  
371 Jesús Timoteo Álvarez. Restauración y prensa de masas. Los engranajes de un sistema (1875-1883), 
Pamplona, Ediciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1981. Sánchez took as a case study the newspapers La 




372 this chapter will examine how the journalism of other countries influenced the reforms of 
La Vanguardia. This approach implies moving on from the national perspective, as well as 
challenging the “ideal-types” of communication studies. Indeed, examining the influence of 
The Times for La Vanguardia implies adopting a transnational perspective that challenges the 
explanation of journalism as separate models. Emphasis will be placed on the importance of 
the exchange of ideas as a crucial element to understand the emergence of new journalistic 
codes. In parallel, it will be argued that La Vanguardia evoked the interest of Barcelona’s 
elites to find reference-models of “modernity” in foreign countries. For the elites of this city 
modernity became a new aspiration that was embodied by foreign cities like Paris and 
London, rather than by Spain’s capital (Madrid). 
 If The Times influenced the change of La Vanguardia it is because this newspaper 
provided the inspiration to adapt to the deep transformations Barcelona had started 
witnessing in 1888. The redesigning of Godó’s newspaper coincided with a turning point in 
the history of Barcelona, the moment when this city abandoned its provincial status and 
started having a new international vocation. The symbol of this transformation was 
Barcelona’s World Fair of 1888. Although public opinion was initially sceptical about the 
capacity of Barcelona to organise an event with international standing, the ultimate success 
and the massive audience that the fair attracted (around 400,000 on the first day) opened eyes 
about the city’s potential. The dimensions of the fair were undoubtedly modest if compared 
to those of London and Paris, but they announced the transformation of Barcelona into a 
cosmopolitan and dynamic urban centre.373  
 Indeed, the World Fair coincided with a new period of economic prosperity and great 
urban transformations in Barcelona. In the mid-19th century the walls that had prevented the 
city’s enlargement since medieval times were pulled down and a new process of urban 
expansion started, reaching the highest point in the 1870s.374 The World Fair continued this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 J. T. Álvarez, op. cit.; and “El retraso español”, in: Josep Francesc Valls, Prensa y burguesía en el XIX 
español, Madrid, Anthropos, 1987, pp. 160-170; and more recently, Jaume Guillamet, “Por una historia 
comparada del periodismo. Factores de progreso y atraso”, Doxa Comunicación, nº 1, 2003, pp. 35-56.           In 
the case of Álvarez, he considered that Madrid’s newspaper “failed” to match the emergence of the mass press 
in Europe. The conceptual framework of this author was influenced by the theories of modernisation 
(particularly in vogue in the 1980s). On the limitations of modernisation theories, see: Isabel Burdiel, Myths of 
Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism, The Journal of 
Modern History, Vol. 70, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 892-912. 
373 See: Ramon Grau (ed.), Exposició Universal de Barcelona. Llibre del Centenari, 1888-1988, Barcelona, 
L’Avenç, 1988. On World Fairs, see: Alexander Geppert, Fleeting cities. Imperial Expositions in Fin-de-Siècle 
Europe, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. This book does not include the case of Barcelona. 
374 The years between 1871 and 1875 were the highest point of building construction of the century, symbolised 
by the construction of Ildefons Cerdà’s new district (the so-called “Eixample”). Xavier Tafunell, “Ritmes de la 




trend and filled the city with new architectural ideas and iconic buildings. As many as 30,000 
workers were recruited for the construction of the fair, most of which were migrants from 
rural Catalonia that kept arriving in Barcelona and caused the city to swell from 400,000 
inhabitants in 1887 to 587,000 in 1910. 375 The World Fair of 1888 thus symbolised the 
emergence of an incipient mass society in Barcelona and gave it a new international 
projection. For a new generation of intellectuals, this event opened their eyes to Europe and 
created the ambition of turning Barcelona into the “Paris” of the Mediterranean.376 
 In the light of these events, the redesign of La Vanguardia was an attempt to match 
the great expectations the World Fair had created in Barcelona. When the 1888 editorial of 
La Vanguardia spoke about the necessity to mirror the society in which it was published, the 
newspaper was trying to harmonise itself with the changes Barcelona was living at the time. 
The city was entering a period of rapid change and remaining the spokesman of the Liberal 
Party was not the way to face these transformations – all the more if Rius was the mayor of 
Barcelona and the main promoter of the World Fair.377 The wise move of the Godó brothers 
consisted, in this regard, in understanding the transformations that Barcelona was undergoing 
at the time and in developing La Vanguardia accordingly. To make this happen the Godó 
brothers put all their hopes in Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, who saw in The Times an example to 
implement the ambitious plan of reforms he was commissioned to carry out.  
 In fact, the redesign of La Vanguardia on January 1st 1888 coincided with the 100th 
anniversary of the renaming of the Daily Universal Register as The Times (January 1st 1788). 
Whether this was deliberate or a simple coincidence is hard to know. In any case, the thing 
that Sánchez admired the most about The Times was its capacity to “register” all the facts and 
ways of thinking in England, a “powerful, prosperous and wise nation”.              
The Times was, in sum, the champion of a journalistic ideal where the press acted as a 
“mirror of society”.378 When Sánchez argued that the new goal of La Vanguardia was to 
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pp. 193-196. 
378 This expression was used by Agustí Calvet, the director of La Vanguardia between 1920 and 1936. 
According to him, there were two different types of newspapers: the ones that “projected” something into 
society (“diaris projectors”, in Catalan), this being a model that corresponded to the partisan press; and the 
newspapers that were a “mirror” of society (“diaris mirall”), corresponding to the informative press. Calvet 
considered La Vanguardia as the best exponent of the latter model, to which he ascribed. The case of Sánchez 
has the potential of revealing the origins of this “tradition” of journalism in La Vanguardia.         See: “La 
prensa en catalán”, in Agustí Calvet (Gaziel), Història de «La Vanguardia» (1881-1936) i nou articles sobre 




mirror three elements (namely, Barcelona, Catalonia, and Spain) he was following the model 
of The Times.  Indeed, although Sánchez believed that it would be naive to imitate the model 
of the British newspaper,379 as the characteristics of La Vanguardia were too modest, he gave 
further evidence that The Times was the model he had in mind. Proof of this is that in 
February 1890, two years after the reforms of La Vanguardia started, Sánchez published an 
editorial called “Doctrina profesional” (“professional rules”) where he mentioned, again, the 
principles that would guide the newspaper in the future. Sánchez referred one more time to 
the idea that newspapers should be “an exact portrait of society”, and referred, again, to The 
Times as the best example of this. The reason he chose the British newspaper is because he 
saw many points of coincidence between England and Catalonia. As he put it: 
 
 “Dos palabras debemos decir también sobre otro punto esencialísimo de nuestra doctrina 
profesional; á saber, que el periódico ha de tener una relación inmediata (...) con el país que lo 
produce. No es vana teoría, sino (...) observación positiva de la vida: el mejor periódico será 
aquel que mejor revele á su país. El Times –por no acudir á otros ejemplos – revela desde punta 
á cabo, y esta es su fuerza y su hermosura, la cultura inglesa. Desde el papel y la tipografía, 
elegidos entre lo bueno, hasta el texto, reflexivo, sabroso, enciclopédico; hasta el sentido moral, 
egoísta con el santo egoísmo de la patria, en todo late Inglaterra en las columnas del Times: 
Inglaterra la patriótica, la poderosa, la trabajadora. Cuando leemos las hermosas páginas de ese 
periódico, nuestro amor á Cataluña y nuestro amor al periodismo, tienen su vigorosa 
conjunción, y este afan incesante por el progreso de lo que amamos encuentra su fórmula 
concreta: que LA VANGUARDIA revele á Cataluña; que no sea preciso leer la data de LA 
VANGUARDIA para saber que es hija de Barcelona; que tenga en su fisonomía el sello de este 
pueblo, tan rico en elementos propios, *380 tan perseverante en su labor, tan europeo en su 
cultura, tan generoso y patriótico en su espíritu.” 381 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 “No intentamos nosotros hacer un «Times», sería pretensión vana y ridícula, pero si queremos que nuestro 
periódico, en compañía de los otros dignísimos colegas de esta capital refleje en primer término y con la mayor 
exactitud posible la vida de Barcelona, luego la de Cataluña, y por último, la de España entera, que constituyen 
las tres relaciones primordiales de nuestra existencia social.” LV, 01/02/1888, p. 1. 
380 * This sentence was almost the same as Sánchez had used two years earlier (1888) to describe The Times: 
“Cualquiera que vea el  «Times», no necesita ver que está fechado en Londres para saber que es el periódico de 
una nación rica, poderosa y sabia.” LV, 01/02/1888, p. 1. 
381 “Las reformas de La Vanguardia”, LV, 21/02/1890, p. 1. [E. T.]: “Simply two words in what concerns our 
professional doctrine; namely, that the newspaper must hold an intimate relation with the country where it is 
published. This is not mere rethoric, but an observation: the best newspaper will be the one that shall better 
reflect the country where it is published. The Times –to put but an example- reveals from the head to the bottom 
(and that is both its strenght and beauty) the English culure. The newsprint and the typography, chosen among 
the best, to the text, always reflexive, juicy, enciclopedic; to the moral sense, selfish as it it is the interest of the 
motherland, every part of England is in The Times. England the patriot, the powerful, the hard-working. When 




The text above quoted reveals the way Sánchez imagined Catalonia’s future. In his 
view Catalan identity should be based on the industrial character of this region and the values 
associated with it (like “hard-labour” and “prosperity”), coupled with a proud sense of 
regional identity based on a series of “distinguishing features” (“rasgos propios”). 
Surprisingly, Sánchez did not consider language to be one of the distinguishing features of 
Catalan identity; or at least he did not apply language to his understanding of journalism as a 
“plant rooted in the earth” (since La Vanguardia continued to be published in Spanish, like 
most of Barcelona’s press).382 Besides, there is another element worth noticing in Sánchez’s 
writing: in his view Catalan culture should be “European”. This kind of aspiration was not 
unique to Sánchez, but evoked a broader aspiration of the Catalan bourgeoisie. The way this 
social group reacted to the birth of mass society was by “constructing” a regional identity. 
This construction was based on two pillars: the vindication of Catalonia’s past (through its 
language, history and tradition of special civil law), and the aspiration to emulate Europe 
(and Paris especially) in the fields of art and architecture, as the emergence of “Modernisme” 
– “Art Nouveau” in France – illustrates.  
Consequently, the case of Barcelona’s urban elites can be seen as an example of those 
“second cities” which had a similar size to the capitals of their respective countries, but 
sought foreign reference-models to reaffirm a distinctive identity.383 Indeed, Barcelona 
possessed a series of characteristics that distinguished it from Madrid (namely, an expanding 
manufacturing industry, a large working class, a different language, the defence of 
protectionist policies, the claim for administrative de-centralization, etc.) and gave it a 
“modern” look – even to the eyes of some Madrid’s observers.384 
Sánchez’s achievement consisted in turning La Vanguardia into the favourite 
newspaper of Barcelona’s Modernist bourgeoisie. Sánchez was well connected with the 
intellectual milieus (like the “Ateneu Barcelonès”, where La Vanguardia had its own cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
will for progress is encapsulated in the following formula: that LA VANGUARDIA shall reflect Catalonia; that 
it is not necessary to read the date in LA VANGUARDIA to know that this is Barcelona’s daughter (...)”. 
382 See: Table 2. 
383 Maiken Umbach, “A Tale of Second Cities”: Autonomy, Culture, and the Law in Hamburg and Barcelona in 
the Late Nineteenth Century, American Historical Review, June 2005, pp. 659-692; Stephen Jacobson, 
Catalonia’s advocates. Lawyers, society and politics in Barcelona, 1759-1900, University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009. 
384 “La ciudad moderna tiene semejanza con todas las grandes capitales de Europa; la Rambla del centro, con 
sus cafés y restaurantes, kioskos, movimiento, y aún en algún otro detalle, recuerda los Boulevares de París; el 
paseo de Gracia tiene semejanza con los Campos Elíseos; la Gran-vía y el resto del Ensanche algo tienen de 
Hayde-Parck de Londres; (...) hay algo de Liverpool y de Manchester en los alrededores del muelle y en los 
barrios industriales (...)”. Juan Valero de Tornos, Barcelona tal cual es. Por un madrileño, Barcelona, Sucesores 




gathering) 385 and recruited some of the city’s most talented intellectuals. Thus, in the 
editorial of 1890 Sánchez announced the list of nineteen artists, writers and painters who 
would contribute to La Vanguardia on a regular basis. The list included prestigious figures 
like Santiago Rusiñol, Ramón Casas, Josep Lluís Pellicer and Joan Sardà, among others.386 
La Vanguardia also started distinguishing itself from other Barcelona newspapers for the 
space it devoted to European culture; and culture, in fin de siècle Europe, was a synonym of 
Paris. La Vanguardia began including different sections about the French capital (entitled 
“Bosquejos parisines” and “De Barcelona a París”), and avidly followed the careers of 
Catalan painters who had migrated to the French city (like Rusiñol and Casas).387 Moreover, 
the newspaper dedicated the entire front page to the Paris World Fair of 1889. The reason for 
this, the newspaper argued, was that “the people of Catalonia and especially from Barcelona 
hold a close link with Paris”.388 
 The second “ideal” that La Vanguardia arguably imported from The Times, besides 
the need to mirror the taste of the society where it was published, was the relation between 
the press and political parties. La Vanguardia did not regret its partisan past (and even 
accepted it as part of its history) but announced that it would no longer be at the service of a 
political cause. Instead, two principles would now guide the editorial line of La Vanguardia: 
“impartiality and severity”. Sánchez believed that the press should hold “high ideals” and 
should judge “deeds, but not the people who do them”.389 That statement was reminiscent of 
the famous principle of The Times (quoted earlier): “not the prying into private life (...) but 
the full and fearless investigation of all public acts of public men”. Accountability earned The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 The so-called “Penya de La Vanguardia”. LV, 25/10/1903, p. 9. 
386 The full list of collaborators was: “José Zulueta, José Coroleu, José Ixart, Juan Sardá, Narciso Oller, Melitón 
González, Ramón D. Perés, Francisco Virella, Emilio Blanchet, Josefa Pujol de Collado, E. Suñol, Rafael Puig 
y Valls, J. Vergés y Almar, José Passos, Doctor Xercavins, Santiago Rusiñol, Ramón Casas, José Luis Pellicer, 
Felipe Pedrell.” LV, 21/02/1890, p. 2. 
387 This issue has been analysed in: Elena Cueto Asín & David R. George, Jr., Looking to France from 
Barcelona: correspondence and travel writing in La Vanguardia (1890-1900), Journal of Spanish Cultural 
Studies, Vol. 9 No. 3 November 2008, pp. 265-283. See also: LV, 28/02/1890, p. 2. 
388 “La población catalana y la barcelonesa singularmente están en constantes relaciones con París. Francia, 
por otra parte, es de las naciones que más contribuyeron á dar vida y explendor (sic) á nuestra Exposición de 
Barcelona, y creemos que por estas razones y por otras de interés comercial é industrial, la Exposición de París 
será visitada por gran número de lectores nuestros”. The newspaper promised to spend as much as necessary to 
inform about the Paris World Fair. See: LV, 05/05/1889, p. 1. 
389 “Respecto de nuestra conducta futura, en nuestras relaciones políticas y sociales con los demás estimados 
colegas, sin quitar ni poner una sola tilde á la anterior, sino al contrario, reconociéndola en absoluta como 
nuestra, solo dos palabras hemos de decir. Creemos que no se desprende de la prensa, obra fecunda para el 
público, si los periódicos no se inspiran en altos ideales y en los principios de una crítica severa. Estos serán, 
pues, nuestros principios de conducta. Imparcialidad y severidad. Aquellos actos que en nuestra conciencia sean 
acertados, tendrán en nosotros desapiadados (sic) censores; para aquellos otros que redunden en beneficio 
público, no nos dolerán aplausos ni regatearemos elogios; pero en uno y en otro caso, en nuestra jurisdicción de 
críticos no caerá más que el acto criticable; jamás la persona que lo ejecute, respetable para nosotros siempre.”. 




Times the nickname of the “Thunderer” and the resolution of men like Sánchez to behave as 
“ruthless censors” (“despiadados censores”), while respecting personal honour, evoked the 
same ideal.390 The adscription to these principles implied that La Vanguardia stopped being 
the organ of the Liberal Party (at least formally), and abandoned all personal attacks against 
Rius. The newspaper would now be at the service of “the common good”, and to do so it 
should focus on providing raw information (“facts”) for the reader’s judgement:  
 
“En esa fórmula «dar á la opinión el dato para su juicio», sencilla en apariencia, pero muy 
compleja cuando se desentraña, se encierra todo el sistema periodístico moderno, que sirve al 
público, no al partido ni á la camarilla. (...) El periódico moderno no puede ser hoy, como 
tantos años, un conjunto de trabajos en los cuales era principio cuando no único elemento, la 
fantasía y el ingenio del escritor; como tampoco puede ser un conjunto de noticias sin 
trabazón y sin arte. La hoja diaria hoy, como reflejo de la civilización, ha de confeccionarse 
con el procedimiento que pide dato, dato y dato; pero ha de ser tan compleja como la 
civilización misma.” 391 
 
The emphasis that Sánchez put on providing “facts, facts and facts” was a plea for 
political neutrality. Supplying facts to the public was not an easy task (as Sánchez 
acknowledged), but it revealed a new professional ethos of public service. This ideal implied 
that news needed to be gathered as fast as possible and with the highest possible accuracy, to 
let every reader make his or her own judgement. As Chapter 8 of this thesis will show, La 
Vanguardia became one of best providers of international coverage of the Spanish press. 
What needs to be stressed, at this point, is that the emphasis Sánchez put on public service 
presented similarities, once more, to the journalism model of The Times.392 The formula of 
this newspaper was, as one of its editors put it, “to obtain the earliest and most correct 
intelligence of the events of the time and instantly, by disclosing them, to make them the 
common property of mankind.” 393 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Sánchez referred to the fame of The Times in the following way: “El más ilustre periódico de Londres, terror 
y esperanza de todos los gobiernos y cristalización poderosa de la civilización inglesa, la más completa, á mi 
juicio, de los tiempos modernos (...)”. M. Sánchez Ortiz, El Periodismo..., op. cit., p. 21. 
391 LV, 21/02/1890, p. 1. Italics added. [E. T.]: “In this apparently simple but very complex formula is where all 
the modern journalism is condensed: to serve the public, instead of the party or the faction. The newspaper can 
no longer be, as it has been for many years, a dispersed number of articles based on the fantasy of its writer. (...) 
Today’s press requires, as in reflecting civilization, to be made by providing facts, facts and facts; but has to be 
as complex as civilization.” 
392 As the London newspaper proclaimed: “(...) and we, the TIMES, being the PUBLIC’S most humble and most 
obedient Servants (...)”. S. Morison, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 30. 




La Vanguardia’s new vocation of public service implied that journalists should work 
accordingly. Instead of publicising the views of the Liberal Party, journalists should now 
focus on providing raw information to the public. This change of philosophy reveals the 
emergence of a new occupational ethic for journalists, one of the great obsessions in 
Sánchez’s career. In the book entitled “El Periodismo” (the first theoretical work ever 
published in Catalonia about journalism) 394 Sánchez expressed his concern about the tight 
links between politics and the press. In his view journalism should not be a pathway into 
public office, but an independent profession; or, to use his own words, journalism should be 
both “priesthood and magisterium” (“sacerdocio y magisterio”). These two concepts, which 
Sánchez borrowed from Catholicism, expressed his understanding of journalism as a 
profession that required discipline and rectitude, and was aimed at fostering the “good” and 
the “truth” in society.395 Accordingly, Sánchez criticised the press that took advantage of 
dramatic events, like murders and gossip, to sell more copies. In his view, journalists should 
stay above the kind of reporting that fuelled the “lower passions” of society, they should 
adopt, instead, a calm state and a moderate tone so as to serve society in a rightful manner.396  
 Besides the highly moralistic tone that Sánchez’s thoughts contained, they present a 
certain similitude to the type of reporting that characterised The Times. As some scholars 
have noted, this newspaper abstained from using morbid events as a strategy to increase 
sales; this being a professional attitude that stood in contrast to the strategy used by the – 
increasingly successful – sensationalist press.397 What needs to be stressed, at this point, is 
that despite the differences between the two newspapers, what The Times and the new 
Vanguardia had in common was not just the emphasis placed on “news”, but also the 
emphasis they placed on the need to balance it. In other words, journalism should not simply 
consist in providing the public with the latest and most abundant news, it should also be done 
in a “responsible” manner. This philosophy – certainly not exempt from an educative and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 In the view of Josep Mª Casasús, “El Periodismo de Sánchez Ortiz es la más antigua de las obras 
importantes, hasta hoy conocidas, que tratan de teoría del Periodismo y que fueron escritas por tratadistas o por 
profesionales relacionados con la prensa catalana”. J. M. Casasús Gurí, “Estudio introductorio”, in: Modesto 
Sánchez Ortiz / El Periodismo, Barcelona, Fundación Conde de Barcelona, La Vanguardia [Facsímil de la 
edición de 1903; introducción de J. M. Casasús Gurí], 1990, p. IX. 
395 “Sacerdocio es, aunque se le niegue esa consideración, la ocupación de que tiene por objeto, en el mar 
revuelto de las pasiones y de los intereses humanos, mantener el dogma del Bien, de la Verdad y de la Belleza 
para que sean esperanza y guía de las multitudes.” M. Sánchez Ortiz, El Periodismo..., op. cit., p. 9. 
396 “la narración de sucesos, lo que se llama el reporterismo, sobre todo en cuanto se relaciona con el orden 
público, es (...) materia de manejo peligroso que requiere escrupuloso espíritu en el escritor, y en el director 
inteligencia experta y serena, carácter muy firme para sobreponerse á todo estímulo bastardo y del momento.” 
Ibidem, p. 53. 




even condescending view of society – reveals the emergence of a new ethic based on public 
service, a key element in the professionalisation of journalism.398 
Still, the fact that Sánchez took The Times as a reference model was not an obvious 
choice. In the 1880s The Times had lost its position as London’s leading newspaper. The once 
prestigious and top-selling newspaper had entered a period of decay in the last quarter of the 
century, to the point that it was losing money and its very survival was in peril.399 One of the 
reasons behind the decay of The Times was the emergence of the “New Journalism”. This 
expression makes reference to a new model of journalism that emerged in the second half of 
the 19th century with the aim of targeting a more popular audience (sometimes including 
women) through a lower selling price and an emphasis on non-political content, like gossip, 
fashion and the serialised story. “New Journalism” represented a completely new way of 
organising language, content and format in the press, and symbolised a new form of mass 
consumption characterised by a less politicised and more entertainment-oriented content. 
Advertisement revenues compensated for the low price of this popular press, known in 
France as “presse au bon marché” and as the “penny press” in England. In late 19th-century 
Europe, the top-selling newspapers were exponents of this new journalism: Le Petit Journal 
(1863), in France, sold 600,000 copies daily; and England’s Daily Mail (est. in 1896) sold 
540,000 copies daily. The Times, in contrast, had a circulation of “only” 100,000 copies in 
1882.400              
At this point we should ask: why Sánchez chose to use The Times as a model when by 
1888 the paper was on the brink of bankruptcy and remained the exponent of the “Old 
Journalism”? 401 Moreover, if Barcelona’s reading public was so interested in Paris, why did 
Sánchez not choose the example of ascending French newspapers, such as Le Petit Journal? 
The answer is that Sánchez aspired to turn La Vanguardia into a “quality journal”, of which 
the “Old Journalism” of The Times remained – regardless the newspaper’s state of decay – 
the international benchmark.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 D. Hallin and P. Mancini, op. cit., p. 35-36. 
399 The crisis was linked to the division of the newspaper’ property between the Walter family and small 
shareholders. The confrontation between the two sides on how to manage the newspaper paved the way for the 
acquisition of The Times in 1908 by the press tycoon Alfred Harmsworth. See: J. Lee Thompson, Northcliffe. 
Press Baron in Politics, 1865-1922, London, John Murray, 2000, pp. 140-159. 
400 Svennik Høyer “Old and New Journalism in The London Press. The 1880s and 1890s”, in: S. Høyer and 
Horst Pöttker (eds.), Diffusion of the News Paradigm 1850-2000, Goteborg, Nordicom, 2014, pp. 65-74; and 
Dean de la Motte & Jeannene M. Przyblyski, Making the News. Modernity & the Mass Press in Nineteenth-
Century France, University of Massachusetts Press, 1999. 
401 British historians hold different opinions about the levels of continuity and rupture between the Old and the 
New Journalism in the 1880s. For a brief outline of this debate, see: Mark Hampton, “Newspapers in Victorian 




Indeed, although Sánchez claimed to serve the “broadest public possible”, in reality this 
newspaper was targeting, as The Times did, an educated upper-middle class market, including 
the members of the petite bourgeoisie. Two elements prove this. First, in 1890 La 
Vanguardia started to sell for 0.10 pesetas. This price doubled that of the vast majority of 
newspapers in Barcelona.402 Moreover, if compared with the average wage in Barcelona 
(3.75 pesetas a day in 1904) the price of La Vanguardia (0.10 pesetas) was quite expensive 
for the popular classes,403 but not for the well-off groups. Second, although Paris was 
Barcelona’s icon of modernity, this was particularly the case among the bourgeoisie but not 
among the working classes. Indeed, the majority of the leisure activities in this city continued 
to be highly provincial.404 In other words, zarzuelas and bullfighting awoke far more 
enthusiasm in fin de siècle Barcelona than the arrival of a foreign artist, as some observers 
lamented.405  
 It was to the relatively narrow – but expanding – elite market that Sánchez was 
targeting the future expansion of La Vanguardia. Evoking the prestige of The Times was a 
way of doing so, to the point that Sánchez’s references to the British newspaper can also be 
regarded as a strategy of self-publicity aimed at building an image of a new and respectable 
newspaper. The fact that The Times was in a period of decline was not an obstacle for this 
strategy. Proof of this is the fact that in Italy too, the newspaper Il Corriere della Sera started 
a plan of reforms that was also inspired by the British newspaper. Established in Milan in 
1875 by Eugenio Torelli and Riccardo Pavesi, Il Corriere della Sera eventually became, 
together with its competitor Il Secolo, the main organ of Milan’s bourgeoisie.406 Initially, Il 
Corriere had a modest circulation (less than 10,000 copies in 1880) and supported the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 J. F. Valls, op. cit., p. 207. 
403 In 1905, when salaries were substantially higher than in 1888, salaries stood between 2.50 pesetas (in the 
case of a builder) and 5 pesetas (in the case of a chief spinner – “Oficial hilador”). Therefore, buying one copy 
of La Vanguardia in 1905 represented around 37% of the daily average wage in Barcelona (approx. 3.75 
pesetas). In 1898 1 kg of bread cost 0.40 ptas, 1 kg of meat cost 2 ptas, and 1 litre of oil cost 1.50 ptas. The 
figures are from: Joaquín Romero Maura, “La rosa de fuego”. El obrerismo barcelonés de 1899 a 1909, 
Madrid, Alianza, 1989, p. 572 and p. 573. 
404 As Lluís Marfany has noted in: “Burgesia, modernització cultural, catalanisme”, in DDAA, Història de la 
cultura catalana, Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1995, vol. VI (“El Modernisme, 1890-1906”), p. 27. 
405 “Descorazona ver cómo después de tantos años de lucha para llevar á la conciencia social el sentimiento de 
lo bello y grande, el género chico, grosero y sensual y la zarzuela, simple y ridícula, salen triunfantes del seno 
de las multitudes (....). En tanto la gente afluye á los toros y va, con una candidez infantil, á deleitarse con las 
habilidades acróbatas de las focas del Tívoli, ó con las ñoñeces de El Húsar ó de El Santo de la Isidra, la 
eminente actriz Italia Vitaliani y su recomendable compañía trabajan poco menos que en familia (...). Esta 
indiferencia del público por el arte verdadero, este desvío artístico de Barcelona, encoge y aplasta, entristece y 
subleva.” El Diluvio, 17/08/1901, p. 12; quoted in: Lluïsa Suárez Carmona, “L’oci a la Barcelona de finals del 
segle XIX. Les primeres sales cinematogràfiques”, X Congrés d’Història de Barcelona – DILEMES DE LA FI 
DE SEGLE, 1874-1901, 27-30 de novembre de 2007, p. 3. 
406  David Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial Era. Cultural industries, politics, and the public, 




Moderate policies of Cavour and was directly opposed to Giolitti’s. At the turn of the century 
the newspaper underwent a process of renovation in the hands of Luigi Albertini, a young 
journalist who spent six months in London and gained first-hand knowledge of The Times.407 
The outcome was the drastic reorientation of the editorial line according to a series of 
principles: a politically neutral standpoint; an emphasis on news content; the hiring of 
prestigious intellectuals; and a profit-oriented business based on advertisement revenues.408 
The case of Il Corriere and La Vanguardia thus reveal that the “Old Journalism” of The 
Times was still an esteemed ideal for those newspapers targeting an educated upper-middle 
class readership. 
 Last but not least, it is interesting to note that although Sánchez and Albertini took the 
same reference model, La Vanguardia also imported some features from the French popular 
press. Proof of this was the serial novels this newspaper introduced in 1888. These novels 
were written mostly by French and English authors and were published on a regular basis (a 
few pages at a time). They were displayed at the bottom of the page (the so-called “rez-de-
chaussée”, in French), so that readers could combine the different excerpts into a collectable 
book (see Illustration 1).409 Although this type of novel had been published in literary 
journals for a long time, its introduction in the popular press in the 1830s has been considered 
a breaking point in the history of the press, and as the “beginning of the cultural 
democratization of French society”.410 Indeed, while most of the newspapers traditionally had 
a strong political content, the serial novel (“roman-feuilleton”) represented a new type of 
entertainment that attracted the interest of social groups traditionally marginalised in the 
“quality press”, like the working classes and women. Thus, some French popular newspapers 
like Le Petit Journal started to recognise women as potential consumers as early as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Albertini was the correspondent of Turin’s newspaper “La Stampa”. During his stay in London he formed a 
good relationship with one of the main editors of The Times (Moberly Bell). Valerio Castronovo, La stampa 
italiana nell’età liberale, Bari, Laterza, 1979, pp. 157-162 (p. 159).  
408 These new editorial lines were based on a series of principles: [in Italian] “Il “Corriere” è sempre il primo, il 
“Corriere” non sbaglia mai”; “un organismo (...) di formazione dell’opinione pubblica, quanto una 
valorizzazione di certe tendenze di questa”; “dove si gareggiava per il raggiungimento della perfezione e non 
erano permesse esagerazioni sia nel dire il bene che nel rilevare il male”. Ibidem (esp. p. 161). 
409 The first serial novel published in La Vanguardia was Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s The Last of the Barons (1st 
ed. 1843). “El Último Barón. Novela inglesa.”, in: LV, 21/02/1890, p. 5. 
410 Maria Adamowicz-Hariasz, “The Roman-Feuilleton and the Transformation of the Nineteenth-Century 
French Press”, Dean de la Motte & Jeannene M. Przyblyski, Making the News. Modernity & the Mass Press in 




1860s. The introduction of the serial novel became central in this strategy, as Jane Chapman 
has recently shown. 411 
 The introduction of the serial novel in La Vanguardia was probably a strategy aimed 
at targeting a female upper-class readership. The high selling price of La Vanguardia 
excluded the working classes (not to mention illiteracy rates, which were particularly high 
among working-class women), but not the educated female readership.412 There are different 
testimonies that mention the popularity of European (and especially French) literature among 
Barcelona’s bourgeoisie women. 413  The presence of advertisements targeting female 
consumers provides further evidence that La Vanguardia also had female readers.414 The 
serial novel thus exemplifies the last point that needs to be stressed about the transformation 
of La Vanguardia: the goal was to turn this newspaper into a profitable business.  
 Adopting a commercial orientation represented a radical change in the way the Godó 
brothers had managed the newspaper until then. While political payoffs were traditionally 
expected to compensate the loss of money, the Godó brothers now aspired to make a 
profitable business of La Vanguardia. The way to achieve this consisted in increasing the 
number of readers and in making advertisements the main source of income. To this end La 
Vanguardia’s page layout was completely redefined in 1888. As Illustrations 2 and 3 show, 
the newspaper page size increased substantially (from 16 pages on 15 x 10 cm format; to 8 
pages in two daily editions, each 21.5 x 31.5 cm format) and a new typeface was introduced. 
The political motto was deleted from the heading and the new heading only bore the 
newspaper’s title, coupled with the name of the place where it was published (Barcelona) and 
the day edition (morning or afternoon). The single-column format of 1881 was replaced with 
a new distribution of content in four columns. Although La Vanguardia traditionally 
dedicated the front page to advertisements, the changes made to the content layout in 1888 
reveal a new awareness about the economic value of space. Moreover, La Vanguardia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Jane Chapman, Gender, Citizenship and Newspapers. Historical and Transnational Perspectives, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, esp. Chapter 2, “France. Pioneering the 
Popular Newspaper Brand and the Female Market”, pp. 25-61. 
412 In 1887 53% of Catalan men were literate, but only 28% of women. J. M. Tresserras, op. cit., p. 69. 
413 Joan Ramon Resina, op. cit. 
414 See, for instance, the advertisement published on the left side of the front-page the first day La Vanguardia 
started implementing the reforms (Illustration 3). This advertisement was for corsets for pregnant women: 
“Corsé higiénico. El verdadero Corsé higiénico privilegiado por la M. Iltre. Academia de Medicina y Cirujía de 
esta ciudad hecho expresamente para el periodo del embarazo y para señoras delicadas, únicamente lo 




increased its invitations to companies to insert advertisements on the grounds of a (supposed) 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 “LA VANGUARDIA. Este periódico, merced á las notables reformas introducidas en él desde principios del 
presente año, es uno de los más leídos de Barcelona y que merece mayor aceptación por parte del público. 
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 When the First World War ended in 1918 La Vanguardia was one of the principal 
newspapers in Spain. The proof of this was the high circulation figures the newspaper had 
achieved and the wide prestige it enjoyed. This situation stood in contrast to the extremely 
modest characteristics of La Vanguardia when it was established in 1881. Numerous reforms 
made the ascendancy of this newspaper possible, but the year 1888 marked a turning point. 
The decision to formally abandon the links with the Liberal Party and become an independent 
newspaper radically altered the newspaper’s course. In contrast to the precarious financial 
state in which most of the partisan press in Barcelona was subsumed, the change of editorial 
line allowed La Vanguardia to break the glass ceiling of the partisan press and reach an 
audience that went beyond the members of the Liberal Party. This did not happen all of a 
sudden but took some years to manifest [see: Table 1]. For all these reasons, the year 1888 
can be considered the moment when the pillars of the journalist model of La Vanguardia 
were firmly established. 
 Yet contrary to a common trend in press history, this chapter has not explained the 
reforms of La Vanguardia as something that was predestined to occur; nor as the creation of 
a farsighted “great man”. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the historical context of 
Barcelona and the changes in the political career of Bartolomé Godó. The World Fair of 1888 
awoke great expectations in Barcelona and the merit for Godó consisted in redirecting his 
political career accordingly. The redesign of La Vanguardia into an independent newspaper 
was Bartolomé Godó’s attempt to increase his influence beyond the limits of the Liberal 
Party at a time when his protector (José Collaso) had passed away and Rius continued to be 
the leader of the Liberals of Barcelona. Changing the editorial line of La Vanguardia was a 
risky move, and nothing guaranteed that this was going to work. Still, and as Sánchez Ortiz 
noted, the Godó brothers were determined to radically transform La Vanguardia.419 
 Sánchez can be considered as the person responsible for choosing The Times as a 
reference model for the new Vanguardia. Compared to the editor of Il Corriere della Sera 
(Luigi Albertini), Sánchez did not have a first-hand knowledge of the journalism in The 
Times. In fact, the impression that Sánchez had of this newspaper was probably an idealised 
one, influenced by his admiration for England.420 Moreover, at a time when the “New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 See: “El Señor Sánchez Ortiz”, LV, 11/12/1901, op. cit. 
420 In his work El Periodismo, Sánchez referred to England and The Times in the following way: “El más ilustre 




Journalism” was gaining momentum in this country, it might seem surprising that Sánchez 
took as a reference model the exponent of the “Old Journalism” – even more so considering 
that The Times was in a state of decay. However, this chapter has argued that no matter how 
idealised Sánchez’s vision of The Times was, he had a clear idea of how the new Vanguardia 
should look. The editorials of 1888 and 1890 reveal a carefully planned strategy about the 
future of La Vanguardia, as well as of the kind of market audience the newspaper was going 
to target. Sánchez’s great accomplishment, in this regard, was in transforming La Vanguardia 
according to the tastes of Barcelona’s Modernist bourgeoisie, as evidenced in the World Fair 
of 1888, and in the attention paid to Paris. 
 Coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the Daily Universal Register’s renaming as      
The Times, Sánchez implemented a new editorial line that shared a series of parallelisms with 
the London newspaper, these were: the public service vocation – rather than the political 
community – as the first mission of the press; the emphasis put on mirroring the different 
tastes of society, defined as the need to reflect different points of view – in contrast to the 
particularistic views of parties; and, finally, making accountability the best sign of political 
independence (a need to act as “ruthless censors”) but avoiding personal confrontation. All 
these changes in the editorial line were in direct contrast to the strongly partisan character 
that the press had in Mediterranean countries, as illustrated in the first part of this chapter. In 
consequence, the reforms that Sánchez implemented in 1888 can be regarded as a significant 
step forward in the professionalisation of journalism in La Vanguardia, this being understood 
as the progressive detachment of journalists from the control of political parties; the creation 
of new codes of ethics; and the emphasis put on news. 421  Sánchez summarised this 
philosophy in metaphorical terms: journalism should be both “priesthood and magisterium” 
(“sacerdocio y magisterio”). 
 Therefore, and in contrast to the theory of media systems, this chapter has 
demonstrated that journalist traditions were not only shaped according to areas sharing 
similar patterns of historical development; they were also nurtured by the importing of 
principles and models of reference (“cultural transfers”) from distant countries. This 
statement does not imply discrediting the value of media systems: the comparison between 
The Times and La Vanguardia (and equally between England and Spain) demonstrates to 
what extent the features of the two newspapers were different. Still, this chapter has argued 
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cit., p. 21. 
421 D. Hallin and Mancini, op. cit., p. 33-40; and Svennik Høyer and Horst Pöttker (eds.), Diffusion of the News 




that putting too much emphasis on studying the press through “ideal-type models” entails the 
risk of losing sight of processes of hybridisation. If emphasis is only put on the countries’ 
structural features, one risks the peril of neglecting the circulation of ideas that historically 
took place beyond national frontiers; as the case of La Vanguardia and Il Corriere della Sera 
has illustrated. 
 Moreover, the introduction of serial novels in La Vanguardia reveals that the 
boundaries between the “popular” and the “quality” press were more blurred than is often 
assumed. In contrast to the case of The Times, which already had a well-established audience, 
La Vanguardia aspired to create a new one. For this reason the serial novel constituted a 
strategy for new readership that was aimed at targeting a segment of the market (represented 
by bourgeois women) that was neglected in the newspapers’ political content. All these 
efforts to reach the broadest audience possible reveal the new commercial orientation of La 
Vanguardia and the Godó’s new aspiration to make this newspaper a profitable venture. 
 Still, the emphasis of this chapter on the redesign of La Vanguardia does not imply 
that the transition from a partisan towards an independent and commercially oriented-press 
model was unproblematic. Proclaiming that La Vanguardia now was an independent 
newspaper was one thing, but the practice often proved to be quite another. Examining the 
tensions that arose out of the new journalist principles La Vanguardia started asserting in 
1888, particularly in relation to the political career of the Godó brothers, will constitute the 
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 The 1870s have traditionally been considered a turning point in the history of 
European colonialism in Africa.422 From this date onwards, the continent that lay beneath 
Gibraltar became the land where the main European powers sought to fulfil their expansionist 
ambitions. The literature on colonialism has traditionally regarded Spain as a minor actor in 
this “scramble for Africa”. At the time, Spain was a second-rate country in the international 
arena that only possessed the scattered remnants of her former Empire (Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
the Philippines and few islands in the Pacific), and some small possessions in Africa (Ceuta, 
Melilla, Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea). Two decades later, the defeat in the 
Spanish-American War of 1898 put an end to Spain’s empire and turned the country into a 
one of the “dying nations”, as Lord Salisbury called them.  
 However, the image of Spain’s weakness in the aftermath of 1898 has often prevented 
historians from noticing the efforts that some elites made to intervene in Europe’s scramble 
for Africa of the 1880s. While Spanish expansionism on this continent is often associated 
with the outcome of the Spanish-American War, and is therefore regarded as a response to 
the loss of the empire,423 less is known about the colonial endeavours that were made before 
this time. This chapter will examine one example of such an endeavour by focusing on the 
Godó’s involvement with a group of elites who actively promoted colonialism in Spain: the 
so-called “Africanist lobby”.424                   
In the 1870s Carlos and Bartolomé Godó entered the textile industry and became 
interested in exporting to colonial markets. This interest was not limited to the Spanish 
colonies in the Caribbean (Cuba and Puerto Rico), but also embraced the possibilities of 
future colonial expansion in North Africa. At a time when the main imperial powers were 
competing to impose their control over African territories, the Godó brothers joined an 
influential group of Catalan businessmen that were determined to increase Spain’s presence 
in Morocco. La Vanguardia actively contributed to this lobby’s wish to turn what was still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 Henri L. Wesseling, Divide y vencerás. El reparto de África, 1880-1914, Barcelona, RBA, 2010 [Spanish 
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423 Víctor Morales Lezcano, El colonialismo hispanofrancés en Marruecos (1898-1927), Madrid, Siglo XXI, 
1976. 
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1914), Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2007; Eloy Martín Corrales (ed.), Marruecos y el colonialismo español 




the concern of a small circle of elites (that is, Spanish expansion in the north of Africa) into a 
new issue on the national agenda.  
 In so doing, the Godó brothers constitute a case study to address one of the most 
recurrent questions in colonial studies, namely, the popular dimension of European 
colonialism. The point at stake in this field is the assumption that imperialism was not just the 
work of a few elites, nor a top-down process, but rather a phenomenon that required a 
minimum level of consent from society. While the works of John Mackenzie were seminal in 
raising interest on this topic,425 a new stream of research dedicated to studying how colonial 
rule was perceived in Metropolitan societies has emerged in the last decade. These works 
have aimed to break the artificial division between metropolis and empire, and constitute an 
attempt to insert the transnational dimension into the writing of national histories. The 
outcome has been a rich analysis of how the idea of Empire was lived out at home, 
sometimes in the most unsuspected daily practices and contexts (such as the church or the 
school), and of how it influenced the shaping of national identities.426 The importance of 
certain media in disseminating visions of empire, like monuments, imperial exhibitions, and 
music, has been stressed in these studies.427    
 The case of La Vanguardia will serve to explore the role of the press as an active 
political agent in transforming public understandings of issues such as colonialism and 
national identity. While Benedict Anderson stressed the importance the press played in 
building the “nation”,428 less is known about how newspapers contributed to this process in 
their role of intermediaries between colonial contexts and domestic audiences. To shed light 
on these issues this chapter will be structured in three parts. The first part will explain how 
the Godó’s interest in Africa arose from a voyage of exploration that Carlos Godó undertook 
in 1889. This trip gave birth to an ambitious plan to spread Spanish influence in Morocco, 
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consisting in Godó’s wish to build a brand-new neighbourhood in the city of Tangier. And La 
Vanguardia became a tool for this family to draw public attention to Morocco.  
 The second part will provide further insights into how the Godó brothers used the 
press to promote colonialism by focusing on the War of Melilla (1893) – a three-month 
conflict that saw Spanish military intervention used to defend its possessions in the north of 
Africa. This war will be used to examine the role of the press in fostering popular jingoism. 
Additionally, by portraying Moroccans as Spain’s eternal enemy, newspapers fabricated the 
image of the “other” against which Spanish identity was defined. Finally, the third part of this 
chapter will examine the role that commercial newspapers played in popularising an 
orientalist discourse about Morocco. This will illustrate the new commercial orientation La 
Vanguardia adopted in 1888, and how this implied changes in terms of management, 
marketing, and content, which reveals the Godó’s ambition to turn the newspaper into a 
profitable business while simultaneously promoting their private agenda to new audiences. 
 Examining all these questions will also uncover some epistemological problems about 
using the press to measure popular attitudes towards colonialism. Examples of this are the 
tendency to confuse the opinions of the press with those of the “people”; or assuming the 
views of contemporaries about the manipulative function of the press, for instance in stirring 
popular jingoism.429 Although this chapter will argue that this often proved to be the case, it 
will also pay attention to alternative points of view. Attention will be paid to the way people 
responded to the content that was published and to the multi-faceted dimensions of jingoism. 
A comparison with other newspapers shall reveal that support for the war was not as 
widespread as it first seemed in La Vanguardia, thus providing further insights about the 
ways the Godó brothers appealed to public opinion to advance their private agenda.  
 The writing of this chapter has benefited from a wide range of historical sources, 
located in Spanish, British, and Moroccan archives.430 Some of the archives where these 
sources are located have been used on very few occasions, especially in the case of the 
private archive of the Marquis de la Vega de Armijo; the Moroccan press written in Spanish; 
and the private archive of the Spanish Franciscan Missions in Tangier. 
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3.1. THE PRIVATE INTERESTS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY IN THE MOROCCAN 
EMPIRE 
 
During the last quarter of the 19th century Africa became one of the most important 
lands in the plans for expansion of European countries. The Madrid Conference of 1880 
represented the first attempt to bring some order to the competing interests of European 
powers in this continent. Later, the Berlin Conference of 1885 marked out the scramble for 
Africa in areas of influence, mainly between Great Britain, France, and Germany. In the case 
of Spain, its influence in the north of Morocco was formally acknowledged due to the 
possessions it had there (Ceuta and Melilla) and to its strategic position in the 
Mediterranean.431 Yet the fact was that Spain was little more than an observer in all these 
conferences.  
The difficulties the Restoration was facing at the time – above all, a chronic budget 
deficit – led to an official policy of “retreat” (“recogimiento”) and neutrality in international 
relations. This position did not mean that certain parties had no ambitions for new colonies 
(especially in the case of the Conservative Party of Cánovas del Castillo). Rather, it meant 
that there was a general agreement that such initiatives should be postponed for the future, 
and that maintaining what was left of the Spanish Empire should be the priority, not to 
mention the modernisation of Spain itself. Consequently, caution in international relations 
became the leading strategy of Restoration Spain – a strategy that was symbolised 
particularly well by the influence of Castelar’s “Doctrina de la Comodidad”. According to 
the policy coined by this Republican politician, Spain’s geographical position was the best 
guarantee to maintain the country’s sovereignty at a time of avid imperialism.432  
However, this policy started to be increasingly contested by the partisans of the 
Spanish colonialist project. Officially known as “Africanistas” (“Africanists”), they argued 
that the best way to modernise Spain was by actively promoting an expansionist policy in 
Africa. According to Sebastian Balfour, two different conceptions were present in this highly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 Richard Pennell, Morocco since 1830. A history, London, Hurst & Company, 2000. A classic work that is 
still of great use is: Luis Miège, Le Maroc et l’Europe, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1961, 3 vol. 
432 For the case of the Conservative politician Antonio Cánovas del Castilla: Azucena Pedraz Marcos, Quimeras 
de África. La Sociedad Española de Africanistas y colonialistas. El colonialismo español de finales del siglo 
XIX, Madrid, Ediciones Polifemo, 2000, pp. 139-142; the so-called “Doctrina de la comodidad”, in: Josep Pich i 
Mitjana, Francesc Pi i Margall i la crisis de Melilla de 1893-1894, Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2008, pp. 58-63. See 
also: Elena Hernández Sandoica, Pensamiento burgués y problemas coloniales en la España de la 
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heterogeneous movement.433 First there was a “neo-colonialist lobby”, composed by a 
myriad of different vested interests, mainly those of businessmen, traders, and industrialists. 
All of these parties had high expectations about the benefits that Morocco could provide in 
the future. The main strategy defended by this lobby was that of a “peaceful penetration” in 
Morocco. Influenced by positivism’s then-current popularity, they thought that “civilization” 
would follow trade, thus benefiting both Spaniards and Moroccans alike. The second trend 
within the Spanish Africanist lobby was composed, according to Balfour, by two different 
tendencies. First, the “traditionalist” movement formed of Carlists and Catholics, which 
defended proselytising as an additional mission of colonialism in Africa; and, second, a 
nationalistic and conservative trend. Their social base was hazy, and included a wide social 
spectrum: from people who considered Morocco as an exclusively Spanish possession; to 
those whose objective was the creation of a new Spanish empire in Morocco.434 
Balfour’s remarks represent a valuable step forward in our understanding of Spanish 
Africanism, but they still need further research to be confirmed, as Martín Corrales has 
recently noted.435 I believe that the case of the Godó family might shed some light here, 
demonstrating that the dividing lines within the Africanist movement were actually more 
blurred than Balfour has suggested. Thus, the plans of the Godó family in Africa will reveal a 
commercial strategy that did not refuse Catholic proselytism, but actually made it the 
cornerstone of a strategy with clear colonial ends. Emphasis will be placed on the importance 
of the press in promoting this private enterprise, as part of a broader attempt to raise public 
awareness about the benefits Africa could provide for Spain. 
The Godó family’s interests in Morocco went back to 1889. By then, certain members 
of the Spanish elites regarded the Moroccan Empire as a potential new market for their 
products. A former intervention in this territory (the so-called “Guerra de África”, 1859-
1860) resulted in a contract of free trade with the Sultan that included a special mention for 
Spain as “the friendliest country”. However, the fact was that the economic transactions of 
the majority of the European powers (especially England and France) with Morocco were 
much higher than those of Spain.436 To reverse this situation, and with the added goal of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 Sebastian Balfour, España, Marruecos y las grandes potencias, 1898-1914, in Guadalupe Gómez-Ferrer y 
Raquel Sánchez, eds, Modernizar España. Proyectos de reforma y apertura internacional (1898-1914), Madrid, 
Biblioteca Nueva, Colección Historia, 2007, pp. 143-173; see also: J. Pich i Mitjana, op. cit., p. 42. 
434 Further thoughts on the Spanish Africanist lobby, in: Azucena Pedraz Marcos, op. cit; Víctor Morales 
Lezcano, Africanismo y orientalismo español en el siglo XIX, Madrid, UNED, 1988. 
435 José Antonio González Alcantud & Eloy Martín Corrales (eds.), La Conferencia de Algeciras en 1906: un 
banquete colonial, Barcelona, edicions Bellaterra, 2007, p. 20, n. 7. 
436 Jean Louis Miège, “Les efforts de pénétration de l’Espagne”, Le Maroc et l’Europe, Paris, Presses 




promoting geographical exploration, the main employer organisation of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie, the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional”, started promoting exploration missions to 
the Moroccan market. It was precisely from one of these missions that the Godó family’s 
interest in Africa would arise. 
It is important to note that these kinds of missions were not new, but rather relied on a 
long tradition of Spanish expeditions to Africa. Numerous explorers, diplomats, businessmen 
and even tourists had long been traveling to African territories.437 Furthermore, the initiative 
of the “Fomento” exemplifies the popularity of geographic explorations in Europe at the 
time: between 1871 and 1890, almost one hundred new geographic societies were founded 
around the world.438 The creation of these types of entities intensified as the rivalry between 
countries to seize new territories increased. In Spain, too, the fear of falling behind in the 
European Scramble for Africa prompted the gathering of explorers, intellectuals, and 
businessmen alike in these geographical (and often openly colonialist) associations, for 
example the “Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid” (1876) and the “Sociedad de Africanistas y 
Colonialistas españoles” (1883).439  
It must be highlighted, in this regard, that the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” was an 
employer’s association, not a geographic society. The “Fomento” shared the perception that 
Africa could bring remarkable benefits for Spanish commerce, but mistrusted the free trade 
policies the majority of geographic societies promoted.440 This discrepancy on economic 
policies is an important point, because the support for protectionist policies (one of the 
traditional demands of Catalan elites) would re-emerge in 1893, during the War of Melilla. 
Therefore, the fact that the Godó brothers chose to use the “Fomento” as their route into 
Morocco, rather than through another institution, is an issue that needs to be borne in mind. 
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While the exploratory mission of the “Fomento” exemplified the interest of Catalan 
economic elites in Morocco, the Godó brothers became interested in it due to their new 
textile business. Having initially moved from their hometown of Igualada to Bilbao, in the 
1870s the brothers Carlos (1834-1894) and Bartolomé Godó Pié (1839-1897) had established 
themselves in Barcelona as textile manufacturers. As Chapter 4 will explain in detail, the 
business of the two brothers consisted in the manufacture of jute sacks, which was a type of 
manufacture that Spain’s overseas colonies needed in great quantities to store raw materials 
(like sugar, tobacco and coffee). Each day the Godó brothers’ factory produced 12,000 jute 
sacks that were exported to Cuba and Puerto Rico alone.441 This pace of production, however, 
did not seem to satisfy the Godó brothers and they soon set their sights on the Moroccan 
market. 
 Indeed, by the 1880s the Godó brothers appeared to have had an interest in opening 
new markets for their business. The journals of the Africanist movement tirelessly repeated 
the abundant opportunities the Moroccan Empire offered for businessmen daring enough to 
explore these territories. The same journals stressed that low-quality manufactured goods 
were the ones that would fit the Moroccan market better. Jute sacks, which were an extremely 
cheap and resistant commodity, consequently appeared to be the perfect product to satisfy 
“the taste of the indigenous people”.442 With this goal in mind, Carlos Godó joined a mission 
promoted by the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional and travelled to Morocco in March 1889.443 
He did not make this voyage alone, however, but was accompanied by two men: his close 
friend Enrique Collaso, and the journalist and Arabist Josep Boada Romeu.444 
 In March 1899 the three men (Godó, Collaso and Boada) embarked on an exploratory 
journey that took them to the main Moroccan cities. Boada included a vivid account of this 
tour in his book Allende el Estrecho, one of the classic works of 19th-century Spanish travel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 As noted, the Godó’s business in the jute industry will be examined in detail in Chapter 4. 
442 “(...) El género barato y fuerte, aunque sea de construcción tosca, es el preferible en estos países”. A similar 
recommendation was made by the Spanish consul in Mogador, who noted that “Los indígenas son poco 
inteligentes y no piden en el género finura o igualdad de hilos sino que tenga tono, parezca fuerte y sobre todo 
que sea barato”. Revista de Geografía Comercial, 31/10/1885, p. 1. 
443 “La Junta directiva del Fomento del Trabajo nacional, de Barcelona, deseando procurar nuevos mercados á 
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one the most prominent figures of the Liberal Party in Barcelona and a close acquaintance of the Godó brothers 
(see Chapter 1). Boada was a famous expert on Morocco and journalist at La Vanguardia. He would be the first 




literature.445 Although the initial plan was to visit the interior of Morocco (from Fez to 
Meknes and then back to Tangier through Tétouan and Ceuta) the problems they encountered 
on the road to Alcazar forced them to change their route (see Illustration 1). The expedition 
then headed towards the West coast, where the travellers visited some of the main 
commercial cities of the Empire (Asilah, Larache, Salé, Rabat, Meknès, Fez, Ksar el Kebir 
and Tangier). Some Moroccan newspapers, like Al-moghreb al-Aksa, provided constant 
updates about the journey of the three men.446 Boada penned a rich description of the various 
cities they visited, and stressed the opportunities the country offered for Spanish goods. 
Numerous details about the cloths consumed by Moroccans, as well as the fibres they were 
made of, were included in such descriptions. Boada often compared Spanish manufactured 
goods with those of other countries (particularly of England and France) and stressed Spain’s 
secondary position in the trade with Morocco.447 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 As this book explains, the trip was motivated by Godó’s commercial plans of expansion: [E.T]: “With the 
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Carlos Godó, socio de la casa fabril Godó Hermanos de Barcelona. Le acompañan el ex diputado Sr. Collaso, el 
periodista Sr. Boada, otro Sr. representante de la prensa de la ciudad condal [Reig], y el intérprete D. Bernardo 
Blanco”. Al-moghreb al-Aksa, Instituto Cervantes en Tánger (Morroco) 10/03/1889, p. 3. This newspaper was 
written in Spanish but was published in Morocco. 
447 In Arzila, for instance, Boada comments that: “Respecto al comercio exterior, Inglaterra es la nación que 
anda á la cabeza; solamente en artículos de algodón importa todos los años, por el vecino puerto de Larache ó 
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Illustration 1. Godó’s journey of exploration in the Moroccan Empire (March-April 1889) 
 
Route originally planned: from Fez to Meknes and then back to Tangier through Tétouan and Ceuta.  
Final route: Asilah, Larache, Salé, Rabat, Meknès, Fez, Ksar el Kebir and Tangier. 448 
 
Having come across certain difficulties, the expedition finally arrived at Tangier in 
late April 1889. The journey turned out to have been a worthwhile endeavour and had stirred 
numerous ideas, as the members of the expedition would confess to the Spanish consulate in 
Morocco.449 In fact, these ideas soon materialised: one month after the trip, Godó and his 
colleagues founded a new company in Tangier: the “Sociedad Hispano-Marroquí”.450        
This company had a very specific purpose: building a whole new neighbourhood, the 
“Nueva España” (“New Spain”), with the aim of fostering the settlement of new Spanish 
immigrants. Although this goal was very different from the Godó’s initial purpose of selling 
jute commodities, Tangier appeared to be a highly promising market for the building 
industry. Indeed, this city was undergoing a profound process of expansion. Tangier’s 
traditional lack of buildings and the great affluence of foreigners radically increased the price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 These two routes are based on the description of Boada in Allende el Estrecho. The roads taken between the 
different cities are only approximate. 
449 “Antes de ayer estuvieron á verme los Sres. Godó, Boada y Colaso á quienes me recomendaba V. en su 
último telegrama y ayer les devolví la visita convidandolos á almorzar para mañana á pesar de faltarme aun 
muchas cosas para hacer honor á la representacion nacional. Dichos señores vienen encantados de su espedición 
y con mil proyectos para aumentar las relaciones comerciales entre los dos payses. De estos proyectos que 
tienen todavía que madurar ha quedado el Consul en dar cuenta detallada oficialmente á ese Ministerio. Yo por 
lo sucinta relacion que de ellos me han hecho los creo muy practicos y realizables (...)”. Archivo Marqués de la 
Vega de Armijo, Museo de Pontevedra (MP), Correspondencia de la Legación de España en Marruecos. R. 
Figueroa. Solla, 198-8. 
450 “Fundación de la Compañía Hispano-Marroquí”, Archivo Histórico de Protocolos de Madrid (AHPM), 





of property, to the point that its value multiplied twenty times. 451  The international 
community was traditionally very significant and was led by Spanish citizens, whose number 
grew from 664 individuals in 1876 to 1,412 in 1888. The majority of these Spaniards were of 
humble origins and came from the provinces of Cadiz and Málaga.452  
 The considerable number of Spaniards that abandoned the country each year became 
an issue of concern for the Africanist movement, especially because many of these migrants 
chose to settle in French possessions (especially in Algeria), rather than Spanish ones.453 La 
Vanguardia contributed to raise public awareness about this population flow, and referred to 
it as “an open artery where the blood of the nation is shedding”. This newspaper considered 
that positive benefit could be obtained for Spanish interests if these migratory flows were 
properly redirected from French Algeria to Morocco.454 The agenda this newspaper was 
promoting was clear: migratory flows could be turned into a profitable way to increase the 
Spanish presence in Morocco, provided they were coordinated.  
This function of the press in setting foreign policy became evident as La Vanguardia 
argued that Moroccan people would also benefit from Spanish migration. According to this 
newspaper, the flow of migrants would attract new industries to the area and, more 
importantly, it would serve to introduce the right of property in Morocco. La Vanguardia 
maintained that the lack of this “right” was one of the reasons behind the alleged 
backwardness of the country, to the point of arguing that “In few places in the world is a 
similar communist principle more extended than in Morocco”. By consequence, La 
Vanguardia argued that the main benefit the new neighbourhood would bring to the 
Moroccans was morality – in short, it was an example of the positive influence that Spain 
could bring.455 Eventually, the press gave further details about the Godó’s construction 
project in Tangier and about the other initiatives associated with it: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 Louis Miège gives the example of a piece of land that cost 32 pesetas in 1860, 500 ptas. in 1876 and 1,000 
ptas. in 1890. Louis Miège, “La proprieté immobilière à Tanger d’apres un plan du XIXè siècle”, Revue Maroc 
Europe, I, 1991, pp. 84-90 (p. 86). 
452 Bernabé López García, “Los españoles en Tánger”, Awraq, nº 5-6, 2012, p. 10 and p. 8, respectively. 
453 Juan Bautista Vilar, Los españoles en la Argelia francesa (1830-1914), Madrid-Murcia, Centro de Estudios 
Históricos CSIC, Universidad de Murcia, 1989; and Eloy Martín Corrales, “La emigración española en 
Argelia”, Awraq, nº 5-6, 2012, pp. 47-63. 
454 “Semeja la emigración en general verdadera artéria abierta por donde escapa la savia de las naciones. Pero 
es frecuente que este sea un mal generador de inapreciables bienes cuando se tiene suficiente tacto para 
encauzar la corriente emigradora hacia aquellas regiones que por su historia y su afinidad de razas y costumbres 
puede ser lazo de íntima unión entre la patria de origen y la que de momento se adopta. (...) si hácia el vetusto 
imperio de los Sheriffes se encaminaran los emigrantes españoles con preferencia á la Argelia.” “Problemas 
marroquíes. La emigración española”, LV, 28/09/1889, p. 1. Italics added. 
455 “(...) Y es la obra catalana á la que nos referimos, de resultados más político-morales que materiales; de 
alcance más grande que en Europa tendría, porque como indicamos antes en Marruecos el derecho de propiedad 





“A la sombra de estos nuevos prestigios se ha creado la Sociedad Hispano-marroquí con 
capitales puramente españoles, se han adquirido muchos miles de metros de terreno donde se 
alzará una nueva población con el nombre de Barrio de España, se han adquirido fábricas 
que antes estaban en poder de extranjeros, y esta sociedad española, es hoy por hoy, la más 
importante de las establecidas en todo Marruecos. Hoy mismo se ha desembarcado para ella 
el primer ferrocarril Decuaville, que se establece en el imperio, si bien ahora no funcionará 
más que en los terrenos de su propiedad, y todo esto son progresos morales y materiales de 
gran valor, á los que no se ha dado publicidad para que no abortasen.”456 
 
 As the article quoted above reveals, the plans of the Godó company were intentionally 
kept secret, arguably to prevent competition from other countries. Tangier was the most 
dynamic port in Morocco, and its strategic position in the Strait of Gibraltar attracted the 
interest of the main European powers, especially England. In fact, the British consul in 
Morocco (Edward Meakin) carefully monitored all of the Godó company movements and 
reported them to the British Prime Minister (Lord Salisbury).457 Eventually, the Godó’s plans 
in Tangier were even disclosed in an English newspaper – the Western Morning News.458 The 
British concern explains why Godó’s plans were kept secret, and that the memorandum of the 
Sociedad Hispano-Marroquí declared that this company had been founded “by the patriotic 
desire to promote Spanish interests in Morocco and to contribute as much as possible to the 
increasing of Spanish influence in the Moroccan Empire”. As a result of this, foreigners were 
forbidden from participating in this company, and its capital (200,000 pesetas) was initially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
puede contribuir á la regeneración de un país donde á España le conviene desarrollar amistosa influencia, 
contribuyendo á afirmar y á acrecentar la fortuna del jefe de aquel vasto Estado y á dilatar la vida de cuentos 
eres se mueven perezosa y difícilmente en él”. “España y Marruecos. III”, LV, 27/07/1890, p. 1. 
456 “España y Marruecos”, LV, 03/09/1889, p. 2-3. 
457 “(...) This new Spanish scheme has arisen out of a purely commercial scheme of my own, and is in all 
respects exactly similar, so far as the communal part goes, and it is very remarkable that while the English 
scheme has met with no support from Her Majesty’s government, the Spaniards are supported primarily (...) by 
their government in the strongest possible way. (...) In fact, Senor Godo has adopted the Company plans 
originated entirely by myself.” The National Archives (NA), FO 99/269, Edward E. Meakin to Lord Salisbury 
(Letter of September 18th 1889). Further information on this diplomat, in: S. E. Fryer, ‘Meakin, James Edward 
Budgett (1866–1906)’, rev. Mark Pottle, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2004. Italics added. 
 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.eui.eu/view/article/34970, accessed 2 May 2011] 
458 Speaking of Godó’s “Nueva España” idea, the British consulate noted: “(...) At the present moment the 
[Spanish] Government is exerting influence at the Sultan’s Court in favour of Senor Godo, a well-known and 
wealthy manufacturer, who seeks for a concession to build a complete Spanish quarter at Tangier. The scheme, 
which is backed by a powerful syndicate of Catalonian manufacturers, includes the construction endowment of a 
teaching college, a bank, and a building for the Spanish Legation, the Consulate, and Military Mission.” “Spain 
and Morocco”, Western Morning News, September 1899. Clipping of the newspaper added in Meakin’s letter to 




divided between the five partners. Later on, the entry of Bartolomé Godó assured that the 
company was family-controlled.459 
 While the Godó brothers showed a serious interest in Morocco, and used the press to 
secure their economic interests in the country, they were not planning to do so on their own. 
Since the very beginning, the project of building the neighbourhood of “Nueva España” was 
designed as part of a broader plan, in which other agents interested in promoting Spanish 
colonialism in Morocco participated. One of these agents was the Catholic Franciscan 
Mission in North Africa. Although this religious order had had a presence in Tangier since 
the 13th century, its presence was favoured by the liberty of movements granted by the peace 
treaty of 1861.460 A network of Catholic missions was subsequently established in the main 
cities of the Empire, and included the running of hospitals and primary schools, as was the 
case of Tangier. At the head of this Franciscan Mission was father José Lerchundi (1836-
1896), arguably the most influential Spanish individual in Morocco.461   
 Godó established a close friendship with Lerchundi during his stay in 1889, and this 
personal acquaintance became an invaluable path to obtaining the support of the Monarchy 
for his projects. Spain’s Queen Regent María Cristina de Habsburgo was in close 
correspondence with Father Lerchundi’s Franciscan Mission through her honorary presidency 
of the so-called “Asociación de Señoras españolas bajo los auspicios de María Inmaculada”. 
This association was founded in 1887 with the purpose of supporting the mission of the 
Franciscans in Africa. Among its members were some of the wealthiest ladies of Madrid and 
Barcelona, such as María Gayón, the wife of the second Marquis of Comillas, Claudio López 
Bru (1853-1925), one of the leading businessmen involved in the programme to increase 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 Initially, Carlos Godó, Enrique Collaso and Josep Boada held 30% each; while Felipe Ovilo and Julio 
Cervera had 5% each. Later on, another member of the Godó family (Bartolomé Godó) joined the company – 
and then the two brothers would control 40%. See: Notary Francisco Lozano Muñoz (Cónsul de España en la 
Ciudad de Tanger, Marruecos), AHPM, Tánger, 17/04/1899, AHPM, Notary Francisco Lozano Muñoz (“Cónsul 
de España en la Ciudad de Tanger, Marruecos”), vol. 37568, pp. 57-58.  
460 A wide literature exists on the Franciscan Missions in Morocco, mostly written by members of the same 
order. José Mª Álvarez Infante, La Misión Franciscana de Marruecos: desde su restablecimiento en 1856 hasta 
nuestros días, Barcelona, Tip. Católica, 1911; Juan Menéndez Pidal, Album hispano-marroquí. Misiones 
católicas de Marruecos, Barcelona, Asociación de Señoras Españolas bajo los auspicios de María Inmaculada, 
1897. An exception to this trend is: Ricardo Castillo Larriba, “Los franciscanos y el colonialismo español en 
Marruecos. José María Lerchundi y Francisco María Cervera (1877-1926)”, Universidad de Alcalá, Doctoral 
thesis, 2014. 
461 Besides being a renowned Arabist, Lerchundi enjoyed a close acquaintance with the Sultan Hasan I. In fact, 
Lerchundi had been the main promoter of the Sultan’s visit to the Vatican in 1884, and also acted as the Sultan’s 
translator during his official visit to Spain in 1885. José María López, El P. José Lerchundi. Biografía 
documentada, Imp. Clásica Española, 1927; Ramón Lourido Díaz (ed.), Marruecos y el Padre Lerchundi, 




Spain’s commercial influence in Morocco.462 Through his acquaintance with Lerchundi, 
Godó was received in an audience with the Queen Regent in the summer of 1889, after which 
he obtained the Crown’s support for the building of a Spanish neighbourhood in Tangier. 463 
 For the reasons mentioned above, the plans of Carlos Godó proved to be part of a 
much broader initiative, which brought together people like the Queen Regent, Father 
Lerchundi and the Marquis of Comillas.464 What all these individuals shared in common was 
the belief that Spain’s influence in Morocco should be strengthened, and that the spreading of 
the Catholic religion should play a central role in achieving this. Therefore, the objective of 
this group was not simply based on the positivist conception that “civilization” would follow 
trade (although this certainly played a part), but was based on the conviction that a moral 
duty was also at stake. The spreading of Catholicism was crucial for such an endeavour as it 
was deemed to contain a set of values that would contribute to the moral improvement of the 
Moroccans.  
The importance of the press in promoting a religious dimension in Spanish 
colonialism became evident at a public event that was held on 27 October 1893. On this day, 
a public ceremony was celebrated in Santa Madrona’s Church, in Barcelona, to celebrate a 
triumph of the Franciscan Mission in Tangier: the religious conversion of a Moroccan girl to 
Catholicism. The Franciscan sisters had picked up a Moroccan girl (Fatma Ben Ansor) and 
saw this as a priceless opportunity to convert her to Catholicism. The culmination of this 
religious endeavour took place when Fatma was baptized in public with the new name of 
“María Luisa”. And amidst the great excitement that this ritual represented for Barcelona’s 
most fervent Catholics, Godó and his wife Antonia Lallana attended as the new godparents of 
the Moroccan girl.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 The Marquis Comillas was a devout Catholic who possessed one of the largest fortunes in Spain, as well as 
being a central figure in Spain's colonial trade with the Antilles. On Comillas, see: Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, 
“Una avanzadilla española en África: el grupo empresarial Comillas”, in Eloy Martín Corrales (ed.), op. cit., pp. 
133-166; and M. Rodrigo Alharilla, Marqueses de Comillas. Antonio y Claudio López, 1817-1925, Madrid, 
LID, 2000. As president of the above-mentioned association, Comilla’s wife purchased land in Tangier. Arxiu 
Històric de Protocols de Barcelona (AHPB), Notary Luis Gonzaga Soler i Pla, 20/05/1890, pp. 2124-2125. 
463  “S.M. la Reina (q. D. g.) se dignó manifestarme el dia 17 del corriente que tendria mucho gusto en que le 
presentara al Sr. D. Cárlos Godó, Presidente de la Sociedad Hispano-Marroquí. Espero, pues, de la notoria 
bondad de VE se sirva citarnos el dia y la hora, en que tendrémos el honor de ser recibidos en el Palacio de 
Ayete, favor que le agradecerá de todo corazón su afmo. y humilde amigo, S.S. / Q.B.S.m. / Fr. José Lerchundi / 
San Sebastián (Calle del Puyuelo, nº 19, 2º) 21 de Agosto de 1889”. Archivo General de Palacio (AGP), 
Reinado Alfonso XIII, Caja 8730, exp. 2. 
464 As the Spanish consulate in Tangier observed, Godó relied on the support of Comillas to construct his 
neighbourhood in Tangier: “Antes de ayer estuvieron á verme los Sres. Godó, Boada y Colaso á quienes me 
recomendaba V. en su último telegrama Yo por lo sucinta relacion que de ellos me han hecho los creo muy 
practicos y realizables, contando por supuesto con los capitales indispensables que ellos auguran poder 
encontrar poniendo el asunto bajo la protección del Marques de Comillas.” M.P. Correspondencia de la 




Moreover, Godó used La Vanguardia to give wide coverage to this event. He wrote to 
Father Lerchundi to request his collaboration in writing an article about the future baptism of 
the Moroccan girl465 and his letter reveals to what extent Godó saw the press as a valuable 
device to spread awareness about the proselytising endeavours in Morocco. The outcome was 
an article that described the baptism with enthusiasm and included two illustrations that 
compared the previous Moroccan Fatma with her new Christian incarnation – María Luisa 
[see Illustration 2]. As La Vanguardia reported enthusiastically:  
 
“Si por un momento prescindimos de los bienes espirituales, puramente del orden religioso, 
que con el ingreso en la fé de Cristo haya podido adquirir la preciosa niña (...) ¡cuánto no ha 
ganado la pequeña Fatma, escapando á la miseria presente, á la esclavitud futura, al 
embrutecimiento y á la abyección en que los mahometanos suelen tener á sus mujeres, y 
viniendo á vivir en un pueblo libre, en donde por lo menos encontrará consideración y respeto, 
si ella es bastante virtuosa para hacerse respetar, que sí lo será, siendo educada por religiosas 
tan hábiles y celosas como las religiosas franciscanas de esta ciudad!”.466 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 “R. P. Fr. José Lerchundi, Tanger. Mi mas querido amigo: Tengo el mayor gusto en manifestarle que el día 
26 se efectuará con toda solemnidad el bautizo de la mora de cuyo acto podrá enterarse por la estensa relación 
que de él que pensamos hacer en La Vanguardia. Si no fuera abusar de su bondad, me permitiria suplicarle que 
me hiciera el especial favor de mandarme algunos artículos o correspondencias para dicho periódico emitiendo 
su autorizada opinion sobre asuntos de Marruecos. Si usted quisiera guardar el incógnito, como supongo, le 
garantizo la reserva mas absoluta en todo, aun en la copia de los artículos antes de darlos á las cajas sí así le 
conviniera. Seria un obsequio que le agradecería con toda el alma, quien le saluda muy cariñosamente y se 
reitera de V. como su mas affmo amigo y SS QBSM, Carlos Godó.” Archivo de la Misión Franciscana en 
Tánger (AMFT), Morocco, Carpeta XVII, sección B, Nº 434, Carta de Godó a Lerchundi (23/10/1893). 
466 [E.T.]: “If we leave aside for a moment the spiritual goods that the girl – portrayed in our picture first with 
Moorish clothes and then with new Christian ones – might have obtained; and we simply pay attention for a 
moment to the worldly goods she has obtained, ¡how lucky little Fatma is! Since she has escaped from the 
misery and future slavery, from the degradation into which the Moors usually hold their women; and has come 
to live with a free people, where at least she might gain everyone’s respect and consideration if she behaves 
virtuously; and we are sure she will, ¡since she has been educated for such skilful and zealous Franciscan nuns 









 Events like the one described above demonstrate Godó’s close commitment to the 
task of “bringing civilization” to Morocco, as well as his efforts to convince the public about 
the central role religion should play in this. If Godó felt that this was an element that 
deserved more publicity is was because proselytising was not part of the colonial strategy the 
Liberal government had promoted at the time. On various occasions Godó met with the 
foreign minister and with the Spanish consulate in Morocco, who officially granted him the 
state’s support. This support probably stemmed from the Queen Regent’s sponsoring of 
Godó’s plans and from the sympathies she had for the Franciscan Missions. In private, 
however, diplomats saw the use of religion as a rather old-fashioned method to foster Spanish 
colonialism. In the view of these state diplomats, Morocco needed “doctors and 
businessmen”, rather than the preaching of the Franciscans.468 In fact, state officials proved to 
be greatly concerned about the Missionaries’ growing involvement in Spain’s plans for 
expansion in Morocco, because this religious order was subject to a foreign authority (the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Ibidem. 
468 “La venida de los Catalanes y las facilidades que parecen encontrar para llevar á buen fin sus proyectos, 
basados en el amor al clero y al bienestar inherente á la naturaleza humana, me han hecho pensar y este 
pensamiento lo someto con alguna repugnancia á su buen juicio y consideracion por el temor que tengo de 
equivocarme, sino ha pasado ya el tiempo en que se creia que la cultura y la civilizacion de estos pueblos no 
podía obtenerse sinó con el auxilio de las Misiones religiosas. En estos payses donde no se registra una sola 
conversion de un idígena á la Religion Católica, entiendo que los médicos, los industriales y los Comerciantes 
estan llamados á ejercer en el porvenir de Marruecos mayor influencia todavía que la que han venido ejerciendo 
hasta ahora los monges franciscanos.” M.P. Corresp. de la Legación de España en Marruecos, Solla, 198-8, 





Vatican).469 This suspicion from state officials reveals to what extent a plurality of projects 
existed on how to promote Spain’s expansion in Morocco, and explains the importance Godó 
gave to public opinion to reform foreign policy. A few years later, the beginning of a new 
war presented a new opportunity for Godó to publicise his views on foreign policy.  
 
 
3.2. POPULAR IMPERIALISM AND THE PRESS: THE WAR OF MELILLA (1893) 
  
By the 1890s, Melilla was little more than a speck on the Mediterranean coast of the 
Moroccan Empire. Although its origins as a Spanish possession went back to the late fifteen-
century, Melilla was no more than a fortified town where a small community of 2,000 people 
lived – basically soldiers, together with a prison population. The territorial limits of Melilla 
were not entirely clear, but were about 3 km.470 At the time the hinterland of Melilla was the 
site of frequent skirmishes between Spanish soldiers and the Amazic tribes that lived in the 
area known as the Riff. These local tribes were formally bound to the religious authority of 
the Sultan. However, the truth was that by the last decade of the nineteenth century the 
Moroccan empire was undergoing a deep internal crisis that would bring it close to 
dissolution. Vast parts of the territory were detached from the authority of the Sultan, 
particularly in the interior and south of Morocco, and it was only the intense competition 
between the European powers that ultimately guaranteed – and greatly benefited from – the 
fragile equilibrium of the Empire.471   
The Spanish press frequently protested about the Sultan’s weakness. The Treaty of 
Wad Ras (1860) formally obliged the Sultan to protect the Spanish possessions from the 
attacks of the Riffians, but this obligation was rarely enforced. The majority of the Spanish 
press neither believed in the will nor the capacity of the Sultan to fulfil such agreements. The 
only solution, the newspapers claimed, was to “repel the aggressions with weapons, since no 
other plan is possible in Melilla to protect the sacred lives of those who live there”.472 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 “En resumen el Padre Lerchundi cuya influencia sobre el Sultan seria un poderoso elemento para nosotros si 
pudieramos utilizarlo, pero por lo que voy viendo es ya mas Romano que español y en la actualidad espera mas 
del Santo Padre que del Gobierno de SM. Todo ello nos crea una situación delicadísima (...).” Ibidem, Letter of 
Figuera to Vega de Armijo (Tangier, 06/04/1889). Italics added. 
470 In 1862 it was agreed that the limits would be established according to the distance of two canon shots from 
the fortress of Victoria Grande. In 1884 the population of Melilla was barely 200 people, though by 1891 it had 
grown to 2,000. Gabriel De Morales, Datos para la Historia de Melilla (1497-1907), Melilla, Centro asociado 
UNED de Melilla, 1992, vol. I, p. 233 and p. 304. 
471 L. Miège, Le Maroc et l’Europe..., op. cit.; Richard Pennell, Morocco since 1830. A history, London, Hurst 
& Company, 2000.  




consequence, wide segments of printed opinion started calling for military action as the only 
way to guarantee security in Melilla. In October 1893 another incident between the Spanish 
troops and the kabilas of the Riff triggered the beginning of a new conflict, the so-called 
“War of Melilla”.473  
Although this war only lasted three months, it revealed the popularity colonial wars 
enjoyed among wide segments of Spanish society. Even though the country had recently 
experienced sporadic eruptions of patriotism,474 no other international episode generated 
such public consensus – either politically or sociologically – as the War of Melilla. With 
very few exceptions475 all political leaders demanded an exemplary punishment of Moroccan 
tribes. This included the conservatives of Cánovas del Castillo and the republicans of Emilio 
Castelar, who severely criticised the management of the crisis by the Liberal government of 
Sagasta and called for prompt military intervention. The same line was followed by the 
parties at the margins of the political spectrum, such as other minor republican parties, the 
Carlists and the Catalan nationalists. Broad consensus therefore existed among the majority 
of political parties in favour of a new intervention in Morocco. This consensus was 
remarkable, since the Restoration’s foreign policy had been characterised, until then, by a 
reluctance to take part in foreign adventures (as discussed earlier). The majority of parties 
threw this caution aside in October 1893. 
The decisive contribution of the press in fostering popular imperialism became evident 
as growing segments of Spanish society mobilised in favour of an intervention in Morocco. 
As news about the first skirmishes arrived, a wave of patriotism and outrage rapidly spread to 
various Spanish cities.476 Newspapers described the behaviour of Spanish troops in heroic 
terms and presented the soldier’s bravery as the only thing that prevented a massacre from 
occurring.477 All sorts of spontaneous acts of support for the troops in Melilla took place and 
the press decisively contributed to publicising these. Patriotic demonstrations were organised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 The War of Melilla would also be referred to as “la Guerra de Margallo” or simply as “la Guerra Chica”, as it 
only lasted three months  (October-December 1893).  
474 The most recent examples of this enthusiasm were the African War of 1859-1860 and the Cuban War of 
1868-1878. Albert García Balañà, “Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina: la guerra de África en 
Cataluña (1859-1860)”, E. Martín Corrales, op. cit., pp. 13-78; Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, “Cataluña y el 
colonialismo español (1868-1899)”, Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millán, María Cruz Romeo (eds.), Estado y 
periferias en la España del siglo XIX. Nuevos enfoques, València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 
2009, pp. 315-356. Some sporadic outbursts of patriotism also took place in 1883 (during the visit of King 
Alfonso XII to Paris) and in 1885 (resulting from a diplomatic incident with Germany over the Carolinas 
Islands).  
475 These exceptions were the socialist Pablo Iglesias and the republican federalist Francesc Pi i Margall. See: J. 
Pich i Mitjana, op. cit.  
476 “Entusiasmo patriótico”, LV, 06/10/1893, p. 6. 




in cities like Granada, Madrid, Seville, Barcelona, Valladolid, Zaragoza and Valencia, where 
some 10,000 people ran through the streets to protest against the attack perpetrated by the 
Riffians.478 Other cities sent telegrams to the government to make “the popular dissent 
against the moors” known and to offer assistance, while city councils promoted public 
subscriptions to buy weapons and groceries.479 Large numbers of civilians of different social 
origins publically volunteered to sign up for combat; private entities, like the Red Cross, 
offered their help to the government; and many declared themselves to be ready to “shed 
their blood for the motherland”.480 The Church joined this collective fervour and blessed the 
wounded soldiers of Melilla and praised their deeds.481 
All these public demonstrations, which the press reported and helped to promote, 
were characterised by widespread enthusiasm. Spanish flags were hoisted and demonstrators 
constantly cheered the names of Spain, the king, and the army. Some contemporaries saw in 
these demonstrations an opportunity to overcome Spain’s worst problems ― among which, 
the emergence of a nationalist movement in Catalonia. Indeed, the 1890s saw the growth of 
Catalanism, an identity-based movement that proposed an alternative conception of the 
Spanish nation to the centralist model of the Restoration. Although a sense of regional 
identity had long existed in Catalonia, the 1890s were a key moment in the politicisation of 
these feelings. A new platform called “Unió Catalanista” brought together different entities 
that opposed the liberal’s plan to implement a common civil law system in all of Spain. This 
plan revealed the liberal’s ambition to underpin a uniform and centralist state-model, but 
started facing growing opposition from the periphery. This became evident in 1892 when the 
Unió Catalanista approved the first political manifesto in which autonomy for Catalonia was 
explicitly requested.482  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478  “Manifestación en Valencia”, “Otra manifestación en Granada”, “otra manifestación”, “En Sevilla”, 
“Manifestaciones”, LV, 13-17, 19, 22, 26, 29-31 October 1893, pp. 3-6.  
479 Like the city councils of Gràcia, Manresa and Barcelona. LV, 05/11/1893, p. 2; 06/10/1893, p. 6.  
480 The miners of Bilbao and the prisoners of different cities (Granada, Valencia and Malaga) offered to 
participate in combat. The Bank of Barcelona sent a telegram to the government to offer a loan of 2.5 million 
pesetas. The Red Cross sent all kinds of equipment for the wounded soldiers in Melilla. LV, 07-14 October 
1893, pp. 1-5; and 05/11/1893, p.2. 
481 Those were the cases, for instance, of the bishops of León and Madrid. LV, 07/10/1893, p. 5.  
482 This manifesto also asked for other measures besides autonomy, like maintaining the Catalan singular civil 
law system; for Catalan to be the only official language in the region; that only Catalans could hold public 
office; and that Catalonia should have its own Courts. As historian Borja de Riquer has noted, this manifesto 
was rather vague at the time in specifying how autonomy was to be implemented. In social terms, this document 
was conservative. For instance, it demanded corporate forms of franchise. On the “Bases de Manresa” and the 
“Unió Catalanista”, see: Jordi Llorens i Vila, La Unió Catalanista i els orígens del catalanisme polític, 
Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1992; and Borja de Riquer, La Lliga Regionalista: la 




Although the demands for autonomy did not prevent Catalan nationalists from joining 
the wave of Spanish patriotism,483 some journalists saw the War of Melilla as an opportunity 
to transcend domestic politics. As one newspaper from Madrid (El Imparcial) commented 
with unconcealed joy: 
 
“¡Consolador espectáculo! El honor de España está en telo de juicio, y 
particularismos regionales, cuestiones de campanario, antagonismos de clase, 
conveniencias de bandería, todo ha sido puesto en olvido. Las pequeñas patrias han 
desaparecido ante la patria grande. Nadie piensa ahora en que es gallego ó navarro, 
castellano ó catalán: sólo se acuerda de que es español. (...) No hay mal que por bien no 
venga, y los salvajes rifeños (...) han venido á ser ocasión de que se compruebe que á 
despecho de todas las miserias de nuestra vida pública el carácter español permanece en 
toda su vigorosa integridad “.484 
 
Indeed, the press repeatedly portrayed the war against the Moroccans – referred to in 
Spanish as “moros” – as a “national movement”. In a political system like the Restoration, 
where the institutional channels for mass participation were manipulated by the strong 
presence of clientelist practices, and where the political system showed little capacity to 
mobilise the population, the euphoria that a potential war in Morocco generated in most of 
Spanish society was remarkable. The press played an important role in fostering this 
euphoria. The “war against the Moor” had numerous precedents in Spanish history,485 but the 
press greatly contributed to popularising them. Newspapers repeatedly referred to previous 
military interventions in Morocco, particularly the War of Africa (1859-1860), and made the 
public familiar with them. Such was the case, for instance, of the Catalan Volunteers 
(“Voluntarios Catalanes”), a corps of 500 volunteers (mainly from the popular and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 Contrary to what some scholars have noted, the colonial wars proved to be very popular in this region too, 
including the supporters of Catalan nationalism, as shown in: Eloy Martín Corrales (ed.), Marruecos y el 
colonialismo español..., op. cit.; and in Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, “Cataluña y el colonialismo español (1868-
1899)”..., op. cit. A different perspective, in: Abel Albert & Rosa Cesarols, “De viatge pel Marroc: entre el 
debat colonial i la mirada estereotipada”, M. D. Garcia Ramon, J. nogué and P. Zusman (eds.), op. cit., p. 239.  
484 “Movimiento saludable”, El Imparcial, 06/10/1893, editorial. [E.T.]: “What a remarkable event! Now that 
the honour of Spain is at stake, everything has been put aside: the regional particularities, religious 
controversies, class conflicts, selfish interests, etc. The small fatherlands have disappeared and only the greatest 
one has remained. No one thinks anymore about being Galician, from Navarra, Castilian nor Catalan: in this 
moment everyone is a Spaniard. Nothing bad comes without being followed by something good and the savage 
Riffians (...) have been the best proof that despite all the miseries of our public life, the Spanish character 
remains in all its vigorous strength.” 
485 Eloy Martín Corrales, “El “moro”, decano de los enemigos exteriores de España. Una larga enemistad (siglos 
VIII-XXI)”, Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, Francisco Sevillano Calero (eds.), Los enemigos de España. Imagen del 
otro, conflictos bélicos y disputas nacionales (siglos XVI-XX), Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y 




Republican classes of Barcelona) who fought in Morocco in 1859.486 During the War of 
Melilla the press in Barcelona repeatedly evoked the deeds of this corps as an example of an 
alleged tradition in fighting against the “Moors”. A whole mythology about the Catalan 
Volunteers (including songs, poems and plays) re-emerged, and several proposals were made 
to regroup this corps. Similarly, though to a lesser extent, the press remembered the myth of 
the Spanish Reconquista, which had ended in 1492.487 Newspapers consequently depicted 
Moroccans as the eternal enemy of Spain, and the term “Christian” was often used as a 
synonym for the Spanish troops in opposition to “the Moors”.  
These historical evocations in the press were combined with a discourse that reinforced 
a stereotypical image of Moroccans, who were depicted as savage, religious fanatics. In so 
doing, newspapers contributed to building a sense of Spanish identity based on moral 
superiority and heroic virtues. Indeed, newspapers contributed to creating a general mistrust 
towards the Moroccans and portrayed them as a bellicose and anarchic people driven by 
primary instincts. Thus the majority of newspapers presented the Spaniards as being morally 
superior and this served to pave the way for the conquest of territories in Morocco. In such an 
enterprise, violence was considered the only language that the local population could possibly 
understand.488 This attitude was supported by the impression that the Sultan was incapable of 
controlling his own people.489  
 The violent language employed towards the Moroccans was, in fact, another 
ingredient in the construction of an “other” against which Spanish identity was defined. The 
press of the time is full of examples in which aggression was used as a sign of Spanish 
patriotism. For instance, the liberal newspaper of Madrid El Imparcial recounted, in an article 
entitled “We are going to eat Moors!” ("¡Comeremos moros!"), the case of a Spanish soldier 
who declared that “Spain may not have money to buy ovens to bake bread in Melilla, but we 
must go there and if there’s no bread, we will eat Moors”. According to the same newspaper, 
“Several officers that were there (...) burst into enthusiastic applause, feeling the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Albert Garcia Balañà, “Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina: la Guerra de África en Cataluña (1859-
1860)”, in Eloy Martín Corrales (ed.), op. cit., pp. 13-77. The theatre play “Verdaderos Voluntarios Catalanes de 
la guerra de África”, in “Los Aucellets”, LV, 27 and 28/10/93, p. 6;. The proposal to recover the corps was 
made by the general Francisco Mª de Borbón to the “Diputaciones provinciales”, LV, 19/10/1893, p. 2. 
487 LV, 19/10/93, p. 1-2. 
488 El Imparcial, 06/10/1893, p. 1. Similar views were expressed in: LV 17/10/1893, p. 5.  
489 See: [Illustration "La Nota del Sultán y la música d'Espanya"]: “While the Sultan keeps preaching the 
terrible sermons, our troops shall preach with the ‘mouths of our canons’”, La Campana de Gracia, 18th 




way”.490 This hostile vocabulary, however, was not exclusive to pro-government newspapers 
like El Imparcial. The Republican press in Barcelona, which mainly addressed the popular 
and urban classes, shared a similar stereotyped image of Moroccans. The Republican and 
satirical newspaper L’Esquella de la Torratxa, for instance, had a daily section entitled 
“Against the Moor” [Illustration 3]. Another satirical and Republican newspaper from 
Barcelona, La Campana de Gràcia, published an illustration in which the head of a 
Moroccan was shown spiked on a bayonet and called it “the only national solution” 
[Illustration 4].  
 
 
Illustration 3 491 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 See: “¡Comeremos moros!”, El Imparcial, 6th October 1893, p. 1. This article was later transcribed in La 
Vanguardia, 8th October 1893, p. 5. 
491 Picture 3: “Forget about Moorish figs! We don’t want anything else from these people!” [in Catalan, figs are 
popularly known as “Moorish figs”]. Second image: “Stand up right now! Don’t you see that it makes you see 
“moorish” to be seated like that?”.  “Contra ‘l moro”, L’Esquella de la Torratxa, 13th October 1893, p. 5. 









 At this point we may ask why the Spanish newspapers, both pro and anti government, 
adopted such a hostile attitude in their reports of the War of Melilla. The first and arguably 
most important reason is that patriotism was the easiest attitude for newspapers to adopt. The 
incidents between local tribes and Spanish troops in the north of Africa were not new, and 
supporting the national cause was something the average reader was likely to sympathise 
with. All the more so when patriotic demonstrations spread and public imaginaries about the 
“Moors” re-emerged; these being two phenomena that the journalists contributed to 
broadcast.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 “The only national solution” [Originally published in Catalan as: “L’única solució nacional”, Almanach de la 




  However, the case of the Republican press in Barcelona provides evidence that 
jingoism also became an opportunity to carry messages with a domestic content. Looking 
closely at the content of the patriotic discourse that Republican newspapers published reveals 
that jingoism contained a multifaceted dimension. As Xavier García has noted, some 
Republican newspapers started drawing parallels between the “savage” Moroccans and 
liberal politicians.493 These newspapers argued that liberal politicians were as “uncivilized” 
as Moroccans because they represented the same type of obstacle to “progress”; to the point 
of considering that Spain’s political system was worse than that of Morocco, because its 
politicians were never held accountable. 494 Moreover, the same newspapers repeatedly 
referred to liberal politicians as the “moors of Madrid” (“moros de Madrit”). This type of 
satire was not used as mere entertainment, but contained a clear political strategy aimed at 
making readers aware of Spain’s political situation.495 As well as this use of patriotism to 
criticise liberal politics, other Republican newspapers like El Diluvio started echoing the 
impression that the soldiers sent to Melilla came from the lower classes; and that the ultimate 
purpose of the military intervention was to defend the economic interests of a few elites.496 In 
other parts of Spain, the Socialist press manifested similar views and portrayed the 
intervention in Melilla as a “bourgeois war”, as Rafael Núñez Florencio has noted.497 
 At this point we may ask how the readers in Barcelona responded to the bellicose 
stance that most of the press had adopted. One way of answering this question consists in 
examining some of the apparently casual observations that the newspapers made about 
society. The Barcelona newspaper El Diluvio, for instance, noted the lack of enthusiasm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 Xavier Garcia Olivé, “‘Moros de dos menas’. Republicanismes barcelonins i la ‘guerra de Margallo’” 
[Master thesis, Universtitat Pompeu Fabra, 2008, unpublished manuscript, 57 pages.]. I would like to thank 
professor Albert Garcia Balañà for giving me access to this work. The following quotations are indebted to the 
work of Xavier Garcia. 
494 As La Campana de Gracia put it: “not all the Moroccans live beneath the Strait [of Gibraltar], but we also 
have them in Spain”. Another Republican newspaper, called El Diluvio, stated: “¡Qué país este! ¿Y tenemos 
sistema constitucional? Pues entre España con este sistema, y Marruecos con el que place á cada kábila, 
declaramos francamente que no encontramos gran diferencia. Allí siquiera se cortan las cabezas de los bajás. 
Aquí no se ha dado ese caso nunca.” Ibidem, p. 13. 
495 “Reader, think about it / and tell me if you are served properly: / Where are the real Moors: / In Melilla or in 
Madrid?” [originally published in Catalan as: “Lector, pénsathi una mica / y digasme si ets servit: / ¿Ahónt son 
los verdaders moros: / á Melilla o á Madrit?”]. La Campana de Gràcia, 28/10/1893, p. 4. Ibidem, p. 12. 
496 “Es para clamar, porque vé uno en España á un pueblo que quiere ser grande, que tiene condiciones para 
serlo, y que por causa de sus malos gobernantes no acaba de salir nunca de la impotencia y la ruina. (...) Me han 
dicho que por qué no organizo un batallon y marcho para el Africa. Y he contestado á los que me han hecho la 
pregunta: ¿Creeis que es por falta de valor? (...) Si no organizo un batallon, es porque no quiero ir á exponer mi 
vida, ni ser causa de que la pierdan los demás, para hacer el negocio de unos cuantos. (...) Dadme quinientos 
hombres de estos que han sido directores, gobernadores, alcaldes y ministros, y vereis si voy á Melilla y si por 
gusto de ver diezmada la clase de los que nos arruinan y nos degradan, pongo yo en peligro mi propia vida (...).” 
El Diluvio, 10/10/1893, p. 2, Ibidem, p. 24. 





among a theatre audience applauding the names of Spain and Catalonia at the beginning of a 
play.498 Even though this newspaper did not pass on the chance to take political advantage of 
this event, the fact that the journalist was surprised by the public’s cold reaction reveals that 
the “war against the Moor” was not as unanimously supported as the newspapers suggested.  
 Further evidence that reveals the reader’s autonomy in the face of jingoist propaganda 
was the failed attempt to reunite the Catalan corps of volunteers. During the War of Africa of 
1859 this corps of civilians became a symbol of Republican pride among Barcelona’s popular 
classes.499 In their attempt to foster popular imperialism, during the War of Melilla liberal 
politicians made repeated calls to regroup the same corps of volunteers. Many pro-war 
newspapers endorsed this endeavour, but the fact is that the initiative provoked little 
enthusiasm and the corps of volunteers was never recovered. This was because, in contrast to 
the war of 1859, during the War of Melilla there was a wide perception among the 
Republicans that the same authorities they opposed (the “Moors in Madrid”) were trying to 
appropriate the myth of the Catalan Volunteers for their own advantage.500 
 The scepticism of the Republican press provides evidence that popular imperialism 
was not a top-down process, rather, it contained a multifaceted dimension. Thus, the 
publishing of racial stereotypes about Moroccans (as Illustrations 3 and 4 exemplify) in the 
Republican press coexisted with alternative forms of patriotism; and even with the opposition 
of some newspapers about the war. In this respect, the multifaceted attitude of the Republican 
press has the value of setting a context against which we may contrast the Godó’s attitude. 
Hence, comparing the stance of La Vanguardia with that of the Republican press will serve 
to shed some light on certain aspects of the Godó’s intentions that would otherwise go 
unnoticed.  
 On 2 October 1893, La Vanguardia first reported the earliest incidents in Melilla.501 
From that day on, and until around the middle of 1894, news from Morocco appeared on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 “Anteanoche estuvo en un tris que no fueran recibidos con chacota en un teatro público los venerados gritos 
de ¡Viva España! ¡Viva Cataluña! Sólo se contuvo la concurrencia porque ninguna multitud congregada hace 
jamás muestra de sentimientos cínicos. Pero se sentía, se respiraba que aquella asamblea, por cierto muy 
selectamente compuesta, propendía á mandar en hora mala al autor y á los cómicos que la ponían en semejante 
compromiso.” Diluvio, 13/10/1893, p. 3. 
499 Albert García Balañà, “Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina...”, op. cit. 
500 As the Republican newspaper El Diluvio commented: “No consiste el patriotismo en lanzar á los países por 
los caminos de perdicion á que los conducen los malos Gobiernos. No consiste el patriotismo en decir que 
somos un pueblo de valientes, ni en atribuirnos victorias cuando hemos sido derrotados. (...) El verdadero 
patriotismo es aquel que redunda en beneficio de la nacion. El verdadero patriotismo debe inspirarse en el bien 
general (...). El otro patriotismo, ese que consiste en hacer la causa de aquello que desean los malos Gobiernos, 
ese será un sistema más o menos cómodo y productivo, pero no es patriotismo.” El Diluvio, 09/12/1893, p. 5, X. 
Garcia Olivé, op. cit., p. 30. 




daily basis. Throughout this period, La Vanguardia used an aggressive tone to describe the 
events, and it criticised Sagasta’s Liberal government for being too cautious. In opposition to 
the government’s attitude, La Vanguardia argued for a more energetic response against the 
Riff tribes: 
 
“¡La conferencia, la inútil y contraproducente conferencia, es el sistema que antes, como 
ahora, se viene adoptando en aquella plaza [Melilla] para responder á hechos salvajes, á 
atentados contra nuestro pabellón y contra nuestra seguridad! (...) Mientras nuestros 
gobiernos no cambien de modo de pensar; mientras al gobernador de Melilla no se le de otra 
consigna, por ejemplo, la de rechazar las agresiones con las armas, en Melilla es imposible 
todo programa, y es exponer de contínuo las sagradas vidas de los que allí moran.” 502 
 
 Although many other newspapers argued along the same lines,503 events would 
demonstrate that La Vanguardia had succeeded in distinguishing itself as a pro-war 
newspaper. Hence, on the night of 7 October 1893 a public discussion was held in one of the 
bars of Barcelona’s city centre about Spain’s future in Melilla. Although this public 
discussion explicitly forbade any form of partisan speeches, as the debate went on the 
audience became so passionate that it incited a spontaneous demonstration through the streets 
of Barcelona. The crowd went down La Rambla (Barcelona’s high street) cheering Spain and 
the army. As the crowd reached La Vanguardia’s editorial office in La Rambla, “the 
demonstrators suddenly went in, where they were welcomed by the staff of this newspaper; a 
commission of the demonstrators explained to the staff what had happened in the bar (...) and 
both parties enjoyed a long and pleasant chat. Later on, the demonstrators abandoned the 
office and continued their march down La Rambla.” 504 
 Events like this demonstration reveal that La Vanguardia was identified in Barcelona 
as a newspaper in favour of Spanish patriotism. In terms of domestic politics, this was not a 
minor issue, especially at a time when Catalan nationalism was gaining momentum. These 
connotations, however, did not seem to worry La Vanguardia, since the following day it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 LV, 03/10/1893, p. 5. [E. T.]: “¡Diplomacy was the useless method that was implemented in the past, and 
also the one that is used now, to respond against the brutal attacks against our nation and our security! (...) It 
will not be until the day that our government changes its way of thinking, and until it decides to repel any 
aggressions with the weapons, that something important will be done in Melilla. (...) Meanwhile, diplomacy 
only means to put at risk the lives of those dwelling there. (...) The immediate future should prove it.”. This is an 
approximate translation. 
503 “Opinión de la prensa” and “La prensa de Madrid”, LV, 05 and 06/10/1893, p. 3 and p. 4. 




reported the jingoistic demonstrations in La Rambla in very positive terms.505 Moreover, La 
Vanguardia actively sought to promote Spanish patriotism by promoting a public drive to 
collect groceries for the Spanish soldiers in Melilla. This effort turned out to be a great 
success: in less than a week more than 50,000 pesetas had been collected, a considerable 
amount at the time.506 And at the top of the list of contributors were various members of the 
Godó family.507  
 If La Vanguardia showed a clear commitment to Spanish patriotism, the mobilisation 
generated in domestic opinion became an opportunity for Godó to promote his own views in 
favour of a more active policy in Morocco. Thus, as the first troops were sent to Melilla (in 
October 14th), La Vanguardia published an article with an illustrative title: “Nuestra misión 
en Marruecos” (“Our Mission in Morocco”). As this article continued:  
 
“Los sucesos de Melilla, que tanto sentimiento é indignación han producido en todo el 
país, despertando su patriotismo, habrán contribuiído, indudablemente, más que todas las 
excitaciones y estímulos de otra clase, á fijar la atención pública hacia unas posesiones de las 
cuales ignoraba la generalidad qué ventajas ó inconvenientes ofrece para nuestra nación la 
posesión de ellas. (...) Todavía hay entre nosotros quienes, con escasa perspicacia, creen que 
nuestra misión en Marruecos es pura conquista material de territorio. No; hay que ir 
rectificando esos erróneos conceptos. Nosotros tenemos el deber de llevar á Africa nuestra 
civilización, y buscar compensaciones positivas á este generoso esfuerzo, ensanchando el 
tráfico y asegurando mercados á nuestros productos. (...) De ahí que, una vez fortificado y 
atrincherado el territorio que poseemos [e.g. Melilla], vengados nuestros compatriotas que 
sucumbieron á la felonía de los bereberes y reclamada y pagada la justa y correspondiente 
indemnización, debemos asegurar más y más nuestro ulterior tráfico y obtener facilidades y 
garantías de que no habrá de perturbarse por parte del Sultán ni por nadie. Todo lo que no 
tienda á esto, será gastar dinero y sangre en empresas ruinosas, (...) que nos señalaría á las 
naciones civilizadas como un país poco práctico y nada previsor.” 508 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
505 Ibidem. 
506 LV, 01-04/10/1893. The Republican La Publicidad, promoted a similar initiative. The same thing happened 
in other Catalan cities. Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, op. cit., pp. 352-354. 
507 Carlos Godó and his son Ramón contributed 5,000 pesetas each. Additionally, the society “Godó and 
Compañía” and La Vanguardia (both of which belonged to Carlos) added another 5,000 in each case. These 
donations reveal to what extent Carlos Godó was eager to contribute to the military intervention through the 
newspaper he owned. “Para las tropas de Melilla. La suscrición de “La Vanguardia”, LV, 01/11(1893, p. 4. 
508 “Nuestra Misión en Marruecos”, LV, 14/10/1893, p. 4. Italics added. [E.T.]: “The events in Melilla, which 
have provoked so much outrage in the whole country to the point of awakening its patriotism, have contributed, 
more than anything else, in directing public attention towards some [Spanish] possessions that have certain 
potential as well as handicaps that have often been ignored. [...] Amongst us, there are still people who think, 
with little perspective, that our mission in Morocco consists purely in the conquering of the territory. No. It is 





As this article explained, in clear terms, La Vanguardia wanted Spain’s intervention to 
be more than a flash in the pan, and instead the first step towards a bolder and longer-term 
intervention in Morocco. These kinds of articles reveal the importance that the press had in 
the Godó’s attempt to secure their private agenda. At the time, both Carlos and Bartolomé 
were members of the Liberal Party, as well as deputies in Congress and in the Provincial 
council, respectively. The affiliation to this party, however, was not an impediment for the 
Godó brothers to pressure the Liberal Party over adopting a bolder policy in Morocco. The 
reason for this is because since 1888 La Vanguardia had formally abandoned its official 
position as Sagasta’s Liberal Party mouthpiece in Barcelona and had become an independent 
newspaper.509 Although this move to differentiate between the two spheres (press and 
politics) was not exempt from critiques,510 the benefits that stemmed from it became evident 
in the War of Melilla. La Vanguardia’s new editorial independence allowed the Godó 
brothers to publicise their private agenda to a broader audience, and at the same time to 
criticise the official policies of their own party. 
Throughout October, La Vanguardia published further articles that revealed the Godó’s 
ambition to make Morocco a new issue of the national agenda. The euphoria generated by the 
War of Melilla became an opportunity to disseminate these demands to new segments of 
society. Instead of presenting the “civilizing mission” as the demand of the Africanist lobby, 
La Vanguardia presented it as a demand coming from the “whole nation”, and used this 
argument to exert pressure on Sagasta’s Liberal government:  
“Acusada en diversos números y en diversas secciones por LA VANGUARDIA la 
emoción profunda que ha despertado en toda España, sin excluir á Barcelona, los sucesos de 
melilla y la buena disposición de ánimo en que se encuentran todas las clases sociales para 
ofrecer al gobierno su apoyo moral y material en cuanto haga por mantener el honor de las 
armas españolas, que es el honor de España entera, no insistimos por hoy sobre este sano 
movimiento nacional (...) Escribimos esta cuartilla meramente para decir al Gobierno en dos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
positive compensations to this generous effort by intensifying our trade and by assuring a market for our 
products. [...] Therefore, once we have fortified our possessions [e.g. Melilla]; once we have taken revenge for 
what the savage Riffians did to our fellow countrymen; and once we have obtained a fair compensation in a 
treaty of peace [...], we must make sure that our trade flourishes and that no one, including the Sultan, shall 
interrupt this. Otherwise, we will spend money and blood totally in vein, (...) and that would present us as a 
country that is neither provident nor practical.” Italics added. 
509 See Chapter 2. 
510 On repeated occasions La Vanguardia was forced to repeat the difference between the two spheres: “ni LA 
VANGUARDIA en su condición de periódico independiente, ni los señores Godó en sus circunstancias de 
hombres políticos han variado ni variarán una línea; pero si alguno lo dudara, porque así le conviniera, le damos 




líneas que cuide de no distanciarse del movimiento nacional, porque ese movimiento puede 
arrollarlo en obra de pocas horas (...) Muchos datos y antecedentes tenemos en la memoria 
para creer que el Gobierno, á pesar de su patriotismo y de sus buenos deseos, no está muy 
feliz en sus funciones para dar solución á las incidencias que surgen en la campaña de 
Melilla (...)” 511 
 
But who authored these articles? Despite the large editorial staff of La Vanguardia, 
when Morocco was the issue at stake the articles were usually signed by some of the most 
conspicuous members of Catalan Africanism, like Josep Ricart, Josep Roca and Josep 
Boada.512 In contrast to the majority of players in the Africanist movement, however, Catalan 
Africanists differed from their counterparts when it came to the economic policy colonialism 
was to follow. In opposition to Spain’s Foreign Office Minister, Segismundo Moret (who 
supported a peaceful penetration in Morocco by promoting free trade policies), the Catalan 
economic elites conceived of the colonies as a protected market for their products.513  
In consequence, during the War of Melilla La Vanguardia acted as the mouthpiece of a 
network of interests and entities of Catalan Africanism, like the “Fomento del Trabajo 
Nacional” and the “Sociedad Geográfica de Barcelona”. This point can be clearly seen in the 
newspaper's fierce advocacy of a colonialist project that had protectionism as one of its key 
points, in contrast to free trade advocates. Josep Ricart i Giralt, together with other writers 
like the Republican J. Roca i Roca (director of the newspaper La Campana de Gracia), and 
Josep Boada i Romeu (a close friend of Carlos Godó and expert journalist in Morocco) were 
the main writers that defended the colonial project of the Catalan bourgeoisie through the 
pages of La Vanguardia ― with the explicit support of the Godó family. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 “Lo de Melilla”, LV, 31/10/1893, p. 2. [E.T.]: “On various occasions, LA VANGUARDIA has portrayed 
the deep emotion that the events in Melilla have provoked in all of Spain, including Barcelona. All the social 
classes have offered their moral and material help to the Government to help it maintain (...) the Spanish 
honour. (...) However, today we do not pretend to insist on the qualities of this national movement. Rather, we 
only want to remind the Government that it should pay attention to not becoming separated from this national 
movement, because this movement is capable of overthrowing the Government itself in a matter of hours. (...) 
We still have recent memories that suggest that the Government, despite its patriotism and good intentions, 
does not seem to be very willing to give appropriate solutions to future events that may come from Melilla 
(...).” 
512 Josep Ricart i Giralt (1847-1930) was arguably the most important theorist of Africanism in Catalonia at the 
time. He would become the future director of the Geographic Society of Barcelona (SGB), a society created in 
1895 with the aim of promoting geographical knowledge “for the fostering of Spanish colonialism and trade”. 
Javier Moreno, José Ricart y Giralt (1847-1930). Una vida dedicada a la cultura marítima, Drassana: revista del 
Museu Marítim, nº 14, 2006, pp. 63-83; Eloy Martín Corrales, El nacionalismo catalán..., op. cit.  
513 José Carlos Ferrero Cuesta, Segismundo Moret. Una biografía política, Madrid, Universidad Autònoma de 





3.3. ORIENTALISM AS A NEW COMMODITY FOR READERS 
 
 If the War of Melilla revealed the attempts of the Catalan Africanist lobby to 
condition Spain’s foreign policy, this war also contributed to promoting interest in Morocco 
among the domestic audience. In this respect, the literature on Spanish Africanism often 
stresses that this movement gave great importance to convincing public opinion about the 
benefits of colonialism. Still, historians rarely specify the way the Africanists aspired to fill 
the existing gap between them and public opinion. By focusing on La Vanguardia, the last 
part of this paper will demonstrate the active role commercial newspapers played in 
popularising an orientalist discourse about Morocco. Analysing the way La Vanguardia tried 
to do so will also shed light on the changes this newspaper underwent in terms of 
management, marketing and content, as a result of the reforms of 1888. 
  The War of Melilla became an illustrative example of how the new commercial 
orientation La Vanguardia adopted in 1888 was implemented. In comparison to the majority 
of Barcelona’s press, La Vanguardia stood out for the amount of information it provided and 
for the way this information was presented. Thus, La Vanguardia did not just provide the 
latest news and bellicose editorials against the Riff tribes (as discussed above), but combined 
them with all sorts of extra information for a growing number of readers who were eager to 
learn more about Morocco. The articles in La Vanguardia during the conflict of Melilla 
displayed a deep interest in the customs, language, and traditions of Moroccan tribes. Even if 
that interest was influenced by a deeply stereotyped image of “the Moor”, an interest in 
orientalism proved to be popular among the urban classes of Barcelona.514  
 “Orientalism” had already been fostered in Spain by the burgeoning field of travel 
literature. Although this was by no means a new genre, since the mid-nineteenth century 
travel literature had become a growing genre following the new wave of European 
colonialism in Africa and Asia. Like the emergence of tourism, the great popularity enjoyed 
by the works of certain adventurers, explorers and scientists created a new market of 
consumers interested in distant cultures and places. In the case of the Moroccan Empire, 
numerous Spanish travellers had already been there since the 1850s.515 Their work decisively 
contributed to the re-discovery of North Africa.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Edward Said, Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient. London, Penguin, 1995 (1st ed. 1978). 
515 M. Marín, Un encuentro colonial: viajeros españoles en Marruecos (1860-1912), Hispania, vol. LVI-192 
(1996), pp. 93-114; L. Litvak, op. cit.; and H. Driessen, Images of Spanish colonialism in the Rif. An essay in 
Historical Anthropology and Photography, Critique of Anthropology, 7, 1 (1988), pp. 53-66. For the Catalan 




However, the travel literature had a limited audience, since its potential readership was 
usually restricted to the upper classes. Books on travel became a sign of distinction of this 
social group. The knowledge of certain classic works and authors – such as David 
Livingstone, Henry Stanley and Gustav Flauvert – became a cultural background for the 
elites, and constituted a set of symbols in the habitus of this social group. Travel books thus 
turned out to be the kind of knowledge that developed together with new forms of elite 
consumption.516 
 In contrast to travel literature, the information La Vanguardia provided about the War 
of Melilla contributed to popularising an orientalist discourse about Morocco that had been 
restricted until then to the upper classes. And this was possible because in wide segments of 
Spanish society the “war against the Moor” showed a capacity to attract bigger audiences. 
This also became an opportunity for newspapers to increase their profits. Madrid’s newspaper 
El Imparcial, for instance, had an estimated circulation of 80,000 copies. When the conflict 
in Morocco started, sales rose to 100,000 copies, and reached 124,000 copies during the hot 
moment of the war.517 In other words, the War of Melilla and the resulting explosion of 
patriotism generated the interest for a new public to learn more about Morocco: the war 
"against the other" also proved to be a great market for newspapers. 
In fact, and contrary to its long tradition of partisan orientation (see Chapter 2), the 
European newspaper industry of the late nineteenth century was adopting a stronger 
commercial orientation. Editors began to be concerned not only with potential readership but 
also with potential advertisers, who provided the biggest revenues for the newspaper. As 
Gerald J. Baldasty has explained, in order to attract advertisers, the editors also had to 
redefine the way news was presented in order to attract bigger audiences.518 In fact, the 1890s 
were the moment when “sensationalism” emerged as a new journalist practice that Spanish 
newspapers started adopting to make news more attractive.519 The increasing attention that 
newspapers devoted to reporting crimes illustrates this change in the content of the press. 
Therefore, the gradual transformation from a politically to a commercially based press 
led to a substantial shift in the way in which news was presented. News became a new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516 A good example of this new type of consuming is the figure of Thomas Cook and the  “invention” of 
tourism. See: Luis Riudor, “Entre la curiositat i el plaer: del viatger al turista o la mutació d’una espècie”, M. D. 
Garcia Ramon, J. Nogué and P. Zusman (eds.), op. cit, pp. 137-171. 
517 Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, Prensa y política en la España de la Restauración: Rafael Gasset y El Imparcial, 
Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1999, p. 89. 
518 Gerald J. Baldasty, The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century, Wisconsin, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1992, pp. 139-146. 
519 María Dolores Sáiz y María Cruz Seoane, Historia del periodismo en España, Madrid, Alianza ed., Vol. 2: 




commodity and, like any other commodity, its profitability was directly related to its capacity 
to attract more consumers. The way La Vanguardia reported the War of Melilla is a good 
example of this process. For the price of 10 cents (0.10 Spanish’ pesetas) per copy, the reader 
of La Vanguardia gained access to a completely new world of information about Morocco. 
Together with pictures La Vanguardia included extensive descriptions about the habits and 
character of the Riff tribes, their religious practices, and their military capacities. For 
instance, on 12 October (the National day), La Vanguardia published an extra supplement, 
together with the ordinary copy, dedicated to the War of Africa of 1859-1860 (see 
Illustration 5). The aim of the supplement (free to subscribers) was to recall the deeds of the 
Catalan corps of volunteers, because La Vanguardia considered this to be something that “all 
the readers” –both young and old – would appreciate.520 
 As Illustration 5 shows, the supplement included numerous illustrations of the most 
famous soldiers that had participated in the war of 1859-1860 (such as generals Leopoldo 
O’Donnell and Joan Prim) with a description of their family origins, military careers and 
deeds in Africa. The supplement also included an extensive description of the customs of 
Moroccans (Illustration 6) and included range of other characters and entries: a description 
of Father Lerchundi and a sister of the charity; an article about a “Moorish farmworker”; an 
article about the “differences between the Spaniard and the Berber” – which included a 50-
point list; and even a collection of “Moroccan popular songs” provided by Father Lerchundi. 
Such supplements reveal that as well as the racial and caricaturised image of Moroccans, 
there stood another one that revealed a curiosity to learn more about North Africa 
(“orientalism”). This point is of special importance, because it provides further evidence of 
the contradictory (or “disoriented”) image that Spaniards often had about Morocco, which 
they both hated and admired.521  
 Besides these supplements, the newspaper of the Godó family promoted numerous 
initiatives aimed at popularising interest in Morocco. Thus, in November 1893 La 
Vanguardia opened an art gallery in the offices that the newspaper had in “La Rambla”. In 
this gallery, the public could contemplate, for free, up to 30 pictures and photographs 
dedicated to the customs, cities and ways of living in Morocco and Algeria.522  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520 “(...) we think it is something that will please our readers. The old ones because these memories will evoke 
their past days of youth and the inner fire that animated them; the youth [readers] because they will discover that 
in the history of their ancestors they have high values to imitate, and they will certainly constitute an example 
for the generations to follow”. LV, 12/10/1893, p. 1. 
521 Susan Martin-Márquez, Disorientations. Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity, 
New Haven, Yale University, 2008.  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Illustration 6. The “customs of Moroccans” 524 
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The War of Melilla ended, finally, at the beginning of 1894. Despite the repeated 
attempts of the Spanish army to turn the confrontation with the Riff tribes into an open war 
against the Moroccan Empire, this did not ultimately take place. As a result of this, General 
Martínez Campos was sent to Marrakesh as the Spanish ambassador to negotiate peace with 
the Sultan Muley Hassan. The newspapers, just as they had during the conflict, carefully 
reported all the events. In the case of La Vanguardia, Josep Boada went to Marrakesh as a 
correspondent to follow the negotiations.525 General Martínez Campos, who was perfectly 
conscious of the great interest and expectation with which Spanish public opinion was 
following the negotiations, repeatedly stated to correspondents “I will not go back to Spain 
until the prestige of my motherland and that of its army is completely restored”.526 Regardless 
of the bellicose statement of the General, the peace treaty with the Moroccan Empire brought 
little benefit to Spain.527 In fact, the war had represented a very high cost: the economic 
outlay went up to 35 million pesetas, while the Spanish army suffered 123 fatalities and 165 
wounded soldiers. Yet the worst consequence was for Spain’s international prestige and, as 
had already happened in the War of Africa (1859-1860), the peace treaty signed in 1894 did 
little to help foster Spanish colonialism in Morocco. 
 However, the newspaper of the Godó brothers made a positive assessment of the War 
of Melilla. First of all, the war against the tribes of the Riff had generated an explosion of 
Spanish patriotism. Like many other pro-governmental newspapers, La Vanguardia 
welcomed this sociological phenomenon as a way of transcending class boundaries. Second, 
the incidents in Melilla contributed to fostering colonialism among Spain’s public opinion, 
one of the traditional claims of the Africanist movement. La Vanguardia, which gave proof 
of acting as the voice of these demands, took clear advantage of the conflict. The journalist, 
and Godó’s companion on the trip to Morocco, Josep Boada explained: 
 
  “Si bien lo que nos dan los moros no bastará á indemnizarnos de los gastos hechos, no 
por esto habrá sido infructuosa la campaña de Melilla. Con ella habremos logrado, cuando 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 Later on, he would include this episode in his book Allende el Estrecho under the title “La embajada 
extraordinaria del General Martinez Campos á Marrakeix”. Josep Boada, op. cit., pp. 479- 611. 
526 “No volveré a España sin que el prestigio de mi patria y de su ejército esté más alto que las nubes. (...) Ó se 
daba cumplida la satisfacción á España, ó el decoro de su bandera y el prestigio de sus armas exigirían el 
empleo de remedios heroicos á despecho de todos y contra todos». Ibidem, p. 607.  
527 The peace treaty was signed on 5 March 1894. In it, the Sultan promised to control the tribes of the Riff and 
protect the Spanish possessions in Morocco. Additionally, he promised to pay an economic compensation of 20 




menos, fijar la atención de nuestros estadistas sobre los asuntos de Marruecos, muy dignos 
de ser estudiados tanto por lo que afectan á nuestra misma nacionalidad cuanto por lo que, 
en día no lejano, puedan contribuir al mayor esplendor y engrandecimiento de nuestra 
patria.” 528 
 
 The brothers Godó, who had important interests in Tangier,529 therefore used their 
newspaper to exert pressure in favour of a more active presence of Spain in Morocco. The 
public subscription promoted by La Vanguardia and the wide coverage that the newspaper 
gave to the conflict, can be seen as clear examples of this position. Moreover, the War of 
Melilla proved to be an illustrative example of the new commercial orientation La 
Vanguardia had adopted since 1888. In order to be successful, the way news was presented 
became fundamental, and this demonstrates the growing commercial orientation La 
Vanguardia was adopting. If the newspaper was to attract new readers and advertisers, then 
reflecting the new tastes of society was crucial. This change in consumption modes was a 
distinctive feature of an incipient mass society. In England, for example, Gareth Stedman 
Jones stated that the new working class of the late nineteenth century became depoliticised  
“through focusing on a consumer and entertainment culture”.530 In Spain, the rise of 
“sensationalism” as a new and attractive way of reporting the news is an example of a similar 
trend. 
 In the case of La Vanguardia, a certain stereotypical image of “the Moor” also 
appeared to be greatly successful, even though it ran parallel to a certain curiosity about the 
customs of Moroccans. Still, the War of Melilla clarified that in Spain’s public imaginary the 
“orientalist” image was far less extended than the “war against the Moor”. This image would 
prove to hold a considerable potential to generate expressions of enthusiasm in domestic 
opinion, as this chapter has demonstrated on repeated occasions. That being said, it seems to 
me that the consequences of this enthusiasm should not be misunderstood: the popularity of 
the war did not necessarily imply that the ordinary people identified with the imperial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 Josep Boada, op. cit., p. 611. [E.T.]: “Even if what we have finally received from the Moors will not 
compensate all the expenses, it does not necessarily mean that that the campaign in Melilla has not been worthy. 
Thanks to this campaign, we have achieved, at least, to direct the attention of our statesmen to the matters in 
Morocco. In fact, these matters in Morocco are of great interest, because they affect our nationality and because 
in a future that is not so distant, they might contribute to give more splendour and glory to our motherland.” 
529 Examining in more detail the private interests of the Godó family in Morocco goes beyond the goals of this 
chapter. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find further evidence about Godó’s plans to build a neighbourhood 
in Tangier. This suggests that for one reason or another, Godó’s plans were not realised. The lack of sources, 
however, makes it hard to explain the reasons for this.  
530 Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class. Studies in English working class history, 1832-1982, Cambridge 
University Press, 1983, pp. 179-238. Original quote extracted from Mark Hampton, Visions of the press in 




projects of the Africanist movement. Likewise, even though the press contributed to 
popularising an understanding of Spanish identity based on the opposition against 
Moroccans, we might wonder to what extent this understanding of identity was actually 
consolidated – especially if we take into account the short-duration of the war (it only lasted 
three months). In fact, the case of the Republican press reveals that certain segments of 
society were sympathetic to the military intervention but also started seeing in it the hidden 
interests of liberal politicians. The Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898) eventually gave 
further evidence of this perception.531 
 While this provides evidence that readers were not passive actors, the case of the 
Republican press also demonstrates that patriotism could be instrumentalized to promote a 
political agenda. For the Republicans, the War of Melilla became an opportunity to criticise 
the Liberal government in public and to use the case of Morocco as a metaphor to justify 
Spain’s need of rejuvenation. Although the Republicans shared the same stereotyped vision 
of the Moroccans, and contributed to foster this image, this political movement evoked the 
growing disconnection between liberal politicians and the “nation”. Moreover, this idea was 
not only portrayed by the opponents of the political system, but also became present in La 
Vanguardia. On repeated occasions, the newspaper warned the government of the perils of 
“distancing [itself] from this national movement”. These types of calls reveal the widening 
gap between the “official” and the “real country”, this being one of the most recurring 
criticisms of liberal politics in those countries where clientelism was widely extended.  
 Although the Godó brothers were closely involved in liberal politics, the editorial 
independence of La Vanguardia allowed them to distance themselves from Sagasta’s Liberal 
Party. In contrast to the partisan press, which was at the service of the party structure, the 
non-partisan links of La Vanguardia allowed the Godó brothers to promote their 
particularistic views – especially in those cases where these views were against the official 
position of the Liberal Party. The need of a more long-term commitment towards Morocco 
and the defence of protectionist policies were two examples of this. 
Finally, despite being little more than a minor conflict that barely lasted three months, 
the War of Melilla has the value of showing the important changes that newspapers were 
undergoing in Spain in the 1890s: above all, the transition from a partisan press towards a 
business orientation; and the important consequences that this evolution had – both in terms 
of content and the way news was presented. This transition was to change journalism’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




traditional raison d’être: it was about attracting new readers and making profits, but also 
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 The hegemony of liberal elites in Southern Europe is often associated with the 
mechanisms they used to monopolise power, like electoral legislation and clientelism. The 
liberal parties in fin de siècle Italy showed little interest in extending the franchise,532 while 
in Portugal their counterparts responded to the mobilisation of new social actors (above all, 
the Republicans) through franchise restriction.533 These reforms in electoral legislation – as 
well as the lack of them – reveal the liberal’s desire to retain excusive hold over public office. 
Even in the case of Spain, where electoral legislation took a different direction and universal 
manhood suffrage was introduced in 1890, the rigging of elections continued to be the 
norm.534 Consequently, it can be argued that in all of these countries liberal elites showed 
little interest in integrating wider segments of society into the political system. Clientelism 
remained the main channel used by these elites to distribute public office among their 
network of supporters. 
 Nevertheless, the integration into patron-client networks did not always suffice to 
secure the private agendas of local elites. Liberal parties did not always share consensus on 
state issues, like foreign and economic policies. This lack of consensus implied that in order 
to secure their interests, local elites often developed alternative mechanisms besides – and in 
combination with – clientelism to exert pressure on central government. Thus the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 Universal male suffrage was not introduced in Italy until 1912, considerably later than in other parts of 
Europe. One of the recurrent arguments liberals used to prevent the widening of the franchise was the 
population’s high illiteracy levels, which made them “unfit” to hold voting rights. Pier Luigi Ballini, “Las leyes 
electorales italianas (1900-1923)”, R. A. Gutiérrez, R. Zurita, R. Camurri (eds.), Elecciones y cultura política en 
España e Italia (1890-1923), València, PUV, 2003, pp. 73-74. On Italy’s successive electoral laws: Pier Luigi 
Ballini, Le elezioni nella storia d’Italia dall’Unità al fascismo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988; and Raffaele 
Romanelli, Le Regole del Gioco. Note sull’impianto del sistema elettorale in Italia (1848–1895), Quaderni 
Storici, Nuova Serie, 69, 1988, 3, pp. 685–725. 
533 In contrast to the electoral law of 1878, which granted voting rights to 18% of the total population (and to 
68% of the male population), the reform of 1895 drastically reduced this to 9.4% of the total population (and to 
40% of the male population). Pedro Tavares Almeida, “Reformas electorales y dinámica política en el Portugal 
liberal (1851-1910)”, Salvador Forner (ed.), Democracia, elecciones y modernización en Europa. Siglos XIX y 
XX, Madrid, Cátedra, 1997, p. 103. 
534 The introduction of universal (manhood) suffrage was one of the historical vindications of the liberal 
progressives in Spain. This did not prevent them, however, from continuing to use clientelism to secure their 
position. Aurora Garrido Martín, “La reforma electoral de 1890”, Carlos Malamud (ed.), Legitimidad, 
representación y alternancia en España y América Latina. Las reformas electorales (1880-1930), México, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000, pp. 41-61. On the liberals’ little interest to promote accountability: M. 
Teresa Carnero Arbat, “Ciudadanía política y democratización. Un paso adelante, dos pasos atrás”, Manuel 
Pérez Ledesma (ed.), De súbditos a ciudadanos. Una historia de la ciudadanía de España, Madrid, Centro de 
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2007, pp. 230-231. A more positive assessment, in: Alicia Yanini, La 
manipulación electoral en España: sufragio universal y participación ciudadana (1891-1923), Ayer, n. 3, 1991 




mechanisms that local elites designed to exert influence in centralised political systems 
constitute a major historiographical concern of the liberal period in Europe.535  
 This chapter will focus on the mechanisms of influence that the brothers Carlos and 
Bartolomé Godó used to secure their business interests in the Spanish colonies of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico. While the two brothers migrated to the Basque Country in the mid-century to 
expand the family business (see Chapter 1), in the 1870s they had both settled in Barcelona 
and became textile manufacturers. The first part of this chapter will explain this process and 
examine how the strong colonial orientation of their business made the Godó brothers very 
dependent on the orientation of economic policies. The outcome was the design of different 
strategies, sometimes in collaboration with other elites, aimed at exerting pressure on central 
government. 
 The second part of this chapter will examine the growing importance of public 
opinion in the competition between different elites to impose their views in policy-making. 
This will be shown through the Cuban War of Independence (1895), a separatist insurrection 
that threatened Spain’s centuries-long presence in the Antilles. Among the different measures 
addressed at pacifying Cuba, changing the commercial laws became a possibility that 
successive governments started considering. In parallel, a growing proportion of Spanish 
society started showing a reluctance to contribute to the war effort. It was in the face of this 
double threat (the change of commercial laws and the opposition to the war) that the Godó 
brothers saw public opinion as a way to reverse the situation. By examining the ways in 
which they sought to do so, light will be shed on the role the public space played in the power 
strategies of elites.   
 Finally, the last part of this chapter will focus on the demise of the Spanish empire. 
The immediate reason behind this demise was the entry of the United States into what had 
been until then a separatist insurrection against colonial rule. Despite the fact that the United 
States clearly possessed superior military capabilities, in 1898 the Spanish government threw 
itself into war against this country. Different contemporaries referred to this as a suicidal 
move resulting from the pressure that both the press and the military had exerted on the 
government. This section will examine the role of the press in creating a public state of mind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 S. Berger (ed.), L’organizzazione degli interesssi nell’Europa Occidentale, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1983; Jean 
Garrigues, La république des hommes d’affaires, 1870-1900, Paris, Aubier, 1997; Juan Pan-Montojo (ed.), 
Poderes privados y recursos públicos, Ayer, Nº 66, 2007 (monograph); Renato Camurri, “Las elites italianas: 
estado de los estudios y perspectivas de investigación”, R. Zurita, R. Camurri (eds.), Las elites en Italia y en 
España, València, PUV, 2008, pp. 11-26 (esp. pp. 24-25); Mercedes Cabrera and Fernando del Rey Reguillo, 
The power of entrepreneurs. Politics and Economy in Contemporary Spain, New York, Berghahn Books, 2007 




that was favourable to the war by popularising an imaginary of the nation based on jingoism. 
All these elements will be fundamental to address, in subsequent chapters of this thesis, the 
reasons that led many contemporaries to hold the press responsible for the loss of the empire 







4.1. BETWEEN BARCELONA AND CUBA: THE GODÓ FAMILY BUSINESS AND THE 
MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE 
 
 As previous chapters have described, the brothers Carlos (1834-1897) and Bartolomé 
Godó Pié (1837-1895) were textile traders during their youth in Bilbao, the city where both 
men were married and where Carlos first entered politics. However, it was not until the 1870s 
that the two brothers were established as manufacturers and built a fortune.536 The secret 
behind this fortune consisted in specialising in a manufacture that the colonies of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico needed in great quantity, but which had little tradition in Spain: namely, the 
manufacturing of jute bags. 
Well until the first half of the 19th century, jute was a little known fibre in most of 
industrialised Europe. The special climatic conditions that jute requires to be cultivated 
concentrated its production in the region of Bengal, in British India. Unlike cotton, jute’s 
sturdy composition had long prevented its use in the textile industry. However, things started 
changing during the Crimean War (1853-1856), when the shortage of Russian flax produced 
by the conflict generated new interest in the possibilities that jute could offer, particularly as 
a substitute for flax bags. Sugar, coffee, wheat and corn were all raw materials that were 
being consumed on a mass scale by that time and thus needed to be carried around the world 
in cheap but resistant containers. Dundee, in Scotland, was the first place in Europe to make 
use of the possibilities that jute could offer to satisfy this demand for manufactured sacks, 
indeed it soon came to be known as “Juteopolis”. The success of Dundee, the Crimean War, 
and the shortage of cotton during the American Civil War (1861-1865) propelled the jute 
industry. By the 1860s, the first jute mills were established in Germany, France and other 
countries in Europe, and in the United States too.537 
In contrast to these countries, in the last quarter of the 19th century the manufacturing 
of jute was still a relatively new industry in Spain. The factories that used jute as a raw 
material were few and were mostly located in Bilbao, Valencia, and Barcelona – all of which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536 Bartolomé had lived in Barcelona since 1864, where he was in charge of the local branch of “Godó brothers 
and Company”. In the case of Carlos, his name did not appear in Bilbao’s municipal census after 1872, while 
notarial documents in Barcelona confirm that in 1875 he was living in this city – one of the reasons behind this 
might be the Third Carlist War (1872-1876), which had a direct impact in Bilbao. From that moment onwards, 
the two brothers always lived in Barcelona. 
537 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal 1890-1940, Princeton University Press, 
2000 [first ed.1989], p. 17. The academic literature on jute is very scarce and is mostly concerned with the two 
cities that controlled its trade at a global scale (Dundee, in Scotland; and Calcutta, in British India). See: 
Anthony Cox, Empire, Industry and Class: The Imperial Nexus of Jute, 1840-1940, Abingdon, Oxon, 
Routledge, 2013; Gordon T. Steward, Jute and empire: The Calcutta jute wallahs and the landscapes of empire, 




had a tradition in the manufacturing of esparto grass.538 Nonetheless, even in Catalonia where 
84% of the Spanish textile industry was concentrated, jute manufacturing represented a very 
tiny sector. Of the estimated 106,000 workers that lived off the Catalan textile industry in 
1890, only 8,000 of them worked in the industries that used flax, hemp, or jute (alone or 
combined) as their prime raw material.539 As this figure demonstrates, the manufacturing of 
jute was still a very modest activity in Spain.540  
 The factory production of jute bags became the gap in the market that the Godó 
brothers sought to exploit. And their previous stay in Bilbao appears to have helped them to 
do so. In this city the Godó brothers had accumulated a small capital and learned about the 
jute industry through Bartolomé’s father-in-law.541 Once in Barcelona, they took advantage 
of this knowledge and became shareholders in a textile company called “Arañó, Rodón y 
Compañía”. The purpose of this company was the “manufacturing of yarn and fabrics made 
of linen, hemp and jute”.542 The Godó brothers eventually took control of the company and 
together with a new business associate named Pere Milà Pi (1838-1880) opened a new branch 
of the business consisting in the manufacturing of jute bags.543 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
538 This tradition in esparto grass is what fostered the interest in jute. As it has been noted, “esparto is to Spain 
what jute is to Pakistan”. Rakibuddin Ahmed, The Progress of the Jute Industry and Trade (1855-1966), Dacca, 
Pakistan Central Jute Committee, 1966, p. 219. 
539 Carles Enrech, Indústria i ofici: conflicte social i jerarquies obreres a la Catalunya tèxtil (1881-1923), 
Bellaterra, Servei de Publicacions de la UAB, 2005, p. 110 and p. 103. 
540 The imports of raw jute from Bengal (by then the world’s main jute supplier) provides further evidence of 
the small size of the Spanish jute industry:  
 
 Country      Quantity (in cwts.) 
 UK       6,745,358 
 USA       2,715,728 
 Germany      1,432,872 
 Austria          316,788 
 Italy          304,704 
 France          295,205 
 Spain            36,731 
 
Cwts = Centum Weight. The figures correspond to 1890 and 1891. G. T. Steward, op. cit., p. 172. 
541 The jute industry had a certain tradition in Bilbao, due to the Atlantic trade this port maintained with 
England. Bartolomé Godó’s father-in-law (Francisco Brunet) was an example of a local businessman who had a 
business in the jute industry (and more precisely, the manufacturing of jute shoes). See Chapter 1. 
542 “‘D. Arañó Rodon y Compañia’ con el capital de diez y ocho mil setecientos duros para dedicarse á la 
fabricacion y explotacion de los hilados y tejidos de yute cáñamo ó lino y en general á todos los demás actos y 
operaciones de indole análoga ó necesarios para el objeto de la Compañia”. Ibidem. Italics added. The company 
had a total capital of 351,750 pesetas. Arxiu Històric de Protocols de Barcelona (AHPB), Notary Jeroni Cahué i 
Ribas, 1875, vol 1r, 30 March 1875, pp. 528-535. 
543 Carlos became one of the four company partners with a capital of 50,000 pesetas in 1875. His brother 
Bartolomé joined the company later, in 1877, with a capital of 31,750 pesetas. In 1880 the Godó brothers took 
control of the company and renamed it: “La Sociedad será en comandita con domicilio en esta ciudad y girará 
bajo la razon social de ‘Godó hermanos Milá y Compañía’, constituyéndola los socios siguientes: Sres. Don 
Cárlos y Don Bartolomé Godó y Don Pedro Milá (...)”. AHPB, Jeroni Cahué i Ribas, vol. 4t, 17 August 1877, 




The business strategy of the new company “Godó hermanos, Milà y Compañía” was 
clear: Spain’s overseas colonies in the Antilles (Cuba and Puerto Rico) possessed a highly 
specialised economy based on the production of raw materials, principally sugar, tobacco and 
coffee. Each year, the economy of the Antilles required huge amounts of packaging material, 
which had traditionally been wood packaging but was now starting to be replaced with the 
cheaper and more resistant jute bags.544 For the Godó brothers and their associate Pere Milà, 
the export of jute bags to the Spanish colonies in the Antilles consequently appeared as an 
untapped market with a great potential; all the more when one considers that Cuba was the 
first world producer of cane sugar in 1890.  
 To supply this market the “Godó brothers and Company” set up a big factory in 
Barcelona’s neighbour city of Sant Martí de Provençals. The factory was popularly known as 
“Els Sachs” (“bags”, in English), in reference to the activity to which it was dedicated.545 
Every single day “Els Sachs” produced between 10,000 and 12,000 jute bags to be exported 
exclusively to the Spanish Antilles.546 To meet this large pace of production the factory had a 
150cv steamship and 2,000 workers who worked in a multiple-shift system: two day shifts 
and one night shift. The working conditions were very precarious and the factory’s vast 
workforce was overwhelmingly female: 90% for the spinning process; a 100% in that of 
weaving; and the 91.4% in the case of jute bags.547 The vast majority of workers at “Els 
Sachs” were thus women who received lower wages than men and they were employed to 
keep production costs as low as possible.548 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
textile manufacturer from Barcelona. His son Pere Milà Camps (1873-1940) commissioned the architect Antoni 
Gaudí to build the famous Modernist building of “La Pedrera”, in Barcelona.  
544 As one economic report noted, speaking of the jute industry: “La sustitución de los envases de madera por la 
saquería para el transporte de azúcares, café, cacao y otros frutos coloniales, ha contribuido y contribuye hoy 
mismo en gran manera á impulsar los adelantos de esta industria.” Arxiu Històric de Foment del Treball 
Nacional (AHFTN), Fomento del Trabajo Nacional. Los dos primeros meses de fusión, Barcelona, Imprenta de 
Henrich y Cª, 1889, p. 16. 
545 The factory was located on the street called Wad-Ras nº 192. It had a total surface area of 9,022 m2 and was 
complemented by different warehouses (3,021 m2) and a piece of land (5,549 m2). AHPB, Manuel Borras i de 
Palau, 1897, vol. 3, 09/09/1897, pp. 2911-2936. For all these assets, “Godó brothers and Company” paid 1,939 
pesetas in real estate taxes in 1886. This sum represented the 20th highest contribution of all the industries that 
existed in Sant Martí de Provençals. J. Nadal and Xavier Tafunell, Sant Martí de Provençals, pulmó industrial 
de Barcelona (1847-1992), Barcelona, Columna, 1996, p. 302. 
546 “Cataluña en la Exposición...”, El Liberal, 14/02/1900, p. 2. See Annex n. 7.  
547 These figures correspond to the jute industry in Barcelona. Carles Enrech, op. cit., p. 142.  
548 As one commercial guide noted: “La maquinaria de sus varias cuadras, en las cuales trabajan unos 2,000 
obreros, está movida por fuerza de vapor debida á una poderos máquina de triple expansión. Por su grandiosidad 
y por su perfecta organización es uno de los primeros establecimientos del Llano de Barcelona. En la misma 
fábrica hay un departamento especial de cunas, en el cual son cuidadas y asistidas las criaturas de las operarias 
ocupadas en el trabajo”. Josep Roca i Roca, Barcelona en la mano. Guía de Barcelona y sus alrededores, 




 For the Godó’s plans to expand their business in the jute industry, politics became 
decisive. The reason for this is that while the export of jute bags to the colonies depended on 
a series of duty tariffs charging foreign production, liberal parties did not share an agreement 
on the need to maintain these tariffs. In fact, the confrontation between the supporters of free-
trade policies and those in favour of protectionism became one of the major political 
controversies in 19th-century Spain. Although this was a widespread debate in Europe, which 
scholars have explained as a response to globalization,549 in Spain it was a debate that 
became very heated. The reason for this is that the two main parties, the Conservatives and 
the Liberals, could not agree on a common and long-lasting economic policy. While the 
Conservatives of Cánovas del Castillo embraced protectionism, the Liberals of Sagasta were 
quicker to defend free trade (albeit with a few exceptions, like the politician Germán 
Gamazo). 550  In contrast to the divisions between the Conservatives and Liberals, the 
importance of the textile industry in Catalonia created a wide consensus among the 
politicians of this region on the need to defend protectionism. This consensus among Catalan 
representatives went beyond partisan adscription and made room for a collective lobbying 
strategy known as  “diputació catalana”.551 This strategy had a long tradition and consisted in 
a corporate strategy in politics: every time a debate over tariffs was at stake, Catalan deputies 
gathered together to defend protectionism in Congress, regardless of their political affiliation 
or the position of their respective party.552 
 Because the business of the Godó brothers was dependent upon maintaining duty 
tariffs, they participated in the actions of Catalan elites aimed at lobbying the government 
about policy-making on several occasions. In this regard, the case of the Godó brothers 
provides a valuable opportunity to examine a crucial element of liberal politics in Europe – 
namely, the mechanisms local elites used to exert pressure on central government. The 
following pages will examine two different – though complementary – strategies that the 
Godó brothers implemented to secure their business in Cuba, as part of the “diputació 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 Kevin H. O’ Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and history: the evolution of nineteenth-
century Atlantic economy, Cambridge, MA, 1999, p. 93. 
550 Esther Calzada del Amo, Germán Gamazo, 1840-1901. Poder político y redes sociales en la Restauración, 
Madrid, Marcial Pons Historia, 2011. José María Serrano Sanz, El viraje proteccionista en la Restauración. La 
política comercial española, 1875-1895, Madrid, Siglo veintiuno editores, 1989. 
551 On the “diputació catalana”, see: Joan Palomas and Montserrat Bravo, Víctor Balaguer, la diputació catalana 
i la lluita pel proteccionisme (1881-1890), Recerques, 1992, Núm. 25, pp. 31-52. 
552 Since the 1830s, if not earlier, the Catalan elites started to make use of coalitions between different 
institutions to defend protectionism. Ernest Lluch has already documented these practices for the period of 
Spanish history known as “Trienio Liberal” (1820-1823). Ernest Lluch, El pensament econòmic a Catalunya 
(1760-1840). Els orígens ideològics del proteccionisme i la presa de consciència de la burgesia catalana, 




catalana” they supported. These strategies consisted, on the one hand, in the adscription to the 
Liberal Party; and, on the other, on business associativism. These two strategies were 
eventually reinforced by a third one: journalism, through the establishing of La Vanguardia 
in 1881. 
 The first mechanism the Godó brothers used to defend their economic interests in the 
colonies were the patron-client networks of the Liberal Party. The private correspondence of 
Víctor Balaguer (the leader of the party in Catalonia, and the Minister of Ultramar in the 
government of Sagasta during the Democratic Sexennium) contains numerous requests from 
Bartolomé Godó. All these requests were written in the 1870s and touched upon the same 
issue: the tariffs concerning the trade between Spain and the colonies of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. As Chapter 1 showed, Godó displayed an attitude of allegiance towards Balaguer in the 
party’s leadership. The private correspondence of Balaguer reveals that in return for this 
personal allegiance, Godó obtained first-hand information on colonial tariffs.553 The links of 
personal dependence (“political friendship”), upon which cadre parties were structured, were 
thus crucial in connecting the interests of elites on the periphery with central government. 
Moreover, besides promoting his private interests Godó also acted as an intermediary of the 
broader economic interests. The personal acquaintance he held with Balaguer became the 
channel through which local concerns were expressed; both in the form of job 
recommendations and concerns about economic policies related to Cuba.554 The case of Godó 
reveals to what extent patron-client relationships were an important channel for local elites to 
reach Madrid, and to secure group interests in the colonies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553 For example, in May 1870 Godó wrote to Balaguer under the following terms: “Muy Sor mio me tomo la 
libertad de dirigirle la presente para que se sirva decirme si en el ministerio de Ultramar han llegado los nuevos 
aranceles de aduana confeccionados en la Intendencia de la Ysla de Cuba, pues en caso de ser asi saldrá una 
comision de industriales y comerciantes para esa con el objeto de hacer presente al gobierno lo que perjudicaria 
á la industria nacional puesto que se impone derecho á muchas mercancias que nada pagan en el arancel vigente 
de aquella Ysla, ó bien algo que pudiese afectar los intereses de la misma. Siento molestar la atencion de V. 
pero creo se convencera del buen dese que me guia. Y en espera de su grata contestacion tengo la alta 
satisfaccion de ofrecerme de V. atento (...).” Arxiu Biblioteca Museu Víctor Balaguer (ABMVB), Private 
Correspondence between Víctor Balaguer and Bartolomé Godó. Letter nº. 7000524 (20 May 1874). 
554 “(...) aunque no es mi costumbre escribir á los amigos, cuando estan en puestos oficiales, por no estorbarles 
de sus muchos que aseres, sin embargo hoy lo hago por encargo de amigos del circulo [Liberal] y fuera del 
circulo, para que V que deberá tener una parte activa en los empleados y autoridades, que se nombra para esta 
Provincia, hay a todo lo que dependa de V para que sean individuos sin tacha y las autoridades, muy enerjicas, y 
al desirlo yo esto no es que dude ni un momento, de su vuena (sic) voluntad en todo lo que atañe á esta 
provincia, pero muchos de los buenos amigos que tiene V en esta, disen que no debe V permitir que se abuse de 
su bondad tocante á recomendaciones. Sobre los asuntos de Ultramar, debe mirarse muy especialmente la 
cuestion economica, y como en esta Provincia hay tantos intereses, en aquellas Yslas, se está muy á la mira de 
las resoluciones, y nombramientos que puede V haser. Dispense V de haberme atrevido en haserle siertos 
indicasiones, pero todas son hijas de mis buenos deseos con V y ya sabe puede mandar a este su amigo (...) 
BG”. ABMVB, Letter nº. 7400359 (15 January 1874). The numerous grammatical mistakes in this letter are 




 The second strategy the Godó brothers used to secure their business in Cuba consisted 
in their membership of the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional”. As the most important 
association of economic elites in Catalonia, with up to 1,800 members, the Fomento’s main 
goal was advocating protectionist policies. 555  Bartolomé Godó was one the founding 
members of this institution, created in 1869, and his brother Carlos joined soon afterwards.556 
Within the different sections that the “Fomento” comprised the Godó brothers turned its 
“section number 5”, which was in charge of controlling the tariffs concerning “flax, hemp, 
and jute”, into the family’s personal domain. Hence, Carlos Godó was first appointed as vice-
president of this section in 1880, and his brother Bartolomé followed him shortly after.557 
Later on, the second generation of the family “inherited” the same position in the 
“Fomento”.558 The reasons for the Godó’s interest in controlling this section were twofold: 
first, through this section they obtained direct information on tariffs concerning the jute 
industry; and, second, they were placed in a favourable position to exert pressure on tariff 
policy.559 This reveals that in addition to patron-client relationships, business associativism 
was also central for elites to secure their private interests. 
 The establishing of La Vanguardia, in 1881, can be considered a further step forward 
in the Godó’s attempt to secure protectionist policies. Their position on economic policy 
went against the mainstream of the Liberal Party, which mostly stood for free-trade 
policies.560 It was in their attempt to make this dissent in economic policy visible that the 
Godó brothers used the press. Hence, in the very first edition of La Vanguardia, the 
newspaper’s total commitment to Sagasta’s Liberal Party was proclaimed, but it was also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 Unfortunately there are no scholarly works about this entity for the period here concerned. Guillem Graell, 
Historia del Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Barcelona, Imp. de la viuda de Luis Tasso, 1910. For a later period, 
see: Magda Sellés Quintana, El Foment del Treball Nacional, 1914-1923, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia 
de Montserrat, 2000. 
556 AHFTN, Foment de la Producció Nacional. Llibre d’Actes. Juntes Generals (09-01-1869/06-07-1879), p. 2. 
This employer association was the result of the merging of two entities in 1889: the “Fomento de la Producción 
Nacional” (established in 1869, Godó was involved in its foundation) and the “Instituto del Trabajo Nacional” 
(1879).  
557 “Clase 5ª. Delmiro de Caralt, José Casals, Pedro Alier, Vda. De José Borrull, Fabra y Portabella, 
Maristany M., Agustin Serdañons, Bartolomé Godó, Hijos de J. Vives Bonamusa, José de Caralt, Lluis Garriga, 
Brunet y Serrat, C. Mitjans y Cª, Camins y Cª ”. AHFTN, “Actas Junta Directiva (28-04-1889/10-6-1891), p. 
50.  
558 See the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
559 “Nombramiento de Comisiones para el estudio del Arancel vigente y proponer reformas. Clase 5ª.”, 
AHFTN, Actas de la Junta Directiva (28-04-1889/10-6-1891), p. 50.  
560 Besides the case of Sagasta, another Liberal politician who became a renowned supporter of free-trade 
policies was Segismundo Moret. Carlos Ferrera, La frontera democrática del liberalismo. Segismundo Moret 
(1838-1913), Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2002. As already noted, German Gamazo was an exception. The case 
of this Liberal politician reveals to what extent protectionism also constituted an important demand of local 
elites in Castile. See: E. Calzada del Amo, op. cit.; María del Pilar Calvo Caballero, “Defensa de intereses y 





stated in very clear terms that this would not prevent it from supporting protectionism at all 
costs: 
 
“Manifiestas nuestras aspiraciones en el órden político, cumple á nuestro deber 
consignar de manera que no deje lugar á duda, nuestras ideas respecto á la mas 
trascendental de las cuestiones económicas. Lucharemos sin tregua ni descanso por la 
proteccion al trabajo nacional. No pertenecemos al número de los que desean la libertad de 
comercio que nos convertiria en esclavos de otras naciones; y tenemos en tanto nuestra 
independencia, que no la queremos hacer objeto de codicia de modernos cartagineses. (...) 
la dignidad y el patriotismo exigen que enarbolemos la bandera de la proteccion, sólida 
garantía de los mas preciados intereses.” 561 
 
 The fact that the newspaper’s editorial line was expressed in such clear terms reveals 
that as well as the aspiration of challenging the leadership of the Liberal Party in 
Barcelona, 562  La Vanguardia was established to oppose the party’s official free-trade 
policies. To give an example of this, during the same month La Vanguardia was established 
Sagasta’s Liberal Party reached power for the first time in the Restoration (1874-1923). By 
then the Spanish economy had suffered a series of difficulties (above all, a crisis in 
agriculture) and Sagasta, who already stood for free-trade policies in the Sexennium (1868-
1874),563 saw in these policies a solution to the economic situation. This became particularly 
clear in 1882 when Sagasta’s Liberal government started negotiating the trade agreements 
between Spain and France. The fear that the reduction of tariffs on French imports might 
harm the Catalan industry resulted in several demonstrations in this region (including 
massive forms of protest, like the closing of shops) and paved the way for another 
mobilisation of Catalan deputies under the so-called “diputació catalana”.564  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 [E.T.] “Now that we have expressed our opinion in the political order, it is our duty to express in the clearest 
terms our ideas about the most important of all economic issues. We are going to fight tirelessly for the 
protection of the national “industry”. We do not belong to those who stay for free trade, for this would turn us 
into slaves of other nations; and we have independence to such a high degree that we do not want to be subject 
to the greed of modern Carthaginians. (...) dignity and patriotism require us to hoist the banner of protection, 
which is the best warranty for the most precious interests.” “LA VANGUARDIA”, LV, 01/02/1881, p. 2. In 
another article of the same edition, entitled “Nuestro criterio economico” (“Our criteria in economy”), the 
newspaper reinforced the commitment to protectionism.   
562 See Chapter 1. 
563 On Sagasta’s position in economic policy during the Democratic Sexennium (1868-1874), see: José Luis 
Ollero Valdés, Sagasta de conspirador a gobernante, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2006, pp. 171-193; and pp. 242-
245. 
564 J. Palomas and M. Bravo, op. cit.; and J. Palomas, “El rerefons econòmic de l’activitat dels parlamentaris 
catalans, 1876-1885”, Bellaterra, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002 [doctoral thesis, unpublished], pp. 




 Bartolomé Godó participated in this form of collective action of Catalan politicians in 
his capacity as deputy of Igualada. Godó joined the demonstrations that were organised 
against the plans of the Liberal government; and later on he joined other Catalan politicians in 
Congress to vote against the signing of the new commercial treaty with France.565 During the 
parliamentary session Godó openly opposed the discourses of his own party, and later on he 
held a “long conversation” with Prime Minister Sagasta on the need to maintain duty tariffs 
on French imports.566 Bartolomé’s behaviour illustrates to what extent personal interests (e.g. 
the need to secure commercial tariffs) went before the discipline of cadre parties. It was in the 
face of this situation, when private interests clashed with the party’s official position, that the 
press became a valuable instrument to publicize dissent. Indeed, if La Vanguardia was 
established to challenge the leadership of Rius in Barcelona’s Liberal Party branch, it rapidly 
became a platform for the local members to express their opposition to the party’s official 
position in economic policy.567 This provides further evidence that in addition to patron-client 
relationships, the press became another instrument the elites used to secure their private 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565 The Fomento addressed a letter to Godó and to other Catalan deputies asking them to attend the voting in 
Congress: “(...) la gran necesidad que en los momentos actuales existe de que todos los Diputados catalanes se 
encuentren en la Corte. El Instituto en nombre de la causa que representa tiene que recordarle la gran minoría en 
que se encuentran los Diputados proteccionistas en el Congreso, y lo premioso de las circunstancias actuales. El 
trabajo nacional le quedará altamente reconocido si haciendo un sacrificio se traslada en estos momentos a la 
Corte, para asistir a la votación del tratado y de las enmiendas presentadas”. AHFTN, Comunicaciones, nº 5, 
letter 4 April 1882; J. Palomas i M. Bravo, op. cit., p. 34. With the exception of one deputy, who was ill, the rest 
of them attended the vote (including Godó). LV, 10/04/1882, pp. 15-16.  
566 “Ha hablado en contra el señor Moret, que ha sido interrumpido varias veces por los señores Godó, Torres 
[editor of La Vanguardia], Quintana, Roger y otros diputados”; “(...) el señor Sagasta, presidente del Consejo, 
con quien ha conferenciado tambien largo rato el diputado catalan señor Godó. En ambas entrevistas se han 
continuado las gestiones activísimas que se vienen practicando en pró de la produccion general y de las cuales 
se esperan buenos resultados”. LV, 02/06/1882, p. 18; and 10/04/1882, p. 9, respectively. 
567 To give an example of this, La Vanguardia criticised the bad treatment that newspapers from Madrid gave to 
demands in favour of protectionism with the following words [here quoted in Spanish]: “En exceso procaz y 
agresiva contra Cataluña se muestra una parte considerable de la prensa de Madrid, especialmente la adicta y la 
benévola, tomando para sus censuras el más excusable de los motivos y escogiendo para lanzarlas el más 
inoportuno de los momentos. ¿No es para Cataluña cuestion de vida ó muerte la aprobacion ó desaprobacion del 
infausto tratado negociado (...)? ¿Somos algunos párias los catalanes para negarnos el derecho de quejarnos y de 
elevar nuestra voz contra un convenio que nos arruina? (...) Nos consideramos hijos de España y con tanto valor 
y dignidad como nuestros hermanos, cuya armonía de intereses anhelamos, y no tratamos de explotarlos en 





4.2. PUBLIC OPINION AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN CUBA’S WAR OF 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
If the editorials of the early days of La Vanguardia were addressed at pressuring the 
leaders of the Liberal Party, the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898) revealed the 
Godó’s interest in conveying the same demands to a broader audience. With the aim of 
reaching an audience beyond the members of the political community, adopting an 
independent editorial line in 1888 became decisive. As the second section of this chapter will 
show, addressing new readers implied adopting a series of new journalistic practices to make 
the newspaper’s content more accessible. All these strategies were aimed at increasing 
readership, while at the same time contained the aspiration of “guiding” public opinion. 
The Cuban War of Independence symbolically started on February 1895, when an 
insurrection took place in the Cuban town of Baire. This insurrection initially raised little 
attention in Spain. The number of insurgents was small, the Spanish newspapers said, and the 
killing and arrest of some of its leaders indicated that the events in Cuba were mostly under 
control.568 In the case of Barcelona, far more attention was paid to a different issue, also 
related to Cuba: namely, the new attempt of Sagasta’s Liberal Government to change the 
commercial laws concerning Spain and the Antilles. 569  Although the Catalan elites 
traditionally showed great concern about maintaining tariff duties, in 1895 the situation 
reached a critical point. As news arrived from Madrid about a meeting between the Liberal 
minister Romero Robledo and the Cuban deputies to reform the commercial laws, unrest 
spread rapidly among the Catalan elites. The senators and deputies of this region were 
summoned to the headquarters of the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” to discuss the 
situation.570 The conclusion they reached was put in clear terms: any reform to the existing 
commercial laws between Spain and Cuba would endanger the prosperity of the Catalan 
industry.571 
The economic ties between the Catalan industry and Cuba had a long tradition, 
reaching back to the 18th century, but had intensified enormously in the late 19th century. 
Especially in 1882, a series of tariffs were established that greatly benefited the trade with the 
colonies: while foreign products entering the Spanish colonies were subject to heavy duties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 Ferran Soldevila, El Año Politico, 1895, Madrid, Imp. E. Fernández de Rojas, 1896, p. 71; and Antonio 
Elorza and Elena Hernández Sandoica, La Guerra de Cuba (1895-1898), Madrid, Alianza ed., 1998, pp. 186-
188. 
569 Inés Roldán de Montaud, La Restauración en Cuba. El fracaso de un proceso reformista, Madrid, CSIC, 
2000, pp. 573-601. 





(of around 40%), Spanish exports to the colonies, by contrast, incurred far lower duties 
(between 11-12%). All these measures clearly favoured Spanish exports and decisively 
contributed to turning the colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines into a fabulous 
market for Spanish manufacturers. In fact, in all of Europe only England exported more to 
her colonies than Spain did to her own.572 The economic dependency of exports on the 
colonial market became acute in the country’s most industrialised region, Catalonia. For 
manufacturers in this region, who faced serious difficulties to compete with foreign 
production, the protected market of Spanish overseas colonies became a great gateway for 
their manufactures. Thus, while the trade with the colonies had traditionally been particularly 
fruitful, the passing of new protective tariffs in 1886 multiplied by five times the volume of 
exports of cotton manufactures to the colonies in the following decade. Cuba was 
undoubtedly the chief market for these exports, and this earned the island the meaningful 
nickname of the “pearl of the Antilles”.573  
It is no surprise, in consequence, that when rumours spread in 1895 about the new 
intention of the Liberal government to change the commercial laws between Spain and its 
colonies that Catalan politicians were rapidly summoned to the “Fomento del Trabajo 
Nacional”. Among the people who attended this meeting was Carlos Godó (1834-1897). 
Carlos officially attended the meeting as deputy of the Liberal Party in Congress (he had been 
elected in 1893), but he was also a businessman with direct interests in the Cuban market. At 
the time Carlos was running the jute factory he had established together with his brother 
Bartolomé and their business associate Pere Milà in the 1870s. According to the description 
in a commercial guide of 1895, it was the most important factory in the country dedicated to 
the manufacturing of jute bags for the Spanish Antilles.574 Because of the great importance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 In the period 1892-1896 the colonial market amounted to 24% of the total Spanish exports. Jordi Maluquer 
de Motes, El mercado colonial antillano en el siglo XIX, in Jordi Nadal and Gabriel Tortella (eds.), Agricultura, 
comercio colonial y crecimiento económico en la España contemporánea, Barcelona, Ariel, 1972, pp. 322-357; 
César Yáñez, El perfil ultramarí de l'economia catalana, in Josep Mª Fradera (ed.), Catalunya i Ultramar. Poder 
i negoci a les colònies espanyoles (1750-1914), Barcelona, Museu Marítim-Ambit, 1995, pp. 53-76; José A. 
Piqueras, Cuba, emporio y colonia. La disputa de un mercado interferido (1878-1895), Madrid, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 2003.  
573 Further statistics can be found in: Borja de Riquer, Lliga Regionalista: la burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme 
(1898-1904), Barcelona, Edicions 62, pp. 63-65. 
574 “Gran fábrica de hilados y tejidos de yute, la más importante de España. Utiliza procedimientos privilegiados 
y produce entre otros articulos una enorme cantidad de saquería, en su mayor parte destinada á la exportación á 
América.”. Josep Roca i Roca, Barcelona en la mano. Guía de Barcelona y sus alrededores, Barcelona, Enrique 




the colonial market for his business, Godó participated actively in the various meetings 
dedicated to examining the events in Cuba.575  
Godó’s commitment to defending protectionist policies, however, was not limited to 
business associativism, but also extended to the field of journalism. La Vanguardia gave 
wide coverage to all the protests of the Catalan manufacturers and portrayed the Cuban 
insurrection as an action aimed at pressuring the Spanish government to change the 
commercial laws. This understanding of the Cuban insurrection was influenced by the official 
accounts of the Liberal government, who initially hoped to hide the extent of the separatist 
insurrection by presenting it as an act of banditry. In the face of the events, La Vanguardia 
condemned the insurrection as being motivated by selfish interests, and urged the government 
not to yield to them.576 Yet, the need to publicise the reasons for opposing any changes in the 
commercial laws to new publics was as important as pressuring the government. As the 
separatist insurrection grew in intensity, La Vanguardia started publishing a series of articles 
under the title of “La Información cubana” (“Information on Cuba”). As the newspaper 
explained to its readers on the first day these articles started being published: 
 
“Hemos creído oportuno, ya que se ofrece al debate una cuestión tan importante y 
compleja como el régimen comercial que conviene establecer entre las provincias de 
Ultramar y la Península, abrir en nuestras columnas una información popular, á fin de que 
pueda estudiarse algo á fondo el problema y ser más fácil el darle una solución justa.” 577 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 For instance, the meeting held by another employer’s association named “Liga de Productores”: “Ha sido 
enviado á Madrid el siguiente telegrama: Congreso Diputados Madrid. —Sala, Rusiñol, Planas y Casals, 
Bustillo, Monroig, Godó y Sol. Liga Productores Principado Cataluña como protestó proyecto autorización para 
revisión aranceles peninsulares protesta hoy autorización para reformar aranceles antillanos y aplaude su 
enmienda relativa aplicación derechos transitorios. (...)”. LV, 03/04/1895, p. 2. On this employer association, 
see: Jordi Planas i Maresma, La Lliga de Productors de Catalunya i els interessos agraris (1894-1898), 
Recerques, 47-48, 2003-2004, pp. 155-186. 
576 “(...) ese movimiento de los laborantes cubanos, cuya falta de importancia reconocen todos hasta ahora, 
Gobierno, opinión y prensa, y hasta cuya índole política anda puesta en duda, no sirva de pretexto, ó no amilane 
realmente al Gobierno y le haga ir en sus reformas arancelarias más allá de lo que permiten los intereses vitales 
de la patria española. Con revuelta ó sin revuelta Cuba española no puede ir en sus reivindicaciones mercantiles 
más allá que cualquiera de sus hermanas las provincias peninsulares (...). Reformas y concesiones que se aparten 
de ese espíritu de igualdad y de reciprocidad entre las provincias antillanas y las peninsulares, y que tomen por 
pretexto un movimiento de opinión en Cortes ó un movimiento de una docena de laborantes, no solo entrañarían 
verdadera gravedad contra la justicia, sino contra los intereses de la patria española.” “La agitación en Cuba”, in 
LV, 28/02/1895, p. 1-2.  
577 “Información cubana. Ropa hecha. Antecedentes”, LV, 05/03/1895, p. 5. Italics added. [E.T.]: “We have 
thought it was convenient, now that a debate has started on such an important and complex issue like the 
commercial laws that shall be introduced between the provinces of Ultramar and the Peninsula, to dedicate to it 




 As this paragraph illustrates, La Vanguardia was concerned that the public became 
aware of the debate that was taking place. The newspaper did not limit itself to providing the 
latest news about the political debate (on the page it dedicated daily to publishing the 
telegraphs arriving from Madrid and La Habana), but also made an effort to attract the 
interest of a “popular” audience to this topic. Every article of “La Información cubana” was 
conducted as an interview with businessmen holding commercial relations with the Antilles, 
who explained the characteristics of their business. An example of these articles was the 
interview with a businessman called Mr. Baldés, who was in the shirt industry. Before 
commencing the interview, the journalist of La Vanguardia set the tone by stressing “the 
importance that shirt production has in this country, not just because it has successfully 
rejected the entry of foreign production, but also because it has conquered our own markets 
in Ultramar and some in South America”.578 Mr. Baldés then expressed his opinion on the 
economic debate affecting the Antilles in very clear terms: “The withdrawal of the 
commercial laws between Spain and the provinces of Ultramar would truly be a disaster for 
Spain and especially for Catalonia, as far as the manufacture of shirts is concerned. The 
number of families that live on the jobs our industry provides is incalculable”.579   
As the interview with Mr. Baldés illustrates, the people interviewed in La Vanguardia 
were mostly small entrepreneurs who were dedicated to the textile industry (tailors of cloths, 
ties, hats, etc.) who conducted business with Cuba. These were the kinds of businesses that 
many readers of La Vanguardia could identify with, especially given the fact that the 
majority of readers of this newspaper belonged to the diverse ranks of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie.580 As this newspaper confessed, on repeated occasions, the goal of the articles 
published under the title “La Información cubana” was: 
 
“(...) abrir una información popular, no ya para instrucción de la comisión arancelaria 
antillana, sino para llevar á la opinión pública el convencimiento de que para los intereses 
generales, tanto peninsulares como antillanos, conviene que el actual régimen de relaciones 
comerciales sea mantenido en su afirmación capital (...)”. 581 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 “Es este ramo importantísimo en nuestro país, no ya porque ha conseguido cerrar las fronteras á los 
productos extranjeros, sino porque ha logrado además conquistar nuestros mercados propios de Ultramar y 
algunos sudamericanos”. “Información cubana. Camisería”, LV, 10/03/1895, p. 1. 
579 LV, “Información cubana. Camisería”, 10/03/1895, p. 1. 
580 On the reader profile of La Vanguardia, see Chapter 2. 
581 “Información cubana. Corbatería”, LV, 12/03/1895, p. 5. Italics added. [E. T.]: “(...) to open a [section] of 
popular information, not so much to instruct the tariff commission on the Antilles, but to bring public opinion to 
the conviction that for the sake of the general interests, both from the Peninsula and the Antilles, it is convenient 




In consequence, the mission of La Vanguardia was no longer limited to pressuring the 
government – even though this remained central – but was combined with the ambition to 
address wider segments of opinion. While this ambition had started becoming evident since 
La Vanguardia’s transformation of 1888 when it became an independent newspaper, both the 
War of Melilla (1893) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895) revealed the introduction 
of new journalistic practices to achieve this goal.582 This new interest in targeting a broader 
segment of society revealed that La Vanguardia’s function as an independent newspaper was 
not limited to delivering neutral information to their readers (“facts, facts and facts”, as the 
newspaper proclaimed in 1888), but also included the ambition of “guiding” public opinion. 
In other words, the Cuban War of Independence provided further evidence that La 
Vanguardia’s mission was not limited to mirroring the interests of its readers; it also 
consisted in waking the interest of those readers on certain issues and influencing the opinion 
they should have about them.  
The two paragraphs quoted above on “La información cubana” exemplify how 
opinion formation and the search for new publics were combined. The use of an accessible 
language (the interview) and an informal format (personal stories) were two journalistic 
techniques aimed at making the content of the newspaper easier to read for a wider public. 
The case of La Vanguardia consequently reveals that despite the fact that large sections of 
the population were excluded from politics by means of clientelism, and illiteracy rates were 
still high,583 businessmen like the Godó brothers were sensitive to the role that public opinion 
could play in political debates. The press thus constituted a key mechanism used by economic 
elites to publicise their agenda to broader segments of society; and, in parallel, they used the 
calls to an imaginary “public opinion” as a pretext to pressure the government.  
 As it began to become evident that the insurrection in Cuba was more serious than a 
simple act of banditry, the Godó brothers made great efforts to appeal to the broadest public 
possible to secure their business interests. Despite the initial attempts of the Liberal 
government to play down the scope of the insurrection, in March 1895 the call to war was 
officially announced in Spain. The first troops were sent to fight the Cuban insurrection and 
the Congress approved a special budget to cover the war expenditure. As the Prime Minister 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 For the War of Melilla, see Chapter 3, section 3.3. (“Orientalism as a new commodity for readers”). 
583 Illiteracy rates in Spain amounted to 59% of the population in 1900. Significant differences existed in terms 
of gender (47% illiteracy in the case of men, and 69% in the case of women) and between urban and rural areas. 
Illiteracy rates in Barcelona, for instance, were lower and amounted to 48% of the population (38% in the case 
of men, 57% in the case of women). M. Vilanova Ribas y X. Moreno Julià, Atlas de la evolución del 
analfabetismo en España de 1887 a 1981, Madrid, MEC, 1992, p. 166; Francesc Espinet i Joan Manuel 




declared, Spain “was ready to spend the last peseta and the last drop of blood of her sons in 
defence of her rights and of her territory”.584 The explanation for such strong sentiments was 
that Cuba was a sensitive part of Spain’s public imaginary. Rather than a colony, the island 
was regarded as an integral part of the Spanish territory that belonged to the so-called 
“provinces of Ultramar”.585 
 At this point the danger was not limited to the possible reduction of protective tariffs, 
but to the loss of Cuba from the Spanish empire. In the face of this situation La Vanguardia 
did not hesitate in fully supporting the action of the Spanish army to maintain Cuba at all 
costs. As this newspaper asserted, “Catalonia and Barcelona are the most concerned of all 
the peninsular regions in that the national flag shall always wave in the biggest [island] of 
the Antilles, a precious reminder of our vast American empire”. Still, for the Godó’s 
newspaper the war was not something to be proud of. In the view of this newspaper the 
majority of the Spanish did not want to go to war because it stemmed from a 
misunderstanding between two parts of the same nation.586 Indeed, the apprehension about a 
war in what was considered to be part of the Spanish territory is what led La Vanguardia to 
present the conflict as something that was particularly painful, but nonetheless necessary.  
 This “unpleasant necessity” became manifest in the comparisons La Vanguardia drew 
with the recent War of Melilla of 1893. The memories of this conflict (studied in Chapter 3) 
inevitably came back in March 1895. As soldiers were in Barcelona’s harbour boarding the 
ships that would take them to Cuba, La Vanguardia noted how distressing this scene was; 
and compared it with the recent war in Morocco: 
 
“Barcelona presenció el viernes por la mañana el embarque de dos batallones para la 
isla de Cuba, en donde ha resonado nuevamente el grito de rebelión contra la madre patria. 
Ir á Melilla á combatir el infiel, al tradicional enemigo de España resultaba menos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 On March the 3rd the Liberal Government made the decision to send an expedition of 17,000 soldiers. For the 
special war budget, and the details on the sending of the first troops, see: Fernando Soldevila, El Año Político 
1895, Madrid, Imprenta de Enrique Fernández de Rojas, 1896, p. 83 and 87, respectively. 
585 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, 'La España Ultramarina': Colonialism and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-
Century Spain, European History Quarterly, 2004, Vol. 34 (2), p. 191-214. 
586 In terms of economic policy, La Vanguardia proposed the cabotage system to satisfy the Cuban demands 
while maintaining protectionist policies. The cabotage system consisted in abolishing the tariffs in the trade 
between the colonies and the Metropolis. This system was already proposed in the commercial reform of 1882, 
but ultimately it was not approved. In contrast to other newspapers in Barcelona, like the Catalan nationalists, 
La Vanguardia made no favourable references to giving autonomy to Cuba. On the links between the Cuban 
insurrection and the birth of Catalan nationalism, see: Carlos Serrano, “Diversités régionales et régionalismes 
péninsulaires face à la guerre de Cuba (1895-1898)”, in C. Dumas (ed.), Nationalisme et littérature en Espagne 
et en Amérique Latine au XIXe siècle, Lille, 1982, pp. 99-120; and Enric Ucelay-da Cal, Cuba y el despertar de 




desagradable que tener que encaminarse á Cuba á luchar con el hermano mal aconsejado, 
quien en un momento de obcecación olvida sus deberes hacia la nación generosa, que en la 
plétora de sus glorias se desangró por dar vida á un nuevo mundo. Mientras exista un átomo 
de gratitud, Cuba será española. La partida de las tropas á las playas africanas dió lugar á 
grandes transportes de entusiasmo, á manifestaciones ruidosas de enardecimiento público, á 
vitores, aplausos y aclamaciones. Encarnada en aquellos valientes iba una de las 
aspiraciones más constantes y vivas de la nación hispana. En cambio el embarque de los dos 
batallones peninsulares destinados á Cuba fué visto con cierto pesar, no porque crea todo el 
mundo que la rebelión allí iniciada no debe ser combatida; no tampoco porque haya un solo 
español que no esté dispuesto á consumar los mayores sacrificios, á trueque de asegurar la 
conservación íntegra del patrimonio nacional, sino porque siempre duele y entristece toda 
lucha entre hermanos, toda colisión sangrienta entre hijos de una misma madre.” 587 
 
The article above is enlightening about how newspapers were central in fostering 
patriotic behaviour, but also in hiding possible forms of opposition to the war. Different 
scholars have shown that wide segments of the popular classes were opposed to the Cuban 
war of 1895, especially due to the uneven system of military recruitment.588 The Godó 
brothers, however, sought to conceal this popular opposition in La Vanguardia because it ran 
contrary to their economic interests in Cuba. Hence, the little enthusiasm that the departure of 
troops drew in Barcelona was not presented in La Vanguardia as an indication of a certain 
reluctance about going to war, but was justified for the “unpleasant” character that the people 
– arguably –considered this war had. In contrast to the war against the “Moors”, which La 
Vanguardia presented as a reasonable conflict (since combating the Moroccans constituted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 “La semana en Barcelona”, LV, 10/03/1895, p. 4. Italics added. [E. T.]: “On Friday morning Barcelona 
witness the boarding of two batallions to Cuba, where again has echoed the cry of rebelion against the 
motherland. Going to Melilla to fight against the infidel, the traditional enemy of Spain was not as unpleasent as 
going to Cuba to fight against the ill-adivsed brother who, at a moment of obfuscation, forgets its duties towards 
the generous nation who at the peach of its glories sacrified to give birth to a new world. As long as one atom of 
gratitude exists, Cuba will remain Spanish. The sending of troops to the African coast gave place to great 
moments of enthusiasm, to noisy demonstrations of public passion, to cheers and shouts. For these soldiers 
embodied one of the most long standings aspirations of the Spanish nation. In contrast the boarding of the two 
battallions to Cuba was seen with some regret, but neither because someone thinks that the rebellion should not 
be fought; nor because there is one single Spanish soldier who is not ready to the biggest sacrifice to assure the 
integrity of the national patrimony, but simply because it hurts and it is always sad any fight between brothers, 
any bloody collision between the sons of the same mother.” Italics added. 
588 According to the prevailing system, soldiers were drawn by lot. Conscription could be avoided by paying a 
fee. As a result of this system, the war effort largely fell on the shoulders of the popular classes and made 
colonial wars unpopular among this segment of society. Evasion of military conscription became particularly 
common in regions like Galicia, Asturias and Catalonia, whereas in other places, like Castelló and parts of 
Castilla, the numbers of deserters was lower. Carlos Serrano, Prófugos y desertores en la guerra de Cuba, 
Estudios de Historia Social, nº 22-23, 1982, pp. 253-278; Núria Sales, Sobre esclavos, reclutas y mercaderes de 




“one of the more lasting and vivid aspirations of the Spanish nation”), the newspaper 
presented the war in Cuba as a regrettable misunderstanding between brothers. For Cubans 
were “ill-advised brothers”, yet brothers nevertheless.589 This case illustrates that the power 
of newspaper editors as political actors consisted in their capacity to select which issues were 
given public visibility and which others were silenced, according to their private agenda. 
 Carlos Godó had good reasons indeed to use the press to publicise the war effort in 
favourable terms. In contrast to the majority of Catalan textiles exports to Cuba, which 
remained steady during the war,590 the separatist insurrection was having very negative 
effects on the jute sack market. The Cuban separatists had adopted a strategy of economic 
warfare that drastically reduced sugar production, upon which the jute bags industry was 
highly dependent. As a result, and as one commercial report on Barcelona’s industry noted, 
“Since 1895, owing to the destruction of the sugar crops in the island, the export of empty 
jute sacks to Cuba has suffered heavily”.591 If we take into account that “Godó brothers and 
Company” was the leading company in the export of jute bags to the Spanish colonies, it is 
clear that the rebellion was having a negative impact on the Godó’s economic interests.592          
 In fact, the Godó brothers’ resolute commitment to securing the integrity of the 
Spanish empire also became noticeable in their public behaviour. On August 1895 Carlos 
Godó contacted the Minister of War to offer 1 peseta per soldier, 1.50 pesetas per corporal, 
and 2 pesetas per sergeant departing from Barcelona to Cuba.593 Godó also offered one daily 
peseta to every “deprived” family of Igualada’s district that had a son fighting in the army. 
These donations amounted to thousands of pesetas (the district of Igualada included 32 
villages) and became the first of the successive donations they made throughout the war. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 “Hermanos mal aconsejados” was the Spanish expression La Vanguardia used (see the quotation above). 
The fact that a Moroccan embassy was visiting Madrid as the war in Cuba took place contributed to 
remembering the events in Melilla. Ferran Soldevila, El Año Politico, 1895, op. cit., p. 96. 
590 According to the figures provided by Borja de Riquer, the exports of cotton goods to Spanish colonies 
followed a growth rate that was only interrupted during the final year of the war. Borja de Riquer, op. cit,, p. 66. 
591 As a result of military operations, sugar production fell abruptly from more than a million tonnes in 1894, to 
only 286,000 tonnes in 1896. Carlos Serrano, Final del Imperio. España, 1895-1989, Madrid, Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores, 1984, p. 23. The above-quoted report was elaborated by Consul General Lay in Barcelona for the US 
Department of State. United States-Division of Insular Affairs, “Industrial conditions in Spain”, Monthly 
summary of commerce of the island of Cuba, 1901, p. 217. 
592 With the exception of textiles, other industries in Barcelona were also suffering the impact of the war: “A 
causa de la paralización de trabajos en varias industrias de Barcelona, viven en situación angustiosa gran 
númbero de familias obreras residentes en Gracia (...)”. LV, 01/03/1896, p. 2.  
593 “El general Weyler telegrafía desde Barcelona al señor ministro de la Guerra, que el diputado á Cortes Sr. 
Godó se le ha presentado ofreciéndose á entregar 1 peseta por soldado, 1,50 por cabo y 2 por sargento que 
embarquen ó hayan embarcado en aquel puerto con destino a la gran Antilla. Admitido el ofrecimiento, el Sr. 
Godó ha hecho entrega de las cantidades necesarias. Las tropas que vayan ya camino de Cuba percibirán el 
donativo del Sr. Godó á su llegada. El general Azcárraga ha telegrafiado dando las gracias al generoso donante”. 




press rapidly welcomed these donations and presented Godó as an example to follow.594 
Moreover, on April 1896 Godó was awarded the “Grand Cross for Military Merit” for his 
support of the war effort, and he travelled to Madrid to personally thank the Queen Regent 
for the decoration he received.595 
 The award given to Carlos Godó reveals the public status he had reached in society. 
Although he had already obtained the support of the Queen Regent for his business plans in 
Morocco, the award he received in 1895 provided further evidence of the excellent relations 
Godó held with the monarchy. From a different perspective, the donations Godó made are 
also indicative of how an event that was taking place thousands of miles away (namely, the 
war in Cuba) could be instrumentalized in local politics. The donations Godó made reveal an 
attempt to reinforce his prestige in the local sphere, and demonstrate the importance 
patronage played in notable politics. The role of the deputy was not limited to defending the 
interests of the constituency in Congress, but also encompassed a series of moral duties, like 
the support of charitable works and the protection of the vulnerable in times of need. The 
Cuban War was an example of these difficult moments in which the deputy adopted the role 
of protector. 
 In fact, there is evidence that Carlos Godó intentionally used the war in Cuba to 
improve his image in Igualada. The last elections held in this constituency, in 1893, had been 
very heated.596 Though Godó had won, he had come up against strong confrontation from the 
parties in the opposition (the conservatives, the Republicans and the carlists). This opposition 
revealed the emergence of some resistance to the Godó’s political hegemony in Igualada. In 
the face of these events, Godó saw the Cuban war as an opportunity to calm the situation and 
reinforce his position in public. In November 1895 a celebration occurred in Igualada in 
honour of Anacleto Girbau, a young soldier who had fought in Cuba. This homage was 
previously announced in La Vanguardia and became a local festivity that mobilised a large 
portion of Igualada’s population. A significant number of people attended the arrival of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594  The Madrid’ newspaper El Liberal, for instance, noted: “Esta patriótica y generosa conducta del Sr. Godó ha 
merecido en todas partes, con justicia, entusiastas elogios.” “Donativos”, El Liberal, 24/11/1893, p. 3. “También 
se entregó dos pesetas á los sargentos, seis reales á los cabos y una peseta á los soldados, dinero procedente del 
donativo de Don Carlos Godó. (...) Debiera imitarse el proceder del señor Godó. Es lo menos que pueden dar los 
ricos á los soldados que van á defender la honra y los intereses nacionales”. Rafael Guerrero, Crónica de la 
Guerra de Cuba (1895-96), Barcelona, Librería ed. M. Maucci, 1896, vol. 1, 2ª part, p. 120. 
595 “Telegrafían á El Noticiero Universal: Por Real Orden se ha concedido al diputado electo por Igualada don 
Carlos Godó la gran cruz del Mérito Militar libre de gastos, en premio á los importantes donativos que ha hecho 
á las tropas expedicionarias á Cuba que han salido de esta región.”, LV, 22/04/1896, p. 2. “La Reina ha recibido 
en audiencia al diputado electo por Igualada don Carlos Godó. El señor Godó dio las gracias á la Reina por la 
concesión de la cruz del mérito militar con distintivo blanco que le ha sido concedida.” “Ultimas noticias”, LV, 
11/06/1896, p. 5. 




Girbau at Igualada’s train station, where he was received as a hero amidst constant cheers and 
shouts.597 The Godó brothers played a leading role in all these celebrations: a member of the 
Godó family accompanied the soldier during his trip from Barcelona to Igualada; and, once 
there, the dinner dedicated to the soldier became an opportunity for Carlos Godó’s supporters 
to vindicate his position as deputy.  
 Indeed, the celebration of Girbau presented an opportunity to overcome the political 
confrontation of the last elections and to publicise the donations Godó made to the deprived 
families of Igualada. The Godó brothers presented the Cuban insurrection as a threat to the 
wellbeing of the entire district and required that all the people, regardless of their political 
affiliation, gathered around a common cause.598 This event demonstrates that at a time when 
Godó’s position as deputy started being challenged in the local sphere, the war in Cuba 
became an opportunity to deflect the criticisms from the opposition and to reassert his 
position in public. Thus by publicising Godó’s actions, and especially the generosity of his 
donations,599 La Vanguardia ultimately contributed to building up and cementing Godó’s 
public reputation as the “father of the district”.  
  
 
4.3. COLONIAL CONFLICTS AND THE PRESS: THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED 
STATES INTO THE WAR 
 
 The last episode of the Cuban War took place in 1898, when the United States joined 
the conflict. What had been until then a domestic confrontation was consequently turned into 
an open war between an emerging power, the United States, and a country desperate to hold 
on to the remnants of its empire, Spain. The last part of this chapter will examine the role of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 “El heroico Girbau”, LV, 23/11/1895, p. 2; “En honor de Girbau”, LV, 27/11/1895, pp. 1-2. 
598 Writing about the welcome dinner celebrated in Igualada, La Vanguardia commented on the speeches made 
in the following terms: “(...) y como esta unidad de sentimientos, expresados con entusiasmo por todos los 
concurrentes, sea el signo más elocuente de que empieza el fin de las rencillas politico-locales, como fruto de 
los esfuerzos de atracción hábilmente iniciados por nuestro buen amigo el celoso diputado á Cortes por el 
distrito [Godó], en beneficio de los intereses y de la pública administración igualadina, sin abdicaciones ni 
humillaciones para nadie (...) ya que por él entreveo el retorno de las unánimes iniciativas perdidas y el 
desenvolvimiento de las enegías serenas que tan alto pusieron el nombre de Igualada (...). Y como quien tuvo 
di[cen] que retuvo, no es extraño, mi querido director, que vea yo con complacencia el término de las terribles 
tormentas pasionales que por aquí se han cernido hasta con menoscabo de la tranquilidad de todos (...)”. Ibidem. 
599 “(...) significar una vez más su agradecimiento al igualadino don Cárlos Godó y Pié, por los expontáneos 
(sic) y repetidos desprendimientos que viene realizando en beneficio de las familias de los soldados pobres de 
esta comarca ya que con ellos enjuga lágrimas de miseria y desconsuelos, y por los donativos hechos á los 
batallones embarcados en al capital de la provincia. Con vítores y aplausos fueron sancionados tales acuerdos 
que honran á todos, y así terminó tan agradable acto que dejará imperecedero recuerdo en la memoria de los 




the press in raising public awareness about the possibility of a war against the United States. 
It will be argued that the newspapers decisively contributed to the creation of a heated 
atmosphere by propagating a jingoist discourse. Although different segments of society 
showed their opposition to the war, or simply remained indifferent, the vast majority of the 
press chose to encourage patriotic behaviour. The role of the press in this process revealed 
the role of editors in conditioning the public debate, while at the same time using it to 
advance their own agenda. These events will be fundamental to understand the deep 
criticisms the press would suffer in the war’s aftermath, as the discredit of liberal institutions 
decisively increased. 
Since the beginning of the war in Cuba the majority of the Spanish press showed a 
clear mistrust towards the United States.600 If the new foreign policy under the motto 
“keeping America for the Americans” (the Monroe doctrine of 1895) already create 
uneasiness among the Spanish press,601 the collision of interests between the two countries 
increased in 1896, when the United States’ Senate recognised the status of belligerent 
government to the Cuban insurgency. Despite the attempts of Spain’s Prime Minister Antonio 
Cánovas del Castillo to minimise the importance of this declaration, Spanish newspapers took 
an aggressive stance. The Madrid newspaper El Imparcial, for instance, argued that “Spain 
shall succumb before tolerating the offence of foreign intervention in its own matters”.602 
Other newspapers from the same city, like El Heraldo, responded vehemently to the US 
declaration, while El Correo and La Correspondencia de España took a more moderate tone, 
albeit considering the situation “extremely serious”. In the case of La Vanguardia the 
declaration of the US Senate was presented as a direct attack on Spain’s honour. The Godó’s 
newspaper referred to the United States as a “perfidious and greedy nation”, since Spain had 
already “sacrificed a great part of its sovereignty and its interests to the American 
postulates”, in reference to the change of the tariffs that were implemented in 1895 to 
promote American trade with Cuba.603 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 In 1892, there were a total of 217 publications in Madrid’s province, and 130 in Barcelona’s. Of these 
publications, 24 corresponded to daily newspapers published in the city of Madrid, and 15 in the case of 
Barcelona. José Javier Sánchez Aranda y Carlos Barrera del Barrio, Historia del periodismo español. Desde sus 
orígenes hasta 1975, Pamplona, Eunsa, 1992, p. 222; María Carmen Nieto, “La Prensa diaria de Barcelona de 
1895 a 1910”, Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, 1958 [doctoral thesis], p. 268.  
601 An example is: “La actitud de los Estados Unidos con relación á España y Cuba”, LV, 11/10/1895, p. 4. 
602 “España se halla dispuesta a sucumbir antes que a tolerar el agravio que la intervención exterior en sus 
propios asuntos supone.” El Imparcial, 01/03/1896. Quoted in A. Elorza & E. Hernández, op. cit., p. 365. 
603 “La actitud de los Estados Unidos basta para justificar la intranquilidad pública. Engreídos con su poderío 
han aprendido á jugar con nuestros intereses por no decir con nuestro decoro (...). El dolor de esas dos saetas 
habrá que sufrirlo como el de las anteriores hasta que España pueda aliviarlo llamando oficialmente al vino, 




The crucial role of the press in increasing public concern about the possibility of a 
future war against the United States became all the more evident on 15 February 1898. On 
that day a diplomatic incident between Spain and the United States took place: a US ship 
located in Santiago de Cuba was accidentally sunk. The outcome of this incident was the 
declaration by US President McKinley of a possible military intervention in Cuba. Although 
war was not a certainty, only a possibility, the newspapers contributed to spreading the idea 
that it was indeed imminent. Newspapers published President McKinley’s statements and 
encouraged the demonstrations that took place throughout the Spanish territory. In Barcelona, 
for instance, a play held at the “Liceu” theatre turned into an impromptu demonstration that 
La Vanguardia warmly welcomed and presented as a sign of the patriotic atmosphere that 
dominated the city.604 Similar demonstrations took place in Igualada, where a play in the 
local theatre led the audience to request, with much enthusiasm, that the national anthem be 
played. Afterwards, “An individual jumped onto the stage and burned an American flag. The 
crowd started shouting ‘death to the United States and long live Spain’. A demonstration was 
soon improvised and 3,000 people marched through the streets playing music and carrying 
Spanish flags”.605 
 This event in Igualada highlights that the excitement about a war against the United 
States was not a phenomenon that was restricted to the big cities like Madrid or Barcelona, 
but generated great enthusiasm in all corners of the Spanish territory. Newspapers became 
central in fostering this kind of patriotic behaviour, as well as in hiding possible forms of 
opposition (or indifference) to the war. The writer Miguel de Unamuno, for instance, recalled 
having seen great indifference to the war among a group of farmers in Castile.606 In a largely 
rural country such as Spain, where 27.5% of the population lived in rural communities of less 
than 2,000 people in 1900, similar careless attitudes were probably very widespread.607 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
los precisos momentos en que España sacrifica gran parte de su soberanía y de sus intereses á la doctrina 
americana, ó en definitiva a la codicia yankee, ¿de qué ha servido el sacrificio?”. LV, “Ecos de la política”, 
28/02/1897, p. 5. Italics added. 
604 “La manifestación patriótica surgida espontáneamente en el gran Teatro del Liceo la noche del jueves 
[22/04/1898] fué un acto importante, revelador del sentimiento íntimo que domina en Barcelona. A ella 
seguirán, sin duda, actos mil, con los cuales nuestro vecindario renovará las gallardías de que ha dado muestras 
cuantas veces la patria española, comprometida en un empeño de honra, ha necesitado del esfuerzo y de la 
abnegación de sus hijos”. LV, 24/04/1898, p. 1.  
605 “Entusiasmo en Igualada”, La Dinastía, 26/04/1898, p. 3. 
606 José Andrés Gallego, Un 98 distinto. Restauración, Desastre, Regeneracionismo, Madrid, Encuentro, 1998, 
p. 140. 
607 In the case of cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the percentage was 32% at the same time. Nicolás 
Sánchez Albornoz, La modernización económica de España, 1830-1900, Alianza editorial, 1985, p. 54. The best 
in-depth analysis of the attitudes of society in the face of the war is: Manuel Pérez Ledesma, “La sociedad 
española, la guerra y la derrota”, Juan Luis Pan-Montojo (ed.), Más se perdió en Cuba. España, 1898 y la crisis 




Likewise, numerous soldiers avoided conscription or deserted the army in different parts of 
the country.608  
 However, resistance or antipathy towards the war left only a small trace in the press. 
With the exception of the Socialist and the Anarchist press, which saw the war as an 
opportunity to attack the political system, the vast majority of the press highlighted events 
that reflected – and encouraged – patriotic behaviour. To give an example of this, the event 
that took place in Igualada’s theatre (described above) was reported by various national 
newspapers, like Spain’s top-selling newspaper (El Imparcial) and Madrid’s La Época, 
which referred to the events in Igualada as a “patriotic movement”. As could be expected, in 
Barcelona too La Vanguardia published positive reports of the same event, and contributed to 
fostering jingoism by arguing that “another thousand events like this will follow tomorrow, in 
which our residents will renew their bravery as they have done every time the Spanish 
fatherland has required the efforts and abnegation of their children”.609 
 This capacity of editors to be selective in their reporting became particularly clear in 
the case of commercial newspapers. Madrid’s newspaper El Imparcial, for instance, 
abandoned the criticism it usually directed against the government and joined the patriotic 
discourse without hesitation.610 Something similar happened in other cities, like Barcelona 
and Seville, where the press that did not have a partisan leaning largely supported the war.611 
In fact, if the war-like stance was an easy attitude for newspapers to follow, editors also saw 
it as an opportunity to increase sales, especially in the case of profit-oriented newspapers, 
because large numbers of readers chose to buy newspapers that were in favour of the war. 
The militaristic newspaper El Imparcial, for instance, saw its circulation increase from 
70,000 copies to 120,000 during the war.612 
 In contrast to the commercial press, partisan newspapers seemed to have fewer 
difficulties in opposing the war (when they chose to do so).613 The reason for this is because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 As already noted. Núria Sales, op. cit.; Carlos Serrano, op. cit.. 
609 LV, 24/04/1898, p. 1.  
610 Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, Prensa y Política en la España de la Restauración. Rafael Gasset y El Imparcial, 
Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1999, p. 111. 
611 Rosario Sevilla Soler, La Guerra de Cuba y la memoria colectiva. La crisis del 98 en la prensa sevillana, 
CSIC, Sevilla, 1996, pp. 39-40. A detailed analysis for the case of Barcelona’s press, in: Fernando San Agustín 
Farlete, “El desencadenamiento de la guerra de Cuba en la prensa de Barcelona”, Barcelona, Escuela Oficial de 
Periodismo, 1975 [unpublished Master thesis]. 
612 J. C. Sánchez Illán, op. cit., p. 103. 
613 Even in the case of partisan newspapers, support for the war became very widespread. For instance, most of 
the Republican press supported the war despite opposing the political system. This reveals to what extent the 
sabre-rattling attitude had become the norm among newspapers. José Álvarez Junco, “Los amantes de la 
libertad”: la cultura republicana española a principios del siglo XX, Nigel Townson (ed.), El republicanismo en 




partisan newspapers privileged opinion formation over selling copies. This was the case, for 
instance, of a Catalan nationalist newspaper named La Renaixença, whose sympathy towards 
the Cuban insurrection made it an opponent of the war. Despite Catalan nationalists initially 
supporting the war effort, mainly to protect the interests of the Catalan industry, later on they 
argued in favour of conceding autonomy to Cuba as the best way to solve the situation.614 
Opposing the war, however, was a decision that carried commercial consequences. As the 
editor of La Renaixença later declared, “during the madness unleashed by the war against the 
United States” his decision of opposing the war became “disastrous” in commercial terms.615 
This illustrates to what extent the war became popular among significant number of readers. 
In the eyes of La Renaixença, the eagerness of the press to meet these expectations could 
have a pernicious influence for the country’s future:  
 
“little more can be said to the people in the city that are waiting impatiently for the 
outbreak of the war against the United States. Influenced by newspapers that are more 
concerned with selling copies than in being Spanish, they cannot wait for the news arriving 
to Madrid or Washington (...). They want the war: let’s have it then. They shall regret it 
(...).” 616 
 
 The words of this newspaper reveal the perception that in their eagerness to reflect the 
wishes of the public, and consequently to increase their sales, commercial newspapers were 
failing in the moral duty of looking for the general interest. This turned out to be a paradox if 
we take into account that the guiding principle of commercial newspapers like La 
Vanguardia was, precisely, to provide neutral accounts to their readers. Moderate and 
impartial reporting were indeed two principles to which the Godó’s newspaper had ascribed 
since the reform plans of 1888. However, the Cuban War brought to the surface the inner 
contradictions of commercial papers. The wish to promote a political agenda (e.g. the need to 
maintain Cuba as a Spanish possession) and increase sales proved to be more important than 
the professed principle of impartial and responsible reporting. In the aftermath of the war, 
both the editors of La Vanguardia and of El Imparcial would regret the bellicose editorials 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 As already noted, the links between Catalan nationalism and the Cuban insurrection have been thoroughly 
studied and highlighted. Carlos Serrano (1982), op. cit.; E. Ucelay-da Cal, op. cit. 
615 Carola Duran Tort, Pere Aldavert: una vida al servei de l’ideal, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de 





they had published; especially as a growing number of voices started holding the so-called 
“press oligarchy” responsible for Spain’s loss of empire.617 
 Still, some exceptions existed in the generalised pro-war behaviour of the commercial 
press. This was the case, for instance, of El Diario de Barcelona – the oldest newspaper in 
Spain (it was founded in 1792) and one of the most representative newspapers of 
conservative opinion in Barcelona. The opinions of its editor (Joan Mañé Flaquer) and those 
of its leading figures were highly respected. Unlike the newspaper of the Godó family, El 
Diario de Barcelona became a resolute opponent of war, this being an attitude that became 
clear in the much more moderate tone it adopted to speak about the United States.618 
However, the patriotic pressure that imbued public life became so heated that it was difficult 
to stand, not just for the liberal politicians, who felt the pressure of going into war to save the 
political system, 619 but also for the moderate opinion-minded newspapers like El Diario de 
Barcelona.620 One of the most reputed writers for this newspaper (Joan Maragall) reflected on 
the oppressive atmosphere the press contributed to create in an article called “la obsesión” 
(“the obsession”): 
 
“¡La guerra, la guerra...! ¡La guerra con los Estados Unidos! No hay medio de hablar de 
otra cosa. (...) la obsesión ha llegado ya al punto en que se siente la necesidad, hasta 
fisiológica, de deshacerse de ella de cualquier manera: ha llegado a convertirse en un 
clamor unánime de que esto acabe y sea lo que ha de ser. No hay partidario de la paz, por 
acérrimo que sea, que no esté deseando que rompa de una vez la guerra, si ella, con todas 
sus catástrofes, ha de acabar con tanta incertidumbre.” 621 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 As will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
618 The attitude of the Diario de Barcelona has been examined in: M. C. García Nieto, op. cit. 
619 In the words of a leading member of the Liberal Party (Conde de Romanones): “En aquellos días tristísimos, 
y ésta era la realidad, flotaba sobre los gobernantes, paralizando sus movimientos y sus iniciativas un fantasma: 
el del miedo. Miedo, sí, a la prensa, al Ejército, á las explosiones del sentimiento nacional. Bajo su presión no se 
pudo siquiera examinar el ofrecimiento del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos para comprar las colonias. (...) Y a 
la guerra con los Estados Unidos se fué, con desconocimiento absoluto de la fuerza militar y naval de la gran 
República”, Álvaro de Figueroa y Torres, Conde de Romanones, Notas de una vida, Madrid-Barcelona, Marcial 
Pons, 1999, [1st edition 1934], vol. 1, p. 103. Another contemporary expressed similar views: “The press 
published accounts stressing the military superiority of Spain. This information was clearly wrong, whether for 
ignorance or in bad faith. (...) As a result, the Spanish people happily went to war in full ignorance (...)”. Joan 
Garriga Massó, Memòries d’un liberal catalanista, 1871-1939, Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1987, pp. 111-112. Or. 
version in Catalan. 
620 The Catholic newspaper El Correo Catalán, for instance, attacked El Diario de Barcelona for its prudence, 
which it regarded as a lack of patriotism. The same critiques were addressed to other newspapers that were 
opposed to the war, like the Catalan nationalist La Renaixença. “Prudentes y patriotas”, El Correo Catalán, 
quoted in: M. C. García Nieto, op. cit., p. 311; Carola Duran Tort, op. cit., p. 165, resp. 
621 Ibidem, p. 138. [E. T.]: “The war! The war against the United States! There is no way to talk about anything 
else. (...) the obsession has reached the point when it is a necessity, almost a phisiologhic one, to get rid of it in 







 Although the fear of a war against the United States was a possibility that the Spanish 
press had contributed to broadcast since the very beginning of the Cuban insurrection of 
1895, when the war finally did break out in April 1898 it was a short-lived affair. Spain 
suffered a series of rapid defeats on the battlefield and the war was concluded in little more 
than three months. This conflict put an end to the Spanish empire and to the centuries-long 
presence of Spain in the Antilles. Neither of the two Godó brothers, however, lived to see 
this. Bartolomé passed away in 1895, after a long illness, and Carlos died in 1897 during a 
sojourn in his country house. 
 In many ways, Cuba was central to the strategies of the two Godó brothers. As this 
chapter has shown, securing protection for Spanish exports to the Antilles became a recurring 
theme in the Godó’s activities in the fields of business, politics, and journalism. The case of 
these two brothers exemplifies, in fact, why Barcelona has been referred to as “Spain’s 
business centre in the trade with the colonies”.622 The importance of the colonial market for 
the Catalan economy traditionally led the elites of this region to give great importance to 
protectionist policies. This need became all the more important in the last quarter of the 19th 
century, when the lack of consensus between the two liberal parties implied that economic 
policy could be changed at any time. Catalan elites were certainly not the only ones that were 
concerned about protectionism. In other parts of Spain, like Castile and Andalucía, the 
securing of protectionist policies also became an important concern of local elites.623  
 Indeed, if the question of how local interests were represented in central government 
was a fundamental question in Europe during the Liberal period, the Godó brothers constitute 
a case study that illuminates how the mechanisms of influence combined private and group 
interests. The letters sent to the Minister of Ultramar, the meetings at the “Fomento”, and the 
intervention in Congress demonstrate that the Godó brothers worked in tight collaboration 
with other Catalan elites in the so-called “diputació catalana” in order to secure group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
There is nobody in favour of peace, no matter his commitment, who is not wishing the breaking of war if this, 
with all its catastrophes, shall put an end to uncertainty.” La Vanguardia noted the same heated atmosphere that 
pervaded society: “En la calle, en el seno de las familias, en todas partes no se habla mientras tanto más que de 
la guerra, de la guerra ya inevitable”. LV, 21/04/1898, p. 6. 
622 Martín Rodrigo Alharilla, “Cataluña y el colonialismo español”, Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millán, Mª Cruz 
Romeo (eds.), Estado y periferias en la España del siglo XIX. Nuevos enfoques, València, Publicacions de la 
Universitat de València, 2009, pp. 315-356. 
623 E. Calzada del Amo, op. cit.; M. del P. Calvo Caballero, “Defensa de intereses y cultura de la patronal 




interests. This demonstrates that in a political system where government was not decided 
through free elections, collective action became one of the strategies local elites used to exert 
pressure on central government.  
 Moreover, this chapter has shown that the public space became decisive in the power 
strategies of elites. In the attempt to oppose the free-trade policies of the Liberal Party, the 
establishing of La Vanguardia became a valuable platform to publicise the Godó views. In 
parallel, the press was also becoming a space where class interests converged, as public 
opinion grew in importance. In fact, if La Vanguardia already acted as the organ of the 
African lobby during the War of Melilla (1893), during the Cuban War of Independence this 
newspaper gave voice once more to the economic interests of Catalan elites. The case of La 
Vanguardia thus challenges the traditional depiction in the literature of the “diputació 
catalana” as a lobbying strategy confined to the halls in Congress and to the headquarters of 
the “Fomento”. Public opinion was another dimension where these collective interests were 
defended. In his threefold capacity as deputy, editor, and member of the Fomento, Carlos 
Godó was in a favourable position to sponsor this strategy. The conclusion that can be drawn 
from this is based on its new independent editorial line: La Vanguardia was evolving from 
being the organ of a political community (the Liberal Party) into a prominent mouthpiece of 
the Catalan bourgeoisie.624  
 In this regard, the main power that the newspaper editors had as political actors 
consisted in their capacity to select which topics became the subject of public debate and 
were given broader visibility. In so doing, the press enabled private concerns to become 
public concerns. The Cuban War of Independence was an example of this: the Godó’s 
interest in securing the integrity of the Spanish empire was presented as an argument that 
wider segments of society could sympathise with (the need to maintain the “integrity of the 
motherland”). As some other parts of society in Barcelona started demonstrating opposition 
to the war (as exemplified in the lack of enthusiasm that the departure of troops raised in this 
city) La Vanguardia chose to conceal these forms of dissent.625 This is an example of the 
importance of newspaper editors in selecting which issues were given importance in public 
debate, and which were minimised. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624 The articles La Vanguardia published on “La Información cubana” were later reprinted in the Fomento’s 
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See: LV, 15/04/, 1895, p. 2 and 30/03/1893, p. 3, resp. This provides further evidence about the close links that 
existed between Barcelona’s most important employer association and Godó’s newspaper.   
625 As explained, La Vanguardia justified the lack of enthusiasm for the war by presenting Cubans as “ill-




 The Cuban War of Independence consequently highlighted the growing importance of 
public opinion in political debate, as well as how editors sought to condition it. The articles 
published under the title “La información cubana” reveal the ambition of La Vanguardia to 
address a broader audience that went beyond the members of the Liberal Party. If this 
newspaper became capable of doing so it was because contrary to the partisan press, the 
Godó’s newspaper had an editorial independence that allowed it to target a wider audience 
and thus sell more copies. The new vocation of serving the public – as established in the 
reform plans of 1888 – became evident in La Vanguardia through its use of varying writing 
formats, like the interview and the personal story. This does not mean, however, that the 
function of commercial newspapers was limited to neutral reporting. Opinion formation 
remained a fundamental goal of the commercial press. Although Spain’s still strongly rural 
character makes it difficult to speak of a public opinion where the interests of all society were 
present, this was not necessarily an impediment. La Vanguardia exerted pressure on the 
government by presenting itself as the interpreter of a broader community that was 
interchangeably referred to as the public opinion, the nation, and the general interest.626 If this 
rhetorical practice had already existed in the past, as in the War of Melilla,627 this reveals that 
editorials were also addressed at pressuring policy-makers (who had the final decision over 
tariff reforms). Newspapers thus presented themselves as the interpreters of an imagined 
public opinion, and used it as a rhetorical strategy to pressure liberal politicians. 
 The Godó’s commitment to securing the integrity of the Spanish empire became 
equally evident in the local sphere. The donations Carlos Godó made contributed to securing 
his business interests in Cuba, while at the same time were aimed at reinforcing his prestige 
in the local sphere. The homage paid to the young soldier in Igualada was explicitly 
presented as an opportunity to overcome the first attacks on Godó’s local pre-eminence; and 
to reinforce his image as the protector of the vulnerable. These rituals demonstrate that the 
control of public office by means of clientelism was not sufficient to assure the position of 
elites. The public dimension was also of central importance, especially at a time when 
politics were still imbued with strong community values. The construction of prestige was a 
move aimed at building the social legitimisation that elections could not provide.628 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 An example of this is the following sentence, already quoted in this chapter: “En el modo en que se expresan 
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que en general se abriga el temor de que los gobernantes españoles no sepan corresponder á lo que la Nación 
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 If the Godó brothers were committed to securing the integrity of the Spanish empire at 
all costs, and also used this endeavour as an opportunity to reinforce their prestige in the local 
sphere, all these decisions carried important consequences in the aftermath of 1898. The 
shock that losing the colonies had in Spain would turn the press into an object of severe 
criticism, and this decisively contributed to eroding the position of liberal elites like the Godó 
brothers. The consequences of the war for the prominence of liberal elites will be the focus of 





CHAPTER 5. PRESS, POLITICS AND THE SPANISH “DISASTER” OF 1898  
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“Va acentuándose aquí la creencia de que dentro de breves 
años sufrirá España una desmembración; este peligro empieza a 
mirarse como natural, y lo que es más triste, con indiferencia. Se 
reconoce que Cataluña podrá ser absorbida por Francia, pero lo 
más alarmante del hecho es que la contestación que se da a los que 
hacen tal advertencia es la siguiente: peor gobernados que por la 
gente de Madrid no podemos estar...”.  
Letter of Manuel Duran i Bas to Francisco Silvela, 5 January   
 1899.629  
 
 
“(...) pongo mi esperanza en la Prensa, en la Prensa española, 
considerada por mí como poder mucho más intenso y extenso que el 
del Gobierno, como poder el más rápido y seguro para modificar el 
estado político, intelectual y moral de la nación.”  






 On 1 January 1899 the Spanish flag was lowered for the last time in Santiago de 
Cuba. What started as a small insurrection in the Cuban town of Baire in 1895 had turned 
into four years of war that affected all of Spain’s colonial dominions, from the Caribbean 
(Cuba and Puerto Rico) to South-East Asia (the Philippines). The sending of 200,000 soldiers 
and an expenditure of over 1,000 million pesetas had proved insufficient for Spain to win the 
war. Thus almost five hundred years of Spanish presence in the Antilles had reached an end, 
while the United States, in contrast, symbolically joined the group of imperial powers. 
The “Disaster” of 1898, as the loss of the colonies became popularly known in Spain, 
was a national trauma that had long lasting effects. In 1923, when General Primo de Rivera 
put an end to the Restoration and established a dictatorship, he justified the armed uprising as 
the result of the national decay that had begun in 1898. In the shorter term, however, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629 Borja de Riquer (ed.), Epistolari polític de Manuel Duran i Bas (correspondència entre 1866 i 1904), 
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Disaster of 1898 led to a process of national introspection, which set in motion different 
projects aspiring to reinvigorate the country. All these projects, known as 
“Regeneracionismo”, would exert a great influence in the historiography. The works of 
Regenerationist intellectuals like Joaquín Costa (to mention perhaps the most influential 
among them) decisively contributed to forging a sense of exceptionalism in the understanding 
of modern Spanish history. Inspired by the work of Regenerationist intellectuals, historians 
saw the year of 1898 as further evidence of a nation that had failed in the “bourgeois 
revolution” of the 19th century, and failed again in the transition from liberalism to 
democracy in the 20th century.631 
However, the intellectual paradigm that saw Spanish history as a history of deviance 
and failure (something that recalls contemporary trends in the German and the Italian 
historiography) has undergone a process of full revision in the last two decades. The 
commemoration of the centenary of the Disaster, in 1998, became an opportunity for 
historians and intellectuals alike to revisit prevailing paradigms of exceptionality.632 The 
outcome of this centenary was a myriad of works that demystified the Disaster and framed it 
in the broader European context. After all, something similar to 1898 had already happened 
to France two decades earlier, in 1870, with the defeat of Sedan. Not by coincidence, the 
French case exerted a powerful influence on the response of Spanish intellectuals to the 
Disaster, as Vicente Cacho noted. Furthermore, Spain’s loss of empire was part of the 
broader international context, namely that of colonial redistribution between imperial powers 
that took place in the late 19th century – as Antonio Jover noted, and Sebastian Balfour 
recalled. As Varela Ortega argued, even the very same crisis of legitimacy that the 
Restoration suffered after 1898 would not have been possible without the social, economic 
and political transformations that the same political system had fuelled in previous decades. 
Additionally, in the countries that were traditionally regarded as exemplary models of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631 Santos Juliá, Anomalía, dolor y fracaso de España, Claves de la Razón Práctica, 66 (octubre 1996), pp. 10-
21; Isabel Burdiel, Morir de éxito: el péndulo liberal y la revolución española del siglo XIX, Historia y Política, 
1999, 1, pp. 181-203. 
632 An example of this new intellectual climate were the following works: Vicente Cacho Viu, Repensar el 98, 
Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1997; Juan Pablo Fusi, España, 1808-1996. El desafío de la modernidad, Madrid, 
Espasa Calpe, 1997; Juan Pan-Montojo (ed.), Más se perdió en Cuba. España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo, 
Madrid, Alianza, 1998. An overview of the literature, in: María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, El 98 desde una 





historical development (like the United Kingdom and France), the political systems did not 
become fully democratic until the First World War, as the same author has reminded.633 
 Therefore, the view of historians that the Disaster was a national trauma has started 
being replaced, in the last two decades, with an interpretation that sees it as a sign of Spain’s 
new “drive towards modernization”, to use the expression of an influential work.634 The 
emergence of this new historical paradigm revealed a more confident attitude in the 
understanding of the recent past and was favoured by the country’s belonging to the 
European Union.635 Still, some historians – such as Antonio Elorza and Isabel Burdiel – have 
warned, without directly questioning the need for revisiting the Disaster, of the dangers of 
falling into an oscillating and now excessively optimistic understanding of Spain’s past in 
relation to Europe.636 
In my view, the historiographical revision of the Disaster of 1898 has been a fruitful 
and necessary attempt. That being said, the efforts of historians to stress the continuities that 
followed the Disaster (in opposition to the previous “dramatic” paradigm) should not lead to 
underestimating some of the historical changes that took place after it. In fact, there seems to 
be a certain tendency in emphasising that when it came to politics, little changed in the 
aftermath of 1898. Historians illustrate this point by arguing that besides the crisis of identity, 
politics did not change a great deal. Hence, and in contrast to Portugal, where the British 
Ultimatum of 1890 resulted, in the mid-term, in the overthrow of the monarchy, in Spain the 
liberal politicians arguably managed to overcome their own colonial drawback.637  An 
example of this continuity in politics would be the case of Sagasta who, despite being held 
responsible for the defeat, seized power again in 1903. The political failure of 
Regenerationist movements (like that of Joaquín Costa or José Canalejas) and the continuity 
of clientelistic practices would provide further evidence that when it came to everyday 
politics, everything remained much the same in the Restoration. 
In contrast to this view, the case of the Godó family will be used to argue that the 
Disaster of 1898 did mark a substantial shift in Restoration politics, for two reasons. The first 
one is that the Disaster became a decisive ingredient in the growing disenchantment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633 María Dolores Elizalde et al., 1898: ¿Desastre nacional o impulso modernizador?, Revista de Occidente, nº 
202-203, 1998. All the authors mentioned on this page made their contributions in this monograph. 
634 Ibidem.  
635 Rafael Núñez Florencio, El peso del pesimismo. Del 98 al desencanto, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2010, pp. 400-
411 (esp. 406). 
636 Ibidem, pp. 410-411; Isabel Burdiel, op. cit., p. 182.  
637 Hipólito de la Torre Gómez, La crisis del liberalismo (1890-1939), Ayer, n. 37, 2000 (monograph “Portugal y 




Catalan elites towards the political system. This would not only represent a substantial 
change in the attitude of these elites, but ultimately had an impact on the entire political 
system. For while the two liberal parties continued to monopolise national politics for a 
further two decades (albeit with growing difficulties), in Barcelona liberal politics suffered an 
abrupt end in 1901. From this date onwards the city never again elected a single deputy from 
either the Liberal or the Conservative parties. This situation was a watershed in the history of 
the Restoration. Second, the changes that had started taking place in Barcelona since 1901 
would be revealing of a broader European phenomenon, namely the birth of mass politics. 
While this was the result of longer-term structural transformations, the discredit of liberal 
parties in the aftermath of the Disaster provided fertile ground for new political movements 
to take root. Barcelona saw the rise of the first political party capable of mobilising the urban 
classes through new forms of discourse (namely, the Republicans of Alejandro Lerroux); as 
well as the creation of a Catalan nationalist party (the “Lliga Regionalista”), which brought 
together intellectuals, economic elites and the middle-class. The emergence of these new 
parties can hardly be understood without taking into account the deep discredit that the 
Disaster of 1898 brought to the political system. And, more importantly for the aims of this 
thesis, the discredit of liberal institutions would bring direct consequences to the pre-
eminence of traditional elites.  
The aim of this chapter will consist, therefore, in exploring the impact that the 
“Disaster” represented for liberal elites through the case study of the Godó family. The 
family will serve to evoke the discredit of liberalism in fin de siècle Europe, and to examine 
the common features that characterised this process in the Mediterranean area. Hence, in 
countries like Italy, Portugal, and Spain, but also in France, the discredit of liberal institutions 
was combined with an acute feeling of national decay. This resulted from the combination of 
different elements, like the obstacles these countries encountered in their plans of colonial 
expansion; an intellectual climate imbued with the ethnographic terminology of racial 
degeneration; and the growing exposure of corruption in public. If these were features 
common to the Mediterranean region, the historiography has paid little attention to the role 
newspaper editors played in them. As this chapter will show, on some occasions editors were 
held liable for the “national decay” and at the same time were seen as potential saviours. This 
double condition stemmed from the growing awareness of the power of the press, and fuelled 
a series of controversies on the role journalism should play in the new mass society. The 
Godó’s case will be used to examine these debates and thus approach the crisis of liberal 




The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part will analyse the relation between 
the Disaster and the press. The behaviour of newspapers during the Spanish-American War 
resulted in public controversies where the crisis of national identity became entwined with a 
debate on the changes that journalism was undergoing at the time. The outcome was a 
prolific debate about the ideal relationship between journalists and the political system. The 
second part will focus on the Godó’s response to the loss of empire. In the aftermath of the 
war a new political context emerged in Catalonia, and a substantial number of elites sought to 
redefine their relation with central government. This implied the political realignment of 
many of La Vanguardia’s readers, and the Godó family saw this situation aggravated by a 
series of internal circumstances.638 The result was the arrival on the scene of a new 
generation who faced the challenge of adapting to this difficult new context. The last part will 
focus on the proposals the Godó family made through the press to renew the political system. 
These proposals will be put in contrast with another dynasty of press editors from Madrid: the 
Gasset family. This will provide the case of two families who shared an affiliation to liberal 
parties, and who were also the editors of Barcelona and Madrid’s top-selling newspapers, 
respectively. Thus their cases will provide a comparative perspective about the role 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 Namely, the passing away of the first generation, represented by the brothers Bartolomé (1839-1894) and 
Carlos Godó (1834-1897), and the crisis of the business dedicated to exporting jute bags to the Spanish colonies 




5.1. THE ‘DISASTER’ AND THE PRESS 
 
In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War (1898), the press went from 
supporting the patriotic discourse to searching for those responsible for the defeat. First and 
foremost, Sagasta and the Liberal government were blamed for the war and the humiliation 
the peace Treaty of Paris represented.639 The same critique was soon extended to the whole 
political class – and to the army.640 Spain had not only lost its centuries-long presence in the 
Antilles and in South-East Asia, but it did so after an embarrassing defeat. As a result the 
country fell into an atmosphere of widespread pessimism where liberal elites were held 
responsible. Thus, while the war had been successful in uniting Spaniards against a common 
enemy, now its outcome was intensely felt in public debates.  
 Yet far from being a singularity, Spain’s intellectual climate was evocative of the 
insecurity that pervaded European culture at the time. In contrast to the mid-19th-century 
confidence in progress through reason and material development, the late 19th century was a 
period suffused with moral decay.641 This pessimism was related to a conjunction of 
historical events, like the consequences of economic development (growth of cities, problems 
of alcoholism, prostitution, criminality); and a series of new controversies that raised tensions 
in society (like the clash between capital and labour, the rise of nationalism, and religious 
controversies). The new figure of the intellectual would be decisive in pervading everyday 
politics with this language of pessimism and decay. Hence, medical and biological 
terminology became part of the vocabulary that intellectuals contributed to popularise in the 
discourse of the nation.642 
 If pessimism was a typical feature of fin de siècle Europe, a series of elements further 
aggravated the intensity of this feeling in the Mediterranean region. The countries of this area 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 Some demonstrations even took place in front of the house of the prime minister, with shouts of “Muera 
Sagasta” and “Abajo el Gobierno!”. On the responsibility of Sagasta in the Disaster, and the demonstrations 
mentioned, see: José Luis Ollero Vallés, De “Viejo Pastor” a “chivo expiatorio”: Sagasta y el 98, Berceo, Nº 
135, 1998, pp. 25-38. 
640 As one newspaper noted: “Cuando en presencia de las desventuras actuales quiera España poner los ojos, la 
esperanza en lo porvenir, se encontrará con que continúan los mismos hombres, y en vigor de las mismas 
prácticas a quienes se debe la serie de desastres iniciada en Baire el 24 de febrero de 1895 y cerrada, por el 
momento, en Washington, el 12 de agosto de 1898”. El Liberal, 14/08/1898, quoted in: Sara Núñez de Prado y 
Clavell, “La prensa y la opinión pública española en torno al “Desastre” ”, Juan Pablo Fusi y Antonio Niño 
(eds.), Antes del “Desastre”: Orígenes y antecedentes de la crisis del 98, Madrid, UCM, 1996, p. 458. 
641 Daniel Pick, Faces of Degeneration. A European disorder, c. 1848-1918, Cambridge, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989; Arthur Herman, The Idea of Decline in Western History, New York, Free Press, 1997 
(esp. Chapter 4: “Degeneration”); Luisa Mangoni, Una crisi fine secolo: la cultura italiana e la Francia fra 
Otto e Novecento, Torino, Einaudi, 1985. 
642 Ibidem; Robert A. Nye, Crime, madness and politics in Modern France. The medical concept of national 




experienced a series of setbacks in their colonial ambitions.643 Uncertainty about their future 
as colonial powers became common to all these countries at a time when international 
relations were interpreted through the lens of Social Darwinism. Evidence of corruption 
intensified the feeling of crisis in these countries (e.g., the disclosure of successive scandals 
in France, and a growing criticism of clientelist practices in Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and 
contributed to discredit the parliamentary system.644 As Eugen Weber noted, even in France – 
where the economic situation at the turn of the century was in a favourable condition – an 
atmosphere of doom pervaded.645 Contemporaries would often see in this situation the 
decadence of the Latin race.646 
 Though moral decay was a widespread feeling in the Mediterranean, national 
peculiarities nevertheless remained important. Besides the chronological coincidence, 
colonial setbacks were experienced differently in each country. In the case of Italy, the 
consequence of the defeat in Adowa (1896) was the immediate resignation of Prime Minister 
Francesco Crispi. In Portugal the British Ultimatum (1890) had longer-term consequences in 
domestic politics, and became one of the factors that contributed to the discredit of the 
monarchy and to its toppling in 1910.647 In the case of Spain, the Restoration survived the 
“Disaster” of 1898, but a new political climate resulted from it. The most important feature of 
this new scenario was the discredit of liberal elites and the intense criticism of the method 
that privileged their position: caciquismo.  
 Indeed, the country fell into a profound process of national introspection where 
electoral corruption was blamed for all the nation’s ills, and especially for alienating ordinary 
people from the political system. In an expression that gained currency, Spain was described 
as a body that had “lost its pulse”: while liberal elites manipulated public office for their own 
benefit, the majority of the country remained passive. Although this type of criticism against 
the caciquismo of liberal elites was not new, the Disaster of 1898 brought it to the fore in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 France’s crisis in Fashoda, 1898; Italy’s defeat in Adowa, 1896; the British ‘ultimatum’ to Portugal, 1890; 
Spain’s loss of empire, 1898. 
644 This question will be studied in further detail in subsequent chapters. 
645 Eugene Weber, France, Fin de Siècle, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 3. 
646 Examples of these were: Giuseppe Sergi, Origine e diffusione della stirpe mediterranea, 1895; and Edmond 
Demolins, A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?, 1899. Lily Litvak, Latinos y anglosajones: orígenes de 
una polémica, Barcelona, Puvill, 1980. 
647 Hipólito de la Torre, op. cit.; Joâo Medina, A crise colonial dos anos novemta em Portugal e Espanha e as 
suas consecuencias para os dos paises ibericos (1890-1898), Estudo de historia comparada, Hipólito de la Torre 




public debate. 648  The work of different intellectuals, like Joaquin Costa, decisively 
contributed to spreading this criticism. According to Costa, Spain’s problem was not a 
parliamentary regime where corruption was widespread, but rather that corruption made up 
the whole political system, from which a small “oligarchy” benefited. In his view, if the 
denouncing of fraudulent practices had had little effect until then it was because rather than 
being a peculiarity, caciquismo constituted the structural feature of the political system.649  
 Costa is arguably the most quoted intellectual of “regeneracionismo”, especially in the 
study of caciquismo, and his analyses have exerted a strong influence on modern 
historians.650 However, the references Costa made to the press when studying caciquismo 
have largely gone unnoticed. In fact, of the large number of testimonies he gathered to write 
his work,651 several of them held the newspapers responsible for the persistence of fraudulent 
elections. The common view among these contemporaries was the impression that 
newspapers were misguiding the public during the Spanish-American War. Instead of 
alerting readers to the risks of fighting against the United States, the newspapers took 
advantage of the situation by fostering jingoism and selling more copies. If this behaviour of 
the press was regarded as a lack of “honesty”, the same contemporaries shared the belief that 
the problem stemmed from the tight links that existed between journalists and liberal elites. 
In their eagerness to reap the benefits of power – in the form of job recommendations, 
political positions and other material rewards – journalists had abandoned their neutrality and 
put themselves at the service of liberal politicians. 652  In so doing, journalists were 
contributing to sustaining the fraudulent nature of the political system and to widening the 
gap between the real and the legal country.653 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 An example of early criticism towards caciquismo was the book written by the Republican Federalist Valentí 
Almirall, entitled España tal como es, Barcelona, Anthropos, 1983 [1st edition printed in Paris, in 1886]. See 
also: Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurúa y Antonio Niño Rodríguez (eds.), op. cit. 
649 Joaquín Costa, Oligarquía y caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España: urgencia y modo de 
cambiarla, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2011 [first ed. 1902], pp. 72-73. Emphasis added. 
650 See the Introduction. 
651 Costa had set up a massive survey and as many as 172 of the country’s more distinguished people 
participated, upon which Costa would build his analysis. The participants belonged to a wide range of positions 
(intellectuals, politicians, lawyers, etc.) and ideological leanings (liberals, republicans, Catholics, nationalists, 
etc.). Costa’s conclusions were presented in public at the Ateneo of Madrid in the first months of 1901, and were 
later printed as a book containing more than 700 pages. Juan Varela Ortega, “Memoria de la sección”, Ibidem, 
p. 15. 
652 “(...) que se hiciera como sabemos todos que no se hacen los periódicos hoy, que se distinguiese por su 
veracidad y honradez, que no halagase al público para vender muchos ejemplares, que no persiguiera al anuncio, 
que priva de la libertad de hablar y juzgar muchas cosas, o la subvención, o el acta de diputado, o la credencial 
del ministro para su director, o el empleo para el reporter, o hasta la butaca del teatro.” Ibidem, p. 216. 
653 “Por halagar unas veces al público, de quien viven, y otras veces a los hombres públicos, con quien viven, 




 The above-noted testimonies reaffirmed Costa’s conviction that as well as liberal 
elites, another oligarchy existed: the “oligarquía periodística” (“press oligarchy”). This was 
the expression he coined to refer to a handful of influential journalists who were subject to 
the commands of liberal politicians, and who were ultimately responsible for building 
opinion.654 The subjugation of journalists by politicians was particularly troublesome in 
Costa’s view, because in a largely rural and backward country like Spain (which he referred 
to as a “semi-African country”), the people’s lack of education made the influence of 
newspapers all the more important – and therefore more dangerous, if their power was not 
used in a responsible manner. Thus, in the view of this intellectual, the influence of 
newspapers did not stem solely from their circulation, but also from the reader’s incapacity to 
discern news content. The problem was that journalists did not use this influence to disclose 
caciquismo in public, but rather to back the fraudulent illusion of elections. The Restoration 
was an utter fantasy that journalists contributed to maintain in exchange for political payoffs. 
As a result of this lack of sincerity among journalists, Costa concluded that Spain’s recovery 
would never be achieved if the renewal of the political elite was not coupled with a through 
renewal of the press.655 
 The comments of Costa and his contemporaries are of particular value because they 
touch upon one of the distinctive features of the press in southern Europe: its tight links with 
politics. Indeed, while the transition from a partisan press model towards a commercial and 
independent one was a common trend to all Western countries during the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the pace and intensity of this historical process differed considerably between 
geographic areas.656 From the perspective of comparative media studies, Daniel Hallin and 
Paolo Mancini have shown that the tight links between newspapers and parties (referred to in 
the literature as “political parallelism”) was indeed a distinctive feature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
con regularidad perfecta, con la legislación y las prácticas de los pueblos libres y modernos, mientras debajo de 
ese lienzo pintado impera la arbitrariedad.” Ibidem, p. 217. 
654 “Y así ha resultado que eso que llamamos opinión no tiene su fuente en la conciencia de la nación, sino que 
se forma en la redacción de dos o tres periódicos; y como, por otra parte, esas redacciones no son, en lo general, 
cuerpos de tutores, patriciado natural, sino, al igual de la plana mayor de las facciones, cuerpos de oligarcas y de 
intérpretes y adscritos suyos (...) el vasallaje político del gobernante resulta doblado por el vasallaje teórico del 
periodista (...)”. Ibidem, pp. 217-218. 
655 “La rehabilitación nacional, he dicho, será imposible, aun dando que nos asista el factor tiempo, con los 
gobernantes de los últimos veinticinco años en el poder: ahora añado que sería también imposible, aun jubilados 
ellos y sustituidos por otros nuevos inculpables y preparados para la gobernación, si hubieran de subsistir las 
actuales oligarquías periodísticas. La renovación de la prensa se impone como otra condición sine qua non.” 
Ibidem, pp. 218-219. 
656 Stephen E. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the political press in Britain, London, Hamilton, 1981, 2 vol.; Rogério 
Santos, O Jornalismo na Transiçao do Século XIX para o XX. O Caso do Diário Novidades (1885-1913), Media 




Mediterranean.657 Thus, and in contrast to countries like England and the United States, 
where the autonomy of journalists was established as an ethical code, in countries like Italy 
or Spain the professionalisation of journalism took longer. Yet far from being a deviance 
from the alleged mission of the press,658 these differences between “media systems” stemmed 
from alternative patterns of historical development. These patterns resulted from a 
combination of structural features (economic development, urbanisation and education 
levels) with the shaping of different journalistic cultures in each “media system”. Whereas in 
“Anglo-Saxon” countries autonomous and impartial reporting was expected of journalists, in 
European countries – and especially Mediterranean ones – comment and analysis of news 
remained important features of journalism.659 
 The Disaster of 1898 represents, in this respect, a valuable opportunity for the aims of 
this thesis to integrate media studies and historical analysis. The key role played by the press 
in popularising the war increased awareness among contemporaries about the power of the 
media. This awareness resulted in a rich controversy that sheds light on how the journalistic 
culture was being re-defined, and how the case of other countries was often taken into 
account in this process. Indeed, Costa demonstrated his awareness about the existence of 
different journalist practices in other countries when he contrasted what he saw as the 
irresponsible behaviour of the Spanish press with England, where in his view newspapers 
acted according to the “general interest”.660 Moreover, the work of Costa is an illustrative 
example of how the redefinition of journalistic culture was entangled with the crisis of liberal 
politics: while contemporaries saw the new commercial press as a pernicious influence for 
society, at the same time they saw it as a potentially powerful agent of national recovery if it 
was transformed appropriately.661  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
657 Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and 
Politics, Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 98. 
658 According to the liberal tradition, the constitutional mission of the press is to act as the watchdog of 
democracy. This “ideal function” has usually led media scholars to see divergent patterns of historical 
development (e.g. Mediterranean countries) as a sign of “failure”. See the Introduction to this thesis. 
659 As D. Hallin and P. Mancini have noted: “By the late nineteenth century a contrasting model of political 
journalism was beginning to emerge, in which the journalist was seen as a neutral arbiter of political 
communication, standing apart from particular interests and causes, providing information and analysis 
“uncolored” by partisanship. This was often connected with the development of a commercial press” (...). By 
contrast, “(...) To most continental European journalists in this period analysis and commentary were absolutely 
central to the function of the journalist”. Ibidem, p. 29 and p. 67, respectively. 
660 Speaking about the Spanish newspapers, Costa noted bitterly: “(...) sería preciso que fueran lo que son, 
pongo por caso, en Inglaterra, cuna de la institución: cosa pública, cosa de la nación, que la paga, en vez de ser 
una propiedad privada, para ser exclusivo provecho del dueño, regida por las leyes del monopolio y de la oferta 
y el pedido como otra empresa cualquiera.” Joaquín Costa, op. cit., p. 218. 
661 “Exalta el señor Unamuno la misión de la prensa periódica, considerándola como uno de los dos agentes más 
eficaces de la europeización, mediante el cual empieza a formarse una conciencia pública; más para ello 




 Furthermore, besides Costa other contemporaries devoted their attention to examining 
the changes in the press and how they affected society. One of them was Ramiro de Maeztu 
(1874-1936), one of the writers of the “Generación del 98”.662 Maeztu harshly criticised the 
press for its obsession with apportioning blame for the Disaster without assuming its own 
responsibility for the defeat. In response to this, Maeztu dedicated various articles to studying 
the changing relations between the press and politics.663 In his view the introduction of the 
“factory system” – understood as the transition from a partisan model towards a commercial 
one – led newspapers to abandon one of their traditional duties: the duty of orienting 
opinion.664    
 Hence, Maeztu considered that the emphasis that newspapers now placed on 
providing information (which he referred to as “menchetismo”, in reference to the first news 
agency established in the country) was not enough.665 In his view, the main limitations of the 
new informative press was the lack of effort it put into commenting on and balancing news; 
this being a limitation that the traditional partisan press supposedly did not have.666 For 
Maeztu, journalists should not limit themselves to providing “facts”, but also had to ponder 
them for their readers. In his opinion this had been the main reason for the loss of the 
colonies. The “people” had forgotten their civic duties as a result of the pernicious influence 
of newspapers, which accustomed them to what he called “gobierno por la prensa” 
(“government by the press”). Therefore, Maeztu concluded that:  
 
“A mi juicio el delito, el crimen de la prensa consiste, no en haberse equivocado al 
juzgar belicosa a la nación, sino en un absoluto incumplimiento de alguno de sus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cuenta ese también el señor Sanz y Escartín: ‘que nuestra prensa, más poderosa que en parte alguna quí donde 
los espíritus han perdido el hábito del propio discurso y aceptan insconscientemente el ajeno, se penetre de sus 
responsabilidades y de que en sus manos está la vida o la muerte de la nación’.” Ibidem, p. 216. 
662 Name given to an intellectual movement that emerged in Spain in response to the loss of the colonies. 
Maeztu would be one of its most conspicuous representatives, together with other names like Azorín, Miguel de 
Unamuno and Pio Baroja. See: Pedro Laín Entralgo, La generación del 98, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1997. 
663 “Pues bien, hablemos de responsabilidades, ya que las responsabilidades constituyen la obsesión, la 
monomanía y el delirio de cuantos escriben fondos en los diarios y de cuantos peroran en los cafés, sobre las 
cosas de la guerra. Hablemos de responsabilidades. (...) ¡Depuremos las responsabilidades!... Á las órdenes de 
ustedes, señores periodistas. Pero veamos, ante todo, si somos nosotros los más autorizados para lanzar la 
primera piedra... ¿Por qué no habíamos previsto la trascendencia de las insurrecciones coloniales? (...)”. 
“Responsabilidades”, Ramiro de Maeztu, Hacia otra España, Barcelona, Editorial Planeta DeAgostini, 2011 [1st 
ed. in 1899], p. 141. Maeztu had a good knowledge of the Spanish-American War, both from his experience as a 
soldier (posted in Mallorca) and knowledge of Cuba, where he had spent part of his childhood.  
664 It must be noted that Maeztu used the English expression “factory system”.  
665 This term referred to Francisco Peris Mencheta, who had founded the Mencheta news agency. Another 
synonym that contemporaries used to refer to the commercial press was “prensa industrial”. 
666 “Esa misma intensificación de la vida moderna, que hizo al público apartarse de los periódicos doctrinarios y 
preferir aquellos otros que le enteraran de cuanto ocurriera de notable, le llevó a demandarles el comentario de 




deberes, especialmente del deber de información. (...) ¿dónde están esas informaciones 
meticulosas, imparciales, dignas, con que la prensa de otros países ilustra a la opinión 
respecto de los asuntos que afectan a la vida nacional?”.667 
 
Another intellectual who made similar observations on the changes in the press, 
although from Barcelona’s point of view, was the journalist Teodor Baró Sureda (1843-
1916).668 Baró was the director of La Crónica de Cataluña (the organ of the Liberal Party in 
Barcelona) and one of the most prominent journalists in this city. In contrast to the opinion of 
Maeztu, who considered that the new commercial press contributed to diminishing the civic 
culture of Spaniards, Baró believed that commercial newspapers were the living image of the 
society for which they were printed. As Baró noted:  
 
“De la prensa no hay quien no reniegue, pero a reserva de acudir a ella y de ella servirse, 
y tan solicitada se han visto por el interés ajeno que ha acabado por atender al propio, 
convirtiéndose el periódico en una empresa industrial, atenta a la prosperidad del negocio, que 
consiste en dar género que tenga fácil colocación en el mercado de la curiosidad y en el de las 
pasiones, halagando éstas, excitando aquélla y falsificando la mercancia. Tal transformación 
revela que nuestra sociedad deja mucho que desear, porque el periódico refleja su manera de 
ser.” 669 
 
 Baró thus considered that in contrast to the partisan press, which had an ideal based 
on opinion formation, the profit-orientation of the new commercial press placed journalists at 
the service of their readers, whatever their taste. As a result of this change in the raison d’être 
of journalists, the press content was transformed. Journalists now focused on delivering the 
shallow and sensationalist news that the public was eager to read. In this regard, Baró’s 
opinion was probably influenced by his former role as director of the Crónica de Cataluña, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667 Maeztu put the French press as an example the Spanish press should imitate. Ramiro de Maeztu, op.cit., p. 
155. Italics in the original. [E. T.]: “To my eyes the worst crime of the press has not consisted in judging the 
nation as being favour to war, but has rather been its default in fulfilling any of its duties, and especially the duty 
of information. (...) where are those meticulous reports, impartial, always fair, with which the press in other 
countries illustrates opinio in regards to what concerns the national life?”. 
668 In 1906, Baró replaced Mañé i Flaquer as the director of El Diario de Barcelona, one of the most respected 
newspapers in the city. Unfortunately, there is little information available about Baró. The information here 
provided, in: El Matí, 07/06/1936, p. 6. 
669 Teodoro Baró, Discursos leídos en la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona en la recepción pública 
de D. Teodoro Baró el día 23 de noviembre de 1902, Barcelona, Casa Provincial de Caridad, 1902, p. 7. 
Document located at the Biblioteca de Catalunya (Barcelona), ref. 07-4-C 1/7. [E. T.]: “Everyone complains 
about the press, but nobody dares to turn it down [;] to the point that the press has been turned into an industry, 
based on profits, and which consists in publishing anything that it is easily sold in the market of curiosity and of 
passions, exciting them and falsifying things. Such transformation reveals that our society still leaves a great 




partisan newspaper in which he defended the political function of journalism. Still, what 
makes Baró’s opinions all the more valuable is that his comments on the commercial press 
were not limited to journalism but evoked the broader transformation of society. His views 
reflected on the rise of the new mass society, a phenomenon that was particularly acute in the 
city where he lived, Barcelona.  
 Indeed, by the time Baró examined the changes in the press Barcelona was 
experiencing radical transformations. The industrial tradition of the city had intensified at the 
turn of the new century. Attracted by the expansion of the manufacture industry and the crisis 
in agriculture, regular flows of immigrants from rural Catalonia had arrived in Barcelona. 
Additionally, in 1897 a series of neighbouring towns were attached to Barcelona and 
multiplied its number of inhabitants. From 334,400 people in 1897, the population grew to 
533,000 in 1900; to 587,000 in 1910; and to 710,000 in 1920. Thus the population had more 
than doubled between 1897 and 1920.670 This demographic growth fostered the redefinition 
of the urban space. While the well-off people moved to the new avenues of “Passeig de 
Gràcia” and “Rambla Catalunya”, the old part of the city and the new towns attached to 
Barcelona in 1897 (like Gràcia and Poblenou) became the dwelling places of a growing 
working class. This redefinition of urban space also had an impact on the city’s cultural life: 
“El Paralelo” emerged as the new leisure area of popular culture, while “La Rambla” lost its 
reputation as an affluent avenue.  
 The developments of new journalistic practices, like yellow journalism, and the new 
commercial orientation contributed to give new visibility to old urban problems, like 
prostitution, begging and alcoholism.671 The press thus acted as an active agent in defining 
the conditions of public debate. Baró’s observations reveal a negative perception about these 
transformations of the press, especially in the case of the commercial newspapers. The loss of 
the colonies provided him with the opportunity to accuse commercial newspapers of fuelling 
the lower passions of the people and of having a negative impact on public morality. Still, 
Baró absolved journalists for their new situation. After all, many of them were no longer at 
the service of a political community, as had traditionally been the case of the partisan press; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 The sudden growth of Barcelona’s population at the turn of the century was linked to the above-mentioned 
attachment, in 1897, of the neighbouring towns of Gràcia, Sant Martí de Provençals, Sant Andreu de Palomar, 
San Gervasi de Cassoles, Santes and Les Corts. Pere Gabriel, “Espacio urbano y articulación política popular en 
Barcelona, 1890-1923”, in José Luis García Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la modernización de España. Los 
decenios interseculares, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1992, p. 61. 
671 Rafael Alcaide González, Inmigración y marginación: prostitución y mendicidad en la ciudad de Barcelona a 
finales del siglo XIX. Una comparación con la actualidad, Scripta Nova: Revista electrónica de geografía y 




but were now at the service of the public.672 In their new function, journalists were but mere 
servants of the “low tastes” of the masses.673  
 If the Spanish-American War increased the contemporary awareness about changes in 
journalism and how they affected society, the war also had a direct impact for the future of 
many newspapers. Their decisive contribution to spreading patriotic fervour during the war 
(as Chapter 4 showed) contributed to their discredit in its aftermath. Most of newspapers 
suffered a loss of readers that led contemporaries and journalists alike to talk of a “crisis of 
public confidence”. This crisis became particularly acute in Spain’s capital, to the point that 
referring to the “crisis of Madrid’s press” (“crisis de la prensa madrileña”) became 
commonplace among journalists at the time.674 As the director of La Correspondencia de 
España wrote, the “lack of public confidence” in the press was still felt intensely in Madrid 
as late as 1906: 
 
“La opinión es totalmente hostil a la Prensa y en ella tiene aún más desconfianza que 
en el resto de las clases sociales. Lee los diarios por necesidad de conocer lo que en el 
mundo pasa, pero no los lee con convicción como antes, a ciegas. Pasó esa época en que 
los lectores ‘pensaban como su diario’, y ha sido reemplazada por otra en la cual los 
lectores, o desdeñan la opinión del periódico, o por lo menos de ella desconfían, 
creyendo que es interesada, egoísta o tendenciosa. Y ésta, aunque muy amarga, es la 
triste verdad. Creer otra cosa es vivir en el limbo. Y negar que el público tiene razón para 
desconfiar sería cándido, pues la Prensa tuvo la mayor parte de culpa de cuanto nos 
sucedió en años no lejanos y no poca de lo que ahora nos acontece.”675 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672 As Baró rethorically asked in relation to the behaviour of the press during the Spanish-American War: “¿por 
qué la prensa no encauzó la opinión extraviada, en vez de dejarse arrastrar por ella? La respuesta está en la 
transformación que ha sufrido en el mundo entero. Antes el periódico se fundaba en defensa de una idea, 
mientras que ahora se ha convertido en una empresa industrial, que se explota como otro negocio cualquiera.” 
Teodoro Baró, op. cit., p. 10. 
673 As Baró put it: “¿Tiene el periodista la culpa de que un torero inflame los entusiasmos de la masa, a quien 
nada dicen los grandes genios, ni de que no emocione la muerte de un hombre eminente al mismo público que 
en ingente muchedumbre acompaña el cadáver de un diestro (...)?”. Ibidem, pp. 9-10. 
674 “No es un secreto, pues, el que descubrimos diciendo que las tiradas de los rotativos bajan, desde hace algún 
tiempo, lentamente e incesantemente (...) es como si a los lectores de los periódicos de Madrid les fuese 
acometiendo, uno a uno, un cansancio, una fatiga de prosa periodística, y uno a uno fueran dejando el diario que 
antes les apasionaba. En las administraciones de nuestros grandes periódicos, y en las redacciones también, se 
ha cristalizado este estado morboso en una frase: hay crisis de público, se dice.” El Mundo, 08/06/1905, quoted 
in María Dolores Sáiz y María Cruz Seoane, Historia del periodismo en España, vol. 3. “El siglo XX: 1898-
1936”, Madrid, Alianza, p. 69.  
675  La Correspondencia de España, 07/05/1906. Quoted in Pedro Pedro Gómez Aparicio, Historia del 
periodismo español, Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1974, p. 72. [E. T.]: “The [general] opinion is completely hostile 
to the Press and the mistrust towards it is greater than towards any other social class. [The people] read 
newspapers for the need of knowing what is going on in the world, but does no longer read them in blind faith, 
as it was customarily. The moment has reached an end when readers “thought as their newspaper do”, and this 




 The situation described above reveals that the popularity the press reached during the 
Spanish-American War was not free from constraints. The bitter outcome became a lesson 
for many readers to differentiate between “printed” and “public opinion”. Moreover, the 
above-quoted testimony challenges the view that some elites (like Joaquín Costa, Maeztu and 
Baró) had of readers as being vulnerable to the manipulation of editors. Indeed, the crisis of 
Madrid’s press provides empirical evidence that communication was not a top-down process, 
where the people were passive consumers, but shows that readers possessed the capacity to 
condition the newspapers’ content through their autonomy to buy one newspaper over 
another. The historical context certainly contributed to these change in readers’ habits (e.g. 
the widespread feeling of moral decline resulting from losing the colonies) and to the 
consequences that resulted from it. Different newspapers, like El Nacional, El Correo, El 
Globo, El Tiempo, La Publicidad, Los Debates and El Resumen, were forced to close due to 
the fall in readers, while some other turned into “diarios sapo” – this being the Spanish 
expression used to refer to those newspapers whose financial instability led them to an erratic 
existence: they were published one day, only to suddenly disappear the next.676  
 The majority of the examples given above corresponded to partisan newspapers. The 
lower number of sales they usually had (which stemmed from having an audience limited to 
the members of a political community) made them more vulnerable to the loss of readers. 
Additionally, their political orientation hindered the attempts to adopt a profit orientation 
based on sales revenues (even if exceptions existed).677 Commercial papers, in contrast, 
seemed to cope with the crisis better than their counterparts, even if their sales also fell 
considerably (by approximately one third of the total).678 This was the case, for instance, of 
El Liberal, La Correspondencia de España and El Heraldo de Madrid, and also of El 
Imparcial, by then the top-selling newspaper in the country.679  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mistrust towards it, believing that their opinion is selfish or obeys to private interests. And this, no matter how 
sad is, is the sad truth. (...)” 
676 “Sapo” means “toad” in English. Ibidem, p. 79. 
677 One of these exceptions was the case of La Publicidad, a commercial-oriented newspaper that maintained a 
strong Republican orientation and remained one of the top-selling newspapers in Barcelona. Yet contrary to the 
case of La Publicidad, the majority of the partisan press linked their financial viability to subsidies from parties; 
and negative sales could only be compensated with political payoffs. The early origins of La Vanguardia (see 
Chapter 1) is an example of this. 
678 Ibidem. Some newspapers even made a more pessimistic analysis, and estimated the fall of sales in the 40% 
of the total: Manuel Ortega Gasset, El Imparcial. Biografía de un gran periódico español, Zaragoza, Librería 
General, 1956, p. 167. Quoted in: Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán, Prensa y política en la España de la Restauración, 
Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1999, p. 137. 
679 J. Sánchez Illán, op. cit., p. 137; and María Cruz Seoane & María Dolores Sáiz, op. cit., p. 72. To a certain 
extent this fall in the figures was also the flipside of the same growth newspapers experienced during the war 




5.2. ‘LA VANGUARDIA’ AND THE REGENERATIONIST MOVEMENT 
 
 At this point we might ask to what extent the crisis of the press was exclusive to 
Madrid? How did the press in other parts of the country experience the loss of empire? And 
more importantly, how was the Godó family affected by the widespread criticism of the 
caciquismo of liberal elites, and how did those elites respond in the face of it?   
 The Godó family confronted the Disaster of 1898 from a critical position. During the 
war the family’s most visible members had passed away. Bartolomé Godó died in 1895 
following a long disease that had confined him to his bed for three years, while his brother 
Carlos died in 1897 in the country house he owned in the coastal town of Teià, named 
“Manso Dalmau”. The deaths of the two brothers were recorded, as was customary at the 
time, in obituaries published in the press. In many of these homages the founding of La 
Vanguardia and the close links with Igualada became two recurrent elements for which the 
Godó brothers were remembered. Appealing to this tradition would be central to the second 
generation of this family, especially when the need came for them to legitimise their position 
in public.680 
 In the shorter term, however, the family faced more pressing needs. To start with, was 
the negative impact the loss of the colonies had for the jute sack business. La Vanguardia had 
insistently campaigned in the past on the dangers of losing the protected market of the 
colonies, and these fears confirmed once the war ended. As early as July 1898 numerous 
factories closed and many jobs were lost (an estimated 4,000 in Barcelona alone). The 
Godó’s factory was among those that closed down.681 The lack of private correspondence 
makes it very difficult to reconstruct these events, yet there is still evidence that the closing of 
the factory was directly linked to the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The man who made the 
decision to do so was Ramón Godó Lallana (Bilbao, 11/05/1864 - Barcelona, 20/09/1931). 
He was the only male son of Carlos and he had inherited the family textile business.682 The 
reasons he closed the factory were simple: the loss of the colonies meant the end of the tariffs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680 See Chapters 6 and 8. 
681 “Gran número de comisiones obreras que carecen de trabajo han visitado al alcalde con objeto de rogarle les 
facilite trabajo. (...) Anúnciase el próximo cierre de una fábrica de yute propiedad del Sr. Godó”. La Época, 
15/07/1898, p. 3. See also: Dórico, "Cierre de fábricas", El País, 28/07/1898, p. 2.  
682 On 8 October 1897 Carlos Godó’s widow and his son divided the inheritance between them. Initially Ramón 
assumed the textile business, while his mother (Antonia Lallana) temporarily took charge of La Vanguardia 
(which by then had an estimated value of 100,000 pesetas). Arxiu Històric de Protocols de Barcelona (AHPB), 




protecting Spanish exports. In the face of this new situation the Godó’s business was unable 
to compete with the new major actor in the global jute trade: the city of Calcutta (India).683 
  The case of the Godó family thus sheds light on the economic consequences of the 
Disaster. Between 1897 and 1898 the colonies went from representing the 30% of the total 
Spanish exports to only 8.3%.684 But contrary to what these figures might suggest at first 
sight, the colonial loss did not result in an economic catastrophe. Economic historians have 
provided wide evidence that the Spanish economy overcame the end of the empire. In some 
aspects, it even acted as a stimulus that contributed to the economic integration of this 
country to European standards.685 In this regard, the Godó family were an example of those 
elites who managed to overcome the initial downturn. Ramón Godó started replacing the 
manufacturing of jute bags with the manufacturing of other fabrics made of jute, like cloth, 
carpets, and ropes. The lack of historical sources makes explaining this business re-
orientation difficult, but, if we are to trust what little information is available, Godó seemed 
to have succeeded in this attempt. Hence, in 1900 – that is to say, only two years after the war 
– his new activity employed as many as 1,800 workers.686  
 Besides the business in the jute industry, the deaths of both the Godó brothers also left 
La Vanguardia without an owner. The family’s response to this situation was slightly 
different: on this occasion Carlos Godó’s widow, Antonia Lallana, became the new owner of 
the newspaper. 687  The case of Antonia Lallana was a very singular scenario: in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
683 “(...) Este último obstáculo presentado á la casa Godó, le hace cerrar la gran fábrica de tejidos de yute. 
Efectivamente, la insurrección de las colonias, primero, comienza á entorpecer y á disminuir la exportación del 
saquerío, y luego la pérdida total de las Antillas trae consigo el cierre de la importante manufactura de tejidos, 
que producía diariamente de 10 á 12.000 sacos. Y no es que el comercio de nuestras antiguas islas no demande 
actualmente grandes partidas de sacos, sino que á la industria española de tejidos de yute le es imposible, desde 
que nos quedamos sin colonias, sostener la competencia económica con sus similares de la India. Es increíble la 
baratura verdaderamente inverosímil, con que son exportados á todos los mercados del mundo los tejidos de 
yute fabricados en la India.” El Liberal, 14/02/1900, p. 2. 
684 “El atraso económico y la regeneración”, Juan Pan-Montojo (ed.), Más se perdió en Cuba. España, 1898 y la 
crisis de fin de siglo, Madrid, Alianza, 1998. p. 285. 
685 Historians have put forward various arguments to support this statement: the war provoked the repatriation of 
a large number of capitals; the end of the war effort (which had annually consumed the equivalent of two years 
of Spain’s GDP) relieved public expenditure; while alternative markets were found to compensate the loss of the 
colonies (especially in South-America). See: Ibidem, esp. pp. 286-288. 
686 During the Paris World Fair of 1900, one newspaper referred to Godó’s new business orientation in the 
following terms: “(...) Al frente de la industria de que nos ocupamos, con motivo de la próxima Exposición, se 
hallan actualmente los Sres. D. Ramón Godó, hijo de D. Carlos, y D. José Batlló. No solamente persiguen estos 
dos jóvenes el objetivo de proseguir la buena marcha de las fábricas de yute; tienen además grande entusiasmos 
por su negocio, ideas nuevas, proyectos casi terminados para imprimir á sus manufacturas un carácter 
progresivo, un movimiento de avance; tienen en estudio, en fin, la producción de nuevos artículos, que 
compensa, de una manera completa y hasta con creces, la pérdida del mercado de nuestras colonias, que paralizó 
la fabricación de tejidos de yute.” El Liberal, 14/02/1900, p. 2. 
687 As already noted, this was the solution she agreed with her son Ramón Godó Lallana after her husband’s 




overwhelmingly male world of journalism, the top-selling newspaper in Barcelona was now 
in the hands of a woman. Even though this was a short-lived affair (her son Ramón took 
command of La Vanguardia in 1899) the case of Antonia sheds light on the inner functioning 
of this newspaper. As Carlos’ widow, she signed an agreement with the current editor 
(Modesto Sánchez Ortiz) in which they established the conditions under which the newspaper 
would operate. This contract – one of the very few documents that has survived from La 
Vanguardia’s historical archive – granted ample attributions to Sánchez Ortiz and rewarded 
him with a generous salary of 625 pesetas, plus 25% of the net profits.688 These favourable 
conditions — especially if compared with the average salary journalists perceived in 
Barcelona—689 were aimed at securing the continuing services of the man who had designed 
the successful reform plans of 1888. However, despite the wide power of management 
conceded to the editor, Antonia Lallana retained for herself one single responsibility that was 
of paramount importance: the capacity to dictate La Vanguardia’s political orientation.690 
 Indeed, the Godó family were never a dynasty of journalists strictu sensu. None of 
their members ever signed a single article in the newspaper they owned. The family saw 
journalism not as a vocation, but rather as an instrument to promote their private interests. 
The status of ownership is what ultimately granted them the power to determine the editorial 
line. Or to put it in other words, the Godó’s influence as political actors stemmed from their 
capacity to use the editorial line of La Vanguardia according to their own interests; and this 
was a valuable source of public influence, since La Vanguardia was the top-selling 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on behalf of his mother. This indicates that, in practice, Ramón was probably already in command of the 
newspaper by that time. For further information on Antonia Lallana, see Chapter 1. 
688 “2- El sueldo del Sr. Sánchez Ortiz será de seiscientas veinticinco pesetas mensuales, además del veinticinco 
por ciento del beneficio líquido de “La Vanguardia”.” “Convenio entre Doña Antonia Lallana, viuda de Godó, 
propietaria del periódico ‘La Vanguardia’ y don Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, director del nombrado periódico”, 
reproduced in: Pedro Voltes Bou, “Historia de La Vanguardia”, [unpublished manuscript], chapter 10, p. 63.  
689 The average monthly salary of a journalist in Barcelona at the time oscillated between 40 and 100 pesetas. 
M. C. García Nieto, op. cit., p. 187. 
690 “8-La marcha política del periódico irá de acuerdo con las ideas políticas de la propietaria”, “Convenio entre 




Table 1. Approximate circulation of Barcelona’s main newspapers (1898-1913) 691 
 
 
          1898          1905         1913 
La Vanguardia         14,000       18,000       58,000 
Diario de Barcelona           9,000         7,000          - - - 
El Noticiero Universal           8,000       10,000          - - - 
Las Noticias           5,000       11,000       47,000 
La Publicidad           5,000         7,000       25,000 
El Correo Catalán           3,000         6,000          - - - 
 
 
 Indeed, and as the table above shows, the first decade of the 20th century was the 
moment when La Vanguardia was consolidated as the principle newspaper in Barcelona. In 
contrast to the 1,400 copies this newspaper sold when it was first established in 1881, it had 
reached a circulation of close to 20,000 copies by 1905. This represented a considerable 
progress, even if the sales figures of the Godó’s newspaper were still very modest – 
particularly if compared with other cities in Europe. In the case of France, for instance, both 
Le Petit Parisien (1876) and Le Matin (1883) were selling well above half a million copies 
by the 1890s; while Paris’ top-selling Le Petit Journal had passed the million copies mark by 
the same date. In England, too, figures were also far higher than in Barcelona. The London 
Daily Mail, for instance, sold an average of 700,000 copies in 1900.692 The explanation for 
this huge gap between the press in Barcelona and the above-mentioned European cities points 
to, once again, Spain’s low development in terms of urbanisation, industrialisation and 
literacy levels. Still, circulation is only one aspect of comparative analysis. The prominence 
given to this quantitative perspective has prevented many historians from noticing the 
cultural transfers that historically took place between European countries.693 Likewise, the 
contrast is also dependent on the subject of comparison. The case of Barcelona appears to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 Source: María Carmen García Nieto “La Prensa diaria de Barcelona de 1895 a 1910”, Barcelona, Universitat 
de Barcelona, 1956 [thesis manuscript], p. 89; Francesc Espinet i Joan Manuel Tresserras, La gènesi de la 
societat de masses a Catalunya, 1888-1939, Bellaterra, UAB, p. 77. These circulation figures need to be taken 
with caution as they are based on stamp duty records.  
692 Carlos Barrera (ed.), Historia del Periodismo Universal, Barcelona, Ariel, 2007, pp. 114-117. 




less “exceptional” if compared with the case of Italy, where in 1900 “only a handful of 
newspapers sold more than 50,000 copies a day”, as David Forgacs has observed.694  
 Table 1 also reveals that contrary to the case of Madrid, in Barcelona the press did not 
seem to suffer a “crisis of confidence”. With the sole exception of the Diario de Barcelona 
(paradoxically, the newspaper that took the biggest stand against the war) the rest of the 
newspapers did not suffer a loss in readers. Their total number did not suffer significant 
changes either: the city had a total of 22 newspapers in 1898, and their number stood at 23 in 
1899 and 24 in 1900.695 What, then, explains the striking difference between Barcelona and 
Madrid? Answering this question is not easy: it has not been possible to find any clues about 
this in the writing of contemporaries. The scholarly literature on the topic does not make any 
references to this either. Still, a possible explanation for this contrast between the two cities is 
that press consumption patterns remained highly localised. For the most part, newspapers had 
a local – and at best, a regional – circulation. Only a handful of newspapers from Madrid had 
a national distribution.696 This lack of integration of the press market is one hypothesis that 
can account for the different evolution of the press in both cities.  
 In fact, the persistence of local and regional patterns was something that also became 
present in the political consequences of the Disaster. Despite being lived as a national trauma, 
the loss of the colonies carried important nuances in each region. One of them was the 
strengthening of regional identities that pushed for the redefinition of the Spanish nation.           
In the case of Catalonia, this became clear in the attempt of elites to reassess their 
relationship with the political system. Until that time the presence of Catalan elites in the 
leadership of liberal parties had been, for the most part, very limited. Between 1814 and 
1899, only 3 Spanish prime ministers came from this region, even though 115 different 
governments existed during this period. Similarly, there were only 22 Catalan ministers 
during the same time span (out of a total of 850). Therefore, the number of ministers from 
this region only accounted for 2% of the total during the period 1814-1899.697  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
694 David Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial Era, 1880-1890. Cultural Industries, Politics and the 
Publics, Manchester-New York, Manchester University Press, 1990, p. 34. 
695 M. C. García Nieto, op. cit., p. 88. 
696 Something similar happened with the case of Italy. Valerio Castronovo, La stampa italiana nell’età liberale, 
Bari, Laterza, 1979, p. 15. 
697 Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, El surgimiento de las nuevas identidades contemporáneas: propuestas para una 




So why was there so little involvement of the elites from the country’s most 
industrialised region? Apart from the traditional weakness of liberal parties in Catalonia,698 
the main reason is that Catalan elites relied on a series of mechanisms, other than the holding 
of public office, to secure their interests in central government and in the colonies. These 
mechanisms of influence consisted in corporate action and business associativism, two 
strategies in which the press also played a decisive role, as Chapter 4 has examined. The case 
of the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” is revealing of these alternative strategies that 
connected centre and periphery: this employer association held a close relationship with the 
Conservatives for the support this party gave to protectionism. In fact, it was not a 
coincidence that the leader of this party (Cánovas del Castillo) was appointed honorary 
member of the Fomento in 1892, shortly after the passing of a new tariff law.699 Therefore, 
rather than opposing the liberal state, Catalan economic elites supported – and conditioned it 
– through alternative channels of influence. 
 However, the Disaster of 1898 led a substantial part of the Catalan elites to reassess 
these mechanisms. The loss of the precious colonial market provided evidence of the 
incapacity of the political system to defend the interests of Catalan manufacturers. In 
response to this, on the very same day that the peace treaty of the Spanish-American War was 
signed in Paris (10 December 1898) the main civic and economic entities in Barcelona 
addressed a memorandum to the Queen Regent.700 The main purpose of this memorandum 
was to express the discontent of the Catalan elites with the political system and to present a 
radical plan of reforms. The first of these proposals was the complete re-organisation of the 
Spanish state, based on the concession of autonomy to the “historical regions”. Once this 
reform was implemented, the memorandum proposed that “The Spanish state should only 
keep the attributions that require the protection and promotion of the interests that are truly 
common to all the regions in Spain, like international relations, repression of crimes, tariffs, 
the navy, communications, etc. etc.”701 The second reform, of equal importance to the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 See Chapter 1. For the case of the Conservative Party in Barcelona, see: Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, Les 
burgesies i el poder a l’Espanya de la Restauració (1875-1900), Recerques, nº 29, 1994, pp. 43-58; and Escolta, 
Espanya. La cuestión catalana en la época liberal, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2001.  
699 On the connections between the Conservative party and Catalan economic elites, see: Borja de Riquer i 
Permanyer, Cánovas y los conservadores catalanes, in Florentino Portero & Javier Tusell (eds.), Antonio 
Cánovas y el sistema político de la Restauración, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, pp. 139-166. 
700 These entities were the “Societat Econòmica Barcelonesa d’Amics del País”; “Fomento del Trabajo 
Nacional”; “Instituto Agrícola de San Isidro”; “Ateneu Barcelonès”; “Liga de Defensa Industrial y Comercial”. 
A reproduction of this referendum can be found in: LV, 10/12/1898, p. 3. 
701 “1ª. Reconocimiento de la personalidad de las grandes regiones naturales é históricas de España y 
consiguiente organización del régimen autonómico de sus intereses, continuando á cargo del Estado español 




one, was the reform of the universal suffrage, based on the introduction of corporate forms of 
representation.  
 The two demands expressed in the memorandum of Catalan civic entities were a 
direct challenge to the way the Liberal state had been organised in Spain since the 1830s. 
Likewise, they demonstrated the discredit of liberal institutions in Europe. Hence, the 
arguments used in the memorandum were inspired by modern sociology and in the historicist 
school of law, two types of argument that were much in vogue on the Continent at the time. 
The memorandum evoked the medieval past as a glorious age that should be taken as a 
source of inspiration to reform liberal politics. In contrast to the customary uniformist model 
of Castile, the Crown of Aragon was presented as a historical example that recognised 
regional peculiarities, and therefore appeared as a suitable reference to re-organise the state-
model according to a new understanding of the nation. The same historical reference applied 
to political representation: the corporate bodies of the Medieval tradition should be used as 
the model to re-structure parliamentary representation according to corporate patterns.702  
 The proposal of Catalan elites thus constituted an open challenge to the liberal 
foundations of the state. In fact, the memorandum openly blamed “modern” influences, like 
the French revolution and its vindication of individual rights, as the main cause of Spain’s 
ills. In the view of the entities that signed the memorandum there were two main conclusions 
that should be drawn from the current crisis: first was the failure of the liberal principles 
imported from France, first included in the constitution of 1812 (above all, the rights of the 
individual); and, secondly, the failure of “the policies the Catholic Kings started”, which 
these entities saw as having inspired the centralised state-model of the liberals since the 
1830s.703 
 The reform proposals reveal the cultural autonomy of Catalan elites. For the 
intellectuals in this region, the Disaster of 1898 intensified the taking of Paris as the main 
point of reference, rather than Spain’s capital.704 This manifested in many ways, like the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
las regiones de España, como son relaciones internacionales, represión de los delitos, aranceles, marina, 
comunicaciones, etc. etc. » LV, 10/12/1898, p. 3. Italics in the original. 
702 “2ª. Organización corporativa para fines políticos, de las profesiones, (carreras, artes, oficios, industrias, 
rentas) hoy día sólo organizadas en parte para fines fisacles y aun en este respecto imperfectamente, formando 
con las agrupaciones que resulten, clases adecuadas á la vida social moderna que ejerzan el Derecho de sufragio 
en todos los órdenes: estado municipal, estado regional, estado español.” Ibidem. 
703 “Recordad, Señora, que si un día uniéronse Aragón y Cataluña, jamás trataron de absorberse, no se 
impusieron idioma, ni instituciones, ni menos procuraron el uniformismo. (...) No así Castilla: los territorios que 
á botes de lanza, en noble y heroica lid reconquistó de los árabes (...) no lograron que les fuese reconocida una 
personalidad, como los de Andalucía, y otros, como Asturias y León, perdieron la suya, sacrificados todos al 
espíritu dominador y consiguientemente uniformista de la raza castellana.” Ibid. 




influence French intellectuals like Ernest Renan and Hyppolite Taine had in the Catalan 
historicist school. The same happened with the case of the Belgian Adolphe Prins (1845-
1919), whose work on La démocratie et le régime parlementaire (1884) exerted great 
influence on the corporativist conception Catalan elites had of political representation.705   
This circulation of ideas was extended to the artistic world, and was evident in the great 
development “Modernisme” had in Barcelona; this being an artistic trend directly influenced 
by the French art nouveau. Moreover, the idea of “modernity” became central in the way a 
substantial part of Catalan elites saw the Disaster of 1898. They saw their region as the most 
dynamic in the country, and therefore as the most suitable to lead the national recovery. 
Together with Narcís Verdaguer, one of the central intellectuals of this interpretation was 
Joan Maragall. For him, Spain’s defeat was the sign of Castille’s decadence, and he saw it as 
a call for Catalonia to lead the task of national regeneration. As Maragall noted: 
 
 “(...) todo está muriendo y Castilla ha concluido su misión. La nueva civilización es 
industrial y Castilla no es industrial; el moderno espíritu es analítico, y Castilla no es 
analítica; los progresos materiales inducen al cosmopolitismo, y Castilla, metida en el centro 
de la naturaleza africana, sin vistas al mar, es refractaria al cosmopolitanismo europeo. (...) 
Castilla ha concluido su misión directora y ha de pasar su cetro a otras manos. El 
sentimiento catalanista, en su agitación actual, no es otra cosa que el instinto de este cambio; 
de este renuevo. Favorecerle es hacer obra de vida para España, es recomponer una nueva 
España para el siglo nuevo; combatirle, directa o tortuosamente, es acelerar la 
descomposición total de la nacionalidad española y dejar que la recomposición se efectúe al 
fin fuera de la España muerta (...)”.706 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 Jordi Casassas, Els intel·lectuals i el poder a Catalunya; and Giovanni Cattini, Prat de la Riba i la 
historiografia catalana. Intel·lectuals i crisi política a la fi del segle XIX, Catarroja-Barcelona, Afers, 2008, esp. 
p. 189. The influence of French intellectuals in other countries, like Italy, in: Luisa Mangoni, Una crisi fine 
secolo: la cultura italiana e la Francia fra Otto e Novecento, Torino, Einaudi, 1985. 
706 Carlos Serrano, “Conciencia de la crisis, conciencias en crisis”, Juan Pan-Montojo (ed.), Más se perdió en 
Cuba. España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo, Madrid, Alianza, 2006 [1st ed. 1998], p. 390. [E. T.]: “everything 
is dying and Castile has concluded its mission. The new civilization is industrious, and Castile is not industrious; 
the modern spirit is analytic, and Castile is not analytic; material progress lead to cosmopolitanism, and Castile, 
placed in the middle of African nature, without seeing the sea, is refractory to European cosmopolitanism. (...) 
Castile has concluded its directive mission and has to pass over its ceptre. The Catalan nationalist feeling, in the 
current agitated situation, is but the instinct in favour of this change; of this renewing. Supporting it means to 
give life to Spain, to rebuild a new Spain for the new century; opposing to it, directly or indirectly, implies 





 For Maragall the moment had come for Castile to pass the leadership to Catalonia, 
with a clear objective in mind: to rejuvenate Spain.707 Maragall’s understanding of the fin-de-
siècle crisis is of particular importance, because the same cosmovision would be applied to 
politics, principally through the founding of the “Lliga Regionalista” (1901). This was to 
become the main party of Catalan nationalism in the Restoration, and would be one of the 
new political movements that fought doggedly against the political hegemony of the Godó 
family in Igualada. For the members of this party, regional identity was understood first and 
foremost as a political project aimed at modernising Spain.708 As Piedmont had in the Italian 
Risorgimento, and Prussia in the unification of the German states, the Lliga Regionalista saw 
Catalonia as the region that should lead the country’s renovation. Political autonomy and 
corporate representation were the two measures Catalan nationalists advocated to put an end 
to the inefficiency of liberal politics (epitomised in the loss of the colonies and the 
widespread presence of clientelism) and to begin the “moral” conquest of Spain. 
 At this point we may wonder: how did the Godó family react to the changes that were 
taking place in the regional context? The proposals of the Catalan nationalists were a direct 
threat to another sector of Catalan elite who, like the Godó family, were closely involved in 
liberal politics and who took advantage of this political system to advance their position in 
society. Worse still, a growing number of readers and group interests that La Vanguardia had 
represented in the past (like the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional) now started to embrace the 
proposals of Catalan nationalism. How did the family react to this new scenario that 
threatened their political hegemony, and also implied the political realignment of a part of La 
Vanguardia’s readership? To what extent was the response of this family singular, when 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707 “El espíritu castellano ha concluido su misión en España. A raíz de la unidad del Estado español, el espíritu 
castellano se impuso en España toda por la fuerza de la Historia; dirigió, personificó el Renacimiento; las 
grandes síntesis que integraban a éste, el absolutismo, el imperialismo colonial, el espíritu aventurero, las 
guerras religiosas, la formación de las grandes nacionalidades, toda la gran corriente del Renacimiento encontró 
su cauce natural en las cualidades del espíritu castellano; por eso España fue Castilla y no fue Aragón.” Carlos 
Serrano, op. cit., p. 390. 





5.3. PRESS BARONS AND THE NATION: RAMÓN GODÓ (‘LA VANGUARDIA’) AND 
RAFAEL GASSET (‘EL IMPARCIAL’) FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 The proposal of reforms that the Catalan elites presented to the Queen Regent in 1898 
(namely, the decentralisation of the Spanish state and the reform of the universal suffrage 
based on corporate representation) were two demands that eventually became the two 
ideological pillars of Catalan-conservative nationalists of the “Lliga Regionalista” (1901). 
The conjunction of economic elites and political Catalanism in this new party, however, was 
not immediate. This conjunction only started forming in 1899, following the failed attempt of 
economic elites to participate in the regeneration project of a General named Camilo García 
Polavieja.709 This General made the first attempt at cooperation between Catalan nationalists 
and other Regenerationist projects from other parts of Spain. The failure of this cooperation 
would have important consequences – namely, the growth of Catalan nationalism and its 
organisation under a new party structure (the Lliga Regionalista, created in 1901).710  
 General Polavieja was one of the few Generals to have escaped the discredit of the 
Disaster. He was a man of solid Catholic convictions, monarchic and conservative, who had 
been the Captain General of Cuba (1889-1890) and the Philippines (1896-1897). His military 
victories during war had provided him with great prestige. This popularity was evident even 
before the war ended, when Polavieja was received by a large crowd in Barcelona (of around 
40,000 people) as part of a public welcome that the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional had 
sponsored.711 In fact, during the war General Polavieja established close connections with 
Catalan economic elites (and particularly with the Fomento) by paying attention to their 
demands for protectionism. As a result of these previous contacts, when Polavieja started 
preparing his entry into politics in the aftermath of the war, he requested the support of 
Catalan economic elites through the president of the Fomento (Joan Sellarés). The support for 
this proposal did not take long to arrive, especially after Polavieja expressed his commitment 
to the demands for decentralisation.712 
 Indeed, on 1 September 1898 Polavieja made public his plan of “national 
reconstruction”. This consisted in a reform plan aspiring to modify the traditional rotation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
709 Borja de Riquer, op. cit., p. 305. 
710 The unfolding of these events, and how they affected the position of the Godó family, will be studied 
throughout this and the two subsequent chapters. 
711 He would receive similar expressions of public support in other Spanish cities. In Madrid, 70,000 people 
turned out to welcome him. 
712 The “Unió Catalanista” would participate in preparing a document with a plan of reforms. Therefore, not 
only the economic elites but also a part of the Catalan nationalists gave their support to the Regenerationist 




power between Liberals and Conservatives by creating a third party.713 Polavieja openly 
condemned liberal parties and caciquismo as the main reasons behind the loss of the empire. 
He claimed to embody a new way of doing politics, based on a series of measures to foster 
economic development714 and in a moderate proposal of administrative decentralisation. 
Through these proposals Polavieja wished to attract the “masas neutras” (“neutral masses”), 
an expression that gained currency in the language of regeneracionismo to refer to the 
segments of society that remained alienated from the political system.   
 La Vanguardia positioned itself for the first time in relation to the regenerationist plan 
of General Polavieja on 13 September 1898, the day after it had published his manifesto (as 
the majority of the press did), and as the peace negotiations were still going on. The 
newspaper of the Godó family applauded General Polavieja for his decision to enter politics, 
and welcomed the attention paid to the demands from the periphery in favour of 
decentralisation.715 However, La Vanguardia considered the manifesto to be “excessively 
prudent”, both in its tone and in the measures it proposed.716 Above all, La Vanguardia 
accused Polavieja of being too cautious in his criticism of the fraudulent nature of liberal 
politics. As this newspaper put it:  
 
“Son esos vicios las fuentes vivas del daño que sufrimos. La corrupción de la 
administración y de la justicia, el imperio del caciquismo municipal, provincial y nacional que 
esteriliza todas las energías [que] nacen de ahí, y no podrá contar con la opinión quien no los 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 Although Polavieja denied any attempts to define the movement he led as a party, there is evidence that this 
was his intention. Álvaro de Figueroa y Torres, Conde de Romanones, Notas de una vida, Madrid-Barcelona, 
Marcial Pons, 1999, [1st edition 1934], vol. 1, p. 106.  
714 As Polavieja argued: “Es preciso que dejemos de pensar en los comités, en las falsificaciones electorales y en 
los medios de fabricar, no tan sólo las mayorías que votan, sino hasta las minorías que fiscalizan y discuten, para 
pensar en los campos sedientos, en los caminos sin abrir, en los montes talados por el caciquismo, en los 
transportes costosísimos, en los puertos, en los talleres, en los tratados de comercio y en la protección inteligente 
de todo interés constituído y de toda irqueza que nace.” “El manifiesto del General Polavieja”, LV, 12/09/1898, 
p. 1. 
715 Especially when a Catalan (Mr. Manuel Duran i Bas) was appointed Minister of Justice (as will be explained 
in the following pages). In the face of this appointment, La Vanguardia commented: “Por último, el 
nombramiento del señor Durán y Bas significa para Cataluña y para todas las regiones un reconocimiento que 
anotamos con gusto. No es solo el reconocimiento de los méritos del designado. (...) El toque además está en 
que se llama á la Gobernación directa del Estado en el Centro á las reputaciones formadas en la periferia, á los 
hombres que en la periferia viven. Eso es un reconocimiento de la vida regional, y también por este motivo 
merece nuestro aplauso. Ese reconocimiento se acentuará si, como se anuncia, se entrega el proyectado 
Ministerio de Agricultura, Industria y Comercio á otros hombres de la periferia.” “Ecos de la política”, LV, 
05/03/1899, p. 4. 
716 “En la expresión hay cierta timidez, quizás muy necesaria en quien aspirando á la conquista del poder 
[Polavieja] ha de recabar apoyo de determinados organismos y fuerzas sociales, pero timidez al cabo que en un 
documento que ha de juzgar el país quita fuerza y eficacia. Fuerzas directivas existen en España que tienen 
principalísima responsabilidad en el desastre que padecemos y no hay en el manifiesto una alusión siquiera que 
las censure ó que las excite á su regeneración.” “Ecos de la política. El manifiesto del General Polavieja”, LV, 




combata con resolución en declaraciones explícitas y concretas, quien no regenere esa fuente 
(...).” 717  
 
  As the above-quoted paragraph demonstrates, La Vanguardia adopted the language 
of regeneration and the criticism of corruption. The very same method that the Godó family 
had used to secure their own position was paradoxically criticised in their own newspaper. If 
the family could justify this criticism it was thanks to the division they had established 
between the press and politics. Editorial independence had been decisive in this strategy to 
separate the family’s two spheres of influence. Regardless of the persistent manipulation of 
elections that the family had perpetrated in Igualada, Ramón Godó could afford to criticise 
these methods because La Vanguardia was no longer a partisan newspaper. The above-
quoted paragraph is revealing of how this freedom of criteria made it possible to exert 
pressure on politicians: La Vanguardia argued that Polavieja would only obtain the support 
of “opinion” if he condemned corruption. This reveals that editors sought to advance their 
own agenda by presenting it as a demand of an alleged “public opinion”. 
 The cold reception La Vanguardia gave to Polavieja is particularly telling, especially 
if we take into account that this opinion was expressed when the political movement was just 
taking its first steps (the manifesto had only been published a day earlier). Moreover, the 
Godó family held close personal ties with General Polavieja. This became clear during the 
Spanish-American War, when before departing to the Philippines as Captain General, 
Polavieja had lunched with Ramón Godó and his father Carlos. The following day, the Godó 
family had accompanied Polavieja’s wife to the monastery of Monserrat (close to Igualada) 
to pray for the General’s safe return.718  
 This close acquaintance with General Polavieja, however, was insufficient to 
convince Ramón Godó to put La Vanguardia at his service. The main reason for this is that 
Polavieja wished to regenerate the country by replacing liberal parties. This was contrary to 
Ramón Godó’s position: as La Vanguardia would advocate on repeated occasions, traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717 Ibidem. Similar statements of La Vanguardia in relation to caciquismo can be found in: “Ecos de la política”, 
LV, 06/03/1898, p. 5. [E. T.]: “this vices are the source of the pain we are suffering. Corruption in the 
administración and in justice, the empire of caciquismo at a local, provincial and national level sterilizes all the 
energies that grow in there, and nobody shall ever count on the support of opinion if he does not fight with 
resolution all these sources through explicit and concrete measures.”   
718 “El diputado á Cortes don Carlos Godó obsequió con un almuerzo en el restaurante Martin, á los señores 
marqueses de Polavieja. Asistieron los ayudantes del general Polavieja, hijos del general Martínez Campos, don 
Ramón Godó y el director de La Vanguardia don Modesto Sánchez Ortiz.” “El general Polavieja en Barcelona”, 




parties (Conservative and Liberal) should be the ones to lead the reform of the Restoration. 719 
Instead of replacing them with new ones, as Polavieja wished, La Vanguardia argued in 
favour of deeply renewing liberal parties; especially in their customary use of caciquismo.720 
The proposal of La Vanguardia to overcome the Disaster of 1898 was thus clearly defined: a 
need to promote a radical transformation of liberal parties (particularly regarding the 
widespread use of fraudulent methods), yet opposition to any plan of regeneration that 
attempted to sweep those parties away.  
 Moreover, like other contemporaries (such as Costa, Maeztu and Baró) La 
Vanguardia also argued that the reform of the political system should go hand in hand with 
the reform of the press. During the war the editor of this newspaper (Sánchez Ortiz) had 
already criticised the Spanish press for its emphasis on fostering a jingoistic discourse, while 
forgetting “national interests”.721 Behind this criticism was Sánchez’s personal conviction 
that newspapers were central to public affairs because they exerted a strong influence on 
politicians. For Sánchez, the loss of the colonies culminated a process of decadence that was 
neither the sole responsibility of the government nor of a single party. Rather, it was the 
responsibility of what he called “la España directiva”. With this expression Sánchez Ortiz 
referred to the ruling class, in which he included the press as an integral part.722 
 In this respect, the argument the director of La Vanguardia used to stress the 
importance of newspapers in the national regeneration was similar to the testimonies 
contained in Joaquín Costa’s work. That is, contrary to liberal politicians, who were alienated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719 “El General Polavieja rechaza á los partidos existentes y hace á la vez protestas de que jamás ha soñado con 
la dictadura. (...) pero creyendo como creemos sinceras las protestas del general, no vemos la manera de 
armonizar todo eso con la aspiración inmediata al Gobierno. Es difícil, por no decir imposible, que por los 
medios ordinarios y constitucionales llegue al poder un partido recién nacido, sin más fuerza moral que la de un 
hombre (...). El llamamiento á las fuerzas neutrales es plausible, pero no es seguro que respondan en cantidad 
suficiente á remediar esa pobreza. Quizás el error capital del general Polavieja estriba en eso: en recusar por un 
lado á título de envejecidas fuerzas organizadas y que bien dirigidas podrían ser útiles (...)”. “El manifiesto del 
general Polavieja”, LV, op. cit. Emphasis added. 
720 Speaking about the manifiesto of Polavieja, La Vanguardia argued: “(...) Fuerzas directivas existen en 
España que tienen principalísima responsabilidad en el desastre que padecemos y no hay en el manifiesto una 
alusión siquiera que las censure ó que las excite á su regeneración.” Ibidem. 
721 “La prensa española, lo decimos con el respeto y con el amor que nos inspira nuestra madre, pero 
convencidos, no ha estado en medio de tantos azares como ha producido el problema cubano á la altura que 
podía esperarse (...). En cuanto ha sido sentimiento de patriotismo, de abnegación (...) ha dado toda ella un 
ejemplo que nos enorgullece (...) Pero en nuestra humildísima opinión, por punto general y sin excluirnos 
nosotros, le ha faltado serenidad de juicio y previsión en cuanto ha sido obra de análisis para conocer aquel 
problema y para guiar á la opinión en los momentos supremos. En ninguna nación, pero singularmente en las 
meridionales (...) existe un poder superior de hecho, al que la prensa en su conjunto ejerce. En cada acto de 
Gobierno tiene la prensa una parte principalísima (...). Esta ventaja ha de tenerse como una carga antes que 
como un beneficio, porque entraña una responsabilidad, y la mayor prueba de patriotismo que puede dar la 
prensa es recabar esa responsabilidad cuando encierra la amargura del error (...).” LV, 01/01/1897, p. 3. 
Emphasis added. 




from society due to their use of caciquismo, he considered that newspapers had a strong 
influence on ordinary people. The capacity to connect the political system with society is 
what made the press, in Sánchez’s eyes, the most important political actor in the task of 
national regeneration.723 Yet to be in the position to lead this mission, journalists should first 
assume their own culpability in the Disaster (above all, in their eagerness to increase sales), 
and adopt a professional code of conduct. Thus, Sánchez made a strong plea in favour of the 
professionalisation of journalism. This implied putting an end to the journalists’ most 
common pitfalls: first, the perception of journalism as a pathway into public office; second, 
viewing sales as the only guiding principle. These two common mistakes should be replaced 
by two new professional ideals: “priesthood and magisterium” (“sacerdocio y magisterio”). 
That is to say, to make journalism an end in itself, rather than a route into politics; and to 
prioritise “truth” over profits. According to Sánchez, adhering to these professional codes 
would be the only way to avoid the errors of the Spanish-American War and to guide the 
liberal parties and society to a new age. 
 If the above-mentioned comments were the work of Sánchez Ortiz, the editorial 
position of La Vanguardia regarding Polavieja was dictated by Ramón Godó. Although 
Sánchez was the one who signed the editorials, in his position of proprietor Ramón Godó was 
the one who had the power to determine the newspaper’s line. In this regard, what needs to be 
stressed about the way in which Godó positioned La Vanguardia in the face of Polavieja is 
that it differed from the attitude that Catalan economic elites adopted. If this newspaper 
became the distinguished organ of the “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional” during the War of 
Melilla (1893) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895), its position differed from this 
employer association after the Disaster took place. Thus, the Fomento and other economic 
entities rapidly supported the plans of Polavieja. This was not mere rhetoric, but rather a 
breakthrough in the attitude the Catalan elites traditionally adopted in relation to the political 
system. Thus, during the elections of March 1899, 14 of the total 44 deputies that were 
elected in Catalonia were members of the Fomento supporting Polavieja’s candidacy 
(including the president of this entity, Joan Sallarès, and his predecessor in the post, Joan 
Saladrigas). This move represented the new interest of Catalan elites to actively participate in 
politics, and to do so through corporate action. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723 “(...) La Prensa entra más adentro y está más continuamente en relaciones con la nación española, con la gran 
masa social que los Partidos, y que los Gobiernos, y que el Parlamento mismo, á todos los cuales la España que 
trabaja y piensa y hace tiene vuelta la espalda, fuera de las relaciones oficiales. Por eso la Prensa, aunque sea 
circunstancial y transitoriamente, es la fuerza político-social más capacitada para iniciar la acción en la obra 
regeneradora.” Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, El periodismo, Barcelona, Fundación Conde de Barcelona, 1990 [1st ed. 




 Indeed, an added consequence of the Disaster in domestic politics was the growing 
presence of corporate principles of representation, to the detriment of partisan affiliation. 
Polavieja and the Catalan elites were not the exclusive representatives of this strategy, but 
rather exemplified a typical feature of the different Regenerationist movements that appeared 
in Spain. An example of this was the “Unión Nacional” (1900), a short-lived political 
movement promoted by Joaquin Costa. Based on the same corporativist scheme, this 
movement had the ambition of bringing together the chambers of commerce, the economic 
societies, and the leagues of producers. Although these entities had a long tradition of 
lobbying, they were now presented as the mobilisation of civic society against liberal politics. 
Moreover, the movement that Costa inspired and Santiago Alba led also shared Polavieja’s 
plan of pragmatic policies to promote economic development based on public investment. 
 The attitude that Ramón Godó adopted in the face of this new political scenario, 
consisting in the support for the regeneration of national politics, but through the renewal of 
liberal parties, most surely obeyed his position as a member of the Liberal Party. Indeed, and 
as the next chapter will show in detail, Godó not only inherited the family business and the 
ownership of La Vanguardia, but also the political career of his father in the constituency of 
Igualada. These are important elements to understand the way he positioned his newspaper in 
the face of the new political scenario that was emerging in the country. 
 A look at Madrid, however, reveals that not all the liberal editors reacted equally to 
Godó. This can be seen through the case of Rafael Gasset Chinchilla (1866-1927), the owner 
of Madrid’s newspaper El Imparcial. What makes the comparison between Godó and Gasset 
interesting is the many common points that existed between them but also their very different 
responses to the Disaster. Both of them descended from families that owned newspapers that 
were also affiliated with the Liberal Party of Sagasta. Likewise, both men were the owners of 
independent newspapers with a clear commercial orientation; and both inherited these 
newspapers shortly after the Disaster (Ramón Godó in 1899, at the age of 35; and Rafael 
Gasset in 1899, at the age of 23). A third similarity between the two men is that following the 
political careers of their respective fathers, both of them would be elected deputies in 
Congress; and they always did so for the same constituency, despite the fact that neither lived 
there.724  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
724 Ramón Godó was deputy for Igualada between 1899 and 1906, while Rafael Gasset was deputy for the 
constituency of Noya, in the region of Galicia, between 1896 and 1910. Both of them also had relatives who 





                                            
 Ramón Godó Lallana (1864-1927)         Rafael Gasset Chinchilla (1866-1927) 
  
 Yet regardless of these points in common, the fact is that the two liberal editors 
responded differently to the first regeneration attempts. In contrast to La Vanguardia, 
Gasset’s El Imparcial did not hold the press responsible for the Disaster, but blamed liberal 
politicians exclusively. This became clear during the treaty negotiations in Paris. Despite the 
fact El Imparcial had been one of the newspapers that most actively promoted jingoism 
during the war, it opened its edition of 2 February 1898 with an article specifically addressed 
to Mr. Montero Ríos, who was in charge of the Spanish delegation in Paris. During the 
negotiations, Montero Ríos had blamed the press for the loss of the colonies. In response to 
this, El Imparcial argued that the complicity of the press to go to war had conformed to the 
false information that the government had provided. Consequently, when it came to 
establishing who was to blame for Spain’s ruin, El Imparcial did not hesitate in pointing at 
“los elementos directivos de la política”. With this expression El Imparcial referred to the 
ruling elites, but did not include the press among them. The understanding of newspapers in 
relation to politics thus appeared to be different to that of La Vanguardia: journalists did not 
belong to the political elites.725 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725 “En la enfermedad nacional que ha tenido funesto desenlace, se descubren, como en la mayoría de los 
procesos morbosos, las causas predisponentes y las determinantes, de las cuales fácil nos será deducir las 
distintas responsabilidades. Fueron causas predisponentes el desbarajuste de la adminsitración pública, la 
política menguada del caciquismo con arreglo á la cual los intereses generales quedaban siempre pospuestos á la 
particular conveniencia y utilidad, el continuo engaño en punto á presupuestos y las falsas estadísticas de 
soldados y de barcos. Claro es; como no disponíamos de los recusos que esos datos oficiales consignaban (...) 
Con semejante organización podía representarse el papel de un pueblo fuerte ante una farsa de comediantes; 
pero al chocar todo aquello con la realidad, tenía forzosamente que descubrirse que eran telones los sillares de 




 In practice, however, Rafael Gasset was involved much more obviously in the first 
attempts of national regeneration than Godó. General Polavieja found in El Imparcial the 
most active supporter of his political ambitions. During the Spanish-American war Gasset 
criticised on several occasions the way the Liberal government had conducted the war 
(particularly the lack of military preparation). Disenchanted with liberal politics (in which he 
actively participated as deputy in Congress between 1891-1899) Gasset became one 
Polavieja’s biggest supporters, encouraging him to make the jump into politics.726 In fact, 
Gasset was the person who presented the manifesto of General Polavieja in Congress; and, 
before that, he had even actively participated in the writing of this document advocating for 
the creation of a third party.727  
 Gasset identified with the Regenerationist calls for modernising the country through 
economic development. To boost this programme, El Imparcial started to publish (in April 
1899) a series of articles under the title “Para la nueva política” (“For the new policy”), 
where it stressed the need for building new infrastructures through public investment. As 
historian Juan Carlos Sánchez Illán has noted, this “new policy” became the new political 
strategy of Rafael Gasset, to which El Imparcial contributed on an almost daily basis.728 
Gasset’s commitment to this plan of reform culminated in 1899, when his intercession 
became decisive to unite General Polavieja with the new leader of the Conservative Party, 
Francisco Silvela (who had also advocated for a Regenerationist plan). The result was the 
formation of a new government (on 4 March 1899) that combined the most conservative 
trend within the Regenerationist movements (General Polavieja) with the liberal politics 
represented by Francisco Silvela. For the first time in Spain, a new government seized power 
with an explicit political programme of national recovery. Polavieja would be appointed 
Minister of War, while the support of Catalan conservatives and economic elites became 
manifest with the appointment of Manuel Duran i Bas as Minister of Justice. Gasset was 
awarded for his contribution with the mayoral office of Madrid. Although he initially refused 
this offer, in April 1900 he joined the new government as Minister of Agriculture. His case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
¿Dónde reside la culpa? Principal y casi exclusivamente en los elementos directores de la política. (...) 
¿Corresponde alguna culpa á la prensa? Nunca empujaron los periódicos del lado de la guerra.” “Contra una 
iniquidad. Para el Sr. Montero Ríos”, El Imparcial, 08/02/1899, p. 1. 
726 During this period Gasset was a non-affiliated deputy but managed to win elections under different 
governments, both Liberal and Conservative. This point illustrates his influence as newspaper editor, at a time 
when governments intervened in elections through caciquismo. Further information on Gasset’s political career, 
in: J. C. Sánchez Illán, op. cit., p. 379. 
727 Furthermore, the manifesto was written by a close friend of Gasset (Augusto Suárez de Figueroa, the director 
of El Heraldo de Madrid). J. Sánchez Illán, Ibid, p. 117. 




reveals to what extent liberal editors not only promoted the war effort in 1898, but also 





This chapter has demonstrated the growing mediatisation that Spanish politics was 
undergoing at the turn of the 19th century. Newspaper proprietors not only had influence over 
public opinion during the Spanish-American War, but also became decisive in the plans for 
the Regeneration that followed. In the new emphasis that growing voices put on the need to 
connect the political system with larger segments of society (the so-called “masas neutras”) 
the press appeared as the only medium capable of reaching large audiences. On some 
occasions newspaper editors were personally involved in this attempt to breach the gap 
between the real and the legal country, as the commitment of Rafael Gasset to the political 
project of General Polavieja illustrates. The efforts of this editor allowed Polavieja to obtain 
the support of one of the most influential newspapers in the country. This influence stemmed 
from the visibility that newspapers gave to the deeds of politicians, but also in their capacity 
to exert pressure during decision-making processes. In both types of influence, having El 
Imparcial on his side was particularly important for the interests of General Polavieja.  
However, the aftermath of the Disaster also revealed that the action of newspapers 
was not free from constrains. The “crisis of Madrid’s press” represents an event that clearly 
shows that the readers of newspapers were not a passive audience. As different 
contemporaries noted, the crisis of the press was, above all, a crisis of “public confidence”. 
The importance of this crisis for newspapers in Madrid carried visible consequences: a large 
number of newspapers simply disappeared in the aftermath of the war; while many others 
suffered a considerable loss of sales. To a considerable degree, this crisis was the 
consequence of the very same success these newspapers had obtained during the war against 
the United States. These exceptional circumstances were obviously impossible to maintain in 
times of peace. But, still, as argued above, there are various sources that make it clear that 
many readers felt deeply disappointed with the attitude followed by their respective 
newspapers, thus providing evidence about the readers autonomy.  
In this regard, the case of La Vanguardia is particularly striking if compared with the 




readers did not appear to feel let down by its behaviour once the conflict had ended. 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find any reference to a “crisis” of the Barcelona 
press during the same period. Still, this does not mean that the circulation of the press was 
something to be taken for granted: El Diario de Barcelona, which had distinguished itself for 
its advocacy of peace from the very beginning, saw its sales fall after the Disaster (from 
9,000 copies in 1898, to 7,000 copies in 1904). This indicates that apart from the strongly 
localised nature of consumption patterns, the reasons why people bought one newspaper over 
another were complex, and were not exclusively linked to the attitude of newspapers during 
the war. 
 The Disaster also made contemporaries more aware about the power of the media in 
society. The opinions of intellectuals like Joaquín Costa and Ramiro de Maeztu, and of 
journalists like Teodoro Baró and Modesto Sánchez Ortiz, reveal the impression that the 
transformations the press was undergoing had contributed to the country’s decadence. By 
exploring the opinions of these contemporaries, this chapter has shown that the discredit of 
liberal politics and the re-definition of journalistic culture were deeply interwoven 
phenomena. The function of journalists in society was certainly not a new concern (as 
Chapter 2 has demonstrated), but the defeat against the United States led contemporaries to 
see journalists as upholding a fraudulent system based on sham elections. The outcome was a 
myriad of proposals on the relations between journalists and politicians, on one hand; and on 
relations between journalists and society at large, on the other. 
Indeed, the fin de siècle crisis revealed the consolidation of the new commercial press, 
to the detriment of the traditional partisan orientation of newspapers. The emphasis put on 
raw information to increase sales explains the success of commercial newspapers in the new 
mass society that was starting to emerge in the main European cities. Yet, paradoxically, the 
emphasis this commercial press placed on satisfying popular culture (and also on shaping it) 
was precisely what conservative men like Teodor Baró lamented. In this respect, the proposal 
of Catalan elites to reform universal suffrage and the criticisms of Baró of the content of 
commercial newspapers can be seen as two sides of the same coin, consisting in a negative 
perception of the “masses” and the need to confront them through new measures. 
From a different perspective, Maeztu also despised the commercial press, but in his 
case he did not blame it on the masses. Rather, he considered that the changes brought to 
journalism by the factory system led newspapers to fail in their duties – such as the fostering 
of civic virtues. In their eagerness to provide abundant information, newspapers were 




still had a great need of it. It must be noted, however, that despite being two contemporaries 
with such different views of society, Maeztu and Baró did share a subtle nostalgia towards 
the partisan press (which while it had certainly not disappeared was losing popularity by that 
time).  
The consequences that stemmed from the growing influence of the press were also the 
concern of the director of La Vanguardia, Modesto Sánchez Ortiz. The incapacity of the 
press to accept its own responsibility for the military defeat, and the obsession of many 
newspapers with sales were two elements that convinced him of the need to professionalise 
journalism. It should no longer be a pathway into public office, nor simply a business 
venture, but rather a self-sufficient occupation with a strong vocation of public service. 
Sánchez thus shared a common point with Joaquín Costa: both strongly criticised the 
behaviour of the press, but at the same time had some confidence in the contribution it could 
make in the task of national recovery.  
The Disaster also brought important consequences in the field of politics. Even when 
liberal parties managed to overcome the situation (as the seizing of power by Sagasta in 1903 
would demonstrate) the widespread pessimism also fostered political re-alignments. The case 
of the Catalan elites is particularly revealing in this respect. The reform plans that came from 
this region, consisting in the introduction of administrative autonomy and corporate 
representation, reveal to what extent the reconfiguration of the liberal state was regarded as a 
necessary pre-condition for Spain’s recovery. Yet far from being an exclusive proposal of the 
elites from this region, the political movement of the “Unión Nacional” (which had its hubs 
in places like Valladolid and Zaragoza) shows that corporate action became a typical feature 
of the Regenerationist movement. This reveals that civic entities were presented as an 
alternative to liberal politicians. 
In this regard, the positioning of La Vanguardia in relation to the new political 
scenario can hardly be explained without taking into account the figure of its new owner, 
Ramón Godó Lallana. Although his father before him had shown on many occasions his 
commitment to defending the economic interests of Catalan elites, particularly in the case of 
entities like Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, the distancing of La Vanguardia from Polavieja 
reveals that this newspaper did not always follow the direction of general opinion in 
Barcelona. Still, it also seems clear that it took care not to directly go against it. The position 
of this newspaper can be explained as the need to navigate between the private interests of 
the Godó family (linked to the Liberal Party of Sagasta) and the new political context 




line was where the Godó family’s power resided, putting too much emphasis on defending 
the family’s private agenda could also have serious consequences for its new owner, Ramón 
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“(...) tan pronto se ha vislumbrado el carruaje del señor 
Godó, se han echado al vuelo las campanas de todas las iglesias, 
y el pueblo en masa le ha recibido y le ha felicitado con 
aclamaciones de entusiasmo diciéndole ¡Bien venido sea nuestro 
diputado! Dios llene de felicidad al padre del distrito! ¡Albricias 
y salud al amigo y amparo de los pobres! Dios bendiga al hijo de 
don Carlos Godó.” 729 
 
 
“(...) que el periódico, si no es arma mortífera, es arma 
temida,  porque hiere sin hacer sangre, sólo con un reproche; 
pero no es la herida la que hiere, sino que de haberla recibido se 






 By comparison to other “press barons”, like Luca de Tena (ABC), Nicolás María de 
Urgoiti (El Sol), the Brusi family (Diario de Barcelona) and the Gasset family (El 
Imparcial), the figure of Ramón Godó Lallana (1864-1931) has received surprisingly little 
attention. Books on the history of journalism often mention him as the man responsible for 
La Vanguardia’s evolution into one of Spain’s main newspapers.731 However, the fact is that 
little is known about Ramón Godó. The traditional image of La Vanguardia as an 
independent and commercial newspaper has contributed, to some extent, to hiding the 
political career of this individual. The supposedly apolitical character of Ramón Godó would 
be the ultimate proof of La Vanguardia’s “modernity” (understood here as detachment from a 
partisan adscription), in contrast to other press editors who fell into the temptation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729  [E.T.]: “(...) as soon as Mr. Godó’s carriage was seen coming, the bells in all the churches started ringing 
and all the people went to welcome him saying enthusiastically: ‘Welcome to our deputy! God bless the father 
of the constituency! Congratulations and good health to our friend and protector of the humble! God bless 
Carlos Godó’s son!’”  LV, 19/05/1901, p. 6. 
730  [E.T.]: “(...) when the newspaper is not a lethal weapon, it is [nevertheless] a feared weapon, because it hurts 
with just one reproach; but it is not the wound that hurts, but that thousands of people become aware of it.” 
Quoted in M. Rodríguez, "Como sembráredes cogaredes" (sic), LV, 26/10/1903, p. 10. 
731 According to Goméz Aparicio, “el auténtico impulsor de La Vanguardia fue, como ya se ha dicho, don 
Ramón Godó Lallana, padre del actual Conde de Godó, que, poniendo en tensión su excepcional talento de 
hombre de negocios y transformando el periódico en una gran Empresa, le dotó de los más modernos medios de 
información, de composición y de impresión, al servicio de un estupendo cuadro de redactores y colaboradores”. 
p. 646. According to Schulte, “the Godó family started La Vanguardia, which was begun as a small, partisan 
organ, favoring the policies of Sagasta. However, under the direction of Ramón Godó Lallana, who took charge 
in 1897 after the death of his father, the newspaper’s founder, La Vanguardia grew into a national newspaper, a 
role it fills today (...)”. Henry F. Schulte, The Spanish press, 1470-1966: print, power and politics, University of 




participating in politics (like Rafael Gasset and Luca de Tena). This view has been common 
to the (few) accounts of both historians and family versions of the Godó family.732 
 However, the goal here is not to stress how politicised Ramón Godó actually was. 
Rather, his case will be used to study the tensions between the position of editor of an 
“independent” newspaper and that of a politician. In the aftermath of the “Disaster”, some 
contemporaries start arguing that the crisis of the press was due, in reality, to the incapacity 
of the new commercial press to see beyond the private views of their proprietors.733 This 
attitude, which arguably made newspapers unpredictable, was inherent to papers that were 
the property of liberal politicians (like El Heraldo de Madrid and El Diario Universal, 
belonging to José Canalejas and to the Count of Romanones, respectively); and of newspaper 
proprietors who held political ambitions like Rafael Gasset, the owner of El Imparcial.734 In 
fact, there is evidence that immediately after his appointment as Minister in the Silvela-
Polavieja government, in 1900, Gasset made great efforts to distinguish his entry into 
government from the path his newspaper would follow. This reveals that the political 
affiliation of Rafael Gasset was seen as being incompatible with a newspaper that had 
traditionally based its identity on its (alleged) neutrality.735 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
732 Jaume Guillamet, has argued, for instance, that “A diferencia de sus colegas madrileños, ni Brusi Ferrer ni 
Godó Lallana ostentaron cargos políticos. La distancia de la Corte podría explicar la independencia de criterio 
del Diario de Barcelona de Brusi Ferrer en el siglo pasado y la opción más informativa de La Vanguardia.” 
Jaume Guillamet, Las élites catalanas y la prensa, in Paul Aubert et Jean Michel Desvois (eds.), Les élites et la 
press en Espagne et en Amerique latine des Lumières à la seconde guerre mondiale, Casa de Velázquez-Maison 
des Pays Ibériques, 2002, p. 132. This statement probably has something to do with the scant information about 
this character. There is, however, the unpublished “tesis de licenciatura” that Pere Voltes dedicated to Ramón 
Godó: “Vida y obra de Don Ramón de Godó primer conde de Godó”, UAB, 1980. Voltes was a journalist at La 
Vanguardia and his work, despite its obvious interest for our topic, barely makes any reference to Godó’s 
political career. Something similar happens with the official (indeed commissioned) history of the family, where 
Godó’s political involvement is also neglected: Vis Molina, Los Godó. Los últimos 125 años de Barcelona, 
Madrid, Martínez Roca, 2005.  
733 “Al transformarse en España el periódico de partido, poderoso hasta los días de la Restauración, en periódico 
independiente, de órgano de un núcleo político que luchaba por ideales y por la conquista del poder, en empresa 
industrial, que hace de la información una legítima mercadería, en lugar de ganar independencia política la ha 
perdido. Al doctrinarismo muerto ha sucedido el fulanismo; representaba antes credos políticos, encarnan hoy 
criterios particulares, naturalmente tornadizos y volubles. Los ideales, de este modo, en vez de ensancharse se 
han estrechado y particularizado totalmente.” “La crisis de la prensa madrileña”, El Nuevo Mundo, 08/06/1905, 
p. 1. 
734 “Para el Heraldo nada hay bueno, grande y fecundo en política sino lo que quiere Canalejas, ni nadie en 
España sabe más de sociología que cuando Canalejas habla en la Academia de Jurisprudencia, ni ante los 
tribunales se vé conmoverse á la diosa Themis más que cuando informa Canalejas. El Imparcial disparará 
tercamente bala rasa, un día y otro, contra todo gobierno en el que no figure D. Rafael Gasset. Diario Universal 
calmará sus nerviosidades cuando el impaciente conde de Romanones no se halle en la oposición.” Ibidem. 
735 “Desde hoy El Imparcial y el Sr. Gasset vivirán en esferas distintas; él atento a sus obligaciones de hombre 
de gobierno; nosotros cuidadosos como siempre, de representar lo más fielmente posible que nos sea dable los 
movimientos de la opinión pública... en lo que el Gobierno acierte tendrá nuestro apoyo... en lo que se 
equivoque hallará nuestra censura tan viva como corresponda. Y no decimos sobre esto más, porque el 
movimiento se prueba andando”. Quoted by J.C. Sánchez Illán, Prensa y política en la España de la 




 In this regard, the case of El Imparcial and Rafael Gasset is particularly revealing of a 
tension in value systems. Namely, that a certain number of readers of El Imparcial might see 
the political career of Gasset as being conflictive with the newspaper they read, especially 
because the identity of this newspaper was based on independence from party interference. 
This case highlights a change that was occurring in the public sphere, particularly from the 
perspective of public values. As Ivo Engels has noted, one of the main characteristics of the 
“long 19th century” was the establishing of sharper lines between the public and the private 
spheres.736 Or to put it another way, certain practices that were regarded as being legitimate 
in pre-modern societies (where a pluralistic system of values existed), started to become 
problematic during the 18th and 19th centuries with the public redefinition of the “common 
good”. As Zygmunt Bauman and Bruno Latour have noted, one of the main characteristics of 
modern societies is their tendency to reduce ambiguities and to establish clear categories.737 It 
is during “episodes of conflict’”(as Michael Johnston has called them) that the clash of 
spheres becomes visible.738  
From a more general perspective, historians rarely take into account the 
communicative nature of politics, and how changes in the media condition the nature of 
power, as John B. Thomson has noted.739 In this regard, it seems to me that the combined 
study of changes in the press and certain forms of corruption (like clientlism) can provide 
valuable insights about the tensions occurring between the private and the public spheres, and 
track the changes in the genesis of public values in modern societies. Indeed, the recent 
research on corruption scandals has revealed that during the 19th century some places in 
Europe experienced changes in the perceptions of private uses of the “common good”.740      
In this regard, I will argue that since clientelism treats information as a privately-held 
resource, and one that is only exchanged in particularistic relationships, its disclosure in the 
public sphere has the potential of diminishing the reputation of the individuals involved.741 
This point might be of great interest for the case of the notables, since they were a social 
group for whom “social esteem” was one of the pillars of their prominence as leaders of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736 Jens Ivo Engels, Corruption as a Political Issue in Modern Societies: France, Great Britain and the United 
States in the Long 19th Century, Public Voices X, Nº 2, 2008, pp. 68-86. 
737 Cited in J. Ivo Engels, ibid. 
738 Michael Johnston, The search for definitions: the vitality of politics and the issue of corruption, International 
Social Science Journal, Vol. 48, Issue 149, 1996, pp. 321-335. The use of these categories (‘episode of 
conflict’) implies adopting a constructivist approach. 
739 John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity. A Social Theory of the Media, Polity, 1995. 
740 Olivier Dard, Jens Ivo Engels, Andreas Fahrmeir et Frédéric Monier (eds.), Scandales et corruption à 
l’époque contemporaine, Paris, Armand Colin-Recherches, 2015. 




local community, as Max Weber noted.742 
 By focusing on the case of Ramón Godó Lallana, the aim of this chapter is to analyse 
the reasons that led him to resign from active politics in 1906. In so doing, I attempt to 
explore how public perceptions of corruption in Restoration Spain were affected by the 
“Disaster” of 1898. This change was motivated, I will argue, by the emphasis the 
Regenerationist movement put on blaming corruption for the loss of the empire, and by the 
growing mobilisation that took place in Catalonia during the first decade of the 20th century. 
As noted before, this region was the first place where the monopoly of power by the Liberal 
and the Conservative party was broken in Spain. This had much to do with the emergence of 
two political movements (Catalan nationalism and Republicanism) that turned the 
denouncing of clientelism into one of the central arguments of their political culture. This 
should allow further comparisons on the crisis of parliamentary politics with other European 
countries.743  
 Finally, the case of Ramón Godó will be used to study how elites transmitted power 
across generations. This topic should allow us to evaluate to what extent the strategies used 
by the first generation of the Godó family to reproduce their power were equally effective for 
the members of the second generation, and thus to examine how the notables reacted to the 
emergence of mass politics. 
 The objectives mentioned above will be divided in two parts. The first part will be 
devoted to studying how power strategies were transmitted between generations of the same 
family, while the second part will deal with the crisis of the family strategies as part of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742 Max Weber, Economía y sociedad, México DF, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014 [1st ed. in German, 
1922], pp. 1080-1081.  
743 See the recent monograph: Corruption and the Rise of Modern Politics in Europe in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries: A Comparison between France, the Netherlands, Germany and England. Introduction, 
Journal of Modern European History, Volume 11, Number 1, February 2013; and Pour une histoire comparée 
des faveurs et de la corruption: France et Allemagne (XIXe-XX siècles), in J. I. Engels, F. Monier and N. 





6.1. THE GENERATIONAL RENEWAL IN THE GODÓ FAMILY 
 
 Although Ramón Godó Lallana was born in Bilbao (in the Basque country), in 1864, 
and lived most of his life in Barcelona, he did not marry in either of these cities. Instead, he 
was married in Igualada, where his family had originated. His wedding was on 2 December 
1893, to a local woman: Rosa Valls i Valls (1874-1922). The day after their marriage La 
Vanguardia congratulated the young couple (Ramon was 29 and Rosa 19 years old), who 
would go on to have numerous children in the years to come.744 Among the celebrations that 
followed the wedding, there is one that that is particularly revealing for the aims of this 
chapter. Namely, the reception that Ramón’s father, Carlos Godó, gave to the members of the 
“Comité Liberal Monárquico de Igualada” to celebrate his son’s marriage. This reception 
gathered the main members of the political network that had been contributing so decisively 
to the political pre-eminence the Godó family enjoyed in Igualada, often through clientelistic 
practices. In fact, the Republican newspaper El Igualadino did not miss the opportunity to 
criticise the wedding reception, likening it to the typical display of a “feudal lord” feeding his 
band of petty followers.745 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744 The marriage produced seven children: Rosa (married to Pere Bonet); Antònia (Pasqual Girona); Merçè 
(Marcel·lí Coll), Ramon (Carme Mir); Roser (Josep Bravo), Maria and Glòria. La Vanguardia commemorated 
the wedding as follows: “Nuestro muy querido amigo don Ramón Godo y Lallana contrajo ayer matrimonio con 
la señorita Rosita Valls. La ceremonia se celebró en Igualada, de donde es natural la novia. Fueron testigos de la 
boda, por parte de la novia, los señores Franc (don Sebastián) y Dolcet; y por parte del novio los señores Conde 
(don Eduardo) y Martorell (don Bernardino); Ligados á los señores de Godo por estrechos lazos de cariño, nos 
asociamos de corazón á las satisfacciones de esta fiesta de familia, y deseamos á los recien casados todo género 
de venturas. La feliz pareja habrá salido á estas horas para Andalaucía, por cuyas provincias hará su viaje de 
novios”. LV, 03/12/1893, p. 2. Arxiu Comarcal de l’Anoia (ACAN), Llibre de Matrimonis (1879-1893), any 
1893, fol. 285 (52).  
745 “(...) El banquete con que el diputado Godó obsequió á los sócios del Centro liberal Monárquico el pasado 
domingo se presta á muy amargas reflexiones. Dejemos á un lado el hecho de que el núcleo de los sócios de 
dicho Circulo, con contadisimas escepciones, se componga de estómagos agradecidos, tránsfugas de los demás 
partidos con más hambre que verguenza, vividores que se arriman siempre al sol que más calienta y nécios 
adoradores del Dios Éxito. No tengamos eso en cuenta, porque en ese caso resultaria naturalísimo lo sucedido y 
fijémonos solamente en lo que significa la comilona del domingo pasado. Es natural y nada tenemos que objetar 
al banquete con que se celebró el sábado dia 2 el casamiento del hijo del diputado; es un acontecimiento notable 
y grato en dos familias y lógico es que se solemnice de la mejor manera posible (...) No hicimos en nuestro 
número pasado comentario alguno á la boda, porque respetamos estas fiestas de família, agenas por completo á 
las cuestiones políticas y á los asuntos de administración local. (...) Pero si no debe importarnos la boda, es en 
cambio deber nuestro demostrar lo repugnante del espectáculo ofrecido al dia siguiente con motivo de ella. Un 
cacique, erigido en señor feudal y en el tono que se usa cuando se dá las sobras del plato á un perro, viendo que 
sobran abundantes provisiones de una comida, dá la órden de que al dia siguiente acuda su partido á comer, y un 
centenar de personas, sin conciencia de su propia dignidad, se arroja con avidez sobre los restos del festin, 
mascando con el afan del goloso, y con los ojos, húmedos por el acontecimiento, vuelto á su amo y señor que 
contempla satisfecho el cuadro, contento de ver como se hartan sus admiradores y convencido de que con un 
partido tan entusiasta se puede imponer la voluntad, no á una ciudad como Igualada, sino aún à Barcelona si 
fuera necesario. Acusa un rebajamiento moral lamentable la frecuencia con que vemos al reconocimiento 
convertido en humillación (...) Pero, perdemos el tiempo si hablamos á los fusionistas. Para tal gefe tales 




 In this regard, both the wedding and the reception are illustrative of the same strategy, 
namely, the attempt of connecting the second generation of the Godó family to Igualada. It 
was where the family had originated, and the city the brothers Carlos and Bartolomé had 
abandoned in the mid-19th century to search for a better living – first in the Basque Country 
and later on in Barcelona. But other members of the same family had remained in Igualada. 
This circumstance became decisive when Carlos and Bartolomé decided to run for public 
office at the Congress in the first years of the Restoration (1874-1923). By the turn of the 
century, now that Ramón Godó was making his first appearances in public life, it was time to 
start preparing the generational take over. Both the wedding and the reception Carlos held for 
the members of the “Comité Liberal Monárquico” can be seen, in this respect, as part of the 
same strategy: to integrate the second generation of the Godó family into Igualada’s social 
and political life. 
 In this regard, family was the centrepiece in the politics of Restoration Spain. When it 
comes to defining the way politics operated in modern Spain, the historian Pedro Carasa has 
even suggested replacing the classic expression “political friends” with that of “political 
families”. Carasa made this point after conducting a vast quantitative study on the origins of 
political elites in the region of Castile.746 For the case of France, Alexandre Niess has also 
noted the importance of family connections and nepotism in the Third Republic (1870-
1940).747 By borrowing a concept used by medieval historians for the study of the family (the 
“Sippe”, understood as “tribe”), Niess has focused on the French department of Marne to 
explore “how family, matrimonial and patrimonial strategies within particular lines are 
explicitly constructed in order to keep up the pre-eminence of a particular social group within 
public affairs – including republican affairs”. In this regard, what the French and the Spanish 
case had in common was the existence of a number of families that managed to stay afloat in 
politics for a long time.748 However, both the studies of Carasa and Niess have adopted a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
artículo. (...)”. Juan del Noya, “¡QUÈ ASCO!”, El Igualadino. Semanario político. Órgano del Círculo de la 
Unión Republicana, 10/12/1893, nº 32, p. 2. 
746 Pedro Carasa (ed.), Élites castellanas de la Restauración, Valladolid, Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de 
Educación y Cultura, 1997, p. 71. The book of the historian José Varela Ortega popularised the expression 
“political friends”: Los Amigos políticos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración, 1875-1900, 
Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2001 (1st ed. 1977). 
747 Alexandre Niess, Nepotism and family confiscation in the electoral system of the Third Republic, French 
History, vol. 26, No. 3, 2012, pp. 325-343. The same author has just published a more detailed account – which 
I have yet to have the chance to consult – that might open further comparisons with the case of the Godó family: 
L’héréditie en République. Les élus et leurs familles dans la Marne (1871-1940), 2012. See also: Christophe 
Charle, Les élites de la République, 1880-1900, Paris, Fayard, 1987, pp. 327-366. 
748 “While in other European polities, the advent of mass politics from the late nineteenth century was 
accompanied by an influx of representatives from a working-class background or a position as trade-union and 




quantitative perspective. It thus seems necessary, in this respect, to study how power was 
transmitted across generations from a more dynamic and qualitative point of view, as Renato 
Camurri has recently noted for the case of Italy.749 That is what I shall attempt to do in the 
following lines, by connecting it to the crisis of liberal politics in Catalonia, which was where 
this phenomenon manifested first in Spain, and with the highest intensity. 
 When Carlos Godó passed away in 1897 (four years after Ramón’s wedding), the 
Godó family was obliged to adopt a transitional solution for the next elections. As a result of 
this, in the elections of 1898 the Liberal candidate for Igualada’s constituency was José 
Balcells Cortada, “un rico comerciante de nuestra plaza [Barcelona], banquero y armador 
de buques, [que] cuenta con grandes simpatías, no solamente dentro del partido liberal, sino 
entre las clases mercantiles de nuestra capital”. This would be the only occasion, between 
1881 and 1916, when no member of the Godó family would lead the candidacy of the Liberal 
party in Igualada. Still, even in such an exceptional case, like the one created by Carlos’ 
death, another member of the Godó family (Juan Godó Llucià) would be in charge of 
“preparing” the elections. Thus, Juan Godó would be responsible for introducing José 
Balcells to the “Centro Liberal Monárquico” of Igualada, and to the leaders of the same party 
that came from Barcelona (Mr. Comas i Masferrer and Mr. Bosch). During this event, which 
took place in March 1898, frequent tributes were made to the late Carlos Godó, the 
“traditional” representative of Igualada’s constituency. The elections finally went smoothly 
and José Balcells was elected, probably thanks to the clientelistic practices of the Godó’s 
network and the little mobilisation of voters (the war with the United States led to the 
Government “controlling” – rigging – elections in a systematic way).  
 During the following year’s elections, however, Ramón Godó took on the 
responsibility and became the official candidate in Igualada. The parenthesis opened by 
Carlos Godó’s death was thus rapidly put to an end when his son replaced him as the Liberal 
representative. The second generation of the Godó family, in the figure of Ramón, was ready 
to maintain the family’s continuity in political affairs. It must be noted, in this regard, that 
Ramón followed the same strategy that his father and his uncle had traditionally used. Hence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
explanation and attention, but rather continuity”. Heinrich Best and Daniel Gaxie, “Detours to Modernity: Long 
Term Trends of Parliamentary Recruitment in Republican France 1848-1999”, H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), 
Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European 
Countries, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 109. 
749 “Desde una perspectiva que considere también los desarrollos de la investigación en el campo europeo, 
aparece necesario (...) empezar a afrontar la cuestión de la formación y del recambio de las elites (...)”. Renato 
Camurri, “Las elites italianas: estado de los estudios y perspectivas de investigación”, R. Zurita, R. Camurri 




the brothers Carlos and Bartolomé Godó (the two founders of La Vanguardia) had always 
followed the same electoral strategy: on the one hand, Carlos ran for the elections of deputy 
at the Spanish Congress, while his brother Bartolomé, on the other hand, always ran for the 
elections of provincial deputy. This strategy provided valuable benefits. First, Bartolomé’s 
position allowed him to intervene in the decisions that affected Igualada’s constituency 
(particularly in the building of infrastructures, like roads), which in many situations depended 
at the time on Barcelona’s Provincial Council. In parallel, the seat Carlos occupied in the 
Congress allowed him to extend the family’s range of influence to Madrid (where economic 
policies and other type of infrastructures, like the building of railway connections, were 
decided). This strategy of “sibling cooperation” allowed the family interests to be promoted 
more effectively in two different but complementary spaces of Spanish politics. 
 The strategy followed by the two brothers between 1881 and 1894 was reproduced 
(with minor differences) by the second generation. Ramón Godó Lallana (1864-1931; the 
owner of La Vanguardia) ran for deputy in Congress, while his cousin in Igualada, Juan 













 But who was Juan Godó Llucià (1851-1935), the person with whom Ramón would 
base his political strategy in the future? Juan was popularly known as “el Morrut” 
(“Morrudo”, in Spanish) due to his bad temper, and he was the heir in the principal line of 
descendancy of the Godó family’ [in blue, Table 2]. This means that besides living in the 
Godó’s traditional household on the “Rambla Nova”,751 he was the one who inherited La 
Igualadina Cotonera – the main business that the Godó family traditionally ran in Igualada. 
By the turn of the century, La Igualadina Cotonera was “one of the oldest and most 
important textile factories in Catalonia” and employed 350 workers.752 In an article that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
750 For the sake of clarity, different family members have not been included (children, etc.), but the full list can 
be found in the Annexes. The brothers Carlos (in orange) and Bartolomé (in pink) were the founders of La 
Vanguardia. Following Bartolomé’s death, the ownership of La Vanguardia would become the property of 
Carlos’ line of descendancy, e.g. Ramón Godó Lallana. This has remained the case up to this very day. Source: 
Arxiu Històric Comarcal de l’Anoia-Arxiu Parroquial d’Igualada (ACAN-API); Llibre de baptismes; Llibre 
d’òbits; Llibre de matrimonis. 
751 See Chapter 1. 
752 M. A. Bisbal & T. Miret, Diccionari biogràfic..., p. 97. This factory has been the object of a recent 
investigation by historian Pere Pascual Domènech: La Igualadina. Símbol de la Revolució Industrial a 






































































































journal la Ilustración catalana dedicated to this factory in 1893, it was described as the 
biggest textile factory in Igualada, as well as the first one to install electric current.753 Like 
his relatives in Barcelona in the jute industry, a significant number of La Igualadina 
Cotonera’s manufactures were also exported to Spain’s former colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines.754 This explains why during the Spanish-American War of 1898 Juan 
Godó participated very actively in the campaigns to raise money that his cousin Ramón had 
arranged through La Vanguardia, while his employees promised to give one day’s salary 
every month to the war effort for as long as it lasted.755  
 The relationship between Ramón Godó and his cousin Juan went far beyond politics. 
As Illustration 2 shows, Ramón held strong emotional bonds with his relatives in Igualada 
and actively participated in the family life. Despite the fact he never lived in this city, kinship 
ties and the family name were two elements that grounded him in Igualada. His marriage to 
Rosa Valls i Valls was another aspect of this. Moreover, the links between Ramón Godó and 
his cousin Juan included common interests in the textile factory, which led them to establish, 
in 1897, a company for the production of corsets and other types of cloth made of wool, with 
a capital of 10,000 pesetas.756 The same year the two men, together with a third cousin, 
established another company called “Crédito Ygualada”, dedicated to credit and banking 
operations.757 These kinds of operations ultimately reveal a tight bond between family 
members in which trust and cooperation were fundamental.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 [in Catalan]: “La nostra es la provincia ahont fa més negoci. Lo que no hi há á Igualada son fábricas molt en 
gran per l’estil de las que ha vist vostè a Mataró, Sabadell y altres centres, però potser no tardin á establirsen 
algunas. Avuy la més gran y la més important per sa producció es la de Joan Godó, de teixits de fil y de cotó, 
perque es la que conta ab més obrers, crech que 350, y s’hi fan totas las operacions fins al tint, entranthi’l gènero 
en brut y sortintne ja llest pera la venta. En fi, ja anirá vostè vegent exas y altras fábricas dignas d’un recort á 
L’ILUSTRACIÓ”. La Ilustració catalana, 31/07/1893, p. 14. 
754 “Prèvia una atenta invitació de don Joan Godó, anarem á visitar la fábrica que porta son nom, tan conegut en 
tota aquesta comarca, y qual fábrica, com deya mon paysá don Segundo en lo cop d'ull general á las fábricas 
igualadinas qu'en altre article publicarem, figura al devant de las més importants baix lo punt de vista de la 
cantitat. L'edifici es grandiosissim; axís es que s'hi mouen amplement los 350 treballadors qu'elaboran sos 
acreditats teixits de fil y de cotó; cutíes, tisanas, turcassas, planxas blavas, mallorcas, cèfirs, tartans de cotó y 
altras classes especials pera Cuba, Puerto Rico, Filipinas, etc. Crida l'atenció la superba máquina de vapor 
construhida en los tallers de la Maquinista, y de 120 cavalls. La primera materia, després d'haver entrat á 
aquesta fábrica, no'n surt fins á quedar convertida en tela completament á punt pera vendre. ―Fins l'aprest y'l 
tint se fa aquí,— digué'l senyor Godó.” La Ilustració catalana, 31 agost 1893, p. 254. 
755 The amount of money donated by Ramón was the highest in all of Barcelona’s provinces, and Juan’s was the 
second. All these donations were commented on in different Spanish newspapers: “Entusiasmo en Igualada”, La 
Dinastía, 26/04/1898; and El Imparcial and La Época on 26/04/1898. 
756 The society, called Baldomero Camps y Compañía was established with a third partner (Baldomero Camps 
Blaví). Ramón and Juan provided the capital in equal parts (5,000 ptas each) while Baldomero Camps was in 
charge of the management. Diario de Oficial de Avisos de Madrid, 17/11/1897, p. 1. 
757 Arxiu Històric de Protocols Notarials de Barcelona (AHPNB), Notari Josep Ferrer i Bernadas, 1897, vol 6è, 




Illustration 2. The Godó and Colomer family (Igualada, 3 March 1900) 758 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758  This picture was taken to celebrate the first mass of Francesc Colomer (first row, sixth from the left). 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find further information about the context in which this picture was taken, 
nor about the relationship between the Godó and Colomer families. Ramón Godó (owner of La Vanguardia): third 
row, first man from the left. Rosa Valls i Valls (Ramón’s wife): second row, sixth woman from the left (wearing a 
white dress). Juan Godó Llucià: front row, seventh person from the left (next to the bishop). Juan Godó Pelegrí 
(Juan’s son and mayor of Igualada between 1906 and 1914): fifth row, second man from the right. Source: Arxiu 




 However, one might wonder what Ramón Godó really thought about the political pre-
eminence his family had traditionally enjoyed in Igualada, especially since this pre-eminence 
relied heavily on clientelistic practices. All the more if Ramon’s newspaper, La Vanguardia, 
presented the fight against corruption as one of the central elements necessary to ‘regenerate’ 
Spain (as we saw in Chapter 5). How did Ramón, then, deal with what might seem to be a 
contradiction between the discourse of La Vanguardia and his own position as a Liberal 
politician? Although this question certainly presents numerous limitations from a 
methodological point of view (that is, what might look like a contradiction for the historian 
was not necessarily interpreted as such by his subject of study) there are certain sources that 
might reveal some of Ramón’s opinions about caciquismo.  
 One of these sources is an open letter that a group of citizens of Sant Martí de 
Sesgueioles (one of the 32 small towns that formed the constituency of Igualada) addressed 
to Ramón Godó, in which they denounced the clientelistic practices that were dominant in the 
constituency Ramón represented. The title of the letter was already indicative of its content: 
“OPEN LETTER. ANOTHER ARBITRARY ACT. [LETTER] TO MR. RAMÓN GODÓ 
LALLANA”; and it went like this: 
 
“Dear Sir.: For a long time, the people of your country, who do not worry about 
anything else but working and living this miserable life of ours (...), have been 
wondering for a long time... who is our Deputy? In this country, everyone thinks that the 
word Deputy is a synonym for cacique, and the caciques have indeed much to do with 
the omnipotence and despotism that prevails everywhere. This does not mean, Mr. Godó, 
that you are one of this kind; yet we wonder where are all the good civic customs that 
were the custom in this country that went beyond miserable interests, where have they 
gone now? All these miserable interests that unfortunately have been revived today as a 
result of political struggle? Who is it that has influence in this country? Where have the 
tranquillity and moderate habitudes of this country, where has its perfect order and good 
management in public things gone now? Will you be the responsible for this, Mr. Godó? 
The facts do not prove it clearly; furthermore, we do not want to think so. Perhaps you 
don’t even know that despotism and shamelessness is everywhere (...). We have not 
treated you well, Mr. Godó, but we believe you have honest and respectable feelings. 




otherwise, how could we understand that you allowed all this without you 
excommunicating it? (...).” 759 
 
 This letter, which is only partially reproduced, goes on to detail the “arbitrary acts” 
the mayors in their town were committing. The authors of the letter kept asking Ramón 
rhetorically if they were “his mayors” and “whether is it really true that we’re now living in 
the late 19th century”. The fact that the letter was written in Catalan carried political 
connotations: Catalan was clearly the dominant language in Igualada’s constituency, but not 
the one Ramón Godó customarily used. As explained in Chapter 1, the adoption of Spanish as 
the current language in the private sphere was the result of Godó’s migration to the Basque 
Country; as well as a typical strategy of “social distinction” among the Catalan bourgeoisie. 
Moreover, and as the next pages will show, language would become a new issue of political 
debate in the new mass politics, especially as Catalan nationalists made it a sign of opposition 
against the liberal-state’s official one (Spanish). Thus, the fact that the letter quoted above 
was written in Catalan is a subtle yet important element that needs to be taken into account.760 
 The letter addressed to Ramón ended with clear warning: “He who sows the wind 
shall reap the whirlwind” (in Catalan, “Qui sembra vents recull tempestats”). Therefore, the 
three men that signed the letter (Tomàs Estany, Josep Pont and Joan Boria Vall, about whom 
nothing has been found) were clearly advising Ramón to do something to remove 
caciquismo, and even left an open door in case he wanted to change things (though with a 
clear feeling of suspicion). Yet besides the content, this letter was clearly bad for Ramón 
Godó’s reputation, especially if we take into account that it was published in a Barcelona 
newspaper (the Diari de Catalunya).  
 Ramón’s reply to the letter did not take long to arrive. He replied from San Sebastian, 
where he was on holiday, and his response was published in La Vanguardia. The fact that he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759 Tomás Estany, Joseph Pont, Joan Boria y Vall, “Carta desclosa. Sobre un altre cas arbitrari. A D. Ramon 
Godó Lallana”. La Renaixensa. Diari de Catalunya, 30/08/1900 Letter written in Sant Martí de Sesgueioles, 
23th August 1900, p. 1. Original version in Catalan.  
760 It is important to note that the fact the Godó family members who lived in Barcelona adopted Spanish as 
their customary language justifies the criteria adopted in this thesis of writing the names of this family in 
Spanish (instead of Catalan). In so doing, an attempt has been made to leave a trace of a historical phenomenon: 
that is, the adoption of another language as a strategy of social distinction. That being said, it is important to 
highlight that at the time Catalonia was undergoing the phenomenon of “diglosia”, understood as the 
coexistence of two languages in the same territory (one of them carrying more prestige, the other one being the 
customary one, especially among the lower classes). Still, in villages and inland parts of the territory, like 
Igualada, Catalan clearly remained the prevalent language, and the branch of the Godó who lived in this town 
most surely used this as their common one. The nickname that Joan Godó was given (“Morrut”, in Catalan) is 
an example of this. On the phenomenon of “diglosia” for this period, see: Joan Lluís Marfany, La llengua 




replied in Spanish (and not in Catalan, as he had been addressed in the letter) is indicative of 
future political realignments of the Godó family in relation to language and identity. Ramón’s 
letter, made it clear that he had “bothered to reply to the letter only out of social courtesy to 
the people who signed it”, because the events the letter describes “have nothing to do with 
him [Ramón], as the men that signed the letter themselves admitted; and have nothing to do 
with his resolution as deputy, unless this public office is distorted”. According to the reply 
given by Ramón, if he had to intervene in every small issue in his district, both the public and 
the private, this would foster caciquismo instead of fighting it. Finally, Ramón’s letter made 
some clear statements about his own understanding of caciquismo: 
 
“(...) Y en cuanto á las consideraciones estampadas sobre los males del 
caciquismo, allí donde exista, el señor Godó las suscribiría con sinceridad completa. Por 
asentimiento natural y por estimación á los pueblos que le honraron con su 
representación en Cortes y en donde tantas afecciones tiene, el señor Godó no quiere 
ejercer en su distrito otra acción que la del bien, general y particular, hasta donde sus 
medios sociales alcancen. Las puertas de su casa están siempre abiertas para todo el que 
quiera contar con él persiguiendo sinceramente esos fines con respeto de la moral y de la 
ley. Frecuentemente, y esto no es ataque ni defensa, sino mera observación de un modo 
de ser de la realidad, se confunde con el caciquismo —otras veces auténtico— lo que es 
un estado social producido por el interés encontrado y por las pasiones desatadas de 
muchos. Ese estado social, que se determina por causas complejas, no se remedia por la 
autoridad ni por la acción de un hombre solo sino que es necesaria la cooperación de 
todos los hombres de buena voluntad, armonizando esos intereses y aplacando esas 
pasiones en lugar de fomentar la discordia con el prejuicio.” 761 
 
  
 The letter above quoted is of immense value to examine the understanding that 
contemporaries had of caciquismo – especially in the case of social actors who directly 
exploited it for their own benefit (“caciques”). Thus, Ramón Godó made his opinion crystal-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761 See also Chapter 7. “NOTAS LOCALES”, LV, 07/09/1900, p. 2. [E. T.]: “In what concerns the observations 
made on the ills of caciquismo, whatever it takes place, Mister Godó would not hesitate to subscribe them with 
total sincerity. Mister Godó was granted his position of Congress as a result of the natural approval and 
estimation that the has in towns, and Mister Godó only wants to exert in his district the comon good, as far as he 
is able. The doors of his house will always be open for anyone wishing to sincerely combat those ends with 
respect towards morality and the law. Very often, and this is not a self-defense nor a critique, but a mere 
observation, [people] mess caciquismo –often authentic– with what is a social state that is the result of heated 
confrontations. This social state, which stems from complex reasons, is not solved through authority nor the 
action of one single man but requires the cooperation of all the goodwill men, who shall join their interests to 




clear: he regarded caciquismo as something that should be extirpated from society (thus 
echoing the views of La Vanguardia). Still, Ramón noted that caciquismo was often mistaken 
as a result of the “existing tensions” in society.762 The only solution, he argued, was the 
“coming together of all the good men”. This kind of argument, which distanced Ramón from 
any responsibility for clientelistic practices, was often accompanied by a parallel discourse, 
consisting in stressing the excellent qualities Ramón allegedly possessed to represent 
Igualada’s constituency. Ramón’s close relation with the constituency, which stemmed from 
the family and material interests he had in Igualada, supposedly made him the “natural” 
candidate of this constituency. This kind of discourse aspired to construct a positive image of 
him as a deputy. The historian Manuel Marín has observed similar behaviour in the case of 
Pau Turull (a Catalan manufacturer from Sabadell, also involved in clientelistic practices). 
Marín has described this practice as the building of the image of “el buen cacique”.763  
 In practice, this discourse represented an investment in symbolic capital (in notions 
such as such as prestige and respectability) and a way to fight against defamation. In 1902, 
for instance, Ramón made a donation of an entire building to the town of Capellades to be 
converted into the new town hall.764 Capellades was one of the towns where the Godó family 
had traditionally faced stronger opposition. In order to combat this opposition, Ramón 
decided to donate the building in an attempt to improve his image in Capellades, as becomes 
clear in his explanation for this donation.765 In this regard, La Vanguardia turned out to be a 
particularly valuable instrument to invest in this type of symbolic capital. As had been 
common with Carlos Godó, when La Vanguardia mentioned anything about Ramón he was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
762 The leader of the Conservative Party in Barcelona (Manuel Planas i Casals) also referred to the accusations 
of caciquismo as a “misunderstanding”, which he morally justified on the grounds of the “legitimate influence” 
and the “protective role” of elites. For instance, he stated that: “Lo que hay es que se confunde maliciosamente 
el caciquismo con la legítima influencia alcanzada á fuerza de trabajos y sacrificios, y protegiendo y 
atendiendo, dentro siempre de sus justas aspiraciones, á cuantos á mi acuden, amigos y adversarios”. 
“Caciquisme”, La Veu de Catalunya, 07/04/1901, p. 1. On the discourse of the “legitimate influence”, see 
Chapter 1. 
763 Manuel Marín, “El buen cacique”, Historia Social, nº 36, 2000, pp. 21-34. The discussion of the role that the 
Godó family adopted as “protectors of the vulnerable” is indebted to the work of this historian. 
764 The new town hall was established in a pre-existing building (“y en cuanto al nuevo edificio por 
construcción hecha á sus expensas”) that Ramón had originally bought from Jaume Prats Casañas on 2 
November 1900. The sale price was 5,000 pesetas. By the time Ramón had donated the building, its value had 
gone up to 30,000 pesetas. Arxiu Notarial d’Igualada (ANI), Notari Martí Gual, any 1902, fols. 742-743. 
765 “Que impulsado por el intenso afecto que siente para la Villa de Capellades, al que ha correspondido esta con 
aquella lealtad y nobleza con que en toda ocasión sabe honrarse y enaltecerse y de que fué elocuente 
manifestación el e[x]pontáneo y entusiasta recibimiento que á raiz de ciertas lamentables injusticias, que 
quisiera el señor compareciente poder oblidar (sic), recibió en ella su señor padre Don Carlos Godó y Pié (q. e. 
p. d.); y en testimonio de gratitud y cariño hace donación á esta Villa de todo aquél edificio de reciente 
construcción, destinado á Casa Consistorial, situado en la calle de las [Plazas] de la presente, en la que aparece 
señalada, con el número treinta, ocupando una superficie de trescientos setenta y seis metros y cincuenta 




always described in especially good terms. Thus, the reception given to Ramón as a result of 
the donation he had made to the town of Capellades was given very detailed and positive 
coverage in La Vanguardia (a newspaper that was not only sold in Barcelona, but also 
throughout the Catalan territory): 
 
“El festival en honor de don Ramón Godó y Lallana, oportunamente anunciado, se celebró 
ayer en esta villa con un esplendor y entusiasmo superior á los cálculos más optimistas. A la 
madrugada de la fiesta, fué sorprendido agradablemente el vecindario con el toque de diana (...) 
desde cuya hora empezó el bullicio que fué aumentando con la llegada de forasteros, 
adquiriendo la población tan animado aspecto, que parecía un día de fiesta mayor. (...) Después 
de aguardar media hora bajo la bienhechora sombra de frondosa arboleda, con gran regocijo se 
divisó allá lejos, en la carretera de Igualada, una jardinera en la que se aproximaba don Ramón 
Godó, acompañado de varios amigos. Al llegar se apearon y cambiaron afectuosos saludos con 
la comisión (...) al frente de la cual iba la orquesta, ejecutando marchas patrióticas. Entró por la 
calle de San Ramón (...) pasando en este último punto por el artístico arco triunfal levantado en 
honor del señor Godó (...). Ante numerosa concurrencia que llenaba literalmente toda la casa, 
se hizo la ceremonia de la bendición de la misma [casa consistorial] por el reverendo cura 
párroco (...). En el propio salón de sesiones se leyó, por el notario de Igualada, (...) la escritura 
de la donación del edificio que motivó esta fiesta (...) Acto seguido, el señor alcalde don José 
Morera leyó con corrección y entusiasmo un bien escrito discurso ofreciendo al señor Godó un 
monumento que, si modesto en sí, dijo es grande en la intención, y retirando al efecto la cortina 
que lo cubría apareció en punto preferente del Salón una preciosa lápida de mármol (...) 
produciendo todo ello aplausos y vivas al señor Godó.”766 
 
 Events like the one above reveal the importance that image played in the social 
legitimation of elites – even for those elites like Ramón Godó whose re-election was often 
due to clientelistic practices. In this regard, I would argue that one of the limitations that can 
be observed in the literature is that the notion of “legitimation” of the elites has been too 
circumscribed to the sociological dimension of power. Thus, whether the aim has been to 
illustrate how violence was a decisive characteristic of the elites’ ascendancy, or to stress the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 LV, 29/07/1902, p. 3. [E. T.]: “The homage paid in honour of Mister Ramón Godó Lallana, previously 
announced, was celebrated amongst a level of brightness and enthusiasm superior to the most optimist 
estimations. (...) with great rejoice was announced the coming of Mr Ramon Godó, who came together with his 
friends. When they arrived they exchanged affectionate greetings with the commision (...) at the head there was 
the orchestra, playing patriotic songs. (...) [the commission] walked under a floral arch made in honour of Mr. 
Godó. (...) Before a great audience, which literally filled the whole building, a ceremony was celebrated to bless 
the new city hall (...) a marble inscription panel was inaugurated containing [leaving testimony of Godó’s 




capacity of those elites to create clientelistic networks based on a patron-client basis, both 
accounts have failed to notice the symbolic legitimation that is, in my view, another crucial 
element behind the legitimation of those elites.767 
 In fact, the pre-eminence of the elites was not only obtained through material sources, 
but was also the result of a (certain) recognition from the rest of the population, based on the 
accumulation by those elites of social and cultural capital, as the case of Ramón Godó 
demonstrates. The capacity of the local members of the elite to construct an image of 
themselves as the representatives and defenders of local interests, as well as their prestige or 
attachment to the locality, were notions that reinforced their power and acted as sources of 
legitimation. In the case of Ramón, discussed above, for instance, his reception in Capellades 
became a public demonstration aimed at strengthening his image in public. Thus, in addition 
to the public forms of gratitude that Ramón allegedly received (e.g. the “crowds” welcoming 
him, the music, the arch of triumph dedicated to him, etc.), this event became an opportunity 
to “invest” in the image of Ramón Godó as the new family leader of the Liberal Party in 
Igualada’s constituency. Thus, a total of 16 municipalities of this constituency sent their own 
commission to pay tribute to Ramón Godó, in addition to numerous social entities.768 This 
kind of demonstration was good publicity for Ramón and contributed to reinforcing his links 
with the territory. Finally, it must be noted that a substantial number of those assisting in this 
event were part of Ramón’s own network. Among the assistants included, for instance, his 
cousin and provincial deputy Juan Godó Llucià. Additionally, there was also Emiliano Orpí, 
on whose behalf Ramón Godó would intercede during that the same year in Madrid, through 
the good relations he held with Antonio Maura (by then Minister of “Governación”), to have 
Mr. Orpí re-elected as mayor of Igualada’s city council. In order to secure this “favour”, 
Ramón reminded Maura of the deep-roots the Godó family had in Igualada, this being the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
767 This does not imply that historians have neglected patronage in their study of clientelism; rather that the 
cultural dimension of elites is a subject that still requires further research, as various historians have stressed: 
Javier Moreno Luzón, “La historiografía sobre las élites de la España liberal”; and Pedro Carasa, “La historia de 
las élites políticas en el Parlamento español: de la prosopografía a la historia cultural”, Rafael Zurita, Renato 
Camurri (eds.), Las élites en Italia y en España (1850-1922), València, Publicacions de la Universitat de 
València, 2008, p. 42 and pp. 113-134, respectively.  
768 The municipalities that sent their comissions were: Monbui, Montmaneu, Bruch, Carme, Copons, Vilanova 
del Camí, Prat del Rey, Collbató, Miralles, Tous, Pobla de Claramunt, Castellolí, Castellfollit de Riubregós, 
Calonge de Calaf, Sant Martí de Sesgueioles and La Llacuna. The social entities were the Liga Comercial, 





argument he used to justify the need of not making drastic changes in the constituency’s 
representatives.769  
 However, despite the good relations Ramón Godó held with central government (as 
his contacts with Antonio Maura reveal), and despite his apparently solid position in 
Igualada’s constituency, the fact is that in the years to follow Ramón’s political pre-eminence 
would be highly contested. Or to put it in other words, the political strategy that had worked 
so well for the first generation of the Godó family (consisting in a combination of clientelism 
and the attachment to the territory through media propaganda) did not bring the same results 
for the second generation of the same family (that of Ramón and Juan Godó Llucià). This 
was due, for the most part, to the changed context in Barcelona in the first decade of the 20th 
century: namely, the emergence of mass politics. 
 Similar to what happened in other European cities (like Vienna, Austria, where the 
liberal parties were swept out of the city council in 1897),770 in Barcelona the rise of new 
political forces radically changed political power in the local sphere at the turn of the century. 
This took place in 1901, a year that can be considered as a turning point in the history of the 
Restoration. During that year, the two dynastic parties that had traditionally monopolised 
Barcelona’s council (the Conservative and the Liberal parties, as was the case across Spain) 
suffered an electoral defeat against the Catalan Nationalists of “La Lliga Regionalista” and 
the Republicans of Alejandro Lerroux. The outcome of these elections had a long lasting 
effect: from 1901 onwards, Barcelona did not elect one single deputy from either the Liberal 
or the Conservative parties, and something similar occurred with city councillors of these 
parties. The system of rotation between the two parties that Cánovas and Sagasta had 
organised since 1885 thus started to fail in Barcelona.771 Furthermore, in the following years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
769 “Excmo Señor Don Antonio Maura. Mi distinguido amigo; en varios periódicos de esta localidad y entre 
ellos, en el de mi propiedad La Vanguardia, se ha publicado la noticia, sin que pueda certificar su validez, de 
que antes de remover y cambiar los alcaldes de RO en las distintas cabezas de districto, espera Vd. recibir el 
informe del Gobernador Civil de cada provincia. Ignoro cual es el criterio del de esta, con respecto al Alcalde de 
Igualada, Don Emiliano Orpí pero, supongo, que si se ha informado ya convenientemente, su opinion ha de ser, 
de que continua desempeñando la presidencia del Ayuntamiento, pues el Señor Orpí, reúne, à la par que una 
honradez extrema, una inteligencia clarísima, siendo en general, muy considerado y querido en toda la 
localidad. Además, un cambio de alcalde en Igualada, ningún beneficio reportaría para unas elecciones, pues 
cualquiera que puediera abrigar la esperanza de representarlo, tropezaría con el inconveniente de su falta de 
prestigio en el distrito, estando este absorbido por la casa Godó que viene representándolo hace veinte años”. 
Archivo de la Fundación Antonio Maura, (AFAM) Leg. 45, carp. 29. Carta de Ramon Godó Lallana a Antonio 
Maura, Barcelona 17 diciembre 1902. On the tight relations between Godó and Maura, see Chapter 7. 
770 In the case of Vienna, the Liberals were swept out by the anti-Semitic Catholics of Karl Lueger. This process 
of degradation of liberal politics has been explained by Carl E. Schorske in his classic book Fin De-Siecle 
Vienna. Politics and Culture, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980. 
771 It must be noted that in previous elections, other city councils also started to challenge the pre-eminence of 
Liberal Parties. However, it never reached the same abrupt change represented in Barcelona, where the 




this change in politics started to spread to the rest of Catalonia (though very slowly and with 
enormous difficulties), finally reaching Igualada where the Godó family would feel its 
consequences directly.772 
 The change that occurred in Barcelona had much to do with the failure of the Silvela-
Polavieja government of 1900. Despite the high expectations this government had created 
throughout Spain, and particularly in Catalonia (for the entry of Duran i Bas in the 
government as Minister of “Gracia y Justicia”), the hopes for a reform of the Restoration 
system rapidly vanished.773 This would be due to the conflicting views that existed within the 
Government, particularly represented by the Minister Fernández Villaverde and his attempt 
to raise taxes as a way to reduce the debt inherited from the Spanish-Cuban-American War. 
Fernández Villaverde’s plans were utterly opposed to the public investment defended by 
Rafael Gasset; and also clearly went against the economic and financial economy that 
Catalan elites had defended as the first step towards the decentralisation of the liberal state. 
The immediate outcome of Villaverde’s economic policies was the resignation of Duran i Bas 
(he submitted his first resignation only two months after the government had started) and the 
emergence in Catalonia of a massive movement of opposition against paying taxes. This 
movement, which would popularly be known as the “Tancament de Caixes”, provoked the 
resignation of the first Catalanist mayor of Barcelona (Bartomeu Robert), the arrest of 
numerous people and the declaration of the state of war in this city. The outcome of the crisis 
would be the creation of an electoral candidacy by the main civic entities that promoted the 
decentralisation of the liberal state in response to the Disaster of 1898. This electoral 
candidacy would be known as “the candidacy of the Four Presidents” (in reference to the 
presidents of the four entities that formed it: the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional; Societat 
Econòmica Barcelonesa d’Amics del País; Ateneu Barcelonès; Liga de Defensa Industrial), 
who would radically break with the “turno dinástico” (“dynastic turn”) in Barcelona for the 
first time, in 1901.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
operated in other parts of Catalonia, in: Gemma Rubí and Josep Armengol, op. cit.; and G. Rubí, Els catalans i 
la política en temps del caciquisme. Manresa, 1875-1923, Vic, Eumo, 2006. 
772 As the historian Borja de Riquer has noted, after 1907 the liberal parties never managed to become again the 
largest political force in Catalonia. Between 1901 and 1923, the combined votes of the two liberal parties “only” 
amounted to 40%, compared to the Lliga Regionalista – 28%; the Republicans – 26%; the Catholic 
fundamentalists – 4%; and the other parties – 2%. In Barcelona’s city council the exclusion of liberal parties 
became even more palpable: after 1901, not a single liberal councillor was elected. Borja de Riquer, “Los 
límites de la modernización. El caso de Barcelona, 1890-1923”, in J.L. García Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la 
modernización de España. Los decenios interseculares, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1992, p. 57, n. 57; “Les eleccions 
de la Solidaritat Catalana a Barcelona”, Recerques, 1972, núm. 2, pp. 93-140. A general overview, in: Maria 
Gemma Rubí Casals & Josep Armengol Segú, Vots, electors i corrupció. Una reflexió sobre l’apatia a 
Catalunya  (1869-1923), Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 2012. 




 Besides their symbolic value, the elections of 1901 marked a turning point because 
they represented the start of mass politics in Barcelona:774 the “Lliga Regionalista” was 
founded, and the Catalan Nationalist Party was led by Enric Prat de la Riba, which 
represented, together with the Republican party of Alejandro Lerroux, a new way of doing 
politics.775  The Republicans and the Catalan Nationalists, however, had very different 
political projects. On the one hand, the Republicans saw the immorality of the political 
system as the ultimate cause of all social ills (and this included not just the loss of the 
colonies, but all sorts of social problems, like prostitution, violence and alcoholism). In 
response to this, their new leader, a young charismatic man called Alejandro Lerroux, made 
use of a populist and anticlerical discourse to attract growing numbers of Barcelona’s 
working class. In contrast to this, the Catalan nationalist party was a party that despite 
officially adopting an interclassist discourse, in practice, was mainly formed by the middle-
upper sectors of society (including the petty bourgeoisie). This party did not call for the end 
of the Restoration, like the Republicans, but rather promoted its reform through transparency 
in elections and the decentralisation of the liberal state. 
 Yet despite the important differences that existed between the Republicans and the 
Catalan Nationalists, both in terms of discourse and social base, what they had in common is 
that they made use of new forms of political activity, like political rallies and mass 
demonstrations. A good example of this were the “meriendas fraternales” of Alejandro 
Lerroux, a gathering – with refreshments – in the countryside that addressed the urban classes 
of Barcelona. On certain occasions, this kind of social event gathered more than 20,000 of 
Lerroux’s supporters. In contrast to the liberal parties, which relied on the indifference of the 
population to use clientelistic practices, the Republicans and the Catalan nationalists actively 
promoted the mobilisation of their supporters during elections. These two new parties made 
great use of newspapers to foster political mobilisation, especially at a time when the press in 
Spain was undergoing a process of great expansion. Thus, in comparison to the estimated 500 
newspapers that existed in Spain in 1879, their number rose to 1,300 newspapers in 1900 – a 
growth of 240%. In this regard, this growth of the Spanish press was characterised by the 
great upsurge of politically oriented papers. In 1901, for instance, of Barcelona’s 22 daily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
774 José Álvarez Junco, The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain. Populist Demagoguery and Republican 
Culture, 1890-1910, Brighton, Sussex University Press, 2003 [1st ed. in Spanish, 1990]. 
775 On Lerroux’s Republicanism, see the classic works of José Alvarez Junco, Joan B. Culla and Joaquín 
Romero Maura. On the Catalan nationalism of the Lliga Regionalista: Borja de Riquer, Lliga Regionalista. La 
burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme, 1898-1904, Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1977; Charles E. Ehrlic, Lliga 




newspapers, half of them still had partisan orientation, while the rest defined themselves as 
“independent”.776 
 The Republicans and the Catalan nationalists made intense use of the press to achieve 
their political goals. First of all, they used the press to disclose corruption in public. The aim 
was to provoke the reaction of their supporters as well as to educate people about their 
political rights. Thus, it was common that Republican and Catalan newspapers explained the 
electoral laws so their readers could report any instances of misconduct during elections. 
Secondly, the press was also used to mobilise their partisans to assure transparency during 
elections. For example, in 1901, when Alejandro Lerroux gathered hundreds of his supporters 
in Barcelona’s city council to make sure that the liberal parties did not manipulate the 
elections. According to some witnesses, many of Lerroux’s supporters did not leave their 
seats despite the elections lasting the entire day. It was even said that some of the assistants 
would not even leave to use the lavatory because they were afraid of losing their seats, indeed 
some of them even relieved themselves in their seats.777 From a more general perspective, 
political life increased notably in Barcelona. Thus, between 1899 and 1893 there were 38 
“big” political demonstrations in this city; between 1899 and 1903, there were 54 (with 23 
big demonstrations in 1903 alone); and between 1906 and 1909, only 33. Therefore, there 
was an average of 10 “important” political events in 1890-1893; 11 in 1899-1903; and around 
8 in 1907-1909.778  
 It was the use of corruption as a way to foster political mobilisation that ultimately 
provoked the crisis in the pre-eminence of the Godó family. Indeed, the political strategy that 
had worked so well for the first generation of the Godó family (that of Carlos and Bartolomé) 
started to be contested by the growing opposition to clientelistic practices, in which the press 
would play a decisive role. In contrast to the elections in which the first generation of the 
Godó family participated, where the opponents of liberal parties based their discourse on the 
fight against caciquismo, what started to change was the personalisation of this fight – that is 
to say, the fight against the “cacique”. As one of the main opponents of the Godó family 
explained when commenting on the elections of 1896 (the last elections in which Carlos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776 Ideological orientation of Barcelona’s partisan press: Republicans (2), Catalan Nationalists (3), Carlists (2), 
Conservatives (1), Liberal Conservatives (1), Democrats (2). María Carmen García Nieto “La Prensa diaria de 
Barcelona de 1895 a 1910”, Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, 1956 [thesis manuscript], p. 88. 
777 This anecdote about Barcelona’s city council appears in: Joaquín Romero Maura, “La Rosa de Fuego”. El 
obrerismo barcelonés de 1899 a 1909, Madrid, Alianza, 1989, p. 124. 
778 Pere Gabriel, Espacio urbano y articulación política popular en Barcelona, 1890-1920, José Luis García 
Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la modernización de España: los decenios interseculares, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 




Godó participated), “Contra el caciquismo se dirigía la campaña; no contra la persona 
[Carlos Godó] que, en opinión de muchos, hubiera quedado á salvo completamente á no 
tener á su lado una camarilla que era quien se decía todo lo mangoneaba”.779 The idea that 
clientelism was something performed by the local supporters of the Godó family, rather than 
by the family itself (something that, as we have just seen, was even defended by the political 
opponents of Carlos Godó) changed with Ramón Godó. For it was Ramón who faced the 
spread of mass politics from Barcelona to inland parts of the Catalan territory, like Igualada.  
 Indeed, Ramón Godó had won the first elections in which he participated without 
much difficulty. In 1899, for instance, he obtained his first victory thanks to the lack of 
participation of his opponents. The victory of Ramón (who apparently received this victory 
with “satisfaction” and “deeply felt emotion”) was due to the “total indifference” of 
Igualada.780 In fact, abstention would be one of the main reasons for the first victories of the 
Godó family’s second generation. On certain occasions, such as in 1901 and 1903, Ramón 
simply had no opposition and obtained 99% of the votes, something that clearly indicates the 
use of clientelistic practices by his supporters, among the general passivity of Igualada’s 
population. [See: Table 3] 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
779 La Semana de Igualada, 23/04/1899, p. 1. 
780 As one Republican newspaper lamented, “while all the Liberals fought with great efforts to win the position 
of deputy, the majority of people have remained indifferent in these elections which unfortunately have given 




 Table 3. Electoral results of the Godó family between 1899-1915 781 
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 However, there is another fact that appears clearly in Table 3, namely, the growing 
mobilisation in electoral participation. Thus, electoral turnout grew from 39.64% in 1896; to 
50% between 1901 and 1906; to more than 60% in 1907; and even experienced an 
“extraordinary” turnout of 80% in 1910. This progressive change in electoral turnout is 
revealing, ultimately, of the growing opposition the Godó family faced in Igualada from 
Catalan Nationalists and Republicans alike to win elections. Furthermore, the case of 
Igualada is clearly representative of the growth these two political forces (Catalanist and 
Republicans) experienced in Barcelona, where electoral turnout followed a very similar trend 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781 Source: Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (ACD); Albert Balcells et al., Les eleccions generals a 
Catalunya de 1901 a 1923. Relació dels resultats electorals de 1869 a 1899, Barcelona, Fundació Jaume Bufill, 
1982, p. 521 and p. 628; Jordi Planas i Francesc Valls-Junyent, Cacics i rabassaires. Dinàmica associativa i 
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Table 4. Electoral turnout in Barcelona’s elections 782 
 
   Date of elections     Electoral turnout  Type of elections 
         1899              10%          General 
         1901        20% and 30%      General; local. 
         1903             45.6%          General 
         1907              60%          General 
 
 
 Of all the elections above considered (both in Table 3 and 4), one of the clear turning 
points is the year of 1907. Indeed, this year represented a substantial shift in electoral turnout, 
both in Igualada (64.12%) and in Barcelona (60%). In the case of Barcelona a similar turnout 
would not be achieved again until the 1930s. This mobilisation would be the result of 
“Solidaritat Catalana”, a political coalition that would roundly defeat, for the first time, the 
Godó family in elections. Yet before this occurred, the Godó family would undergo profound 
internal tensions about how to respond to the rise of mass politics. 
 
 
6.2. WORDS AS WEAPONS: FAMILY SCANDALS AND RAMÓN GODÓ’S 
RESIGNATION (1906) 
 Although La Vanguardia was a newspaper that fully supported the Restoration system 
(though advocating its full renewal), the failure of the Silvela-Polavieja Government and the 
“Tancament de Caixes” marked a substantial shift in the position this newspaper adopted in 
relation to Catalan nationalism. The voluntary resignation of Duran i Bas from the 
government provoked strong criticisms from Madrid’s press, as the majority of newspapers 
strongly opposed the Catalan demands for decentralisation because they were regarded as a 
veiled attempt at separatism. This depiction of the events by the Madrid press occasionally 
provoked a reaction by La Vanguardia, as became clear on 9 May 1901 in an article entitled 
“Cataluña y la prensa de Madrid”: 
 
“ (...). No somos sospechosos de catalanismo en el sentido político de la palabra, 
porque jamás hemos militado en sus filas. Amando de todo corazón á Cataluña, de todo 
corazón amamos á España, nuestra patria. Pero precisamente por tributo á esos amores 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




lamentamos que algunos colegas de Madrid no sólo no acierten á estudiar con serenidad el 
catalanismo político, ni tampoco acierten á cumplir, á pesar de su deseo, la misión de paz 
que les corresponde, sino que contribuyan á la confusión y al malestar, hablando de 
explotadores y explotados (...).”783 
 
 This article illuminates the attitude La Vanguardia adopted in relation to Catalan 
nationalism. The newspaper openly admitted that “political catalanism” had never been part 
of its editorial policy. Still, the fact that even a newspaper like La Vanguardia, which was not 
“suspicious” of Catalan nationalism, protested about the way the Madrid newspapers had 
represented this political movement, is particularly revealing of the changes that were taking 
place in Catalonia at the time. In fact, immediately after the Disaster of 1898, the 
Conservative Duran i Bas had already warned General Polavieja about the growing 
detachment of Catalan public opinion from the Restoration system.784 And in 1906 this 
dissatisfaction resulted in the creation of the electoral coalition of the “Solidaritat Catalana” 
(“Catalan Solidarity”). As we have seen, these elections had the highest participation ever 
achieved in Barcelona. A similar political mobilisation also took place in Igualada, where the 
Solidaritat Catalana also ran in the elections with the specific goal of overthrowing the 
political domination of the Godó family. 
 The immediate motivation behind the creation of the Solidaritat Catalana was a 
historical event popularly known as the “fets del Cu-Cut!” (1905). This expression referred to 
the attack on the editorial offices of the satirical journal Cu-cut! and La Veu de Catalunya by 
the military. The first of these newspapers had ridiculed the Spanish army in a caricature and 
a group of young soldiers had decided to retaliate. The vast majority of Barcelona’s press 
immediately criticised the attack and expressed its solidarity with the two newspapers 
affected. Like other newspapers in the city, regardless of their ideology, La Vanguardia 
condemned the assault. Yet, despite all these protests, the Liberal government of Segismundo 
Moret not only refused to denounce the attack but also decided to pass a new Law 
(20/03/1906) according to which any insult against Spain or Spanish symbols (understood in 
a broad sense, including criticisms of the army and the Crown) would be judged by martial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783 “Cataluña y la prensa de Madrid”, LV, 09/05/1901, p. 5. [E. T.]: “(...) We are not suspicious of being Catalan 
nationlists in the political sense, because we have never been in their ranks. We love with all our heart 
Catalonia, and we also love with all our heart Spain, our motherland. But precisely because we pay tribute to 
these beloved we lament that some coleagues in Madrid miss the point of examining with serenity [the nature] 
of political catalanism, and they also miss, despite their intentions, in their mission, and rather contribute to 
confusion and to creating discomfort, when they speak of exploiters and exploited.” 




law and military courts. The response to this law (which designated the display of the Catalan 
flag or the singing of the Catalan anthem as an “offence” to Spanish symbols) was a massive 
public demonstration in Barcelona of around 200,000 people (35% of the total population of 
the city). That same year, another protest gathered some 20,000 people, the biggest crowd 
ever achieved in a close area.785 All these demonstrations illustrate the growing politicisation 
of Barcelona’s population, which culminated the following year in the creation of a wide 
coalition of political forces. With the sole exception of the liberal parties and the Republicans 
of Alejandro Lerroux (which were openly against Catalan nationalism), the rest of the 
political forces joined together in a coalition that would be known as the “Solidaritat 
Catalana” (the Carlists, the Lliga Regionalista, Centre Nacional Republicà, Unió Catalanista, 
federal republicans and a part of the Unión Republicana). The political programme of this 
coalition was based on very few points, consisting in the repealing of the above-mentioned 
Law and a set of vague proposals (decentralisation, autonomy in education and other social 
services).786 
 Amidst the heated political situation of Spain, and particularly Catalonia, at the time, 
Ramón Godó started to become the target of the newspapers that supported the Solidaritat 
Catalana. As we saw earlier, Ramón had already been criticised in the past by other 
newspapers. However, what was different in 1906 was that due to the growing mobilisation 
of political parties in the region, the criticisms levelled at the Godó family in the press 
became more hostile. For instance, Ramon started to be referred to in the press as a 
“stranger” to his own country because of his lack of support for the cause of decentralisation 
and his poor knowledge of the Catalan language.787 Moreover, a novel strategy was used by 
these newspapers, consisting in the association of La Vanguardia with the clientelistic 
practices of Ramón Godó. In fact, the fight against caciquismo would be one of the main 
leitmotifs of the Solidaritat Catalana. Thus, as La Veu de Catalunya claimed, in an article 
entitled “La Vanguardia caciquista”: 
 
 “La Vanguardia has finally removed its mask. In opposing Catalonia and the national 
cause, this newspaper has presented itself as it really is, namely as with the owner of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
785 As noted by Pere Gabriel, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 
786 On this coalition, see: Gemma Rubí i Francesc Espinet, Solidaritat catalana i Espanya (1905-1909), 
Barcelona, Base, 2008. 
787 Although it is hard to believe that Ramón did not know the Catalan language (especially as he held close ties 
with Igualada, where this was the predominant language) various contemporaries noted Ramón’s reluctance to 
speak in Catalan. Apparently, this was related to the fact that he was born in the Basque Country and had a close 




newspaper, as the cacique of Igualada, the Catalan who ignores the language of his own 
grandparents, the mestizo that repudiates the traditions of the country of his own father. (...) 
La Vanguardia only keeps repeating the point of view of its foreign owner; this newspaper 
speaks in the same way as newspapers in Madrid do (...); when honourable patricians decide 
to start a vigorous electoral campaign, and make the effort of organising endless political 
rallies, La Vanguardia remains silent, as if nothing has happened (...); it is in Igualada that 
elections are manipulated shamelessly; it is in Igualada that the will of the voters is 
manipulated, and when that is not possible, votes are bought with money or with food; it is 
in Igualada that elections are won at any cost, no matter who should fall to get it. The ones 
that rule in Barcelona want real votes; in Barcelona the Lliga Regionalista prefers losing the 
elections rather than winning the Republicans through illegal methods, (...) the same illegal 
methods that are still used in Madrid; for us it would be easy to employ such methods if we 
wished to. In Barcelona, if a candidate used the same methods as Godó, he would have been 
considered a dishonest person, and his enemy would be the one to oppose him through fair 
rules. (...) So please Mr. Godó don’t tell us about morality... because people will laugh in 
your face.”788 
 
 The article quoted above is revealing of how language and caciquismo were two 
rhetorical arguments that were used to contest the Godó’s political domain. Indeed, if the 
members of this family had traditionally presented themselves as the natural representatives 
of Igualada, based on the deep-roots they had in this locality, now the same discourse was 
used against them. Thus, Ramón’s supposed reluctance to use Catalan was the point that the 
family’s political rivals sought to exploit through the press: he was not a “native” of Igualada, 
but a “foreigner”; and therefore he lacked the legitimacy to represent local affairs.789 These 
attacks from Barcelona’s press reveal the importance given in politics to the personal 
attachment to the constituency; as well as how the prestige of local elites was contested in the 
public sphere by the new political movements. 
 Moreover, the second persisting argument in the attacks against Ramón Godó was the 
link between caciquismo and La Vanguardia. The nationalist newspaper La Veu de 
Catalunya kept publishing further articles with the title “La Vanguardia és caciquista” (“La 
Vanguardia is the mouthpiece of caciquismo”, in English); while in parallel other newspapers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788 “La Vanguardia es caciquista”, La Veu de Catalunya, 28/09/1905, p. 5, evening edition. Quote translated 
from Catalan. 
789 Besides “foreigner” (in Catalan, “forester”), Godó was also called “mestizo”. This was the Spanish word 
used in the Spanish colonies in South-America to refer to the children born of Spanish and Amerindians 
relations. The fact that Godó’s mother was Basque and his father was Catalan was probably the reason behind 




in Barcelona accused Godó of silencing any news related to the Lliga Regionalista.790 These 
kinds of attacks against La Vanguardia continued during the latter months of 1905, and not 
just from La Veu de Catalunya and La Renaixensa, but also from other newspapers in 
Barcelona, like La Campana de Gràcia and El Diluvio, as well as from the press in 
Igualada.791 La Veu de Catalunya, for instance, argued that “Mr. Godó is nothing more than 
the cacique of the district, they are all the same. And the newspaper he owns is a defender of 
caciquismo that shamefully hides behind its label as independent”.792 
 The smear campaign directed at Ramón Godó demonstrates how his position as 
deputy was increasingly being related to his position as newspaper proprietor. This link 
between the two spheres of influence (politics and the press) is precisely what the Godó 
brothers had sought to separate with the reform plans of 1888, when La Vanguardia was 
turned into an “independent” newspaper. But now this strategy was starting to fail, as the 
family’s rivals saw this double condition (proprietor of an independent newspaper as well as 
politician) as Ramón’s Achilles heel. These kinds of attacks contained a second aim, that of 
challenging the image of La Vanguardia as a politically neutral (“independent”) newspaper. 
 If this string of attacks was detrimental to Godó’s image as the father of the district 
and damaged La Vanguardia’s reputation as an independent newspaper, the worst was still to 
come. A few months later, on 22 June 1906, rumours start to surface about Ramón’s intention 
to resign as deputy of Igualada. These rumours did not stem from the attacks Ramón had 
received until then, but rather started when an incident that occurred in Igualada leapt onto 
the pages of the Barcelona press. The incident in question was the arrest of the presidents of 
“El Ateneo Igualadino” (Mr. Llansana) and of the “Centro Autonomista” (Mr. Mussons), two 
entities of Igualada that had a clear Republican and Catalanist orientation. They were arrested 
for having organised a meeting. This incident, for which the Godó family was blamed, was 
one among a number of other arbitrary acts that the followers of this family had been 
committing recently.793 The situation in Igualada reached its tipping point a few days later, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
790 “Mentidas del ‘Ciero’ y ‘La Vanguardia’,” La Veu de Catalunya, 16/09/1905, p. 1, Night edition. These 
accusations, in case they were true, reveal that the power of newspaper editors not only consisted in the capacity 
to publicise certain events, but also to silence others according to their private agenda. 
791 La Campana de Gràcia reproduced an article published in Igualada’s newspaper Nova Llevor that started by 
saying “Our dear elected deputy, Ramón Godó Lallana, is a FOOL.” This title referred to an event that took 
place in Igualada that had apparently made a fool of Ramón. La Campana de Gràcia, 30/09/1905, p. 7. “La 
Vanguardia es caciquista”, La Renaixensa, 16/09/1905, night edition, p. 1. 
792 The original text stressed in italics “the newspaper he owns”. Ibidem. 
793 The newspaper El Igualadino made a detailed account of events: "IGUALADA. – Una de las mayores plagas 
que nos ha traído la Restauración es, sin duda, el caciquismo (...). Este último es el que impera en Igualada, 
cuyo cacicazgo comparten el diputado á Cortes, don Ramón Godó y Lallana; el diputado provincial, don Juan 




June 1906, when the second major deputy of the city was physically assaulted by an 
employee of Juan Godó Pelegrí – the mayor of Igualada.794 Hence, when these events took 
place, the Godó family had reached its highest level of control in Igualada’s political life: 
three members of the family were, respectively, deputy at the Congress, provincial deputy 
and mayor – each for Igualada’s constituency. Such a monopoly over public office by 
members of the same family increased the feeling that despotic rule pervaded Igualada’s life. 
 Yet what is particularly remarkable about the events that occurred in this city is that 
they rapidly turned into a mediatised scandal, capable of exceeding Igualada’s local sphere 
and attracting the interest of newspapers in Barcelona. The event that took place in May 1906 
turned into an scandal capable of generating interest not only among local readers in Igualada 
but also in Barcelona because it entered the debate about public perceptions of the common 
good (e.g. arbitrary violence linked to caciquismo).795 Furthermore, the scandal in Igualada 
generated an open protest by a group of deputies, who protested to the Council of Ministers 
in Madrid. The same deputies also visited the Civil Governor and the President of the 
Audience to demand an investigation for the “very serious events” that took place in 
Igualada, while a petition was organised to free the arrested men.796 
 As all these events took place, Ramón Godó found himself embroiled in the family 
scandal. In fact, Ramón was not directly responsible for the events that had occurred in 
Igualada. Rather, all the accusations were directed at the mayor, Joan Godó Pelegrí. But it 
was as a result of Ramón’s membership of a broader collective, that is, the family, that the 
scandal also affected him and La Vanguardia. Thus, there is evidence that the day after the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
terrenos. Los Godós andan descaradamente de continuo visiteo con los funcionarios de justicia, cuando los actos 
del alcalde son censudaros se apela al envio de fuerzas de la guardia civil, la tranquilidad desaparece, se envian 
anónimos amenazadores; un sujeto apodado Rosa Negra, agente municipal, anda repartiendo palos por las 
calles, sin que nadie se atreva con él porque el caciquismo le ampara; en fin esto es un vivir insoportable y no 
será extraño que algún dia colmada la medida se registre en Igualada un dia de luto.” “Dietario de Igualada”, El 
Igualadino, 30/06/1906, p. 1. 
794 Juan Godó Pelegrí (1876-1957), popularly known as “Juanito”, was the son of Joan Godó Llucià. He was 
appointed mayor of Igualada by royal decree on January 1st 1906, a position he held until 1914. For his position 
within the family, see Table 2; for an image of him, see Illustration 2; both in this chapter. Further details on his 
career, in Chapter 7. 
795 Hence, one contemporary recalled that “Almost all of Barcelona is aware of the confrontation the honourable 
town of Igualada is holding against a petty oligarchy, and we are all eager to follow the events”. Another 
testimony recalled that “the majority of Barcelona’s press has talked about the dispute in our city between the 
people and the oligarchy”. Indeed, numerous newspapers of Barcelona (like La Campana de Gràcia, La 
Renaixensa, El Poble Català and El Diluvio) referred to the events and used the opportunity to criticise, once 
again, the Godó family. See, for instance, El Diluvio, 26/06/1908, p. 14. 
796 “Rogamos V.E. encarezca ministro Gracia y Justicia procure enterarse procedimientos anormales seguidos 
Igualada contra republicanos y catalanistas contra ley, comprometiendo paz publica, y ponga remedio eficaz 
para que no se quebranten los principios que todo Gobierno debe defender. Rusiñol, Albó, Rahola, Salvatella, 
Abadal, marqués de Camps, Corominas, Bertran y Musitu, Girona.” “Gacetilla”, El Diluvio, dissabte 30 de juny 




aggression took place (22 June 1906), Ramón arrived in Igualada to discuss what had 
happened with his relatives. During the following days, all sorts of rumours spread about the 
possibility that the three members of the Godó family would resign from public office.797 
Finally, the tension among the different members of the family was resolved on 1 July 1906, 
when, only one week after the “scandal” had broke in Igualada, Ramón Godó Lallana 
decided to resign from his position as deputy. He announced this in an open letter published 
in La Vanguardia, where he stated that he would not be running for the next legislative 
elections. The letter went: 
 
“De don Ramón Godó, diputado á Cortes y propietario de LA VANGUARDIA, 
recibimos la siguiente carta: Sr. Director de LA VANGUARDIA. Mi estimado amigo: En más 
de una ocasión he manifestado particularmente á algunos amigos íntimos el propósito que 
abrigaba de apartarme por ahora de la vida política activa, en que ninguna satisfacción 
personal he encontrado, pero sí muchos disgustos y decepciones. Habiendo mis 
manifestaciones, no obstante su carácter, hasta ahora meramente particular, trascendido á la 
opinión en el distrito de Igualada, que tengo la honra de representar en Cortes, y sido 
torcidamente comentadas é interpretadas, entiendo llegado el momento de declarar que, en 
efecto, he tomado la firme resolución de no presentar mi candidatura en las próximas 
elecciones de diputados á Cortes, sea cual fuere el plazo que tarden en verificarse aquéllas y 
sea cual fuere el partido que las realice, considerándome, por lo tanto, desde ahora apartado de 
la política. Créome, pues, obligado á poner mi resolución en conocimiento de mis amigos y de 
los electores del distrito de Igualada, de cuyo afecto y confianza guardaré siempre vivísimo 
agradecimiento. Ruego á usted ordene la inserción en las columnas de LA VANGUARDIA de 
esta carta. De usted siempre afmo. amigo, Ramón Godó.”798  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797 The newspaper El Igualadino provided a detailed account of the tension within the Godó family: “Dia 22 de 
Junio. —Un empleado del Alcalde D. Juan Godó Pelegrí, atropella brutalmente al teniente de Alcalde D. 
Leopoldo Sabat. Dia 23 de Junio. —Es obsequiado el alcalde D. Juan Godó con serenatas. Llega en automóvil el 
diputado á Cortes D. Ramón Godó. Dia 24 de Junio. —Dicese que los tres Godó diputado á Cortes uno, 
diputado Provincial otro y alcalde de R.O. el tercero, acuerdan retirarse de la política. Dia 25 de Junio. —Se 
dice que ya no se retiran los Godó. Dia 26 de Junio. —Amigos íntimos de los Godó afirman que renuncian á su 
cacicato. Dia 27 de Junio. —Asegúrase que eso de la retirada son pamplinas. Dia 28 de Junio. —Sesión del 
Ayuntamiento presidida por el Sr. Godó en que se demuestra que no hay necesidad de policías ni guardia civil 
para que haya órden. Por lo visto no se retiran. Dia 29 de Junio. —Los Godó hace (sic) como que se van y 
vuelven.” “Dietario de Igualada”, El Igualadino, 30/06/06/1901, p. 1. 
798 LV, 01/07/1906. [E.T.]: “My dearest friend: on more than one occasion, I have privately confessed to my 
closest friends my purpose of retiring from politics. No private pleasure have I ever found in politics, and it has 
rather been a source of continuous annoyance and disappointment. However, since my thoughts have become 
public in the district of Igualada, which I am honoured to represent at the [Spanish] Congress, and have been 
repeatedly manipulated, I deem it necessary to announce my firm intention of not running for the next elections 
for deputy at the Congress, no matter the date or the party that will call these elections. Therefore, I now 
consider myself as retired from politics. I believe it is my duty to communicate this decision to my friends and 






 With the above letter, Ramón Godó decided to put an end to his political career. Up to 
that moment, he had run in four legislative elections (spanning the years between 1899 and 
1906) and had won all of them. Yet, as he confessed, he was tired of politics. 
  Soon after La Vanguardia published Ramón’s letter of resignation, the traditional 
opponents of the Godó family celebrated the news. In the view of El Diluvio, the resignation 
of Ramón Godó was the result of the campaign in which this Barcelonan newspaper had so 
actively participated.799 Other newspapers from the same city, like La Veu de Catalunya, 
reached the same conclusions as El Diluvio, and presented Ramón’s resignation as “the 
victory of the good citizens of Igualada against caciquismo”. Another newspaper insisted that 
“Everywhere all the newspapers talk about the same thing: articles, correspondences, 
telegrams and telephone calls, all these comment on and try to explain the reasons that have 
led him to resign.”800 Eventually, even Madrid’s press made reference to Ramón Godó’s 
letter of resignation.801 In this regard, Ramón’s decision was probably influenced by another 
element. Namely the fact that Spain’s Superior Court had sentenced a group of Ramón’s 
supporters to imprisonment for violently assaulting a man in Pierola (one of the towns of 
Igualada’s constituency).802 
 In any case, regardless of what finally convinced Ramón Godó to resign from politics, 
his case is revealing of the growing mediatisation of politics. As had happened to Rafael 
Gasset with El Imparcial (explained in the introduction to this chapter) Ramón’s involvement 
in politics started to be incompatible with his status as the proprietor of an “independent” 
newspaper. However, while Gasset saw the sales of his newspaper decrease as a result of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
799 “Por lo visto, el revuelo y desasosiego que reina en el distrito de Igualada por las rechorías del caciquismo, 
de las cuales se ha ocupado toda la Prensa y motivando que los representantes en Cortes republicanos y 
catalanistas se ocuparan seriamente del asunto, ha producido sus resultados. Al menos así hay que suponerlo en 
virtud de retirarse de la vida activa de la política el diputado á Cortes por aquel distrito, don Ramon Godó, 
retirada que el interesado explica del siguiente modo en una carta que ha publicado.” “Gacetilla”, El Diluvio, 
03/06/1906, p. 8-9. 
800 R. Romesquet Picantó, “¡¡¡Quin desastre!!!”, El Igualadino, 08/07/1906, p. 2.  
801 “Retirada de Godó”, ABC, 03/07/1906, p. 10. 
802 “IGUALADA. – El vecindario de esta ciudad y de todos los pueblos del partido de que es cabeza, 
convertidos por la estirpe caciquista de los señores Godó en otros tantos feudos, ha recibido con entusiasmo la 
noticia de que el Tribunal Supremo ha confirmado la sentencia dictada por la Audiencia de Barcelona 
condenando á una temporada de prision por el delito de lesiones á varios prójimos, instrumentos ciegos del 
cacique máximo señor Godó, que con fecha 5 de julio de 1904 agredieron cobarde y brutalmente al propietario 
del pueblo de Pierola don José Roviralta. Aquellos cuatro criminales eran entonces uno, llamado José 
Parcerisas, teniente de alcalde del Ayuntamiento de Pierola; otro, secretario de éste, y los otros concejales del 
mismo, individuos todos ellos del somaten, y por lo tanto agentes de la autoridad.” “Regionales”, El Diluvio, 




behaviour during the Disaster of 1898, in the case of Ramón the tension between the press 
and politics manifested itself through public accusations of corruption (clientelism). The case 
of the Godó family thus reveals how the fight against corruption became one of the main 
elements in the discourse of the Catalan nationalists and the Republicans. This chapter has 
shown how the fight against corruption became a new device for political mobilisation, 
particularly for those parties that symbolised the new mass politics.  
 As in the case of Vienna, where the liberal parties were swept away by a new political 
movement (in that case, by the anti-Semitic Catholics of Karl Lueger), something similar 
happened in Barcelona too. From 1901 onwards this city would not elect a single member of 
the Conservative or Liberal parties. Although the cases of Vienna and Barcelona obviously 
obey very diverse political contexts, and the new political forces that emerged were very 
different, in both cities these forces made clear a new type of subjective discourse, one of the 
characteristics of the new mass politics in Europe. That is to say, a new type of discourse 
emerged, based on appealing to a bourgeoning electorate through subjective elements (such 
as anticlericalism, nationalism, demagoguery or anti-Semitism).803 This kind of discourse was 
in stark contrast to mid-19th-century politics, which showed a confidence in the progress of 
mankind through reason and material development. In contrast to this, the turn of the century 
was a moment in all of Europe (and in the Mediterranean in particular) that was dominated 
by pessimism and unrest about the future. 
 The capacity of mobilisation in the denouncing of corruption produced in Catalonia is 
also revealing of the changes that were taking place – arguably with less intensity – in some 
of Spain’s major urban settings.804 Before 1898 clientelistic practices had already been 
criticised on many occasions. These public accusations, however, traditionally brought few 
consequences.805 The scarce interest of liberal parties in enforcing anti-corruption laws, 
combined with the low mobilisation of society during elections, explains why these 
accusations had little effect. However, the Disaster of 1898 represented a crisis of identity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803 The idea of the emergence of a new “subjective” discourse is taken from Carl E. Schorske Fin De-Siecle 
Vienna..., op. cit. 
804 Especially in the case of Valencia, where the Republicans broke the monopoly of power of liberal parties and 
gained control of the city council in 1891. In Madrid the Republicans (and to a lesser extent, the Socialists) 
considerably improved their results, especially in 1893 and 1903; but they did not manage to transform the 
electoral map. Indeed, this chapter has argued that Barcelona was the place where the crisis of liberal parties 
became more intense, for none of these parties ever saw one single councillor elected again. See: Borja de 
Riquer, op. cit; Alicia Yanini y Rafael Zurita Aldeguer, “Comunidad Valenciana”; and Rogelio López Blanco, 
“Madrid”, both in: Joaquín Varela Ortega (ed.), El poder de la influencia. Geografía y caciquismo en España 
(1875-1923), Madrid, Marcial Pons, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2001, pp. 383-419; and pp. 
283-324, respectively.  




during which corruption and other moral issues underwent deep scrutiny in public opinion. 
The outcome was the strong discredit of the political system and the growing calls for the 
need of redefining the Restoration (or even the need of overthrowing it). Far from being 
monopolised by the new political movements, the calls in favour of renewing the political 
system were also embraced and supported – at least in public – by the same liberal parties, as 
the case the Silvela-Polavieja government illustrated.  
 However, the case of Ramón Godó reveals to what extent the increasing mobilisation 
of new political parties became a serious threat for the social pre-eminence of liberal elites. 
This threat was not only evident in the calls for accountability during elections, but also in the 
attempts the new parties made at undermining the public legitimation of traditional elites. In 
this regard, the scandal that affected Ramón can be seen as part of a struggle over the sources 
of symbolic power. As John B. Thompson has noted, scandals have the potential of 
destroying reputation and undermining trust.806 The same author has observed that reputation 
does not apply equally in all social fields. In certain fields, where confidence and trust are a 
crucial aspect in the legitimacy of an individual (e.g. a politician), reputation is particularly 
important, and therefore the consequences a scandal might entail are bigger.807  
 In the case of Ramón, while he invested in his position as the heir of Carlos Godó and 
therefore as the “natural” representative of Igualada’s interests (as became clear in his visit to 
Capellades), his enemies used the opposite argument. Namely, that Ramón was a “stranger” 
to the territory, because he was born in the Basque country and rarely used the Catalan 
language. Both the strategy of Ramón and that of his enemies reveal one of the characteristics 
historians have noted about parliamentary life in Catalonia, consisting in the general 
reluctance to accept “foreign candidates” (the so-called “candidatos cuneros”). In other 
Spanish regions this reluctance was not so evident as it was in the case of Catalonia.808  
 In this struggle for the symbolic sources of legitimation, public opinion became the 
target sought by the different actors involved. Since 1881, the Godó family had seen the 
establishing of La Vanguardia as an opportunity to gain public visibility and as a way to 
promote their private agenda more effectively. The resignation of Ramón Godó, however, 
reveals the unexpected consequences of Godó’s strategy to expand their influence to new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 John B. Thompson, Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age, Cambridge, Polity, 2000,        
p. 247. 
807 Ibidem, p. 249. 
808 As much as 80% of the deputies in Congress from Catalonia were born in this region, which was in contrast 
to the customary practice of central governments to impose their own “foreign” candidates in given 
constituencies. Maria Gemma Rubí y Josep Armengol Segú, “Cataluña”, Joaquín Varela Ortega (ed.), El poder 




publics. The role of newspaper editor exposed Ramón in public (even when he did not use the 
press in the same self-oriented way as Luca de Tena did with El Imparcial) and meant being 
subject to criticism from a wider range of political actors. Especially since the passing of the 
new press freedom law of 1883, and the expansion of both the number of newspapers and the 
reader market (mentioned earlier), public opinion became an alternative channel to elections 
for a growing number of political actors.809 The outcome was a new space for political 
participation that was more plural and depersonalised (in contrast to clientelism, which was 
based on favouritism), and therefore harder for the Godó family to control. 
 As a man who based the popularity of his newspaper on the commitment to providing 
“neutral” information (no matter how suspect this claim was), Ramón Godó probably decided 
to resign from politics to salvage of La Vanguardia from the bad publicity caused by the 
family scandal.810 Ramón’s resignation, however, can hardly be justified if we do not take 
into account the very special historical context in which it took place (the highly politicised 
moment of post-1898, the crisis of legitimation of the Restoration system and the creation of 
the Solidaritat Catalana), and the expansion of the reading market and its pluralistic 
characteristics. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that for social actors, 
controlling the “legitimate discourse” became a much more difficult goal to achieve in the 
increasingly plural market of readers.  
 Finally, it must be noted that in his attempt to save the prestige of La Vanguardia, 
Ramón Godó disrupted the strategies of his relatives in Igualada. His resignation meant that 
the Godó family, which had monopolised public office in this constituency for years, now 
suddenly disappeared from the map. However, the family did not give up its position in the 
Congress without a fight. According to this determination to resist, the family would redesign 
its traditional strategies to face the challenge of the Solidaritat Catalana. Ramón Godó 
himself would participate in this attempt, though by using more subtle forms of exerting 
influence. This redefining of strategies will be the focus of the next chapter. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
809 See the remarks of Hilda Sábato quoted in the Introduction of this thesis. 
810 As the Republican newspaper El Igualadino commented: “The advice of family and friends... and the serious 
damage that Godó feared in La Vanguardia, led him to take the decision [to resign] (...) Everywhere the press is 
full of it”. Original text, written in Catalan: “Els consells de familia, la veu dels amichs... y ‘ls grans perjudicis 
que ‘n Godó preveya à La Vanguardia, l’han induit á prendre tal resolució. (...) Arreu la prempsa d’aquets dias 
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 The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the way the Godó family responded to the 
crisis of liberal politics, as part of the rise of the new mass society in Europe. The years prior 
to the First World War (1914-1918) were a period of drastic transformations across the entire 
Continent. One of the features that characterised this moment of change was the broadening 
of the political spectrum, spurred by a double process: the widening of the franchise and the 
politicisation of larger segments of society, on one hand; and the advent of a new class of 
professional politicians and large-scale organisations, on the other.811 A series of heated 
controversies galvanized these transformations and divided European societies profoundly. 
Disputes over the role of religion, tensions over social reforms and challenged understandings 
of the nation pervaded public debate during this period. None of these controversies were 
new, but intensified as a result of structural transformations (like urbanisation and 
industrialisation) and the arrival on the scene of a new social actor: the “masses”. 
 These were all transformations that put liberal institutions and the elites who 
traditionally benefited from them in dire straits. Historian John Garrard has identified two 
different patterns of response among Europe’s liberal elites to this new situation, divided by 
the Rhine. According to Garrard, while elites on the west side of the Rhine (e.g. England or 
France) accepted the widening of the franchise, after previous periods of initial resistance, 
elites located on the east of the Rhine, in contrast, accepted the widening of the the social 
bases of their regimes, but arguably “did so within political frameworks intended to remain 
basically autocratic”. This would be the case, for instance, of Italy.812 The dividing line that 
Garrard establishes with the Rhine constitutes an attempt to provide an overview of a 
phenomenon that is difficult to classify at a European scale.  
 Still, the geographic division of this author seems to draw on the same perspective 
that dominated the debate in the 1990s about the role of the “bourgeoisie” in the crisis of 
liberalism. Hence, in the case of southern Europe, historians have long debated the capacity – 
and above all, the willingness – of traditional elites to promote the democratisation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811 A collection of classic essays on these transformations: Benjamin Ziemmann and Thomas Mergel (eds.), 
European Political History, 1870-1913, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007. 
812 These considerations do not imply that the democratisation of politics was a top-down process controlled by 
elites, but rather an uneven and often erratic process. John Garrard, “The Democratic Experience”, Stefan 
Berger (ed.), A companion to nineteenth-century Europe, 1789-1914, Malden, Blackwell, 2006, pp. 149-163; 
John Garrard, Vera Tolz, Ralph White (eds.), European democratization since 1800, Hampshire, Macmillan, 
1999; Raffaelle Romanelli (ed.), How did they become voters? The History of Franchise in Modern European 




political system; as well as how these attitudes contributed or not to the rise of new 
authoritarian regimes in the 1920s. 813  Nowadays the breakdown of parliamentary 
representation continues to be an important topic of debate, where emphasis is still put on 
examining electoral legislation, the deeds of statesman and the evolution of liberal parties, 
among other topics.814 
 This chapter will adopt an alternative perspective, where the focus is put on local 
elites and the strategies they designed to cope with the new mass politics. One of the reasons 
for doing so is because in countries like Italy and Spain, the crumbling of liberal institutions 
primarily began at a local level, rather than at a national scale.815 It was in big cities like 
Bologna, for the Italian case, and Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid, for that of Spain, where 
the political hegemony of liberal parties was first challenged.816 This chapter will examine 
how the crisis of liberal hegemony spread from Barcelona to an inland constituency like 
Igualada.817   
 For the first time in 30 years the Godó family started suffering a series of electoral 
defeats that were not linked to the change of party in power, but to the new competitive 
elections. The crisis of this family culminated in 1914, when in a similar time span to that of 
other liberal elites in Europe, the Godó’s political career reached an end. Yet before this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
813 Recent overviews on the topic: Nick Carter, Rethinking the Italian Liberal State, Bulletin of Italian Politics, 
Vol. 3, No. 2, 2011, pp. 225-245; Ángeles Barrio, La crisis del régimen liberal en España, 1917-1923, Ayer, 
Num. 63, 2006 (monograph). A broader view encompassing the case of different countries, in: Edward Acton, 
Ismael Saz (eds.), La transición a la política de masas, València, Universitat de València, 2001; Salvador 
Forner Muñoz (ed.), Democracia, elecciones y modernización en Europa. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid, Cátedra, 
1997; Marcela Alejandra García Sebastiani, Fernando del Rey Reguillo (eds.), Los desafíos de la libertad. 
Transformación y crisis del liberalismo en Europa y América Latina, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2008.  
814 Ibidem; Manuel Suárez Cortina (Ed.), La crisis del Estado liberal en la Europa del Sur, Santander, Sociedad 
Menéndez Pelayo, 2000; Silvana Casmirri, Manuel Suárez Cortina (eds.), La Europa del Sur en la época 
liberal. España, Italia y Portugal. Una perspectiva comparada, Santander, Universidad de Cantabria, 
Università di Cassino, 1998; Rosa Ana Gutiérrez, Rafael Zurita, Renato Camurri (eds.), Elecciones y cultura 
política en España e Italia, València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003 (section III). 
815 John Davis, “Liberal elites and Mass politics in Italy 1860-1914”, I. Saz, E. Acton, op. cit., p. 17.  
816 Axel Körner, Politics of Culture in Liberal Italy. From Unification to Fascism, New York, Routledge, 2009. 
José Luis García Delgado (ed.), Las ciudades en la modernización de España. Los decenios interseculares, 
Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1992; José Varela Ortega (ed.), El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en 
España (1875-1923), Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2001.  
817 As historian Gemma Rubí has noted for the case of Catalonia, the nature of this process still needs further 
research: “We know with a considerable degree of detail how the changes in the political system took place in 
fin de siècle Barcelona, but in contrast we ignore the features of these changes in many other cities”. Gemma 
Rubí, Entre el vot i la recomanació. Partits, mobilització electoral i canvi polític a Manresa (1899-1923), 
Manresa, Angle, 1995, p. 60. Quotation translated from Catalan. However, it must be noted that the case of 
medium-sized localities has received considerable attention. The best analyses are: Salvador Forner Muñoz, 
Mariano García Andreu, Rosa Ana Gutiérrez Lloret, Rafael Zurita Aldaguer, “Modernización social y 
comportamiento electoral urbano en España, 1910-1923”, Salvador Forner (ed.), Democracia, elecciones y 
modernización en Europa. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid, Cátedra, 1997, pp. 241-293; and G. Rubí, Modernizando 
desde abajo. La reconversión del caciquismo y la política de masas en las ciudades catalanas (1901-1923), 




happened, the family tried numerous strategies that revealed an attempt to adapt to the new 
language of mass politics. The case of this family will be used to challenge the narrative that 
presents liberal elites (or notables) as a monolithic social group that opposed democratisation 
through autocratic means. Instead, this chapter will demonstrate that in their attempt to 
maintain their position in society, liberal elites sought to legitimise their authority through 
new methods. In parallel, this case study will be used to show that the growing politicisation 
of society did not put an end to notables’ practices, like clientelism, but opened instead a new 
scenario where fraudulent practices coexisted with new forms of action.  
 The second part of this chapter will focus on the owner of La Vanguardia. As Chapter 
6 showed, in 1906 Ramón Godó resigned from politics to protect the prestige of his 
newspaper. This decision, however, did not imply his dissatisfaction with politics, but rather 
the adoption of an alternative channel to participate in political life. This consisted in using 
his position as proprietor of Barcelona’s top-selling newspaper to support the plans of 
national regeneration of a politician named Antonio Maura. At the same time, though in a 
subtler manner, Godó would use the same position in La Vanguardia to help his relatives in 
Igualada to hold on to their local hegemony. In this way, the case of the family will shed light 
on how the new mass society created tension in the relation between family members, as well 
as demonstrating that newspapers became an alternative to public office for traditional elites 
to maintain their influence in the new mass society.  
 The methodology used in this chapter will consist in micro-analysis, with the aim of 
providing an in-depth picture about the responses elites gave to the crisis of liberal politics in 
Europe. Still, because the agency of the Godó family was conditioned by events taking place 
in Catalonia and in Spain, and was deeply entrenched in political controversies that were 
common to other parts in Europe (like nationalism and anticlericalism), multiple scales of 
analysis will be combined.818 Continental, regional and national spheres will consequently be 
intertwined in a narrative where the micro-experience of the Godó family will take the 
leading role. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








 Historians have seen in the general elections of 1907 a sign of the transition to the 
new mass politics in Restoration Spain.819 Next to the traditional fraudulent practices (like the 
purchase of votes and the intervention of state officials) these elections evidenced important 
changes in political behaviour. In contrast to the customary apathy, liberal parties faced the 
growing competition of alternative political movements. Of the total 155 constituencies in 
which the country’s electoral map was divided, in 62 of them the emerging political forces 
(Republicans, Democrats and Carlists) presented their candidates. 820  In parallel, these 
elections became tainted by a strong ideological controversy. In 1905 France established the 
separation between the state and the church and this decision was echoed in Spain, where 
anticlericalism was central to the political agenda of the Liberal Party and especially of the 
Republicans. This propaganda resulted in the mobilisation of Catholics – through 
demonstrations, protests and the active use of the press – and in their increasing involvement 
in elections to defend religion.821 All these elements revealed the growing competition in 
elections and the politicisation of wider segments of society, two elements that were 
traditionally absent in the Restoration. 
 Catalonia arguably became the place where changes in politics became more evident. 
The broad electoral coalition named the “Solidaritat Catalana” had gathered, since 1906, all 
the parties in this region, with the sole exception of the two liberal parties and the 
Republicans of Lerroux.822 The threat this coalition represented to the status quo became 
evident in the elections of 1907, when the Solidaritat Catalana won in 41 of the 44 districts. 
This overwhelming majority exposed the decay of the liberal parties in Catalonia and 
indicated an unprecedented – yet to some extent, conjectural – mobilisation of society.823  
 The Godó family became an example of those local elites whose social pre-eminence 
was threatened by the new competitive politics embodied by the Solidaritat Catalana. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819 Rosa Ana Gutiérrez & Rafael Zurita, “España en la campaña electoral de 1907: entre la vieja y la nueva 
cultura política”, R.A. Gutiérrez, R. Zurita, R. Camurri (eds.), Elecciones y cultura política en España e Italia 
(1890-1923), València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003, pp. 121-142 (esp. p. 139).  
820 Ibidem, p. 139-140. 
821 Julio de la Cueva Merino, Católicos en la calle: la movilización de los católicos españoles, 1899-1923, 
Historia y Política, 3, 2000, pp. 55-80; Rafael Cruz (ed.), “El anticlericalismo”, Ayer, 27, 1997 (monograph). 
822 For further information about the formation of the Solidaritat Catalana see Chapter 6. 
823 Conjectural insofar that the same electoral turnout was not repeated until 1931. In some districts, voter 
participation reached 80%. For an analysis of these contests, see: Gemma Rubí, “Les eleccions generals de 
Solidaritat Catalana del 21 d’abril de 1907”, G. Rubí i F. Espinet (eds.), Solidaritat Catalana i Espanya, 




Table 1 shows, before the elections of 1907 the Godó family had achieved a solid political 
hegemony. Regardless of the party in power (Conservative or Liberal), the owner of La 
Vanguardia, Ramón Godó Lallana, won four elections in a row. Moreover, he won them 
without much difficulty: on two occasions he faced no competition and electoral turnout was 
low. These two elements, combined with clientelism, allowed him to secure ample victories 
(sometimes with 99% of the vote). However, and as a result of the broader changes taking 
place in Catalonia, the elections of 1907 marked a turning point in the Godó’s trajectory. As 
Chapter 6 showed, the creation of Solidaritat Catalana resulted in a smear campaign against 
Ramón Godó, who decided to resign in order to save the reputation of La Vanguardia.  
 The first part of this chapter will focus on the consequences of Ramón’s resignation 
for the strategies of the Godó family. The elections of 1907 marked the first of successive 
defeats that would finally put an end to the political career of this family in 1914 – which 
would be the last time a member of the Godó family would run in an election. Yet far from 
resignedly accepting the end of their political hegemony, before these defeats took place the 
Godó family made various attempts to adapt to the new mass politics. These attempts will be 
used as a case study to examine, from a micro-perspective, the ways in which liberal elites 
sought to cope with the new mass politics, as part of the debate about the end of the notables 





Table 1. Electoral results in Igualada’s constituency between 1899-1918 824 
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 As soon as the resignation of Ramón Godó became public, in late 1906, rumours 
began to spread that his relatives in Igualada would follow suit and abandon politics too.825 
The decision of the owner of La Vanguardia put the family’s traditional strategy in crisis: 
while Ramón ran for Congress, his cousin in Igualada (Juan Godó Llucià) ran for Provincial 
Council. A third family member (Juan’s son) joined this strategy in 1906 when he was 
appointed mayor of Igualada.826 But now this strategy based on kinship cooperation was no 
longer feasible as a result of Ramón Godó’s resignation. The end of this strategy implied the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
824 Source: Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (ACD); Albert Balcells et al., Les eleccions generals a 
Catalunya de 1901 a 1923. Relació dels resultats electorals de 1869 a 1899, Barcelona, Fundació Jaume Bufill, 
1982, p. 521 and p. 628; Jordi Planas i Francesc Valls-Junyent, Cacics i rabassaires. Dinàmica associativa i 
conflictivitat social. Els Hostalets de Pierola (1890-1939), Vic, Eumo, Centre d’Estudis Comarcals d’Igualada, 
2011, pp. 41-42. 
825 “Dia 24 de Junio. —Dicese que los tres Godó diputado á Cortes uno, diputado Provincial otro y alcalde de 
R.O. el tercero, acuerdan retirarse de la política. Dia 25 de Junio. —Se dice que ya no se retiran los Godó. Dia 
26 de Junio. —Amigos íntimos de los Godó afirman que renuncian á su cacicato. Dia 27 de Junio. —Asegúrase 
que eso de la retirada son pamplinas. Dia 28 de Junio. —Sesión del Ayuntamiento presidida por el Sr. Godó en 
que se demuestra que no hay necesidad de policías ni guardia civil para que haya órden. Por lo visto no se 
retiran. Dia 29 de Junio. —Los Godó hacen como que se van y vuelven.”  “Dietario de Igualada”, El Igualadino, 
30/06/1906, p. 1. 




risk of losing access to Congress, the position from which the family traditionally expanded 
its influence to Madrid. From a broader perspective, the same challenge was extended to 
other liberal elites in Catalonia. With the exception of the Conservatives (who expected to 
win the elections with the support of their party, now in government) the majority of liberal 
elites in this territory decided not to run for elections in 1907.827 The broad party coalition the 
Solidaritat Catalana represented made it very difficult for liberal elites to win.  
 Yet contrary to the majority position, the Godó family decided to stand for election: 
Juan Godó Llucià (1851-1935) became the new family candidate for Congress. As explained 
in Chapter 6, Juan was the heir of the Godó family’s branch in Igualada, as well as a 
prominent textile manufacturer. Still, the decision of standing for election did not seem to be 
his own, rather it obeyed the pressures from the family’s supporters in the 32 towns that 
formed Igualada’s constituency.828 The resignation of the owner of La Vanguardia in 1906 
had already generated great unease among these family supporters (or “clients”), for it 
implied the risk of losing their access to public office.829 Given this possibility, the mayors of 
different towns mobilised and pressured Godó to stand for election; they even announced his 
candidacy in public, despite his promise of not running for elections.830 This case illustrates 
to what extent clientelism implied a whole set of close and long-lasting relations of personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
827 Gemma Rubí, op. cit., p. 87. 
828 “(...) el distrito está harto de Godós, y lo mas cuerdo hubiera sido el retirar á tiempo la candidatura (...). No se 
lo han permitido, segun dicen en un manifiesto, los malos amigos que tiene la familia Godó, y sobre tan malos 
consejeros caerá la responsabilidad del disgusto que sufrirán con la derrota. La mayoría de los candidatos 
monárquicos que se presentaban por distritos catalanes, han retirado su candidatura convencidos de que es 
imposible luchar contra un movimiento de opinión tan formidable como el actual. Solo Godó no se convence y 
quiere que le retiren.” El Igualadino, 20/04/1907, pp. 2-3. The historians Jordi Planas and Francesc Valls have 
written an excellent analysis of one of the rural towns (Pierola) where the Godó family had wide support. J. 
Planas and F. Valls, Cacics i rabassaires. Dinàmica associativa i conflictivitat social. Els Hostalets de Pierola, 
1890-1939, Vic, Eumo, 2011. 
829 As the Republican newspaper El Igualadino noted with irony: “(...) Someone commented: ‘I lament Godó 
has decided to abandon us, for this implies losing my breadwinner’. Needless to say, there are many plans to 
make Godó reconsider his decision. One hungry secretary of the town council has even argued in favour of 
organising demonstrations in all the towns of the constituency to protest against the decision of Godó. Perhaps – 
another man said – it would be preferable to send an exposition to the Government, with thousands of 
signatures, asking for a Real Order to forbid Godó’s decision. (...) Perhaps it would be more practical to send 
some commissions to the selfish Godó to ask him not to abandon his empire, under the threat of not supplying 
him with more votes?” R. Romesquet Picantó, “¡¡¡Quin desastre!!!”, El Igualadino, 08/07/1906, p. 2. Original 
version in Catalan. 
830 “El gobiernador civil recibió ayer un telegrama en el que se le comunicaba que había sido proclamado 
candidato para la diputación á Cortes por el distrito de Igualada don Juan Godó y Lluciá. Los firmantes del 
referido telegrama eran los alcaldes de Copons, Carme, Castellfullit, Pobla de Claramunt, Prats del Rey, Santa 
María de Miralles, La Llacuna, Torre de Claramunt, Castellolí, Montbuy, Jorba, Odena, Calonge, Pierola, 
Veciana, Igualada, San Martín de Sasgayolas y Tous, y dos delegados de los pueblos de Calaf y Capellades.” 
LV, 01/04/1907, p. 3. Juan Godó Llucià personally assured the members of the Solidaritat Catalana that he 
would not run for the next elections, as noted in: Pilar Martínez-Carné Ascaso, Els inicis del catalanisme polític 




dependence. The Godó family could not abandon politics because it meant leaving behind the 
people who had been supporting the family for 30 years. 
  Still, all these efforts became insufficient for the family to win the elections of 1907. 
The constituency of Igualada witnessed the early expansion of mass politics in Catalonia and 
showed the negative consequences this represented for traditional elites. Electoral turnout 
increased substantially (see Table 1) and echoed the structural transformations Igualada was 
undergoing at the time. Indeed, the economic downturn this city suffered in the mid-19th 
century did not prevent it from maintaining a strong industrial character, as historian Pere 
Pascual has explained.831 The textile and leather industries remained the leading economic 
sectors of this city with a population of 10,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the 20th century 
– including a large working class.832 These economic transformations in Igualada were 
accompanied by the mushrooming of spaces of sociability and political activism. New party 
headquarters were established in Igualada at the turn of the century, among which 
Republicans, Catalan nationalists, Catholics and Anarchists.833 Among them, the Republicans 
consolidated as the new leading force.834 This varied range of political movements managed 
to expand their influence over Igualada’s population based on two pillars: first, the 
proliferation of different social spaces (like social centres and “ateneos”) where the working 
people and the petty bourgeoisie gathered. These centres promoted all sorts of leisure and 
educative activities (like choral groups and public libraries) and provided a fertile ground for 
new currents of thought to spread, like rational education, antimilitarism and masonry.835 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
831 Even though this city did not again reach the 14,000 inhabitants it had reached in the 1850s until the 1930s. 
Pere Pascual Domènech, Fàbrica i treball a la Igualada de la primera meitat del segle XX, Barcelona, Abadia 
de Montserrat, Ajuntament d’Igualada, 1991. 
832 The main working association was the “Federación local de Sociedades Obreras”, established at the end of 
the 19th century. Antoni Carner, Els moviments obrers a Igualada durant el segle XIX, Igualada, Centre 
d’Estudis Comarcals, 1971, p. 33. 
833 The new party headquarters of the Republicans were: the “Centre Republicà Històric” (1886), “Centre de la 
Unió Republicana d’Igualada” (1893), “Cercle Republicà d’Igualada” (1904). The Carlists gathered in the 
“Centro Tradicionalista de Igualada” (1889) and the Anarchists in the “Federación Igualadina” (1883-1885). 
Ibidem; Antoni Dalmau Ribalta, L’arrelament territorial de la «idea». El cas dels anarquistes d’Igualada, 
Miscellanea Aqualatensia, 2011, 14, pp. 291-309.   
834 As one of the main leaders of the Anarchist movement in Igualada, named Joan Ferrer i Farriol, evoked in his 
memoires [in Catalan]: “Els nostres republicans, aquests sí que tenien traça i manya, car disposaven d’un Serra i 
Constansó, d’un Sebastià Freixes, d’un Amadeu Biosca, d’un Lopòlit Sàbat. Llur sentit de l’humor enriolava 
ensems que encoratjava públics, mentre que nosaltres [the Anarchists], decantat pel cantó tràgic, acabàvem en 
apòstols de la basarda”. Joan Ferrer i Farriol, De l’Anoia al Sena sense pressa, Choisy-le-Roi, Impr. des 
Gondoles, 1966, p. 56. 
835 The “Ateneo de la Clase Obrera”, established in 1863, deserves special mention. Jorge Pablo Martínez de 
Presno, Moviments socials a Igualada al segle XIX (anys 1854-1890), Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de 
Montserrat, 1993; Antoni Dalmau Ribalta, La maçoneria a Igualada: la lògia Jespus núm. 73 (1889-1896?), 
Miscellanea Aqualatensia, 2013, 15, pp. 173-202; Soledad Bengoechea, Les dècades convulses. Igualada com a 
exemple. Mobilització patronal i obrera entre principis del segle XX i la dictadura de Primo de Rivera, 




 The second element that most contributed to the growth of new political movements 
in Igualada was a modest yet still very active press. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century 
the press experienced a major growth in Igualada: the number of newspapers increased from 
2, in 1900, to 12 in 1910. Thanks to some valuable local studies, the common features of 
these newspapers can be delineated.836 Most of them had a partisan orientation,837 and their 
sales did not surpass a few hundred copies. The majority of them followed an erratic 
existence and usually did not last for more than a few years.838 Yet even under such modest 
circumstances, the press became one of the most valuable instruments for the opponents of 
the Godó family.839  
 This expanding civil society is where the new emerging forces, like the Lliga 
Regionalista and above all the Republicans, widened their social bases and used it to fight the 
Godó’s domination. The elections of 1907 became an example of the vital function of the 
press in mobilising society against caciquismo. In the days prior to elections, the newspaper 
of the Catalan nationalists (Pàtria) gave much publicity to the candidate of the Solidaritat 
Catalana (Frederic Rahola) and published different articles specifically addressed to workers, 
and to women, as well. Although the electoral law of 1890 did not allow women to vote, the 
press encouraged them to participate in the demonstrations and thus contribute to the victory 
of the Solidaritat Catalana against caciquismo.840 This reveals that in contrast to liberal 
politics, which were the concern of a social minority, the new political movements sought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836 Maria Teresa Miret, La premsa a Igualada (1808?-1982), Barcelona, Departament de Cultura de la 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 1983, 2 vol. 
837 Name and political orientation of Igualada’s partisan press between 1900-1910: Sometent (1905-1911), 
Catholic conservative; El Estandarte (1908-1910), Carlist; El Igualadino (1904-1909, organ of the “Unión 
Republicana”); Igualada Radical (1909-1915, organ of the Republicans of Lerroux); Pàtria (1906-1910), 
Jovent (1910-1911, satirical newspaper) and Nova Llevor (1905, organ of the “Centre Autonomista d’Igualada”) 
all Catalan nationalists. Ibidem. 
838 27.3% of the newspapers founded in this city did not last for more than a year, and 49.2% lasted for between 
one and five years. In terms of language, Spanish was the common language, even though at the turn of the 
century growing numbers started adopting Catalan. Ibid., pp. 24-26.  
839 The resignation of Ramón Godó (explained in Chapter 6) already provided evidence of this. Nevertheless, 
and as one contemporary noted, these newspapers also had heated confrontations between them: “En 1906 las 
relaciones periodísticas locales estaban muy tirantes, a causa del fuego graneado que se disparaba entre «El 
Igualadino», «Pàtria» y «Sometent» con cada artículo, lleno de metralla, que metía miedo.” Ramon Solsona 
Cardona, Mi ciudad y yo. Un período de historia anecdótica, N. Poncell-Impresor, 1948, p. 125. 
840 [E.T.]: “It is time that women abandon certain concerns and besides being good wives and exemplary 
mothers they also work for their land (...). Wives, mothers, sisters, fiancées and girlfriends, work for the victory 
of this candidacy; and support those men who shall defend our [national] rights in Congress.” [original text: “Es 
hora ja, de que les dones catalanes deixin certes preocupacions que les lliguen y á més d’esser bones esposes y 
envejables mares, sentin bategar el cor pel bé de Catalunya. (...) Trevalléu, esposes, mares, germanes, promeses 
y amigues, pera que triomfi aquesta candidatura; apoyèu á n’aquets homes que desde ‘l Congrés han de trevallar 
y defensar els nostres drets”]. It should be noted that this article was written by a women, Maria Dolors 




politicise wider segments of society. In so doing the press became a valuable instrument to 
publicise an interclass discourse.  
 Moreover, the articles published during these days demonstrate that Republicans and 
Catalan nationalists also used the press to educate people about their political rights and 
instructed them on how to prevent the rigging of elections. Readers were advised to be at the 
electoral college by 7 in the morning and to bring with them “any friends, relatives or people 
you may know”. Likewise, the press encouraged them to report any wrongdoing they might 
witness, like vote shopping, and told them not to fear intimidation. 841  These 
recommendations exemplify how the press became a central device in mobilising broader 
segments of society. 
 Still, the new practices of the emerging parties sometimes ran parallel to more 
traditional ones, like clientelism. One of the leaders of the Lliga Regionalista (Francesc 
Cambó) made arrangements addressed at winning the support of local bosses who 
traditionally supported the Godó family.842 This case illustrates that although the fight against 
caciquismo was a central point in the programme of the Solidaritat Catalana, on some 
occasions their candidates used it to their own favour. These dubious practices, also noticed 
in other constituencies in Catalonia,843 were morally justified by the challenge of removing 
the Godó’s long-established roots from the territory. The scale at which the new political 
movements made use of caciquismo seemed to be considerably lower, yet still the leaders of 
the Lliga Regionalista justified these measures for the great importance they gave to winning 
in Igualada.844  
 But the Godó family did not watch the exploits of their enemies with their arms 
folded; they mobilised their supporters too. One of the ways they did so consisted in 
monitoring the electoral roll, which became one of the most important features of the new 
competitive politics. On polling day the chamber of notaries in Igualada was flooded with 
petitions to appoint legal assistants to monitor the vote counting. This was a strategy aimed at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
841 “¡Electors!”, El Igualadino, 20/04/1907, p. 1. A reproduction of this copy, in the Annex n. 10. 
842 More specifically, Cambó urged the need of winning the favour of a local boss in the town of Calaf to rig the 
elections: [E.T.]: “[Mister] Ferrer Carulla, from Calaf, can contribute decisively to our victory. It is of central 
importance for the Lliga that Rahola wins the elections. I am aware you have influence on Ferrer. It is necessary 
that you make the greatest use of it. Yours faithfully, Francesch Cambó”. [original version: “En Ferrer y Carulla 
de Calaf pot ajudar moltíssim a que la victòria sigui nostra. És, pera la Lliga, d’un interès capitalíssim que’n 
Rahola surti triumfant. Sé que V. té influència sobre’n Ferrer. És precís que la posi tota en joch. Mani a son 
afectíssim amich, Francesch Cambó.”] Pilar Martínez-Carné Ascaso, Els inicis del catalanisme polític i Leonci 
Soler i March: 1858-1932, Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1999, p. 524. 
843 Gemma Rubí, Els catalans i la política en temps del caciquisme. Manresa, 1875-1923, Vic, Eumo, 2006. 




manipulating the census, and in the worst case preventing political rivals from doing so.845 
Among the people who made these requests were various relatives of the Godó family; 
mayors of neighbouring towns; and the very same owner of La Vanguardia, Ramón Godó.846 
The intervention of this man revealed that his retirement from politics did not mean leaving 
his cousin in the lurch.847 Moreover, in the days prior to the elections Ramón Godó had 
visited the constituency in his car, almost certainly to encourage the family’s supporters in 
the different towns of the constituency to rig the elections.848 His deeds show to what extent 
the kinship ties with his cousin Juan remained strong, even when he had retired from politics. 
In the fierce competition against the new political rivals, the family worked together to 
maintain the political hegemony.  
 Still, the efforts that the Godó’s supporters expended in counteracting the mobilisation 
of the Solidaritat Catalana were insufficient and they lost the elections. Of the total 31,819 
people with the right to vote in 1907, Juan Godó only obtained 2,898 votes; in contrast to his 
competitor, who obtained 3,571.849 An important segment of the electorate did not participate 
(3,507 voters) but these elections registered the highest electoral turnout in the history of 
Igualada’s constituency (64%). This growth in participation went in line with the broader 
situation in Catalonia, where the politicised atmosphere increased electoral turnout to similar 
levels.850 The case of Igualada consequently shows that the crisis of liberal parties was not 
exclusive to big cities like Barcelona – as the literature has often assumed851 – but was 
expanding to inland and medium-sized cities of the Catalan territory too. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
845 The Article 32 of the electoral law of 1890 allowed candidates to appoint legal assistants to monitor the 
elections. José Carlos Rueda (ed.), Legislación electoral española (1808-1977), Madrid, Ariel, 1998, p. 160.  
846 Such as Hermenegildo Godó Llucià (brother of the candidate); Antoni Llansana Soler, who was the 
examining judge (“juez de instrucción”) and brother-in-law of Juan Godó Llucià; Baldomero Camps Blaví, who 
was a business partner of Juan and Ramón Godó; and Josep Ferrer Carulla, the mayor of the neighbouring town 
of Calaf. Arxiu Notarial d’Igualada (ANI), Notari Martí Gual, 1907, pp. 291-292. 
847 “confiere poderes para que juntos ó cada uno de ellos á solas, (...) intervengan en todas las operaciones ó 
actos que con motivo de la elección en este Distrito han de tener lugar; y al efecto se personen en los locales de 
las secciones y presencien la constitución de las mesas, la votacion y el escrutinio en cada una de ellas, 
examinen y comprueben (...) papeletas, listas de electores y de votantes (...) asistan al escrutinio general y 
reclamen y protesten por lo que en el recuento de votos y proclamación de Diputados ocurra, si consideran justo 
(...).” ANI, op. cit. 
848 “Don Ramón Godó Lallana, solidario en Barcelona, ha reaparecido en la vida política de la que se había 
retirado, viniendo á combatir en Igualada la candidatura del solidario Sr. Rahola (...). En la tournée electoral 
que ha hecho estos días por los pueblos, habrá podido convencerse D. Ramón, que todo el distrito está harto de 
Godós, y que lo mas cuerdo hubiera sido el retirar á tiempo la candidatura de su pariente D. Juan (...)”. El 
Igualadino, 20/04/1907, p. 2. 
849 Modesto Sánchez de los Santos, Las Cortes españolas: las de 1907, Madrid, Antonio Marzo, 1908, p. 245. 
850 Electoral turnout in the four Catalan provinces: Barcelona (55.93%), Girona (58.46%), Lleida (66.73%), 
Tarragona (68.27%). G. Rubí (2008), op. cit., p. 91. For the changes that resulted in Catalonia’s electoral map, 
see Annex n. 11. 




 The Godó’s case demonstrates nevertheless that this was a long and uneven process. 
The growing mobilisation of society did not imply the immediate disappearance of the 
family, but forced them to develop new strategies to adapt to the new mass politics. Despite 
the fact Juan Godó lost the elections in 1907, in the 1910 elections he reversed the situation 
and won. And, most importantly, he did so in a context of spectacular mobilisation: in 1910, 
voter turnout in Igualada reached 80%. That percentage revealed a highly politicised local 
context, where the traditional oligarchy and the emerging political forces fiercely competed 
to mobilise the population.852 These elections also presented further novelties: a new electoral 
law now existed; and Godó’s opponents were no longer united in the Solidaritat Catalana.853 
The wide ideological spectrum of this coalition proved to be too strong to survive, and by 
1909 the Solidaritat Catalana ceased to exist. These changes in the regional context were 
echoed in the local sphere and the coalition also ceased to exist in Igualada. As one 
contemporary lamented, this implied the end of the united front against the Godó’s 
caciquismo.854 
 In this now fragmented yet highly mobilised political panorama, the Godó family 
made an attempt to adapt to the new mass politics. Juan Godó did not seek to limit the rigging 
of elections, as was customary, but actively sought to attract new supporters. To this end he 
began an electoral campaign and with a long caravan of cars and other vehicles he visited all 
the towns in the constituency. This strategy reveals two important novelties in the Godó’s 
strategy (e.g. the launch of an electoral campaign and the use of cars to do so) and reveals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852 As one contemporary recalled, speaking of the heated levels of confrontation that politics reached in 
Igualada: “(...) división de la ciudad y pueblos en dos grandes bandos, que se combatían enconadamente en los 
cafés, en los talleres, en el campo, en las casas comunales. La «sala de dalt» y la «sala de baix» eran, en los 
pueblos, la línea divisoria de «godonistas» y «antigodonistas». Parientes que no se saludaban, casamientos que 
no se efectuaban por no ser del mismo bando, peleas que se entablaban, aún en el seno de las familias, eran los 
efectos de este germen de discordia, efectos que se dejaban sentir con bastante intensidad, todavía, en los días en 
que arrancan estas memorias. Preciso es confesar que aquellas luchas llegaron a tomar un aspecto primario y 
brutal. Todas las armas eran buenas contra el enemigo político, y, para herirlo, todos los medios eran lícitos...” 
Ramón Solsona, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
853 Among the novelties included in the new electoral law, there was the introduction of compulsory voting; and 
different measures aimed at counteracting caciquismo. The most problematic of these measures was Article 29, 
according to which in those constituencies where there was only one candidate standing for election, he would 
be elected automatically. In practice, rather than preventing caciquismo this article (which was proposed by the 
Republican Gumersindo Azcárate) was exploited by local elites for their own benefit. See: María Jesús 
González Hernández, El universo conservador de Antonio Maura. Biografía y proyecto de estado, Madrid, 
Biblioteca Nueva, 1997, pp. 145-150. On the breaking of the Solidaritat Catalana, see: G. Rubí & F. Espinet, op. 
cit. 
854 “Al ceder el paso don Juan Godó Lluciá al empujón de las fracciones coaligadas, que le disputaban la 
representación en Cortes, vino el desmoronamiento del bloque anticaciquista, por falta de razón de ser. Si bien 
quedaba el aglutinante solidario, la verdad es que cada uno caminó por cuenta propia, procurando sacar partido 
de las inteligencias del momento, que se rompían con una facilidad portentosa. Parecía que la ciencia electoral 





that besides the rigging of elections he was now interested in addressing the voters too. In this 
attempt, Juan Godó also displayed a new discourse based on identity issues. All the cars of 
his caravan hoisted Spanish flags. This was a subtle but not meaningless detail, for it revealed 
how the liberal elites’ strategies of adaptation were tightly interwoven to the new political 
context.  
 Indeed, the first decade of the 20th century was a moment when identity issues 
became a heated issue in most of Europe. Although nationalism was not a new phenomenon, 
in this period it presented some distinctive features if compared to previous decades. In 
contrast to the democratic revolutions of the mid-19th century, when nationalism carried 
progressive and even emancipatory connotations, the picture was different at the beginning of 
the 20th century. Nationalism now highlighted the difficulties of the liberal’s nation-building 
project to integrate the whole of society. 855  These difficulties manifested differently, 
according to each country. In central Europe, for instance, nationalism took a reactionary 
shape and revealed the tensions of multi-ethnic entities, as in the case of the Austrian 
Empire.856 In the Spanish case, in contrast, nationalism took the form of alternative voices 
from the periphery that challenged the liberal’s centralist understanding of the “nation”, and 
held it responsible for the country’s state of decay (intensified in the Disaster of 1898).857 
 In Spain the victory of the Solidaritat Catalana in 1907 gave new visibility to identity 
issues at a national level. Together with the Republicans, the nationalists of the Lliga 
Regionalista were now the leading force in Catalonia and proposed to regenerate Spain by 
means of a decentralised administration.858 These demands for autonomy, however, were 
often regarded in the rest of Spain as a selfish demand containing a hidden separatist 
agenda.859 In this context, the Godó family saw in the Spanish identity the opportunity to 
mobilise the segment of society that did not identify with the growing influence of the Lliga 
Regionalista. Juan Godó thus tried to make identity a new element of his candidacy, and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
855 Marteen Van Ginderachter and Marnix Beyen (eds.), Nationhood from Below. Europe in the Long Nineteenth 
Century, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012. 
856 Pieter M. Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries. Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the 
Austrian Empire, 1848-1914, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996. 
857 Historians have debated the supposed weakness of the liberal’s nation-building project and their relation with 
the rise of alternative understandings of the nation. It is impossible to mention here the vast bibliography on this 
topic, however some valuable references are: José Alvarez Junco, Mater Dolorosa: la idea de España en el 
siglo XIX, Madrid, Taurus, 2001; Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith (eds.), Nationalism and the nation in the 
Iberian Peninsula. Competing and Conflicting Identities, Oxford, Washington, Berg, 1996.  
858 Borja de Riquer, Lliga Regionalista. La burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme, 1898-1904, Barcelona, Edicions 
62, 1977; Charles E. Ehrlic, Lliga Regionalista. Lliga Catalana, 1901-1936, Barcelona, Institut Cambó, 2004. 
859 On the receptions of the demands of Catalan autonomy: Borja de Riquer, Escolta, Espanya: la cuestión 
catalana en la época liberal, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2001; Agustí Colomines, El catalanisme i l’Estat. La lluita 




that attempt he relied on the precious support of his cousin and thus also of his cousin’s 
newspaper, La Vanguardia. The paper gave positive coverage of Godó’s electoral campaign 
and stressed his defence of the Spanish identity. In the meantime, it also criticised his rivals 
from the Lliga Regionalista. As this newspaper stated: 
 
“En pocos distritos de esta región se presenta la contienda electoral tan empeñada como 
en el de Igualada. El candidato regionalista multiplica sus esfuerzos para recuperar las 
simpatías de la mayoría de sus electores, que sufrieron grave quebranto durante la temporada en 
que tuvo la representación parlamentaria, y no perdona medio para recobrar el favor perdido. 
Esta ímproba tarea, á juzgar por las apariencias, resulta hasta ahora infructuosa, como pudo 
comprobarse en el acto celebrado ayer en la Torre de Claramunt, donde el candidato liberal don 
Juan Godó recibió inequívocas demostraciones de afecto por parte del vecindario y de los 
habitantes de otros pueblos de la comarca, que permiten augurar el lisonjero éxito que obtendrá 
su candidatura en la próxima elección. El candidato regionalista y sus amigos se presentaron en 
carruajes adornados con banderas catalanas, siendo recibidos por sus correligionarios con 
algunos aplausos, que se trocaron en verdadera ovación á la llegada del señor Godó, quien, 
como los demás de su comitiva, iban en coches en los que ondeaba la enseñera nacional. (...) 
Asistieron al acto unas dos mil personas, quienes, con sus aplausos, demostraron claramente su 
adhesión al señor Godó.” 860 
 
 This article reveals the importance the press played in the new mass politics. Despite 
the fact the electoral rally of Juan Godó was held in a very small town (Torre de Claramunt) 
this rally was turned into a media event that thousands of readers learned about thanks to the 
intermediary role of La Vanguardia. This newspaper, by then Catalonia’s top-selling paper, 
contributed to publicising the image of Juan in highly positive terms: emphasis was put on 
the warm welcome he received from the local population (“the crowds received him with 
enthusiasm”); while the presence of Spanish flags in his caravan was implicitly contrasted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
860 “Movimiento electoral”, LV, 25/04/1910, p. 3. [E. T.]: “In few constituencies of this region the electoral 
contest appears to be so tight as in Igualada. The Regionalist candidate multiplies its efforts to recover the 
simpathies of voters, which was severly damaged during his time as deputie (...). This hard to be achieved aim 
seems to give no fruits by now, as it could be observed in the meeting celebrated yesterday [in the town] of La 
Torre de Claramunt, where the liberal candidate Mister Juan Godó received clear indications of support from the 
local people and from people coming from other towns, this being something that allows predicting his victory 
in the next elections. The Regionalist candidate and his friends arrived with their coaches hoisting Catalan flags, 
and were received with few applause; [in contrast] to the arrival of Mr. Godó, who arrived in a caravan where 
all the cars were hoisting Spanish flags. (...) Around two thousand people attended the meeting, and who 




with the Catalan flags of his opponent. This double-identity discourse was repeated in 
subsequent rallies, which La Vanguardia contributed once again to publicising.861  
 This provides evidence of Juan Godó’s attempts to take advantage of the new political 
scenario, and of how his cousin could help him in doing so through La Vanguardia. At a time 
when the Catalan nationalists were challenging the family’s traditional hegemony, the 
ownership of this newspaper allowed the promotion of a new discourse based on identity, 
while at the same time undermining the prestige of the family’s opponent.862 All this provides 
further evidence for one of the arguments of this thesis. That is, that the influence of 
journalists as political actors consisted in their capacity to select which events were given 
public visibility, and to choose the nature of this publicity (positive or negative). Instead of 
rigging the elections, Ramón Godó was now supporting his cousin in Igualada through a 
subtler – yet equally valuable – manner consisting in using La Vanguardia to support his 
cousin’s political campaign.            
 The lengths to which Ramón Godó would go to maintain the family hegemony in 
Igualada were laid bare when it became evident that the above-quoted article of La 
Vanguardia was a fantasy. As copies of the edition with this article about the glorious 
reception that Juan Godó received in the town of Torre de Claramunt were distributed, 
various voices started questioning that version of events. Apparently, the strong animosity 
Juan Godó faced in this town had ultimately led him to stay away and instead to send one of 
his delegates. These last-minute changes, however, were ignored in La Vanguardia, and the 
positive report was made up instead. As it could be expected, Barcelona’s press rapidly 
noticed the dishonest account of events in La Vanguardia and criticised the editorial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
861 “La lucha electoral se presenta reñidísima en el distrito de Igualada; uno y otro bando batallan con verdadero 
encarnizamiento y los candidatos no descansan en sus visitas de propaganda en los diversos pueblos del distrito. 
(...) los adversarios llevan en sus vehículos la bandera catalana. (....) Nosotros —añadió — llevamos en el 
carruaje la catalana y la española. ¡Viva Cataluña! ¡Viva España! Por Cataluña y por España, votad á quien 
ama á ambas por igual; ese es el señor Godó.” LV, 02/05/1910, p. 10. The same strategy was used in the 
elections of 1914: “De noche ya de regreso á esta ciudad, se reunieron en la cruz de término todos los llegados 
del Bruch, Copons, Montbuy, La Llacuna, etc., etc., formando una caravana de unos treinta carruajes, entre 
automóviles, coches y tartanas, luciendo todos la bandera española. A la entrada de la ciudad, todas las sirenas 
y bocinas hicieron sus llamadas, produciendo su paso un entusiasmo indescriptible y siendo saludados los 
propagandistas con palmas y vivas muestras de afecto, hasta que llegaron en casa del señor Godó, en cuya calle 
habían situadas unas dos mil personas, que les tributaron una prolongada salva de aplausos”. LV, 03/03/1914, p. 
6. [E. T.]: “The electoral contest will be very disputed in Igualada’s constituency; both sides battle with 
determination and candidates do not stop for a moment in their rallies of propaganda around the differen towns 
in the constituency (...) the adversaries carry in their vehicles the Catalan flag (...) We –he added– carry both the 
Catalan and the Spanish flag. ¡Long life to Catalonia! ¡Long live to Spain! For Catalonia and Spain, please 
vote who loves both equally; and this is Mr. Godó.”  
862 As the article above-quoted shows, the candidate of the Lliga Regionalista was deprived of the support of the 
masses that Godó allegedly received. Thus, Rahola received only a “few applauses”, according to this 




independence that the newspaper liked to boast about.863 Ramón Godó’s attempts to support 
his relatives in Igualada thus tarnished the image of the newspaper, and not for the first 
time.864 This anecdote reveals the importance traditional elites gave to public opinion to 
redefine their sources of authority; yet at the same time demonstrates that public opinion was 
hard to control and open to contest from other actors. In such a disputed field, not even the 
editorial independence of La Vanguardia was a safeguard. 
 In the end, and despite this small controversy, Juan Godó Llucià won the elections of 
1910. Apart from the new methods he started implementing in these elections, there is 
evidence that he made an intense use of clientelism too. The opposition denounced these 
fraudulent practices, but once more the liberal institutions showed their disinterest in 
promoting accountability, and the protests were disregarded once in Congress.865 These 
elections illustrate, in consequence, that even when a high mobilisation of the electorate took 
place (voter turnout reached 80% on this occasion) the use of clientelist practices did not 
disappear but coexisted with the new methods of competitive politics. Traditional elites like 
the Godó family consequently demonstrated that while relying on the traditional practices 
based on clientelism, they also sought to adopt some of the methods of the new professional 
politics. The electoral campaign, the organisation of caravans of cars, the use of a discourse 
based on identity, and the use of the press as an instrument of propaganda, are all evidence of 
this. 
 But what were the reasons for the end of the Godó’s political career? At least three 
elements can be identified, the first of which is the active mobilisation of the opposition. 
Republicans and Catalan nationalists learned a bitter lesson from the elections of 1910: when 
they ran separately they were incapable of defeating the Godó family. They managed to do so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
863 “(...) ‘La Vanguardia’, afirma que el candidato señor Godó fue recibido con entusiasmo por millares de 
electores. Eso, sencillamente, es embaucar á las gentes; el señor Godó no pudo ser recibido con entusiasmo por 
millares de electores de Pobla de Claramunt porque no fué á dicha localidad, mandando á un apoderado. (...) 
Porque en Igualada, ante los evidentes propósitos del caciquismo de volver á hacer mangas y capirotes en 
aquellos pueblos, la parte sana del cuerpo electoral ha establecido tan estrecho tacto de codos que al unísono 
labora por la candidatura del señor Rahola, como se demostró perfectamente en el mitin de anteayer en Pobla de 
Calaramunt en el que mientras el senyor Rahola y el señor Serra y Constansó (...) fueron ovacionados, á los 
corifeos del señor Godó se les quería lynchar, ¡y eso que el candidato caciquista tuvo buen cuidado de no 
presentarse en aquel pueblo, mandando un representante!” El Diluvio, quoted in: "Lo que n'ha dit la premsa", La 
Veu de Catalunya, 26/04/1910, p. 3. See also: “El famós meeting de Torra de Claramunt”, La Veu de Catalunya, 
29/04/1910, p. 2. 
864 See Chapter 6. As one newspaper rightly put it: “Bien puede estarle agradecido el Godó de Igualada al Godó 
de Barcelona, puesto que en obsequio del primero sacrifica don Ramón hasta la seriedad y el buen nombre de 
‘La Vanguardia’”. Ibidem.  
865 Godó mobilised as many as 286 assistants and 6 notaries to monitor (and manipulate) the electoral roll. 
Further details on the protests for the numerous irregularities, in: Modesto Sánchez de los Santos, Las Cortes 




in 1907, when they ran together in the Solidaritat Catalana, but failed when they ran alone (as 
evidenced in 1910, and despite the 80% electoral turnout). All this explains why in the next 
elections, in 1914, the political opposition (the Republicans, the Catalanists and even the 
Catholics) united again.         
On this occasion they did not do so by forming a coalition, but through supporting the 
Conservative candidate (see Table 1). This shows that in Igualada political struggle did not 
consist in liberal parties versus new emerging ones, but in a fight between all the parties and 
one single family. This polarisation of local politics explains why a Republican journal like 
El Igualadino presented the elections of 1914 as a “war of liberation”, even though the 
candidate this newspaper now supported belonged to the Conservative party.866 
 The second cause of the demise of the Godó’s hegemony is that the family started 
suffering from the same government intervention in elections that it had traditionally 
benefited from. The strong position this family built in Igualada on behalf of the Liberal 
Party traditionally led the other liberal party (the Conservatives) not to present their candidate 
in this constituency. This situation started to change in 1914, when the Conservatives started 
competing against the family. This decision echoed the growing confrontation between 
liberal parties on a national scale, and the growing difficulties they faced to impose their will 
in elections.867 As a result of all this, the Conservative Party attempted to retrieve the 
constituency in Igualada from the Godó’s hands. This became evident in the methods the 
Conservative government of Eduardo Dato used in 1914, when a classic repertoire was used 
to rig the elections (including physical intimidation, intervention of state officials and 
coercion of voters). Ironically, the Godó’s were now the ones who denounced, via the ever-
supportive La Vanguardia, the coercion the government exerted on voters. 868  Indeed, 
although Juan Godó Llucià kept participating in public events to reinforce his image as the 
“father of the district” (see Illustration 1) such efforts all proved to be in vain. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
866 As this newspaper argued: “Once again we are in the face of a new war of liberation which, like a crusade, 
we have been holding for many years those of us who have not lost the dignity of free men. (...)” [original text, 
written in Catalan: “Altre volta ens trovem en vigilies d’una d’aquestes lluites de lliberació, que com una nova 
creuhada, sostením desde molts anys els que sentím la rojor de la vergonya, o no hem perdut encare la dignitat 
d’homes lliures.” “Redempció”, L’Igualadí. Setmanari Republicá Autonomista, porta-véu d’Igualada i sa 
comarca, 01/03/1914, p. 2. 
867 The divisions between liberal parties will be studied in the second part of this chapter. 
868 “Por la mañana recorrieron las calles unos 25 individuos armados de gruesos garrotes, ejerciendo coacciones 
no sólo con su actitud provocativa, sino incluso de obra, pues agredieron á tres electores, partidarios del señor 
Godó, causándoles lesiones. A los empleados del Ayuntamiento se les ha hecho votar con candidaturas que 
llevaban una contraseña, y, á pesar de esto, aun se les acompañaba, a la mayoría, hasta el colegio, no 
perdiéndoles de vista hasta después de emitir el sufragio, para evitar que cambiasen de papeleta. La presión 
oficial ha sido grandísima, pues los delegados del gobernador obraron como agentes del candidato conservador, 
no como representatntes de una autoridad que tiene el deber de guardar una actitud imparcial y la obligación de 




government’s pressure on the Godó family became so strong that it reached a point where the 
supporters of this family in the city council (eight councillors in total, including Juan Godó 
Pelegrí) resigned en masse. This was a move aimed at denouncing the Conservatives’ new 
decision to meddle in Igualada’s affairs, and reveals to what extent the state’s intervention 
remained an important element in local politics.869 
 The third and most important reason for the Godó’s downfall was the resignation of 
Juan Godó Llucià in March 1916. On previous occasions Juan had considered abandoning 
public office.870 His continuous hesitation led the family’s supporters to pressure him not to 
resign. The last evidence of this was in 1914, when an event was organised to thank both 
Juan Godó Llucià and his son Juan Godó Pelegrí for their years of public service as deputy 
and mayor, respectively (see Illustration 2). As many as 600 people attended this event, 
including representatives from all 32 towns in the constituency,871 and it sheds light on the 
pyramid of patron-client relations that stemmed from Godó’s leadership, and on the large 
number of people who were interested in maintaining the family’s hegemony.  
 All these attempts from supporters (or “clients”), however, were insufficient to 
convince a man that was tired of the disquiet and squabbles of local politics. The press in 
Igualada continued with their smear campaign against Juan Godó, as they had done so before 
with his cousin Ramón.872 And these aggressive attacks from the press, combined with some 
rather more prosaic reasons, finally led Juan Godó’s to abandon politics, as he explained in 
the open letter he sent to La Vanguardia:  
 
“Con ruego de que la publiquemos, se nos remite la carta siguiente:  Sr. Director de LA 
VANGUARDIA. Muy señor mío y amigo: Dada la campaña de insidias y calumnias que 
contra mí se ha emprendido y no repuesta todavía mi salud del grave quebranto que sufrió el 
verano último con motivo de un accidente automovilista, he decidido apartarme por ahora de 
toda lucha política y retirar, en consecuencia, mi candidatura á diputado á Cortes por el 
distrito de Igualada. Al suplicarle, señor Director, que haga pública esta determinación mía, le 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
869 “Igualada 12, 6 tarde. Se ha enviado al gobernador civil el siguiente telegrama: “Los concejales monárquicos 
del Ayuntamiento de Igualada que constituyen su mayoría, ante los atropellos inconcebibles de que ayer fueron 
víctimas el candidato liberal Sr. Godó, que tantas veces hizo sacrificios en pro de la Monarquía é intereses de 
nuestra comarca, y los amigos de este señor, atropellos amparados por las autoridades, aliadas con los enemigos 
del régimen para sacar triunfante, por toda clase de medios, al candidato ministerial, nos vemos precisados á 
presentar á V.E. la dimisión de nuestros cargos. –Primer teniente alcalde, Juan Godó Pelegrí; segundo, José 
Pelfort; tercero José Lladó; cuarto, Ramón Solé; suplente síndico, Narciso Puiggros; concejal, Lorenzo Font; 
concejal y ex alcalde, Baldomero Camps; concejal y ex alcalde, Jaume Roca (...)”. ABC, 13/03/1914, p. 10. 
870 Such as on the eve of the 1907 elections, as explained above. 
871 During this crowded homage, Juan Godó and his son Juan Godó Pelegrí were given a commemorative scroll 
from his supporters in the 32 towns of the district as an expression of support. See Illustration 2.  




ruego también que me permita dar las gracias, por conducto de su periódico, á todos los 
buenos amigos de aquel distrito que, resueltamente y con una lealtad á toda prueba, me han 
prestado su cooperación, asegurándoles que ahora como antes pueden fiar incondicionalmente 
en mi amistad y reconocimiento para cuanto, en la esfera privada, se les ofrezca. Con este 
motivo me reitero de usted afectísimo y atento amigo q. b. s. m., Juan Godó y Lluciá. (...)” 873 
 
 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
873 LV, 31/03/1916, p. 3. [E. T.]: “We have been kindly asked to publish the following letter: Mr. Editor of LA 
VANGUARDIA. My dearest friend: Due to the smear campaign I have been suffering lately and having not 
recovered yet from my last automovile accident, I have decided to stay appart from political struggle and to 
withdraw my candidacy for deputie in Congress in representation of Igualada’s constituency. I also ask you, Mr. 
Editor, when making this announcement public through your newspaper, to express my gratitude to the 
goodfriends I have in this constituency, for the loyalty they have shown to me in all times, and I promise to all 
of them my most loyal frienship and help in whatever concerns the private sphere. (...)” 
874 Source: La Ilustració Catalana, 03/08/1914, p. 742. Godó had previously donated the land for the 
construction of the school. This picture is a revealing example of the patronage dimension that politics still 
involved, and how the Godó family sought to build their prestige on it. The people surrounding Juan Godó are 
also very indicative of the support he obtained from certain groups in society (like the Church). Unfortunately 




Illustration 2. Popular homage paid to the former deputy Juan Godó Llucià (1851-1935), and to his 
son and former mayor of Igualada Juan Godó Pelegrí (1876-1957) by the 32 districts of the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
875 Source: La Vanguardia, 03/02/1914, p. 9. Juan Godó Llucià is the old man located on the front row - fifth 
from the right. On the left, holding the scroll, is his son Juan Godó Pelegrí. This picture was taken during the 
electoral campaign of 1914. The fact that La Vanguardia gave wide coverage of this event and published this 
picture a few days before the elections were held (February the 8th 1914) provides further evidence about the 




7.2. RAMÓN GODÓ: BUILDING THE CHARISMA OF ANTONIO MAURA 
 
 
 The letter Juan Godó Llucià sent to La Vanguardia in 1916 put an end to the Godó’s 
long political hegemony, achieved by two successive generations of the same family. This 
letter was published in the same newspaper that had already been of invaluable support to his 
electoral campaign in the past. Yet contrary to what might be expected, La Vanguardia did 
not lament Juan Godó’s decision to resign from politics, but welcomed it in favourable terms. 
In the view of this newspaper, noble interests no longer inspired politics in Igualada, and 
consequently Juan’s decision was praised as being the right one.876 
 The attitude of La Vanguardia might seem surprising at first glance. After all, the 
resignation of Godó implied the end of the family’s long political career. However, the 
attitude of this newspaper was not that surprising if we focus on the trajectory of its owner, 
Ramón Godó Lallana (1864-1931). As Chapter 6 explained, Ramón had retired from politics 
in 1906, in response to the smear campaign he had received from the Solidaritat Catalana. 
The second part of this chapter will show that his resignation from politics also followed his 
new will to embrace the cause of a politician called Antonio Maura. The attitude that he 
showed towards this conservative politician, who embodied one of the most ambitious plans 
to renovate liberal politics, will reveal that Ramón Godó was still firmly committed to 
political action – yet not through public office, but through his position as newspaper 
proprietor. His case will be used to examine the role the press played in the crisis of 
liberalism, and it will show how public opinion became an alternative platform for traditional 
elites to maintain their influence in society.  
 In February 1911, a letter addressed to Ramón Godó had accidentally arrived in the 
hands of his cousin living in Igualada, Juan Godó Llucià. This letter was written by one of the 
leading figures in Spanish politics, Antonio Maura, who wished to thank the owner of La 
Vanguardia for the support he received from this newspaper. Ramón Godó took advantage of 
this letter to introduce himself to this politician and express the great admiration he felt for 
him: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
876 “Al dejar complacido al señor Godó, no podemos menos de felicitarnos de su resolución, inspirada en los 
consejos facultativos y en los de buena amistad, que le desean reposo y apartamiento de unas luchas llevadas 
ahora al extremo del encono y de la mala pasión. Todo espíritu deseoso de la paz ha de apartarse, como acaba de 
hacerlo nuestro distinguido amigo, de esas contiendas menudas y locales, de móviles mezquinos, en que el ideal 
patriótico es lo de menos y que, apreciadas de cerca, acaban por infundir invencible repugnancia.” LV, 




“Exmo. Sor. D. Antonio Maura. Mi ilustre y respetable amigo; aunque por muy 
explicable confusion, debida á la identidad de apellido, estuviese dirigida su carta á mi primo 
Juan Godó y Lluciá, ha venido ella á mis manos puntualmente y me proporciona la honrosa 
ocasion de corresponder con Vd. y darle mil gracias por el concepto, sin duda benévolo, que 
forma de mi modesta ayuda y por las expresiones laudatorias que me dirije. Y ya que ha 
mediado la confusion de nombre á que aludo, me será permitido decir á Vd. que hace años me 
retiré de la política activa y rompí mis compromisos de abolengo con el partido liberal, así por 
la desviacion antipatriótica que me pareció observar en sus elementos predominantes, como 
por la positiva admiracion que Vd. y su política me venian produciendo. He dejado, pues, de 
ser Diputado á Cortes y me he dedicado á acrecentar la influencia y difusion de mi periódico 
“La Vanguardia” para acabar de convertirlo en un gran instrumento de opinion conservadora 
en Cataluña y poder apoyar con mas eficacia y libertad los ideales é intereses nobilísimos de 
que es Vd representacion suprema y en los cuales ha de hallarse al fin y à la postre la única 
via de salvacion para nuestro pais. Crea Vd. que me he de esforzar en contribuir à ello con 
todas mis fuerzas; y su carta de Vd., que me ha llenado de satisfaccion, será prenda de 
perseverancia inquebrantable para este que se reitera suyo afmo. amigo y SS q. s. m. b. 
Ramon Godó.  (...).” 877 
 
 
 This letter illustrates the deep change in Ramón Godó’s political views. As he made 
clear, both his political career in Igualada’s constituency and his affiliation to the Liberal 
Party obeyed a family tradition.878 This confession demonstrates to what extent politics was a 
family enterprise, where the different members cooperated to reach collective aims. Yet as 
Godó himself explained, he had ended this family tradition in 1906 for two reasons: “the 
antipatriotic attitude of the Liberal Party” and the “admiration” he felt for the politics of 
Maura. The following pages will examine these two reasons, because they were two elements 
that decisively contributed to the crisis of the Restoration. This will provide the historical 
context in which to frame the agency of Ramón Godó as a newspaper proprietor, and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
877 Archivo Fundación Antonio Maura (A.F.A.M.), Legajo 266, carpeta 2. Letter written in 08/02/1911.   In the 
past (1905) Ramón Godó and Maura had already exchanged some letters concerning local politics. [E. T.]: 
“Dear Mr. Antonio Maura. My illustrious and respectable friend; (...) I would like to take advantage of this 
confusion to let you know that few years ago I retired from active politics and broke my family commitment 
with the Liberal Party, due to the unpatriotic behaviour of this party, as well as for the positive admiration I feel 
for your person and your political aims. I have thus ceased in being deputie to Congress and have concentrated 
in expanding the influence and circulation of my newspaper “La Vanguardia” with the final aim of turning it 
into a powerful instrument of conservative opinion in Catalonia from where I can support more efficiently and 
freedom the noble ideals that your person embody, and which represent the only possible salvation for our 
country. I can assure you that I will contribute with all my efforts to such task, and the letter you sent to me has 
brought me great joy, and has reasserted me in my determination (...).” 




explain his declared objective of “turning La Vanguardia into an important instrument of 
conservative opinion in Catalonia”; a task to which he promised to dedicate “all my efforts”. 
 But who was Antonio Maura? What was the political programme of this politician, to 
which Godó referred as “the only salvation for our country”? Maura had started his political 
career in the ranks of the Liberal Party of Sagasta, but later abandoned it to join the 
Conservatives.879 After this move Maura started championing one of the most serious 
attempts of the right to renovate liberal politics. His plans shared some parallels with those of 
other liberal politicians in Spain (like José Canalejas), as well as with those of Giovanni 
Giolitti in Italy. All these liberal politicians embodied different gradualist programmes of 
reforms aimed at renovating the political system by broadening its social base to new 
actors.880 
 In Maura’s view, Spain’s state of decay resulted from the great distance that existed 
between society and the liberal-state project. For a large number of Spaniards the state was a 
detached entity whose presence in the local sphere was mostly perceived in negative terms 
(in the form of taxes and interventions in elections). To counteract this situation, Maura 
designed a programme of national regeneration based on two pillars. The first one was the 
eradication of caciquismo. In the view of this politician, the rigging of elections had 
decisively contributed to widening the distance between society and liberal institutions, and 
led him to argue in favour of “dignifying” and “moralising” public life (in his words). During 
his time as Prime Minister (1907-1909) Maura sought to materialise this philosophy through 
a triple legislative reform, consisting in the reform of local government, a new electoral law, 
and the reform of municipal justice. All these reforms were aimed at eradicating caciquismo, 
and contained legal measures to prevent both central government and local bosses from doing 
so. In parallel, these measures wished to foster political participation from below by 
conferring new administrative attributions to municipalities, and were part of the broader 
decentralising scheme Maura wished to implement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
879 His affiliation to the Liberal Party had personal motives, for Maura married the daughter of a prominent 
liberal politician named Germán Gamazo. See: Esther Calzada del Amo, Germán Gamazo, 1840-1901. Poder 
político y redes sociales en la Restauración, Madrid, Marcial Pons Historia, 2011. 
880 In the case of Giolitti, these new social actors were the Catholics and the Socialists. In the case of Maura, 
they formed the social spectrum he referred to as the “neutral masses” (“masas neutras”), as will be explained. 
Alexander J. De Grand, The hunchback's tailor: Giovanni Giolitti and liberal Italy from the challenge of mass 
politics to the rise of fascism, 1882-1922, Westport, Praeger, 2001. Some comparisons between the plans of 
Maura and Giolitti, in: Teresa Carnero Arbat, “La difícil transición de la política liberal a la política democrática 
en Italia y en España: algunas consideraciones”, Edward Acton, Ismael Saz Campos (eds.), La transición a la 




 The second pillar in the programme of this politician consisted in broadening the 
social basis of the Restoration, in a progressive way and within the framework of the political 
system. To do so he sought to attract those conservative elements of society that were 
alienated from politics, and to whom Maura referred as the “clases neutras” (“neutral 
classes”, in English). In contrast to other supporters of the renewing politics, Maura had an 
optimistic outlook on society and believed that the majority of the people were conservative. 
The problem, however, was that the liberal parties had paid little attention to integrating 
broader segments of society into the political system, as clientelism had demonstrated. 
Through the legislative measures he proposed to moralise public life, and in combination 
with a moderate plan of social reforms, Maura aspired to begin a “revolution from above” 
that would integrate the “conservative classes” into the political system. Total support of the 
Monarchy, as well as of Catholicism and social order, were other elements in the 
regenerationist programme of this liberal conservative politician. 
 The assessments of historians of Maura’s plans of reform have differed considerably. 
While some of them have seen them as a sincere attempt to renew the political system and to 
put an end to clientelism,881 some others have gone a step further and speak of Maura in 
clearly laudatory terms.882 In contrast, other historians argue that Maura did not represent a 
serious attempt to reform the power basis of the Restoration. Accordingly, Maura’s measures 
to promote free elections were not as transparent as he pretended, and included legal 
measures that acted as filters for the state control of elections and the banning of “unwanted” 
candidates. Additionally, these measures contained some dispositions that challenged the 
liberal nature of political representation, like the introduction of corporative forms of 
representation.883  
 The emphasis Maura placed on appealing to the “neutral masses” is what made the 
support of Ramón Godó particularly valuable for the plans of this politician. If it is taken into 
account that Maura lacked an official mouthpiece, and that he paid little attention to 
propaganda activities, it can be argued that La Vanguardia became Maura’s most influential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
881 María Jesús Hernández González, Ciudadanía y Acción. El conservadurismo maurista, 1907-1923, Madrid, 
Siglo XXI, 1990; and El universo conservador de Antonio Maura. Biografía y proyecto de Estado, Madrid, 
Biblioteca Nueva, 1997; ‘Neither God Nor Monster’: Antonio Maura and the Failure of Conservative 
Reformism in Restoration Spain (1893-1923), European History Quarterly, 2002, Vol. 32 (3), pp. 307-334. 
882 Javier Tusell, Juan Avilés, La Derecha española contemporánea: sus orígenes: el Maurismo, Madrid, 
Espasa-Calpe, 1986; J. Tusell, Antonio Maura. Una biografía política, Madrid, Alianza, 1994. 
883  Teresa Carnero Arbat, Elites gobernantes y democratización inacabada (1890-1923), Historia 




organ in Barcelona.884 This support became manifest when an unexpected event put an end to 
Maura’s government (1907-1909) and to his plans of regeneration. This event was the 
“Tragic Week”, as the popular insurrection that took place in Barcelona during the last week 
of July 1909 became known. A new military intervention in Morocco promoted a series of 
protests that eventually turned into a general and anticlerical revolt. As many as 12 churches 
and 40 convents were burned in the space of a week, and the corpses of nuns were paraded 
through the streets of Barcelona. This city remained stranded as the events unfolded and the 
authorities utterly failed to control the situation, which created an acute sense of insecurity 
among the well-off citizens and revealed the rise of a new social actor (the “masses”).885  
 Indeed, the black columns of smoke rising from the convents lingered for a long time 
in the city’s memory. In the years that followed, some people regarded the Tragic Week as a 
plot aimed at social revolution, while others saw it as a spontaneous upheaval against the 
church. For some of the progressive movements, like the Republican of Lerroux, the Tragic 
Week became part of their political imaginary based on anticlericalism, and they referred to it 
as “the Glorious” or the “Red” week. The most conservative and religious elements in 
society, in contrast, referred to it as the “Bloody” week or “Black” week.886 In the short term, 
the Tragic Week resulted in a harsh repression from the conservative government of Antonio 
Maura. More than 3,000 people were arrested and more than 150 worker unions and secular 
schools were shut down, accused of having promoted anticlericalism. In August the first five 
death sentences were pronounced, but one single man was blamed as the sole intellectual 
instigator. This man was Francesc Ferrer i Guàrdia (1859-1909), a renowned educator who 
promoted a network of state-independent schools based on secular and rationalist education.  
 The prosecution and execution of Ferrer, however, unleashed an extraordinary 
campaign throughout Europe that greatly discredited Maura’s public image. Thousands of 
people mobilised across the continent, in what became a pan-European mobilisation with 
some resemblance to the Dreyfus affair (1895). Paris became the first focus of the protest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
884 Maura’s supporters often lamented the little interest this politician showed in party-building activities and 
propaganda efforts. This attitude stood in contrast to his discourse of a “revolution from above”. M. J. 
Hernández González (1997), op. cit., p. 117. On Maura’s relations with the press, pp. 61-64. 
885 Joan Connoly Ullman, The Tragic Week. A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1968. A detailed state of the art, held on the centenary commemoration of the Tragic 
Week: Eloy Martín Corrales (ed.), Semana Trágica. Entre las barricadas de Barcelona y el Barranco del Lobo, 
Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2011. An overview of the events: Antoni Dalmau, Siete días de furia. Barcelona y la 
Semana Trágica (julio de 1909), Barcelona, Destino , 2009.  
886 The expression “Tragic Week” contains a negative connotation and was coined by conservative elements, as 
noted by Joan B. Culla. This expression only started to be used by contemporaries some time after the events. 
Joan B. Culla Clarà, Revisitar la Setmana Tràgica; and Agustí Colomines Companys, La Setmana Tràgica de 





campaigns and more than 10,000 protested in front of the Spanish embassy. Demonstrations 
also spread to literally all the corners of the French territory (incidents were recorded in 52 
departments and 82 cities) and the number of people who demonstrated was the largest since 
the days of the Paris Commune.887 In Italy too, demonstrations mobilised a great number of 
people across the country. As many as 10,000 people rallied in Rome, while 3,000 people did 
the same in Naples and Turin. In the city of Forli, a young socialist called Benito Mussolini 
participated in Ferrer’s solidarity campaign and held him as an example to follow in the fight 
against the church’s tyranny.888 Demonstrations also took place in the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Russia, and different national parliaments held plenary sessions to discuss the 
events in Barcelona.889  
 This extraordinary mobilisation in support of Ferrer shows the prominent place 
religious controversies had in Europe at the time. While the Church traditionally had uneasy 
relations with the liberal state,890 the first decade of the 20th century saw an unprecedented 
mobilisation of Catholics and their involvement in political struggle through new 
organisations. In opposition to this, liberal progressive parties started making secularisation a 
new central element of their political agenda. This was a common trend in most European 
countries, which historians often explained as an attempt of liberal parties to address the new 
expanding franchise, and to distract voters from labour disputes. More recently, however, it 
has been argued that anticlericalism was much more than a tactical move from liberal parties. 
In reality, it was a phenomenon that epitomised the strong polarisation of European societies 
around religion.891 
 The Tragic Week exemplified how popular anticlericalism was among Barcelona’s 
working class, and also showed the vital function of the press in creating an unprecedented – 
though ephemeral – “European public opinion”.892 Newspapers became the main channel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
887 Vincent Robert, “La protesta universal contra la ejecución de Ferrer: las manifestaciones de octubre de 1909, 
Historia Social, 1992, 14, pp. 61-82. 
888 Quoted in: Wolfram Kaiser, “‘Clericalism – that is our enemy!’: European anticlericalism and the culture 
wars”, Christopher Clark & Wolfram Kaiser (eds.), Culture Wars. Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-
Century Europe, Cambridge, CUP, 2003, p. 74. 
889 A general view of Ferrer’s international impact, in: Juan Avilés, Francisco Ferrer y Guardia. Pedagogo, 
anarquista y mártir, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2006, pp. 247-258. For the case of France, see: Vincent Robert, op. 
cit; for that of Italy: Fernando García Sanz, “Tra strumentalizzazione e difesa del liberopensiero: Il caso Ferrer 
nella opinione pubblica italiana e nei rapporti Madrid/Roma”, Aldo A. Mola (ed.), Stato, Chiesa e Società in 
Italia, Francia, Belgio e Spagna nei secoli XIX-XX, Foggia, Bastogi Editrice Italiana, 1993, pp. 251-286; and 
Maurizio Antonioli (ed.), Contro la chiesa. I moti pro Ferrer del 1909 in Italia, Pisa, BFS, Edizioni, 2009. 
890 As exemplified in the attitude of the Vatican during the Italian Risorgimento; and in the Carlist civil wars in 
Spain. 
891 C. Clark and W. Kaiser (eds.), op. cit., esp. chapters 1 and 2. 
892  Ibidem, pp. 64-74; Lisa Dittrich, Die Hinrichtung Francisco Ferrers. Ein Fall für die europäische 




through which news about Ferrer circulated between countries, and contributed to 
disseminating imaginaries that were re-adapted to local contexts. In Italy, for instance, the 
doors of some churches were burned for the first time as a symbolic act of anticlericalism 
borrowed from Barcelona’s Tragic Week. 893 Additionally, newspapers contributed to 
popularising the name of Ferrer and to transforming him into a major icon among the 
intelligentsia and the progressive minds of all Europe. The dubious evidence used by the 
authorities to sentence and execute Ferrer turned him into a martyr of rationalism and 
freethinking who transcended national boundaries.894  
 In blunt contrast, Antonio Maura was held responsible for the execution and was 
harshly criticised by the same protestors. The editorials of newspapers all-over the Continent 
emphasised the numerous irregularities of the trial and generally condemned the execution. 
The French newspapers L’Humanité and La guerre sociale, for instance, portrayed Maura as 
the archetypical politician of a backward country dominated by intolerance and religious 
fanaticism. Moderate newspapers, like the The Times of England, also noted the bad 
impression the execution made for the international image of Maura’s government; while the 
Italian Il Corriere della Sera denounced the repression of the Spanish government in very 
strong terms.895  
 The case of La Vanguardia revealed the unease this supra-national campaign in 
support of Ferrer had started generating among the conservative segments of Spanish society. 
Godó’s newspaper deemed the attacks against Maura as a smear campaign against Spain 
(“campaña anti-patriótica” were the words it used), and complained about the recurring 
stereotypes published in the European press. In fact, in most countries the progressive forces 
spoke of Maura’s government through a limited yet highly evocative repertoire of images 
(like the Inquisition and religious fanaticism) that had a long history and were inspired by the 
country’s “black legend”. 896 The most conservative segments of Spanish society mobilised 
against these attacks and set up different initiatives to protest against what they saw as an 
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893 Adrian Lyttleton, An Old Church and a New State: Italian Anticlericalism, 1876-1915, European History 
Quarterly, 1983, 13, pp. 225-248. 
894 Daniel Laqua, Freethinkers, anarchists and Francisco Ferrer: the making of a transnational solidarity 
campaign, European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire, 2014, 21, 4, pp. 467-484. 
895 See: The Times, 21/09/1909, quoted and reproduced in Spanish, in: Luis Simarro, El proceso Ferrer y la 
opinión europea, Madrid, Imp. Eduardo Arias, 1910, pp. 281-284.  
896 Frierich Edelmayer, The “Leyenda Negra” and the Circulation of Anti-Catholic and Anti-Spanish Prejudices, 




internationally orchestrated campaign supporting the deeds of the Tragic Week.897 Ramón 
Godó actively contributed to this conservative reaction through the press. La Vanguardia 
supported the idea of creating a group of journalists in charge of counteracting foreign 
news,898 and made an open call to foreigners living in Barcelona to contradict the image the 
foreign press gave of this city.899  
 Moreover, the international campaign in support of Ferrer carried destabilising effects 
in domestic politics. Until that time, and in sharp contrast to the rest of Europe, the 
indictment of Ferrer had provoked few protests in Spain.900 However, once the international 
outcry started, the Spanish left saw it as an opportunity to revive the animosity it traditionally 
felt towards Maura. Before the Tragic Week the left had already had strong confrontations 
with this politician. These confrontations were mostly related to Maura’s sympathies with the 
Church and with his strict measures to combat terrorism. The outcome was the union of the 
left in a new coalition called the “Bloque de Izquierdas” (“Left Bloc”) in 1908. This coalition 
was a novelty in the Restoration, as it brought one of the liberal parties (the Liberal Party) 
together with parties that opposed the political system (the Republicans and the Democrats). 
This coalition revealed the efforts of the Liberal Party to renew the political agenda by 
putting an emphasis on the primacy of civil institutions over the church.901 This new policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
897 Juan Avilés, “L’image de Ferrer dans la presse conservatrice espagnole”, Anne Morelli and Jacques Lemaire 
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Hommes, 2011, pp. 53-70. An example of this conservative reaction was Julián Juderías, who published a book 
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Studies of the Image of Spain Abroad”). See: F. Edelmayer, op. cit.  
898 Alfredo Opisso, “Nueva Hermandad”, LV, 01/09/1909, p. 4. 
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based on secularisation, coupled with the anticlerical discourse, went in line with the 
realignment other liberal progressive parties adopted in Europe.902  
 What makes the Spanish Liberal Party interesting, in this regard, is that in its 
eagerness to replace Maura in power the party relied upon the support of a new media 
holding called the “Trust”. This English term was how the “Sociedad Editorial de España” 
was commonly known, and it was the first media holding ever created in Spain. The Trust 
consisted in an alliance of progressive-oriented newspapers aimed at sharing production costs 
and counteracting the loss of sales the press suffered after the Disaster of 1898.903 With a 
capital of 10 million pesetas, the Trust brought together 9 different newspapers. Some of 
them were top-selling papers like El Imparcial and El Heraldo de Madrid, while some others 
were created with the aim of extending the Trust’s influence to other cities (like El Liberal, 
which started to be published in Barcelona, Seville and Bilbao). The newspapers of the Trust 
covered a wide geographic area and a broad range of opinion (especially on the centre-left) 
and gave, above all, great capacity of influence to their editors. In fact, all the Trust’s editors 
were also deputies in Congress, a feature that reveals the intertwined relations between the 
press and politics at the time.904  
 The capacity of the Trust to influence policy-making became manifest when Maura’s 
government was toppled shortly after the Tragic Week. As the international campaign started 
protesting against Ferrer’s indictment, the Trust mobilised all their efforts into an aggressive 
campaign under the slogan “Maura no!”. Day after day, the various newspapers belonging to 
this media holding attacked Maura, and blamed him for Spain’s discredit in the international 
arena. At the peak of this campaign, the Trust’s standard bearer – Madrid’s El Imparcial – 
addressed an article to the King with a clear warning: the Liberal Party could hardly support 
the Monarchy in the future if Maura’s government was to remain in power for much longer. 
This article was published one day before King Alfonso XIII suddenly decided to remove 
Maura from power.905 As the King would recognise later on, his decision was motivated by 
the heated atmosphere – both national and international – that had followed Ferrer’s 
execution, as well as by the need to distance the crown from Maura’s negative public 
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Antonio Sacristán. They were all journalists and deputies. Pedro Gómez Aparicio, Historia del periodismo 
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image.906 This incident reveals the considerable influence editors had over policy-making. 
They were not simple recorders of events, but actively sought to shape them as political 
actors. 
 The fall of Maura’s government in October 1909 decisively contributed to the crisis of 
the Restoration. The change of government put an end to Maura’s plans of national 
regeneration and, above all, revealed a new way to reach power. Instead of resulting from an 
agreement between the two liberal parties, the Liberal Party reached power through the 
pressure the Trust exerted on the King. As the leader of the Conservative Party, Maura was 
deeply disappointed with this strategy and considered that it broke the consensus Liberals and 
Conservatives had established since 1885 to rotate in power. Maura saw the attitude of the 
Liberal Party as a stab in the back, and after that time refused any form of agreement with 
this party. Thus the traditional consensus between liberal parties, upon which the Restoration 
stood, started to tremble. 
 La Vanguardia became the way through which Godó expressed his dissatisfaction 
with the new political situation. The newspaper put in very clear terms the discontent about 
the Tragic Week and the following political crisis. Such a bold statement was not very 
common for a newspaper that was independent and therefore preferred to avoid political 
confrontation. However, the crisis of October 1909 led Godó to express in very clear terms 
the social model he supported, and announced the attitude it would hold in relation to the 
Liberal Party led by Segismundo Moret: 
 
“No tiene por qué ocultar LA VANGUARDIA que vió con disgusto y extrañeza el 
desarrollo de la última crisis y las campañas desaforadas y en grandísima parte injustas que se 
desataron contra el anterior gabinete [Maura]. Hemos deplorado que el partido liberal, á raiz 
de los sucesos de julio y ahora, últimamente, con motivo de la agitación extranjera contra 
España no consiguiese adoptar una posición despejada y firme (...). LA VANGUARDIA 
simpatiza con las ideas de conservación social, sin excluir ningún desenvolvimiento ordenado 
ni ninguna conquista legitima del derecho moderno; es un periódico de tendencia 
conservadora; pero no es ni será nunca un periódico de partido ni un órgano oficioso. Con la 
mayor libertad hemos censurado la gestión del señor Maura y de los demás ministros en 
cuantos extremos nos han parecido nocivos para el país; y del mismo modo aplaudiremos lo 
que de beneficioso para el país puedan llevar á cabo el señor Moret y sus colaboradores. En lo 
que no incurriremos jamás es en la oposición por la oposición, en la tarea disolvente, en la 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




campaña de mala fé. (...) Estar al lado del señor Maura en las difíciles circunstancias que han 
pasado, no era ser ministerial de un gobierno: era serlo de España, puesto que de grandes 
intereses nacionales se trataba. En tales cuestiones también estaremos al lado del señor Moret 
(...), sin renunciar á nuestro criterio ni á nuestra significación, y deseando únicamente que no 
llegue el caso de considerar incompatible la subsistencia del actual gobierno con aquellos 
supremos intereses nacionales.” 907  
 
 
The above-quoted article was published as an editorial that positioned La Vanguardia 
in relation to the Tragic Week and to the new political situation. This newspaper defined 
itself as conservative, yet open to change as long as this took place within the political 
system’s framework. This position revealed the fear of social revolution, as evidenced in the 
Tragic Week, but also showed a clear awareness of the need to promote reforms. 
Additionally, the above-cited editorial contained a clear criticism of the attitudes of the 
Liberal Party and of the Trust for taking advantage of the international campaign to attack 
Maura. On repeated occasions La Vanguardia criticised this press holding for having an 
irresponsible attitude, similar to the one that led to the Disaster of 1898, and for preventing 
the renewal of the Liberal Party. Thus, whereas the Conservatives adopted a plan of national 
regeneration based on Maura’s policies, La Vanguardia criticised the Trust for acting as a 
boa constrictor that was coiled around its prey (the Liberal Party). This media holding 
impeded the movements of the party and risked the peril of crushing it to death.908 Evidence 
of this was the Liberals’ strategy of criticising Maura and its anticlerical propaganda. This 
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was, in sum, the “antipatriotic behaviour of the Liberal Party” that Ramón Godó criticised 
in his correspondence with Maura. 
 At this point we may ask: if Godó was such a critic of the relationship between the 
Trust and the Liberal Party, how did he aspire to support Maura if La Vanguardia defined 
itself as an independent newspaper? The solution to this puzzle was the definition of a new 
relation between press and politics, where serving “national interests” became La 
Vanguardia’s new guiding ethos. This implied that La Vanguardia’s support of Maura was 
not unconditional, but was at the service of a cause. According to this view, which had much 
in common with the view Sánchez Ortiz defended in the aftermath of the Disaster of 1898, La 
Vanguardia declared that it would not hesitate in supporting the Liberal Party, nor any other 
party, as long as they defended “national interests”.909 This principle implied breaking with 
the partisan affiliation that guided the Trust, as well as most of the press in southern Europe. 
In fact, of the 17 newspapers that were published daily in Barcelona in 1910, 10 of them still 
defined themselves as “partisan”, and only the remaining 7 newspapers claimed to be 
“independent”.910  
 Still, the “national interest” to which La Vanguardia ascribed was a blurred concept, 
open to much subjective interpretation. This was, precisely, the value behind editorial 
independence: freedom of criteria is what allowed the influence of La Vanguardia to be 
concentrated in Godó’s hands. In contrast to the newspapers of the Trust, which had a 
partisan adscription that linked them to the Liberal Party, Godó was free to decide the 
orientation of his newspaper. If he supported Maura it was because he wished to do so, not 
because La Vanguardia was at the service of the Conservative Party. The instrumental use of 
editorial independence is what allowed Godó to maintain his influence in society.  
 This implied a substantial change in the Godó family’s sources of influence. Ramón 
Godó’s position did not stem from acting as the local representative of the Liberal Party (as 
was the case of the first generation of his family); nor in the monopoly of public office in 
Igualada (as was the case of his cousin Juan Godó Llucià). Ramón’s influence stemmed 
solely from the wide circulation of La Vanguardia and the capacity to control the editorial 
line of this newspaper. Godó’s case sheds light on the historical transformation of the press 
from being the mouthpiece of political parties to an autonomous power in society. In this new 
mass society, public opinion was becoming a dimension of growing importance where the 
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power of editors was measured on their capacity to attract readers. Adopting a line of 
editorial independence and an informative journalistic model became two ways to expand 
this political influence, while turning newspapers into a profitable enterprise.911  
The importance of the press in the new mass society became evident as the crisis of 
liberal politics intensified. In 1913, Maura began suffering the opposition of his own party. 
The boycott policy of the Liberal Party in the aftermath of the Tragic Week started creating 
unease within the Conservatives, who started deeming this position as too radical. The 
boycott exerted against the Liberals precluded the Conservatives from the support of the 
government in elections; and therefore from the benefits of holding public office. This 
situation eventually provoked the crisis of Maura’s leadership within the Conservative Party 
and the splitting of this organisation into two factions: the supporters of restoring the 
consensus with the Liberals (named “idóneos”, in Spanish), and the supporters of Maura, 
who were still reluctant about this. The climax of this intra-party crisis occurred in October 
1913, when King Alfonso XIII called the leader of the “idóneos” into power (Eduardo Dato) 
to Maura’s detriment. This decision demonstrated the consequences that the Tragic Week 
was still producing on domestic politics, and symbolised the crumbling of the Restoration 
due to the division between the liberal elites. 
Paradoxically, the tensions Maura encountered within his own party greatly increased 
his popularity, to the point that a new charismatic movement known as “Maurismo” emerged. 
A historian who has studied this movement in detail has stressed how difficult Maurismo is to 
define.912 Maurismo was not a political party, but rather a body of opinion that eventually 
aspired to transform itself into a stable political organisation. It was not a class movement, 
although the majority of its members were conservative, Catholic, and mostly of a middle-
class background. The people who formed it belonged to the segment of society who deeply 
disliked the anticlerical agenda of the Liberal Party and listened in horror to stories about the 
burning of convents in Barcelona. They all identified with the regeneration ideals Maura 
embodied, and sympathised with the marginalisation he had suffered – to the point of 
creating a cult of celebrity around this politician.913 This veneration stemmed from the 
effective communicative skills of this politician, like his brilliant oratorical skills or the 
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912 M. J. Hernández González, Ciudadanía y Acción..., op. cit.  
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pomposity of his gestures;914 as well as the numerous attacks he was victim to. The 
vociferous campaigns of the Trust under the slogan “Maura, no!”, and the decision of the 
King to remove him from power, contributed to Maura’s image of martyrdom. The more 
Maura was attacked, the more supporters he gained. Yet, and surprisingly, this politician 
never nurtured this movement nor looked for its support. In fact, it can be said that Maurismo 
existed in spite of Maura.915 This movement saw the politician as more of a hero that 
embodied a noble ideal of regeneration, than as a liberal politician. 
The case of Ramón Godó is evocative of the social and political context that gave 
birth to Maurismo. Godó became the archetypical person who saw in the exclusion of 
Maura the same obstacles that prevented Spain’s salvation. La Vanguardia had already 
expressed solidarity with this politician during Ferrer’s international campaign, but the 
exclusion Maura suffered in the Conservative Party in 1913 intensified even further the 
admiration that Godó felt for this politician. The correspondence between the two men 
reveals that Godó’s admiration eventually developed into open worship: 
 
“Exmo Sor D. Antonio Maura. Mi ilustre amigo; aun á trueque de molestar su ocupada 
atencion, no puedo resistir por mas tiempo al prurito de solicitar un retrato de Vd, avalorado 
con su firma, para colocarlo en mi despacho de La Vanguardia. Creo, que el periódico es 
digno de tal honor y que sabrá corresponder á él en lo sucesivo, si tuviese la fortuna de 
alcanzarlo (...) le diré que sigo con profundo interés el desenvolvimiento de los negocios 
públicos y sobre todo, de los conservadores en su pleito. Huelga añadir que espero con la 
natural ansiedad oir la voz de Vd, cuando crea llegado el momento de desplegar la labia y 
romper el silencio guardado hasta ahora. A Vd corresponde fijar ese momento y todos 
hemos de acader su prudencia; pero no es menos esplicable nuestra espectacion, hija del 
entusiasmo que la causa y el caudillo nos inspira. (...)”916 
 
 Antonio Maura did not disappoint Godó and rewarded him with a portrait of himself. 
The fact that Maura’s brother painted the portrait illustrates how close the relation between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
914 Ordinary people, for instance, sometimes assisted in Congress just to be able to hear Maura’s speeches. M. J. 
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916 A.F.A.M., Legajo 45, carpeta 29. [E. T.]: “Dear Mr. Antonio Maura. My illustrious and respectable friend; 
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from you, and I am ready to breaking the silence and start the campaing when you order it. You have the power 
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the two men had become. Moreover, Godó was not content with merely hanging the portrait 
in his office at La Vanguardia, but decided to publish a full-page reproduction of the painting 
in his newspaper, including the personal dedication it contained (see Illustration 3). This 
gesture, and the letter quoted above provide clear evidence of the great interest Godó still had 
in politics. Yet more importantly, his case reveals that besides public office, alternative 
channels of political action existed, like contributing to build the charisma of a politician 






Illustration 3. Antonio Maura’s portrait, with a dedication to Ramón Godó Lallana, reproduced in La 
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 This chapter has shown how an episode in European history, like the responses of the 
elites to the birth of mass politics, becomes particularly complex and nuanced if studied from 
a micro-perspective. The reactions of the Godó family to the challenges of mass politics were 
far from being the same. On behalf of the Liberal Party, and based on a combination of 
clientelism and a new repertory of political action, Juan Godó Llucià fought to maintain the 
family’s local dominion in Igualada. In contrast, his cousin Ramón Godó embraced, through 
the pages of La Vanguardia, a project of national regeneration that sought the eradication of 
caciquismo. The case of these two men illustrates to what extent traditional elites gave 
different responses to the same challenge.            
These different attitudes illustrate the impact that the crisis of Liberalism had at a 
micro-scale, which challenged the solidarity between family members. Yet, in the end, 
kinship ties proved to be stronger than personal views, as shown in the cooperation the Godó 
family sustained.918 The conclusion that can be drawn is that the family continued to play a 
central role in the social cohesion of elites, even though the crisis of liberalism (sometimes) 
posed a serious threat to this. 
 The full mobilisation of the family’s members, however, became insufficient to save 
the Godó family’s political domain in Igualada. This case study provides an alternative view 
about the transition from the liberal’s monopoly of power to the new mass politics. While 
historians have mostly explained this transition through the case of big cities, this chapter has 
examined the transition through the case of a smaller city. Igualada was an industrial location 
immersed in a rural constituency of 32 small towns. In each and every one of these towns the 
Godó’s had a branch of local supporters. As the family crisis intensified, this network of 
“clients” became more visible as they mobilised to uphold the family’s hegemony, which 
they themselves benefited from. In the meantime, an alternative segment of society – those 
who did not benefit from this privileged access to public benefits, based on patron-client 
relationships – started participating in politics and challenged the supremacy of the family. 
 The outcome was a new political scenario where local society became deeply 
polarised with respect to the Godó family. In contrast to the confrontation that existed at a 
national level between traditional and new political parties, in local politics this confrontation 
took place around the position of one single family. This process of polarisation in local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
918 The support Ramón Godó gave to the electoral campaign of Juan Godó Llucià through the pages of La 




politics became manifest in the remarkable increase of electoral turnout. This was the result 
of changes in the regional context (e.g. the creation of the Solidaritat Catalana) but above all 
of the great capacity for mobilisation that the new political movements had at a local scale. In 
contrast to the socially restricted character of liberal institutions, Republicans and Catalan 
nationalists devoted great efforts to politicising new segments of society. The press became a 
precious tool in such an attempt, as the calls made to women – who were not allowed to vote 
at the time – illustrates. Yet, and contrary to what is often assumed, the new competitive and 
plural character of elections neither removed clientelism nor led the traditional elites to 
respond exclusively through autocratic methods.919 Instead, clientelism took a new form 
where the two confronting camps competed for the influence of local bosses, 920 while at the 
same time the local elite sought to redefine (or “professionalise”) its sources of authority.  
 The strategies the family developed to redefine their legitimacy can be compared with 
the strategies of other European elites. For the case of Italy, for instance, Anthony Cardoza 
has demonstrated that the Piedmontese nobility progressively abandoned its leadership in 
liberal parties, but kept its sway in public life by “investing” in informal channels of 
influence. 921  These channels consisted in those social fields where aristocratic values 
remained predominant (e.g. diplomacy and the army); but also in the developing new spaces 
of sociability (like mutual aid societies and religious associations) that allowed noblemen to 
reassert their role as community leaders. The case of the Godó family, in contrast, highlights 
an alternative strategy, where elites sought to maintain their influence through public office. 
The new competitive and plural character of elections, however, implied that clientelism was 
no longer sufficient to control this position. The case of Juan Godó Llucià reveals different 
attempts to adapt to the new situation, and it is what allowed him to win in highly 
competitive scenarios (like the elections of 1910, with an 80% electoral turnout). If all these 
attempts to renovate the sources of authority finally failed it was, in part, due to the changing 
relations between this family and the central government. Local politics, therefore, was 
highly autonomous and yet not totally alienated from outside interference. 
 Public opinion became an alternative dimension where traditional elites sought to 
build a new legitimation. If Ramón Godó Lallana achieved a privileged position in society it 
was not thanks to the combined use of press and public office, but stemmed solely from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
919 John Garrard, “The Democratic Experience”, Stefan Berger (ed.), A companion to nineteenth-century 
Europe, 1789-1914, Malden, Blackwell, 2006, pp. 149-163 
920 The calls of the leader of the Lliga Regionalista (Francesc Cambó) to win the support of local bosses is 
particularly revealing in this respect. 
921 Anthony L. Cardoza, Aristocrats in bourgeois Italy: the Piedmontese nobility, 1861-1930, Cambridge, 




former. This reveals a substantial transformation in the Godó’s traditional sources of 
influence, consisting in the growing differentiation between two spheres (press and politics). 
It was in their capacity to address an audience of thousands of readers that the political power 
of editors now stood. The case of the Trust illustrates this point, and reveals the growing 
importance that contemporaries were giving to public space, despite the importance 
clientelism still had. The emergence of an – ephemeral – European public opinion, and the 
advantage the Trust took from this to topple Maura from power, exemplify how important 
public opinion was becoming in decision-making.  
 Contrary to the Trust, Ramón Godó could no longer base his influence on acting as 
the representative of a political party. Yet rather than an inconvenience, editorial 
independence allowed him room for a range of manoeuvres, and concentrated La 
Vanguardia’s influence in his sole hands. This freedom of criteria allowed Godó to continue 
exerting an influence in politics according to his particularistic views, as the absolute support 
he gave to Maura reveals. This instrumentalization of the press to support a private agenda, 
however, also made editors highly dependent on this blurred and diffused power that public 
opinion represented. Now that he could no longer rely on either party filiation or public 
office, Godó’s influence was directly subject to his capacity to appeal to the widest number 
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CHAPTER 8. THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF ‘LA 
VANGUARDIA’ 
 
“Se vive en tiempos de Moratín, porque es tradición española 
recoger las noticias del regazo perfumado de las actrices; pero algo 
han cambiado los tiempos, de otras fuentes más caudalosas dispone la 
prensa moderna y otra muy distinta es la vida, sujeta á la marcha de 
los acontecimientos y cada día más compleja y abierta á las 





 José Escofet (1884-1939), who wrote the lines that open this chapter, was one of the 
longest-serving journalists at La Vanguardia. Escofet wrote this article, entitled “Old habits: 
The press and the theatre”, to voice his dissatisfaction with the work of journalists in Spain, 
and with those of Madrid in particular. According to Escofet, the Spanish capital was still 
dominated by an old journalistic ideal, where the newspapers focused on three topics: theatre, 
bullfighting, and politics.923 The reason these three topics, which Escofet considered as mere 
“gossip” (“chismorreo”), were given such preference in Madrid’s press was related to the 
characteristics of the journalistic profession: the majority of journalists were still self-
educated men who, after having “wasted their time writing poetry, novels and comedies”, 
decided to enter in the world of journalism to make a living. It was no surprise, then, that this 
passion for literature conditioned the way journalists elaborated news.  
 If Escofet deplored the work of journalists in Madrid it was because he thought that it 
prevented the regeneration of Spain. Instead of opening the country to what he saw as the 
positive influence of the outside world, journalists perpetuated an image of Spain as a 
“tambourine country” (“España de pandereta”).924 In contrast to the case of Madrid, Escofet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
922 José Escofet, "Costumbres viejas. La prensa y los teatros", La Vanguardia, 29/09/1917, p. 8. [E. T.]: “We 
still live in the times of Moratín, because it is a Spanish custom to gather news from perfumed actresses; but 
times have changed, there are alternative and abundant sources on which the modern press can now rely. Life is 
now very different and complex as a result of the great external influences it is now opened up to.” Moratín was 
the name of a famous Spanish poet and playwright of the 18th and early 19th centuries. 
923 “No se encuentra en los periódicos españoles, salvo honrosas excepciones, más que la chismografía política, 
la chismografía teatral y la chismografía taurina, es decir, una forma unica acomodada á las tres líneas del 
triangulo alrededor del cual va dando vueltas, viciosamente, el ingenio del periodista español”. José Escofet, 
“Costumbres viejas. La prensa y los teatros”, LV, 29/09/1917, p. 8. 
924 “No lamentaríamos que se hablara tanto de espectáculos, de toreros, copleras y bailarinas, si no se 




considered that the situation was slightly different in Barcelona – “where the press has 
reached greater expansion and mirrors the rich life of a more cosmopolitan and active city”. 
Although Barcelona also contained examples of the petty journalism Escofet despised, in his 
view the main difference was due to Madrid’s “strongly parochial character”.925   
 Escofet’s comments touch upon one of the central points of this thesis. His article 
evokes the changes – but also the persisting continuities – of the journalistic profession in 
Spain during the modern era. The previous chapters of this thesis have explained how the 19th 
century saw the emergence of “the news paradigm” in journalism. This ideal can be defined 
as the growing awareness among journalists about the importance of abstaining from partisan 
views when conducting their work. The previous chapters have stressed that the emergence 
of new professional codes was part of a broader historical phenomenon: the transition from a 
partisan press model towards an independent and commercial one, which took place in 
Europe and the United States during the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.  
 This chapter should be read as a step further in addressing the above-presented 
questions. It will analyse the relation between the press and politics from a different – though 
complementary – perspective. This perspective will be the relation between technology and 
the professionalisation of journalism. The reason for doing so is that technology, understood 
as the investment in new communication machinery, was the pillar upon which Ramón Godó 
based the growth of La Vanguardia. Since Godó decided to abandon his political career, and 
then became fully committed to Maura’s plan of national regeneration, his capacity of 
influence was directly dependent on La Vanguardia’s circulation. The readers of this 
newspaper were no longer the members of the Liberal Party, but a more plural and 
depersonalised public. As a result, if Godó wished to secure his influence in this new era of 
mass politics, he could no longer rely on political office or on clientelism, but depended on a 
more indirect channel to exert his influence: that is, the capacity of La Vanguardia to reach 
the biggest number of readers possible. In this attempt, adopting a more professionalised 
form of journalism, based on continuous investments in technology, became the strategy 
Godó selected to reach the broadest audience possible. In this way, the case of Ramón Godó 
allows us to explore in which ways the “notables” that traditionally relied on clientelist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contemplación de una perspectiva que es la menos á propósito para hacerle reaccionar contra la fatalidad de su 
destino”. Ibidem. 
925 “La prensa madrileña, por exceso de localismo, olvidó su admirable situación para recoger las actividades de 
la periferia, y ha sido por esto una prensa de información escasa, limitada á los telegramas de la agencia 





practices redefined their strategies to maintain a pre-eminent position in society during a 
crucial moment in the crisis of liberal politics: the years of the First World War (1914-1918).  
This chapter is divided in two parts. The first one will analyse the role that technology 
played in La Vanguardia by examining the new journalistic ideal this newspaper adopted 
during the first decade of the 20th century. At that time, La Vanguardia started an ambitious 
programme of reforms – inspired by the reforms of 1888 – that consisted in signing contracts 
with different news agencies (such as Havas, Reuters and Wolff) and in installing the first 
telegraphic machinery in Spain. These services were novelties at the time, and revealed 
Godó’s ambition to broaden the readership of his newspaper by providing more, and 
increasingly diverse, content.  
 The second part of the chapter will use the case study of La Vanguardia to tackle 
historical debates on the role that technology played in the birth of modern journalism. 
Historians have often argued that the growing dependence on the telegraph and news 
agencies led newspapers to produce a more “rational” type of news, this being in contrast to 
the more arbitrary work of journalists.926 Likewise, it has been argued that the newspaper’s 
growing investment in technology, produced by the desire to increase their circulation, also 
increased the newspapers’ dependence on advertising as a fundamental source of income. 
Such dependence on advertisers allegedly became a second reason that newspapers started to 
produce more “neutral” news.927  
 In contrast to the above-mentioned views, this chapter will argue that technology was 
not a guarantee of “objectivity” in the journalist profession. This will be demonstrated by 
focusing on the public debate that took place in Spain during the First World War. Although 
this country never entered the war, public opinion became strongly divided into pro-Allies 
and pro-Germans. Such division did not only show that Spain was, in reality, directly affected 
by the war (thus challenging traditional views on the subject), but also epitomized the 
changes of a public sphere that was becoming more diffused and larger in number of readers. 
In this context, the way La Vanguardia responded to the challenge of informing a more plural 
– and deeply divided – society will be analysed. This challenge was hardened by the 
divisions taking place within the newspaper itself, due to the opposing pro-German views of 
the proprietor (Ramón Godó) and those of a pro-Allies director (Miquel dels Sants Oliver) to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
926 This was, in fact, one of the main claims of José Escofet, in the article quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter. Some reflections on the relation between technology and news, in James Curran, Narrating Media 
History, Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2009, Section VII.  
927 Henrik Örnebring, “Technology and journalism-as-labour: Historical perspectives”, in Journalism, February 




report daily on the war. This confrontation will be used to demonstrate that the emphasis La 
Vanguardia put on technology and “hard” news did not become an impediment for Godó to 
continue promoting his political views; yet at the same time will demonstrate the difficulties 
of Godó to instrumentalize the newspaper according to his own agenda. 
 The archival sources used in this chapter are wide and diverse. In addition to using La 
Vanguardia as a source, I have occasionally consulted other Spanish newspapers. Secondly, I 
have relied on the archives of two liberal politicians (Antonio Maura and the Count of 
Romanones), located in Madrid. Thirdly, the archives located at the French news agency 
Havas, in Paris, have been consulted. This archive contains valuable information about 
Godó’s use of news agencies during the First World War. Finally, the testimonies left by 
some contemporaries (“ego-documents”) will be used to test some of the arguments that will 







8.1. THE SPECIALISATION OF ‘LA VANGUARDIA’ IN INFORMATIVE JOURNALISM 
 
 
 In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we saw how the year 1888 represented a radical 
breakthrough in the history of La Vanguardia. During that year, the Godó brothers 
abandoned the main reason that had inspired them to establish the newspaper in 1881 (that of 
acting as the mouthpiece of the Liberal Party in Barcelona) and replaced it with a new ideal: 
La Vanguardia as an “independent” and commercially oriented newspaper. Following the 
example of The Times, the new aspiration of the Godó brothers was to turn La Vanguardia 
into the mirror of the city where it was published. For this reason, they made the renovation 
of this newspaper coincide with the celebration of Barcelona’s Universal Exposition, an event 
that aspired to transform this city and symbolised one of the landmarks of mass society in 
Catalonia.928  
 In fact, newspapers are part of the city where they are published.929 They aspire to 
reflect the transformations of society while actively contributing to shaping those 
transformations. But at the same time, newspapers are also subject, to a considerable extent, 
to the demands of “the public” – through the autonomy readers have in their choice to buy 
one newspaper over another. Therefore, any account wishing to explain La Vanguardia’s 
“golden age” during the First World War should also take into account the transformations 
that Barcelona and Catalonia were undergoing at the time, and examine the strategies press 
editors designed to adapt to these transformations. If we take a look at the evolution of 
Barcelona’s press, it can be argued that Ramón Godó excelled, to a considerable extent, in 
the task of reflecting the tastes and needs of a substantial part of public opinion in this city, as 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
928 Francesc Espinet i Burunat & Joan Manuel Tresserras i Gaju, La gènesi de la societat de masses a 
Catalunya, 1888-1939, Bellaterra, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1999.  
929 On the relation between press and its urban setting, see: Christian Delporte, Médias et Villes (XVIIIe-XXe 
siècle), Paris, Presses Universitaires François-Rabelais, Col. Hors, 1999; and Friedrich Lenger, European cities 
in the Modern Era, 1850-1914, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2012, pp. 209-228 (“Mass Media, Perceptions of the City, 




Table 1. Circulation of the main newspapers in Barcelona between 1905 and 1920 930 
 
 
        1905         1913        1918            1920 
La Vanguardia      18,000       58,000   90-100,000          100,000 
Las Noticias      11,000       40,000     45-50,000            50,000 
La Publicidad       7,000       25,000     25-30,000            85,000 
El Noticiero Universal      10,000           —     20-25,000            30,000 
El Diluvio      10,000           —     15-17,000            40,000 
La Veu de Catalunya        4,000       20,000         6-8,000             — 
  
 
 As Table 1 showed, during the First World War (1914-1918) the newspaper of 
Ramón Godó practically doubled its circulation. The rest of Barcelona’s big dailies, in 
contrast, experienced few changes, as in the case of Las Noticias and La Publicidad; or even 
suffered a drastic loss of readers, such as in the case of La Veu de Catalunya. What were the 
reasons, we may then wonder, behind La Vanguardia’s singular growth during this period? 
The following pages will argue that La Vanguardia’s expansion during the war was not 
something that happened all of a sudden. Rather, it will be argued that this expansion 
constituted the blossoming of a journalistic strategy that started to be implemented in 1888; 
and was given new impetus on 25 October 1903. It is to this latter date that we will now turn 
our attention. 
 On 25 October 1903, La Vanguardia devoted seven of its sixteen pages to explaining 
in some detail its new planned reforms. Among other things, these reforms included moving 
the newspaper to a new company building, located at number 28 on Pelai, an excellent 
location in the centre of Barcelona.931 The building was designed in the Modernist style, 
containing a floral decoration and a series of stone reliefs in its interior that were recognised 
with an honorary mention in Barcelona’s historical-artistic buildings awards of 1904.932 The 
dimensions of the new headquarters, built exclusively for the newspaper, were considerable: 
two five-story buildings, one facing Tallers Street and the other facing Pelai. The building’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
930 Source: Josep Lluís Gómez Mompart, La gènesi de la premsa de masses a Catalunya (1902-1923), 
Barcelona, editorial Pòrtic, 1992, p.133. 
931 The newspaper had already announced the move to the new building the day before. “Á NUESTROS 
LECTORES”, 24/10/1903, p. 2. 
932 The awarding of the honorary mention, in: Cercador de Patrimoni Arquitectònic, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 




construction amounted to 335,000 pesetas and contained “a total surface of 26,479 palms”.933 
The mere fact that a newspaper owned a building constituted a novelty at the time: as late as 
the 1920s only two newspapers in Barcelona did – La Vanguardia and Las Noticias.934 
 The first floor of the new building contained a series of decorative figures that 
symbolised the journalistic model that La Vanguardia wished to champion. These decorative 
figures consisted of three different elements – “the Science and the Arts”, the “Telephone” 
and the “Printing Press” – and were sculpted as allegorical figures to which the newspaper 
wished to pay tribute. This type of decoration reveals a “cult of modernity” based on the 
progress that technological innovation (in the form of communication and speed) had brought 
to journalism. In fact, the same admiration for technology was present in the description La 
Vanguardia made of the new printing machinery it had recently purchased, which it 
described in an almost poetic manner: 
 
  “Por una escalerilla se baja á la amplia cuadra, en cuyo centro la máquina luce su 
férreo y complicado organismo, en pleno reposo al escribir estas líneas; aguardando la 
vida que el motor cercano ha de imprimirla, poniendo en movimiento sus ruedas 
dentadas, sus cilindros, sus dedos de madera, todo aquel laberíntico engranaje, en que 
nada huelga, pues no hay pieza que no responda á la satisfacción de una necesidad.”935 
 
 In this way, the new rotary press was referred to as a living thing – “organism”, “life”, 
“fingers” were some of the words used to describe it – that was perfectly designed and ready 
to show its full potential. This admiration for technology mainly originated in the new 
opportunities it offered for journalism. The new rotary press, bought from the German 
company Koenig and Bauer, was indeed an example of the practical opportunities technology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
933 On 20 November 1901, Ramón Godó signed a contract with the constructor Isidre Majó Carner to demolish 
the building located in Tallers Street, number 20, and to construct a new one for 55,000 pesetas. Besides this 
building, a new one would also be constructed, facing Pelai Street, to contain the headquarters of La 
Vanguardia. The cost of this second building was 280,000 pesetas. The architect of both buildings was Josep 
Majó Riba. Pere Voltes, “Análisis empresarial y contable del auge del diario “La Vanguardia” en el periodo 
comprendido entre 1881 y 1939”, Barcelona, Colección “Cuadernos de Investigación, Nº 19, p. 5. The total 
surface of the two buildings, in “La casa de “La Vanguardia”, LV, 25/10/1893, p. 4.  
934 The rest of the newspapers had to locate the newsroom and the printing press machinery in two different 
places. In the case of the printing machinery, it was usually located in the basement of another building. As 
Víctor Alba noted in the memoirs: “(...) les impremtes estaven en els baixos de cases de pisos i cap no tenia 
edifici propi (excepte La Vanguardia i Las Noticias)”. Víctor Alba, Sísif i el seu temps, vol I “Costa avall”, 
Barcelona Laertes, 1990, p. 92. 
935 Ibid. [E. T.]: “Down stairs there is the wide room, at the centre of which lies the machine with its complicate 
organism, in a calm state as we are writing these lines, but waiting for the moment when the engine shall bring it 
into life, puting in motion its cogwheels, its cilinders, its fingers made of wood, all this labryinth of gears, where 




opened for the journalistic profession: this new rotary press would allow La Vanguardia to 
publish twice as many pages, and to do so quickly.936  
 If the above-presented examples reveal that technology was seen in La Vanguardia as 
a tool of progress, the way this newspaper justified the need of investing in it was based on a 
clear premise. Namely, the wish to satisfy the changing needs of the audience. And this 
audience, it must be noted, was not a uniform body, but was integrated by a multiple and 
diverse number of readers, each of them having its own preferences. These were the terms in 
which La Vanguardia described its audience. Hence, this newspaper presented itself as a 
newspaper that “has come to enjoy the favour of the public, to the point of having extended its 
presence to all the social classes”. Such support from the public, the newspaper argued, is 
what ultimately imposed the duty of organising the whole production process as efficiently as 
possible.937  
 Still, identifying the needs of the customers was not something La Vanguardia took 
for granted. Satisfying these wishes required the ability first to identify them. In other words, 
if the newspaper was to change, it was because someone thought this change was necessary, 
so as to satisfy the needs of the “public”. In this respect, the owner of La Vanguardia, Ramón 
Godó Lallana (1864-1931), was presented as the main promoter of the interpretation of 
opinion. The plan of reforms of 1903 coincided, in fact, with the recent takeover of La 
Vanguardia by Ramón Godó. As explained in previous chapters, this takeover was the result 
of a generational renewal prompted by the death of the founding brothers Bartolomé (in 
1894) and Carlos Godó (in 1897), and entailed not only the transmission of the family 
business in the jute industry, but also the leadership of the political network of the Godó 
family in Igualada – this being a duty that eventually ended in Ramón’s resignation from 
politics.938 
 The plan of reforms of October 1903 can be regarded as the attempt of the second 
generation of the Godó family, led by Ramón, to renovate the newspaper.939 Besides the 
practical arrangements, it must to be noticed that the newspaper itself presented Ramón Godó 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
936 “Abajo aparece la gran mole de la nueva máquina rotativa, que permitirá tirar números dobles que los 
actuales en menos tiempo que el que se emplea con la que hasta aquí se ha tirado LA VANGUARDIA, y que se 
emplazará al lado de la recientemente adquirida.” Ibid.  
937 “Las necesidades á que forzosamente ha de atender en el día un periódico que, cual LA VANGUARDIA, ha 
conseguido merecer el favor del público hasta el extremo de haberse difundido en todas las clases sociales, 
imponen el deber de montar los servicios de manera que funcionen con la debida holgura é independencia, á fin 
de obtener la mayor perfección posible en cada uno de ellos, única manera de corresponder al apoyo siempre 
creciente de la opinión.” “La casa de “La Vanguardia” ”, LV, 25/10/1893, p. 4. The quoted parts, in italics. 
938 See Chapter 6. 
939 This is evidenced by the fact that that Ramón himself signed the contracts for the construction of the new 




as responsible for the construction of the new building. That is to say, Ramón was portrayed 
as the main driver behind the modernisation of the newspaper. This projection of Ramón can 
actually be regarded as a strategy of self-fashioning in public, insofar as it presented him as 
the owner of a newspaper that was ruled according to a family tradition. Moreover, when La 
Vanguardia announced the inauguration of the new building, in 1903, it did so by printing a 
portrait of the two founding brothers (Carlos and Bartolomé Godó) on its front page, which 
was a custom that would be used on further occasions.940 The faces of the two brothers were 
also sculpted onto the facade of the new company building in Tallers Street, thus presenting 
the two men as the pioneers of a journalistic tradition that was still alive in the figure of 
Ramón. Besides being a mark of respect that Ramón probably wished to pay to his father and 
uncle (whose portraits he displayed in his office), these gestures had a clear public 
dimension. Hence, every time La Vanguardia published the portraits of the founding brothers 
it was actively reinforcing the family tradition in public. Linking the name of La Vanguardia 
to that of the Godó family constituted a way of reasserting the family control over the 
newspaper, while also being a manoeuvre that invested the heir with the symbolic capital 
stemming from it. This means that the transmission of different forms of capital was not 
limited to the political domain in Igualada, but also took place in the world of journalism.941 
 In practice, Ramón Godó was presented in La Vanguardia as the interpreter of the –
vague and blurred – concept the newspaper referred to as “opinion”. To carry out this task, 
Godó and the editor of La Vanguardia coined a motto that summarised their business 
strategy: “to keep up with the times and avoid crystallising” (“hay que marchar al compás del 
tiempo, rehuyendo de cristalizarse”).942 This leitmotif is of particular interest, for it reveals 
the way Godó understood journalism. This motto reveals that he did not conceive of the press 
as a self-sufficient element, but rather as one that was highly dependent on the social context 
in which it was published. This line of reasoning, which was publicised on further occasions, 
implied a clear premise: if the newspaper was to survive, it should be capable of matching the 
broader changes in society. If there was an area where La Vanguardia was apparently not 
staying abreast with the times then it was that “concerning information”. This statement 
reveals the perception, shared by Godó and the newspaper editor, that public opinion in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
940 For instance on 24 December 1911, when the newspaper inaugurated a new rotary press. 
941 In consequence, the building of a family “tradition” in journalism should be seen as complementary to 
building the same tradition in politics, explained in Chapter 6. 
942 “No contentos aún la propiedad y la dirección del periódico con las mejoras que se han ido paulatinamente 
introduciendo, en lo que atañe a la información, teniendo por norma que hay que marchar al compás del 
tiempo, rehuyendo cristalizarse, han aspirado sin descanso á que LA VANGUARDIA construyera un 




Barcelona was demanding a different type of newspaper. The crisis that newspapers suffered 
in Madrid, in the aftermath of 1898, might have acted as a stimulus in this regard. 
 In fact, during the first quarter of the 20th century the deep transformations taking 
place in Barcelona had the effect of changing the needs and tastes of newspaper consumers. 
Between 1887 and 1910, the city grew from 400,000 to 587,000 inhabitants.943 The majority 
of this population growth came from the inner parts of Catalonia, and were people attracted 
by the employment opportunities of a city that was abandoning its traditional dependence on 
the textile industry. Triggered by the broadening of Barcelona's borders (in 1897 the city 
absorbed 6 of its neighbouring towns) the building industry stood at the helm of a process of 
industrial diversification, while the metallurgical and chemical sectors gained a new presence 
too.944 These were also the years of improvements in the literacy levels (between 1900 and 
1910, illiteracy dropped from 54% to 41%; by 1930, it had decreased to less than 15%). In 
the field of culture, “Modernisme” kept expanding its presence in Barcelona’s intellectual life 
and architecture (of which the headquarters of La Vanguardia were an example), while a 
series of technological innovations – like the electric light, the telephone, the automobile, the 
radio and the airplane – intensified a feeling of rapid transformation that contemporaries 
repeatedly noticed.945 Moreover, the general improvement in living conditions was expressed 
in new forms of leisure that gained weight in the following decades, like cinema, sports and 
eventually even jazz.946 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
943 For the general case of Catalonia, between 1887 and 1910 illiteracy fell from 60% to 42% (in the case of 
men, from 47% to 32%; and in the case of women from 72% to 51%). F. Espinet & J.M. Tresserras, op. cit., p. 
11. 
944 In 1900, the main industrial employer in Barcelona was the textile industry (53.1% of the active population), 
followed at a great distance by the building (8.1%) and dressmaking sectors (7%). In just ten years (1910), the 
situation had changed considerably: though the textile industry did not lose much of its workforce (from 54,940 
in 1900 to 51,710 workers in 1910), it lowered its presence in relation to the total: in 1910 it “only” represented 
26% the of active population; in contrast to the emergence of the building (20.3%), metallurgical (19.1%) and 
chemistry sectors (6.4%). These figures are a selection of the data provided by the “Información Comercial 
Española” (1962), quoted in: Ibidem, p. 22.  
945 Claudi Ametlla noted the differences between his hometown and Barcelona: “The telegraph, the telephone, 
electricity, the automobile, the cinematograph, the phonograph, these are all novelties which have not arrived 
here yet [in his hometown of Sarral] [but] that characterise this fecund age and are the subject of passionate 
debate (....). Perhaps someone will come from Barcelona who has already seen all these devices!.” Claudi 
Ametilla, Memòries polítiques, Barcelona, Pòrtic, 1963, vol. 1, p. 86. Original version, in Catalan. Further 
testimonies of contemporaries noticing the speed of change can be found in F. Espinet & J.M. Tresserras, op. 
cit., pp. 26-28. 
946 In his memoirs, José María Francés mentioned the swift changes in Barcelona’s taste for music: “Nos 
hallamos en la era del Charlestón. Desde que nací han pasado por mi vida, el “can-can”, los “tangos” primitivos, 
el “kake-walk”, los “machicha”, los valses franceses de 900, los vieneses, los bostonianos, los “tangos 
argentinos”, el “fox-trot” y otros más que hoy dejan paso a esta descoyuntada fórmula de danza que hace 
prosélitos.” This sentence corresponds to the early 1920s. Josep Maria Francès, Memorias de un cero a la 




 It was in the context of some of these transformations taking place in Barcelona that 
the Godó put forward the reform plans of 25 October 1903. This line of reasoning, 
summarised in the motto referred to above, was explained in further detail in an article that 
was published on that day entitled “El periódico moderno” (“the modern newspaper”). For 
the type of reflections it contained, this article constituted a roadmap summarising the 
journalistic ideal to which La Vanguardia wished to subscribe in the future. The argument of 
the article was presented in very clear terms and according to a Darwinist standpoint: the 
newspaper should be regarded as a “living organism”. As such, if it was to survive it should 
be capable of “adapting quickly” to changing environments. One of the main reasons behind 
this change, La Vanguardia claimed, was the “development of industry, commerce and 
banking”, which required “vast amounts of information”. When nations lived in a system of 
autarchy, the article reasoned, reading about foreign events constituted a mere “amusement”. 
Now, by contrast, “a war taking place in America or in the Far East touches on the 
commercial transactions of the entire world; (...) likewise, if England persists in its free trade 
policies or decides to move into protectionism it might provoke a cataclysm in some 
businesses, like the agricultural and manufacturing industries. It is clear, then, why all the 
news is of great importance for the public, no matter how insignificant they may seem”.947 
 The world La Vanguardia was describing in this article of 1903 was one undergoing a 
rapid process of economic integration. If this newspaper was to satisfy the needs of the 
public, it could not afford to lose its grip on the changes taking place in society. In this 
regard, the case of La Vanguardia is illustrative of how newspapers were seeking to adapt to 
the globalisation process that took place in the 19th century. Indeed, as Jürgen Osterhammel 
has explained, global communications provided the means for newspapers to gather the news 
from literally every corner of the world. For the leading newspapers, reporting on worldwide 
events simply became a must.948 Together with foreign correspondents, the press based the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
947 A. Riera, “El periodismo moderno”, LV, 25/10/1903, pp. 10-11. Original version: “cuando cada nación 
fabricaba casi exclusivamente para su consumo, las noticias del extranjero se leían por puro entretenimiento; 
ahora se leen por necesidad; entonces eran algo así como artículo de lujo; ahora no se puede prescindir de ellas. 
Una guerra que estalle en América ó en el Extremo Oriente influye en las transacciones comerciales del mundo 
entero (...); que Inglaterra persista en su sistema de librecambio ó adopte el proteccionismo, puede producir un 
cataclismo en algunas industrias, desde las agrícolas á las manufactureras. Se comprende, pues, el interés 
vivísimo que revisten para el público todas las noticias, hasta aquellas que á primera vista pueden creerse 
insignificantes.” 
948 “The major newspapers felt they had a responsibility to print news from all over the world – indeed, only if 
they were capable of providing international coverage could they “hit the big time”. Jürgen Osterhammel, The 




task of newsgathering on the service a few agencies provided, like Reuters and Havas.949 
These agencies were the most important actors in the global distribution of news, thanks to 
the vast network of correspondents they possessed. Equally as important as the growing 
dependence newspapers had on agencies is how this dependence transformed the content of 
newspapers. Hence, and according to Osterhammel, agencies distributed the news without 
modifying its content, thus contributing to fostering a “uniform kind of journalism” that 
epitomised “the ideology of objectivity”.950 
 What makes the case of La Vanguardia interesting, in this regard, is that it constitutes 
an empirical case study through which studying how the growing interest to learn about 
distant parts of the world (“being informed”) altered the way of presenting the news, as part 
of the broader changes in the journalistic field.951 According to the self-perception of La 
Vanguardia, the wish to provide greater quantities of news obliged newspapers to restructure 
their content. La Vanguardia criticised the Spanish newspaper’s traditional tendency of 
publishing long and complicated articles that only a select audience was capable of 
understanding. In contrast to this, La Vanguardia considered that articles should be shorter 
and written with clarity and concision, so as to make them accessible to the average reader. 
The news provided by news agencies also contributed in such attempts to popularise the 
press. According to the estimates of Godó’s newspaper, this news format multiplied its 
presence in newspapers by ten times, to the point of appropriating some of the space 
traditionally devoted to the articles written by journalists.  
 Two reasons explain the spectacular success of this novel format. First, news coming 
from agencies tended to be shorter than the journalist’s accounts. This was because news was 
paid for per word, and therefore newspapers required the agencies to provide news that was 
as concisely written as possible. Second, this new succinct format allowed newspapers to 
publish more news in less space, thus allowing the reduction of paper costs. 952  The 
inconvenience of this news format, however, was that it also obliged newspapers to spend 
more money on the services of news agencies. Ideally, the new added costs would be covered 
by the rise in advertisement revenues that a wider readership would attract. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
949 On the role of news agencies as “agents of globalization”, see: Terhi Rantanen, “The globalization of 
electronic news in the 19th century”, Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 19, 1997, pp. 605-620. 
950 In the words of this scholar: “The agencies contributed to the globalized production and dissemination of 
news, passing it along without additional comment in a powerful expression of the ideology of ‘objectivity’. On 
the other hand, their standardized reports promoted a uniform kind of journalism, now that all print media were 
more or less in the same boat.” J. Osterhammel, op. cit., p. 38. 
951  Roland Wenzlhuemer, Connecting the Nineteenth Century World: The Telegraph and Globalization, 
Cambridge, CUP, 2013, esp. pp. 91-92. 




 All these changes in the content and format of news represented an attempt to broaden 
the newspaper readership. As La Vanguardia argued, “the modern newspaper must provide 
room for all the events taking place (...) because it has thousands and thousands of 
subscribers, and each of them devotes himself to a different profession and has his own 
understanding of things”. Thus, having the capacity to fit more news into less space, thanks 
to the advantages provided by news agencies and the telegraph represented an advantage. 
Additionally, addressing a wider audience also required presenting the news in a different 
language: the tone used in the articles should be as neutral as possible, so as to avoid 
upsetting the views of any potential reader. This moderate tone in news, La Vanguardia 
concluded, is what explained the “death of the partisan press” and justified, ultimately, the 
huge circulation of foreign newspapers (deemed by La Vanguardia as being “very neutral” in 
their coverage).953  
 From this testimony it can be deduced that writing news with a moderate tone was 
still a rare practice among the majority of the Spanish press, which was still driven by 
partisan ethics. Indeed, the testimony of José Escofet, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
supports the idea that gossip was still a major element of journalism in this country. Inspired 
by the larger circulation achieved by foreign newspapers, in contrast, La Vanguardia 
considered that adopting a neutral tone was the key to success. This strategy implied a radical 
departure from the strongly partisan work of journalists in the early years of the Godó’s 
newspaper.954 
 The strongest proof of Godó’s intention to turn La Vanguardia into an informative 
newspaper was his use of one of the most important suppliers of international news: the 
French news agency Havas. While Spanish newspapers usually relied on the work of 
journalists when it came to reporting on local and national events, their coverage of 
international affairs heavily depended on the services of news agencies. As in most of 
Europe, in Spain too different news agencies were founded in the 19th century to supply 
foreign news to newspapers. This was the case, for instance, of the agencies Fabra (1865) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
953 “En el periódico moderno han de tener cabida todos los nuevos (sic) políticos, económicos, sociales, 
científicos, artísticos, locales, que ocurran. Cuanto sucede diariamente que tenga algún relieve, que pueda 
interesar á buen número de lectores, ha de reflejarse en sus columnas. Tiene miles y miles de abonados y 
compradores; cada uno de ellos dedica su actividad á un objeto distinto, tiene sus peculiares ideas preconcebidas 
sobre todos los problemas que se discuten y apasionan los ánimos. Para no herir ningún amor propio, para no 
producir molestia, para que su lectura aproveche á todos y á ninguno desagrade, es necesario que el periódico 
hable de cien cosas que la exposición de los hechos se desprenda. Los diarios de partido han muerto ó están á 
punto de morir. (...) Los grandes periódicos extrangeros son, por regla general, muy imparciales. Sólo así 
obtienen esas tiradas enormes que asustan á los lectores de España.” A. Riera, “El periodismo moderno”, LV, 
25/10/1903. Emphasis added. 




and Mencheta (1876).955 However, during the first decade of the 20th century the global 
information market experienced a process of integration that eventually resulted in the 
oligopoly of three big agencies: the French Havas, the English Reuters and the German 
Wolff. These three agencies partitioned the world in three respective areas of influence. In 
accordance with this distribution map, Spain fell into Havas’ area of influence.956 The 
outcome was that Havas came to monopolise the information flow between Spain and the rest 
of Europe. Indeed, the historian María de la Paz Rebollo, who provided the best study on this 
phenomenon, referred to Spain’s dependence on Havas as “information colonialism”.957 
 Still, the monopoly of this French agency was not absolute. Newspapers in Spain 
could always come up with alternatives to escape from their dependency on Havas – whether 
for political reasons or economic ones. These alternatives were numerous and differed in 
their degree of complexity. For instance, there was the rather unsophisticated – but greatly 
extended –practice of simply copying what foreign newspapers had published on previous 
days. Another alternative for newspapers, significantly more expensive, consisted in sending 
their own correspondents to the hot spots. This strategy was already put in practice in 1900, 
when a group of four newspapers in Madrid, tired of Havas’ hegemony, created their own 
network of international correspondents. Barely one year later, however, the same 
newspapers abandoned their attempt and subscribed to Havas’ services once again.958   
 The reason for this failure is that Havas based its primacy on two premises that 
Spanish newspapers could hardly match. First, it had a global network of correspondents, 
which often benefited from the favourable treatment of national institutions (who used this 
agency to propagate their “official” views worldwide). Second, the sending of news was 
faster and cheaper for Havas, thanks to the discounts the three big agencies had in cable 
transmissions.959 At this point, Spanish newspapers were left with two options: to content 
themselves with the cheaper but more limited services of the numerous minor agencies that 
existed in Spain (like the “Agencia Mencheta”, which specialised in providing national 
news); or to join efforts with other newspapers to reduce the economic cost of subscribing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
955 Pedro Gómez Aparicio, Historia del periodismo español, Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1971, vol. 2, p. 256 and 
pp. 648-649, respectively. 
956 This agency reinforced this privileged position by signing an agreement in 1870 with Spain’s most important 
agency (“Fabra”), according to which the latter became Havas’s official distributor in Spain.  
957 María Antonia Paz Rebollo, “El Colonialismo informativo de la Agencia Havas en España, 1870-1940”, 
Madrid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1988 [unpublished thesis]. 
958 See: María Antonia Paz Rebollo, “La rebelión de la prensa madrileña ante el monopolio informativo de la 
Agencia Havas (1900-1901)”, Angel Bahamonde Magro & Luis Enrique Otero Carvajal (eds.), La sociedad 
madrileña durante la Restauración, 1876-1931, Madrid, Consejería de Cultura de la Comunidad de Madrid, 





Havas. This latter option was the one chosen by the Barcelona Press Association 
(“Asociación de Prensa de Barcelona”), an association that gathered some of the most 
important newspapers in this city (La Veu de Catalunya, Las Noticias, El Diluvio).960 
Analogous situations to that of the Barcelona Press Association existed in other countries.961 
In England, for instance, Reuters reached an agreement with the Press Association (a 
cooperative for the provincial press, founded in 1868). This agreement benefited both sides: 
provincial newspapers received the better service Reuters provided, while this agency 
received in return the domestic news from the provincial press and used it in its overseas 
service.962 A clear difference can easily be noted, however, between the case of the British 
provincial press and that of the Barcelona Press Association: the relation the latter held with 
Havas was not a mutually beneficial cooperation, as in the British case, but rather a relation 
of dependency, for it was Havas that dictated the conditions.963 
 The following pages will argue that the aim of turning La Vanguardia into the best-
informed newspaper in Barcelona, as stated in the reform plans of 1903, is what led Ramón 
Godó to make Havas a central part of his strategy for increased readership. A close look at 
Havas’ historical records, located in the French National Archives (Paris), reveals that the 
newspaper of the Godó family had become the best customer the French agency had in 
Barcelona by the outbreak of the First World War. [Table 2]  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
960 Contract signed between the “Asociación de la Prensa Barcelonesa” and Havas in 1908, Archives de 
l’Agence Havas / Archives Nationales de France (ANF), 5 AR/95.  
961 In the United States, for instance, five newspapers from New York joined forces in 1846 to create the New 
York Associated Press, the seeds of the famous news agency Associated Press.  
962 Oliver Boyd-Barrett, “Market control and wholesale news: the case of Reuters”, in George Boyce, James 
Curran and Pauline Wingate (eds.), Newspaper History from the seventeenth century to the present day, 
London: Constable; Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1978, pp. 192-204 (esp. pp. 193-4). 
963 That is to say: the Barcelona Press Association did not provide anything in return, and was subject to the 
Havas monopoly. Still, it must be noted that the British case was also not an agreement between equals, since 
the provincial press also made an important payment for Reuters’ service, despite their cooperative agreement. 
See: Oliver Boyd-Barrett, “Market control and wholesale news: the case of Reuters”, in George Boyce, James 




Table 2. Havas subscribers in Barcelona before the First World War 964 
 
   Newspaper 
(contract date) 





First contract signed in: 
01/12/1909 
 
Next modifications:  
 - 06/11/1911 







- News service of the entire world 
(except Spain and the Spanish 
Protectorate in Morocco). 
 
- Minimum of 15,000 words per 
month. Right of increasing this 
quantity in face of special events. 
(Contract of 06/11/1911). 
 
 
- Right of requesting news directly 
from London, Berlin, Rome and 
Vienna, elaborated by Reuters, 
Wolff, Steffani and Correspondenz 
Bureau, respectively. 
 
- New contract (09/10/1913): 







-  Under 15,000 words: 6 
pesetas per word. Over 
15,000 words: 5 ptas per 
100 words. 
 
- Commission of 8 ptas 
per 100 words coming 
from London, Berlin, 




- Up to 15,000 words: 6 
ptas per word. Next 
55,000 words: 5 ptas per 
word. Next 30,000 words: 
4 ptas per word 
 
- Average number of words 
per month (January-April 
1913): 81,709 w/m 
 
- Direct service from Paris 
per Lisbon to the bureau 
office of La Vanguardia. 
 
- Contract period: 11 years 







- New enlargement of 
words mainly to be devoted 




Diario de Barcelona 
 
First contract signed in: 
02/08/1885 
 
Next mod.: 22/09/1913 
 
- News on Spain (made in Madrid) 
 
 
- General service “for the rest of the 
world”: maximum of 15,000 words 
per month (from Paris) + 1,000 




- 200 ptas per month  
 
 






- General service from 
Paris is divided in the two 
editions of the newspaper 
(6,000 per morning / night 
edition). 
 
- “Does not want to receive 
any news opposed to its 




“Asociación de Prensa 
Barcelonesa”  
 
First contract signed: 
01/07/1908 
 
Next mod.: 22/09/1913 
 
- Shared service between La Veu de 
Catalunya, Las Noticias, El 
Diluvio.967 
 
- General service “for the entire 
world”: maximum 15,000 words per 
month (from Paris) + 1,000 words 
(from Lisbon direct to Barcelona) 
 
 
- 750 ptas per month 
(each of the four 
newspapers) 
 
- To be sent together with 
the “general service” of 
Diario de Barcelona by 
terrestrial cable.  
 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
964 Source: resume of Havas service contracts with Barcelona newspapers. ANF, 5 AR/424. 
965 Further conditions: 1) No other newspaper or society neither from Spain or abroad can make use of the same 
service. Under the threat of immediate cancelling of the service; 2) Increase of the service by 25% in case of 
war (Europe, US, China or Japan); 3) Right of requesting 250-300 words of a “last minute” service in case the 
telephone line between Barcelona and Paris is opened to press services. 
966  Between 01/07/1908 and 13/06/1909 the Diario de Barcelona also got a “Special service” 6,000 
words/month (containing 2nd rate news & special news), at the cost of 50ptas/1,000 words. 
967 Members of the “Asociación de Prensa Barcelonesa”. The newspaper La Publicidad joined this service 




 As Table 2 shows, by the eve of the First World War La Vanguardia had become 
Havas’ most important client in Barcelona. The reason for this was La Vanguardia’s 
continuous increase in the pace of demand. Hence, while all the newspapers started 
demanding from Havas a similar quantity of information (around 12,000 words per month), 
La Vanguardia distinguished itself from the rest of the pack in the contract it negotiated. In 
contrast to both the APB and the Diario de Barcelona, which set strict limits on their 
respective consumption of words by sticking to a fixed monthly instalment (400 pesetas in 
1908; around 800 in 1913) La Vanguardia requested a mode of payment that left the door 
open to increase its demand in the foreseeable future. This method of payment was based on 
economy of scale: the more words the newspaper requested, the cheaper the cost (e.g. under 
15,000 words - 6 ptas per 100 words; over 15,000 words - 5 ptas per 100 words).  
 The difference in the fees agreed between Havas and La Vanguardia and its 
competitors in Barcelona eventually marked a massive difference in the pace of demand. 
Whereas the number of words that both the APB and the Diario consumed grew very 
gradually over the years (12,000 words in 1908; 16,000 in 1913); in the case of La 
Vanguardia this demand rocketed: 15,000 words (1909); around 75,000 (1911); 81,000 
(1913), 100,000 (mid-October 1913 onwards). 968  Therefore, in barely five years the 
newspaper of the Godó family had multiplied the number of words it bought from Havas by 6 
times, and had reached 100,000 words per month just before the war started. The service of 
the rest of Barcelona’s newspapers, in contrast, experienced minor changes and halted at 
16,000 words by the same period. 
 In parallel to the growing increase of information from Havas, in 1909 the Godó’s 
newspaper became the first in Spain to install a telegraphic station in its newsroom. This 
station consisted of one Hughes receiver and one Morse receiver, as well as a cable that 
connected the headquarters of La Vanguardia with Barcelona’s telegraphic network. Thanks 
to this, this newspaper was capable of transmitting and receiving information from all the 
Spanish and international telegraph stations that were connected to Barcelona’s station. For 
instance, from March 1909 La Vanguardia started receiving two daily connections from 
London. The connection was soon extended to Paris, although in this case it required La 
Vanguardia to undergo complex negotiations with the French authorities. The reason for this 
was that no laws existed at the time regulating the telegraphic flow of information for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
968 The only exception to this progression was the year of 1912, when La Vanguardia set a limit of 55,000 
words per month. In October 1913 this limit was removed. This parenthesis might have had something to do 
(we might imagine) with the newspaper’s temporary lack of liquidity. ANF, 5 AR/95, “La Vanguardia”, 




newspapers to use between France and Spain.969 Probably interested in the opportunity of 
increasing French influence in Barcelona through its top-selling newspaper, the French 
authorities accepted La Vanguardia’s proposal.970  
 The advantages La Vanguardia obtained with the telegraphic station were twofold. 
The first was the capacity to receive Havas’s service faster and without intermediaries. This 
was because Havas’s services in Spain were distributed through Madrid’s office, in part 
resulting from the radial structure the telegraphic network had in this country, in accordance 
with the liberals’ state centralism.971 The innovation of La Vanguardia consisted in saving 
time by doing away with Madrid’s intermediation. This was achieved by making use of an 
alternative Spanish connection, which connected France and Spain through the location of 
Portbou, on the northeast side of the border. As a result, journalists of La Vanguardia did not 
have to wait for Madrid’s service or go to Barcelona’s telegraph station to pick up the news. 
They simply received the news directly to the newsroom. In terms of time, this was not a 
minor issue for a newspaper that made the provision of information a central element of its 
editorial strategy. 
 The second advantage La Vanguardia obtained with the telegraphic station was the 
capacity of requesting higher amounts of words from Havas. For the ordinary needs the 
newspaper used a Morse receiver (capable of printing 25 words per minute), and a Hughes 
receiver for more urgent matters (60 words per minute).972 The use of such machinery in the 
journalistic field constituted a novelty, to the point of giving birth to a new journalistic 
profession: the “news re-writer”. This job consisted in the translation and transcription of 
news agencies’ dispatches. Joan Puig i Ferreter, who worked for La Vanguardia, left a vivid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
969 By means of its correspondent in Paris, Ricardo Blasco, La Vanguardia requested France’s Ministère des 
Travaux Publics, des Postes et des Télégraphes the establishing of a cable line between Paris and Barcelona to 
receive the news directly from the French capital. ANF, 5 AR/95, Correspondence Havas-Fabra-Madrid, 1904-
1918, “Note pour Monsieur le Chef du Cabinet de Monsieur le Ministre des Travaux Publics, des Postes et des 
Telegraphes” 20/09/1909, p. 149. 
970 ANF, 5 AR/95, Correspondence Havas-Fabra-Madrid, 1904-1918, “Note sur une convention réglant les 
communications télégraphiques de presse entre la France et l’Espagne”, date unknown, p. 148. 
971 The first line of the Spanish telegraphic network, put forward by the Government on November the 7th 1852, 
was designed as a “line that will depart from Madrid and will go through the provinces of Zaragoza, Navarra 
and Guipuzcoa to end up in France’s border through Irún (...)”. For this reason, Barcelona’s newspapers usually 
had to wait for Havas’ service to reach Fabra’s offices in Madrid first, and then to Barcelona’s, from which 
news was subsequently re-distributed. Because this service was relatively slow, when the Barcelona newspapers 
wanted to publish breaking news (and therefore were ready to pay a higher cost for the service) they asked 
Havas to send them through Marseille’s maritime cable. For the regular service, in contrast, they relied on the 
terrestrial cable that departed from Madrid and connected with France through the town of Irún. On the radial 
nature of the Spanish telegraph network, see: Ángel Bahamonde (ed.), Las comunicaciones en la construcción 
del estado contemporáneo en España (1700-1936). El correo, el telégrafo y el teléfono, Madrid, Ministerio de 
Obras Públicas, Transporte y Medio Ambiente, 1993 (the previous quote, in p. 140). 




account of this job in his novel. The two main requirements for work as a “re-writer”, 
according to Puig, were the ability to read and translate French (due to Havas’ 
omnipresence); and the capacity to turn the concise and encrypted dispatches of news 
agencies into longer, readable articles. It was, thus, essentially a low-skilled job that was 
often undertaken in a clumsy manner, with untimely working hours (the shifts started at 
midnight), and a miserable salary of 100 pesetas per month, meaning that most re-writers 
relied on other jobs to make a living.973 The use of the latest technology thus coexisted with 
the traditional low levels of professionalisation among journalists. Other testimonies, like 
Gaziel’s, noted the same paradox: the most prestigious newspaper in Barcelona was 
essentially run, in its inner life, by a myriad of low-paid workers with meagre salaries.  
 The new telegraph machinery and La Vanguardia’s pace of demand provide empirical 
evidence of how this newspaper implemented the reform plan of 1903. As stated in this 
reform plan, the direction of La Vanguardia considered that “information” was a field where 
the newspaper was not doing sufficiently well. The strategy adopted involved a growing 
reliance – and thus expenditure – on news agencies, as successive contracts La Vanguardia 
signed with Havas demonstrate. The First World War would be the moment when this 
specialisation in informative journalism delivered its full benefits, thus explaining the great 
boost in readership of Godó’s newspaper. 
 
 
8.2. NEW CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF MASS POLITICS 
 
 Between 1914 and 1918, Europe and large parts of the world were subsumed into the 
bloodiest war ever seen. For the scale of tragedy it entailed (an estimated 17 million deaths 
and 20 million wounded) and the geography of the countries it involved, the First World War 
represented a truly global event.974 In Europe, the deep social and economic distress that 
resulted from the war, including the changes in the political map (four empires and three 
dynasties fell) have led historians to see the First World War as the symbolic demarcation 
between two eras. That is, a war that put an end to the so-called “Long 19th century” and 
heralded the birth of a new era, increasingly regarded as a “European civil conflict”, lasting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
973 Joan Puig i Ferreter, op. cit. 
974 Jay Winter (ed.), The Cambridge History of The First World War, Cambridge-New York, CUP, 2013, 




up to the Second World War (1939-1945).975 Historians have traditionally considered that all 
these changes deepened the transformation that European elected representatives started 
living after the 1880s: the “decline” of the notables and its substitution by the new mass 
parties and the professional politicians.976 The case of Ramón Godó, however, will provide 
evidence that some elites designed alternative mechanisms besides official politics to 
maintain their influence in society, at a time when the war shook liberal regimes all over the 
Continent.  
 Spain was part of the small group of European countries that did not enter World War 
One.977 As early as 30 October 1914, the Conservative government of Eduardo Dato 
proclaimed the country’s official neutrality. The vast majority of the political class 
immediately supported the government’s decision. Such consensus among liberal politicians 
was based on the shared perception, which the Disaster of 1898 and the subsequent calls for 
national regeneration were a painful reminder of, that Spain had very limited room for 
manoeuvre in international relations. Ironically, once the war started to reveal its full horror, 
Spain’s neutral position appeared to have saved the country from its worst consequences.  
 However, in recent years scholars have challenged the myth that Spain’s official 
neutrality saved it from being engulfed by the war. The new works published on the occasion 
of the First World War centenary have provided further evidence that Spain was, in reality, 
another piece in the complicated European chessboard of 1914-1918 – certainly not the most 
important one, but one whose fate was still tightly intertwined to that of the Continent.978 An 
example of this was propaganda. Some of Spain’s characteristics (like its geostrategic 
position in the Mediterranean, its condition as market supplier to the warring countries, as 
well as its potential entry into the war) made both the Allies and the Central Powers aware of 
the importance of getting the public opinion of this country on their respective sides.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
975 Julián Casanova, Europa contra Europa, 1914-1945, Barcelona, Crítica, 2011.   
976 Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta, “Transformations of the Original Parliamentary Establishment between 
the 1880s and 1920s”, in: H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000. 
Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries, Oxford, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2000, p. 513. 
977 Together with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. Portugal remained neutral too, but its support to the 
Allies was manifest. Belgium was soon invaded by the Central Powers. Italy entered the war in 1915 on the 
Allied side. 
978 Eduardo González Calleja and Paul Aubert, Nido de espías. España, Francia y la Primera Guerra Mundial, 
1914-1919, Madrid, Alianza, 2014; Fernando García Sanz, España en la Gran Guerra. Espías, diplomáticos y 
traficantes, Madrid, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2014; and Maximiliano Fuentes Codera, España en la Primera Guerra 




 Indeed, historians have shown the large resources the Central Powers devoted to 
buying, bribing or blackmailing numerous Spanish newspapers.979 The propaganda system of 
the Allies in Spain, in contrast, was set in motion quite late (in 1915) but despite significant 
resources it never succeeded in matching the more systematic work of their enemies. The 
financial outlays were clear in this respect: while Great Britain spent about 24,000 pesetas on 
propaganda activities in Spain during the March of 1917, Germany spent some 35,000 
pesetas every month just to secure the favourable treatment of one single newspaper (El Día). 
Moreover, scholars have estimated that the Central Powers eventually managed to control the 
impressive number of 500 local and national newspapers in Spain.980   
  The second part of this chapter will attempt to offer an alternative approach to the 
traditional narrative that portrays Spanish newspapers as mere transmission belts of European 
powers. This different approach will consist in studying the case of La Vanguardia to 
demonstrate that the situation of informative newspapers in neutral countries became 
particularly difficult. I will analyse how an independent newspaper like La Vanguardia 
experienced at a micro-scale the same ideological tensions affecting Spanish society in 
relation to the war: while the newspaper’s owner (Ramon Godó) proved to be a passionate 
defender of Germany’s cause, the director (Miquel dels Sants Oliver), in contrast, was an 
Allied supporter. The confrontation between Godó and Oliver will be used to challenge the 
association that historiography on the First World War often makes between “neutral” and 
“passive” countries, and will demonstrate that the adoption of an informative model, based on 
news agencies, did not prevent Ramón Godó from using the press as an instrument to 
maintain his influence in society. 
 Initially, when the First World War started La Vanguardia took a neutral standpoint. 
This position went in line with La Vanguardia’s self-proclaimed desire, in the reforms of 
1903, to be as neutral as possible when reporting events. Hence, the editorials of La 
Vanguardia referred to the war as the “failure of a whole civilization” and praised the liberal 
politicians for having defended a neutral alignment for Spain.981 However, as the illusion of a 
hasty war faded and the conflict deteriorated into trench warfare in late 1914, Spanish society 
started to take sides. The country’s official neutrality began to be contested by the creation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
979 The “Treaty of Algeciras” (1906), which subordinated Spain’s foreign policy for that of France and England, 
is what convinced the Central Powers of the need to ensure Spain’s official neutrality by means of propaganda. 
980 F. J. Romero Salvador, op. cit., p. 68 and p. 69, respectively. The stipend for El Día corresponded to 1916. 
981 “Por sorprendente que resulte la cosa, hay que tributar un caluroso aplauso á los gobiernos españoles que se 
han venido sucediendo desde el 98 en cuanto á la política extranjera se refiere. Todos han sido calamitosos 
dentro de casa, pero han mantenido, sin desviarse nunca del acuerdo, la neutralidad ante los conflictos 




two opposing camps, which saw in the war the opening of new perspectives for Spain’s 
future recovery.  
 On one hand, there were the “Germanophiles”, who saw in the Central Powers the 
model of order, tradition and discipline they considered Spain needed. This side was formed 
by the most traditional and conservative ranks of Spanish society, like the church, the army, 
the catholic fundamentalists and the aristocracy, but also contained many admirers of 
Germany’s technology and culture. Overall they were the majority in Spanish public opinion 
(in contrast to the majority of non-aligned countries in Europe) and argued for Spain’s most 
absolute neutrality in relation to the conflict. In practice, the Germanophiles’ advocacy for 
“absolute neutrality” benefited the interests of the Central Powers, since Spain’s international 
commitments were with the Allies (Treaty of Algeciras, 1906). 
 On the other hand, there was the pro-Allied side, which identified France and the 
United Kingdom with liberty and democracy. The pro-allies also considered that Spain’s 
decay was the result of the country’s historical detachment from Europe. For this reason, and 
now that the fate of the Continent was being decided on the battlefield, the pro-Allies felt that 
Spain should not remain detached. Consequently, Spanish pro-Allies were the fiercest 
detractors of the country’s official neutrality, and pressured for an open alliance with France 
and the UK, if necessary by joining them in the war. The supporters of this trend were mostly 
the Republicans, the socialists (who would abandon their initial neutralism) and progressive 
intellectuals. The pro-Allies had a strong presence in the most dynamic regions of the 
country, like Catalonia, Valencia, Vizcaya and Asturias.982  
 Therefore, the First World War provoked a great division of Spain’s public opinion. 
The testimonies of contemporaries evoke, in fact, the heated discussions that took place on 
various occasions, even between old friends or family members.983 However, it was precisely 
amidst this highly polarised public opinion that the informative-character of La Vanguardia 
gained popularity. As one witness, Claudi Amettla, commented in his memoires: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
982 Between these two confronting camps (supporters of the Allies and supporters of the Central Powers) there 
remained only a small heterogeneous group who advocated for alternative views: the Liberal politicians, most of 
whom stood for neutralism; the Anarchists, who argued in favour of internationalism but also experienced 
important divisions; and a small group of intellectuals, leaded by Eugeni d’Ors, who deplored the conflict as a 
European civil war.982  
983 As the Catalan writer Josep Maria de Sagarra observed: “Como el tema belicoso era del dominio de todo el 
mundo y todo el mundo podía meter cuchara, estallaba a cada momento en los cafés, los tranvías y en cualquier 
esquina. La discusión era inevitable, y padres de familia acabaron a puñetazos y echando sangre por las narices 
a propósito de una cuestión que en realidad no les afectaba ni poco ni mucho. Provocábanse riñas a muerte, 
entre familiares y amigos de toda la vida y en vulgaridad corriente se declaraba indeseable a un señor porque se 
manifestaba francófilo, o se le marcaba en el calificativo de caníbal si opinaba lo contrario”. Josep Maria de 





 “The passion that this event [the First World War] has arisen is so enormous that you 
should not be surprised to see that every citizen follows it with great interest. In so doing, 
one learns about tactics and strategy, international politics and geography. [As a result of 
this] newspapers see their circulations increase, especially in the case of ‘La Vanguardia’, 
which due to the wider information it provided, started to stand out in relation to the rest of 
these newspapers, in such measure that this newspaper never lost its principal position.”984 
 
 
“In all the material respects, [La Vanguardia] stood out among the rest of newspapers. 
It was better informed than any other, and counted on its own exclusive means (...). It 
reached the point were it became indispensable, even for those who supported a political 
cause and were loyal to a partisan newspaper.”985 
 
 The above-quoted testimony demonstrates that providing greater quantities of 
information was not a minor aspect for newspapers; especially if we take into account the 
great interest the First World War awoke in Spain. This interest, as the testimony quoted 
above reveals, was not limited to the harsh confrontation between Germanophiles and pro-
Allies. In many ways, the war also represented a “media spectacle” in itself. In fact, the First 
World War was the first moment when a series of technological innovations were 
implemented in modern warfare, like the airplane, the tank or the Zeppelin. Likewise, the war 
was also singular for the wide range of countries that were involved, as well as for the style 
of warfare it entailed (e.g. trenches). For thousands of readers, all these novelties turned the 
war into a spectacle they followed eagerly in the newspapers. It was precisely in this field of 
competition, consisting in the abundance and novelty of news, that La Vanguardia stood out 
from its competitors in Barcelona.  
 Yet contrary to what the “technological determinist paradigm” would suggest, La 
Vanguardia’s privileged relationship with Havas did not imply that its sources of information 
were always more “neutral” than the news of other newspapers. Havas’ service certainly 
allowed faster access to more news, but this did not assure “impartiality”. The reason for this 
is because news agencies traditionally held close relationships with national governments.986 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
984 Claudi Ametilla, Memòries polítiques, 1890-1917, Barcelona, editorial Pòrtic, 1963, pp. 338-339. Originally 
written in Catalan. 
985 Ibidem, pp. 216-217. 
986 Reuters was even regarded as a “semi-official body” of the British government. Donald Read, The Power of 
News. The History of Reuters, 1849-1989, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 64. Countless examples 




This became particularly visible during the Great War, when news agencies were turned into 
the loudspeakers of state propaganda.987 In the case of the English agency Reuters, for 
instance, the German origins of its owner (Baron Herbert) arose many concerns in England 
about its reliability. These concerns only stopped when Reuters gave public proof of its 
“Britishness”.988 In France too, the government repeatedly used Havas’ influence to spread 
propaganda messages throughout Europe.  
 Furthermore, Ramón Godó himself gave proof that the informative character of La 
Vanguardia left ample room to promote his own political agenda. Since 1914 he started 
considering that defending neutrality in La Vanguardia was insufficient. The polarisation of 
Catalan society deeply troubled him, as became evident in the letter he wrote to Antonio 
Maura on 25 October 1914. In this letter, Godó asked the conservative politician to advise 
him on how to position La Vanguardia in relation to the war, but at the same time took the 
opportunity to put forward his own political views: 
 
“Exmo Sor D. Antonio Maura. Mi respetable amigo; en el periódico de mi propiedad La 
Vanguardia, hemos observado hasta ahora, una actitud completamente pasiva, en todos los 
asuntos relacionados con el pleito internacional que se ventila. Y sin embargo, creo, que las 
circunstancias imponen que nos preocupemos muy seriamente. El Sor Oliver [the editor of La 
Vanguardia], tiene su criterio propio y particular. El mio, no solo particularmente, sino, como 
propietario de un organo de opinion, difiere en algunos puntos. No creo, que en La Vanguardia, 
convenga una campaña activa, en ningun sentido, que podria soliviantar algo los animos. Pero 
sí, una colaboracion prudente que sirva como guia ú orientacion, precisamente, para mantener 
nuestras derechas con energia, si llegara el momento. No opino en la inmediata movilizacion, 
que concluiria de arruinarnos, pero si, prepararnos de cuanto nos haga falta, por si llegara el 
momento de la movilizacion. Creo, que tenemos demasiado ejercito en Marruecos y aunque se 
repatriara á todo él, nada perderiamos. Entiendo, que no podemos ponernos enfrente de 
Ynglaterra, mientras conserve su flota, pero no demasiado francofilos, porque la historia nos 
dice, que de allende los pirineos nos han venido todos los males. En resumen, que, sin ser 
apasionados, ya que todo el servicio de informacion viene de Francia y por lo tanto, con una 
parcialidad, á veces, irritante, conviene contrastarlo con esos articulos prudentes. No hay que 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Services and Big Business in the Nineteenth Century, The Business History Review, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Winter, 
2003), pp. 577-610. This author speaks, for instance, of the subsidies the Russian government paid to Havas in 
1905 to “sweetening” the bad news during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). 
987 Historiographical remarks on news agencies as “sources of hostile propaganda”, 
988 As the agency rapidly proclaimed, “Reuter’s Agency has always ben recognised as a British institution 
representing the English point of view”. See: Donald Read, The Power of News. The History of Reuters, 1849-




olvidar, que toda la masa conservadora y neutra, la mas sana del pais, se ha inclinado á un lado, 
quizás, con esceso. Algunos motivos tendrá. Todo esto, queria preguntar á Vd, pues su 
autorizada opinion, me es de absoluta necesidad en estos momentos, porque no cabe duda, que 
debo tomar posiciones. (...) Ramon Godó, Barcelona, 26 octubre 1914”. 989 
 
 The letter that Godó wrote to Maura needs to be framed, first of all, by the historical 
context. Godó wrote this letter barely one month after the Battle of Marne (5-12 September 
1914), which represented the first great victory of the Allies and marked a turning point in the 
course of the war. The consequences of this victory had a strong impact in Spain, where it 
produced the first great upsurge of pro-Allied sentiment and even led the Socialists to 
abandon their previous neutralism and to embrace the cause of France and England.990 As the 
testimony of one contemporary shows, this pro-Allied euphoria was felt with particular 
intensity in Catalonia, the region where this side traditionally enjoyed more sympathies.991 
Thus, the moment when Godó wrote to Maura was characterised by the growing mobilisation 
of Catalan public opinion in favour of the Allies.  
 This context explains why Godó felt troubled about the need of “orienting” the 
“conservative masses”, which he regarded as “the healthiest” segment of opinion in the 
country (“la más sana del país”). Godó’s concern about the ideological stance of Catalan 
society demonstrates that as a newspaper proprietor, he was deeply attentive to politics. In 
fact, and as he had already explained to Maura in 1911, he had a precise political mission for 
La Vanguardia: to be the lighthouse (“órgano de opinion”) of the political right in 
Catalonia.992 This reveals to what extent Godó had a clear idea of the kind of reader La 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
989 Archivo Fundación Antonio Maura (AFAM.), Legajo 45, carpeta 29. [E. T.]: “Dear Mr. Antonio Maura. My 
illustrious and respectable friend; (...) At the newspaper of my property La Vanguardia, we have adopted a 
passive attitude until now, in what concerns the international events. Yet still, I belive that the circumstances 
impose that we should be very concerned. Mr. Oliver [the editor of La Vanguardia] has his own and particular 
criteria. Mine, and not just my own, but that of a newspaper proprietor, is different in certain aspects. I don’t 
think that La Vanguardia should start an active campaing, in any sense (...) But I do believe that a prudent 
collaboration could serves as guidence for the right-oriented people and keep them animated. I don’t argue in 
favour immediate mobilization, whish would ruin us, but I do argue in favour of getting ready in case 
mobilization is necessary. I believe we have too many troops in Morocco and that they should be transferred [to 
the Peninsula]. I think we cannot go against England, as long as she keeps her fleet, but also not to much in 
favour of the Allies, for history reminds us that all the ills have always originated beyond the Pyrenees. To sum 
up, I believe that without being passionate, for all the news service comes from France, and sometimes, it does 
with an irritating partiality, that things need to be contrasted with prudent articles. We should not forget that all 
the neutral masses in the country have positioned in one side. They shall have their reasons for doing so. All this 
I explain to you for the great steem I have for your opinion, for it is for me the most urgent necessity to adopt a 
position. (...) Ramon Godó, Barcelona, 26 October 1914”.  
990 See: Gerald H. Meaker, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
991 Jaume Passarell, “La Publicitat”, diari català, Barcelona, editorial Pòrtic, 1971, p. 19. 




Vanguardia should target.993 The problem with Godó’s political preferences, however, was 
that a significant part of the Catalan public opinion sympathised with the Allied cause. This 
situation was worrying from the sales point of view since many of these people were part of 
Barcelona’s educated upper-middle class male readership, which La Vanguardia was 
targeting. Moreover, the situation deteriorated when Godó discovered that Oliver, the editor 
of La Vanguardia, also sympathised with the Allies. As Godó himself explained to Maura, 
Oliver had “his own and particular criteria (...) which differs from mine in certain points”.994  
 The difference of criteria that Godó and Oliver had regarding the war is confirmed by 
the testimony of two journalists who worked for La Vanguardia: “Gaziel” (the nickname of 
Agustí Calvet) and Joan Puig i Ferreter (1882-1952). Their two testimonies confirm the 
disagreement between Godó and Oliver over the war – although their accounts of this dispute 
suggest that it was stronger than Godó admitted to Maura. According to the testimony of 
Gaziel, for instance, the division arose out of the different ideological views the two men had 
about the war, regardless of their common admiration for Maura. On the one hand, Gaziel 
described Godó as a “fervent supporter of the German cause”, who loved reading the 
Germanophile articles of Madrid’s newspaper ABC and wished to adopt a similar stance in 
La Vanguardia. On the other hand, Oliver is depicted in the same memoires as a “sincere and 
disinterested pro-Ally” who deplored the war as a civil European conflict, as well as being 
determined to keep La Vanguardia absolutely neutral.  
 According to Gaziel, the different positions of Godó and Oliver resulted in a 
tempestuous relationship.995 Every time the course of the war changed, Godó was tempted to 
adopt a more favourable stance towards the Central Powers. Additionally, numerous 
Germanophiles who saw La Vanguardia as a potentially valuable mouthpiece for their cause 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
993 As Godó confessed to Maura in 1911: “me he dedicado á acrecentar la influencia y difusion de mi periódico 
“La Vanguardia” para acabar de convertirlo en un gran instrumento de opinion conservadora en Cataluña y 
poder apoyar con mas eficacia y libertad los ideales é intereses nobilísimos de que es Vd representacion 
suprema y en los cuales ha de hallarse al fin y à la postre la única via de salvacion para nuestro pais.” A.A.M., 
Legajo 266, carpeta 2. Further details, in Chapter 7. 
994 Miquel dels Sants Oliver (1864-1920). He was appointed editor of La Vanguardia in 1906, after having 
worked at the Diario de Barcelona. By the time he joined Godó’s newspaper Oliver was already a widely 
recognised journalist and intellectual. There is a bibliography available on this figure: Gregori Mir, Miquel dels 
Sants Oliver. Nacionalisme i síntesi liberal-conservadora, 1898-1919, Palma de Mallorca, Miquel Font, 1993, 2 
vol. 
995 “As it could be expected, Godó rapidly became a fervent ‘Germanophile’, of the apocalyptic kind I only met 
in Spain, a neutral country [where this standpoint was common to] the well-meaning people, self-referred as 
Catholic and who got enormously rich thanks to the war. Oliver, in contrast, and as it also could be expected, 
was a ‘sincere and disinterested pro-Ally’”. The original text, in: Agustí Calvert (“Gaziel”), Història de La 




repeatedly pressured Godó to abandon this neutrality.996 According to Gaziel, only Oliver’s 
resistance prevented Godó from turning La Vanguardia into the mouthpiece of the Central 
Powers’ interests in Barcelona. The outcome of this difference of criteria was the worsening 
of the relations between the two men; to the point that Oliver, tired of the daily struggle he 
held with Godó, handed in his resignation (which was not ultimately accepted).997  
 Moreover, Godó’s correspondence with Maura shows that his distaste with France 
was not a kneejerk reaction, but rather a judgement that he had formed from the past. As he 
himself asserted, “history tells us that all our troubles have always come from beyond the 
Pyrenees”.998 It was in accordance with this way of reasoning that Godó suggested to Maura 
nothing less than sending the entire Spanish army from its current posting in Morocco to the 
French border in the Pyrenees. Although Maura rapidly tempered Godó’s warlike attitude, 999 
Godó’s opinion reveals the animosity that notorious segments of the Spanish right felt 
towards France. Although various elements help to explain the distaste of Spanish 
conservatives for their neighbouring country – like the secular and Republican nature of the 
French state model, contrary to the overwhelmingly Catholic character of the Spanish 
conservatives, or the tight constraints that France imposed over Spain’s colonial ambitions in 
Morocco – there was one cause that was of primary importance. This cause was the mass 
demonstrations that took place in France in reaction to Ferrer i Guàrdia’s indictment and 
execution, in the aftermath of the Tragic Week (1909). For right-wing oriented people like 
Godó, these mobilisations were seen as an attack against Spain’s honour (see Chapter 7).  
 This resentment proved to be alive by the time of the Great War, when in his 
correspondence with Maura, Godó explicitly noted the partisan character of French news and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
996 “Oliver was a prudent, calm and clairvoyant person, who suffered enormously to resist the extreme pressures 
he received both from the owner [Godó] and the numerous agents (friends and enemies) who wanted to turn La 
Vanguardia into a fiercest Germanophile newspaper, similar to Madrid’s ABC. On every hot episode —and the 
war had hundreds of these, of all sorts— the absolute master of La Vanguardia [Godó] and the director “in 
partibus” [Oliver] clashed. A hundred times they were close to breaking [their agreement]”. Ibid, pp. 83-84. 
997 Ibidem. 
998 Originally written in Spanish as: “(...) la historia nos dice, que de allende los pirineos nos han venido todos 
los males.” 
999 Maura advised the owner of La Vanguardia to keep this newspaper in the field of strict neutrality: “Mi 
querido amigo: con el mayor gusto respondo á su carta de ayer y ante todo le digo que hallo justificadisima la 
preocupación que le sugirió consultar conmigo sus perplegidades; pues para quien tiene en su mano instrumento 
de tal eficacia como es La Vanguardia, como para todos los que llevan encomienda de algun modo de cura de 
almas, resultan ahora complicados en grado excepcional, los miramientos que merece influir en una conducta 
honrada atenta à responsabilidades de orden moral. Sin embargo soy acerrimo partidario de que España 
pertenezca neutral. (...) Lo que aprovecharia es desempañar a quienes no advierten que hoy tenemos 
virtualmente suprimidas la independencia y la soberania de España; a quienes creen muy gustosos en tal 
dejadez, eclipse del patriotismo que no es punto muerto sino narcotizado de modo que la realidad de hoy tuviese 
al menos eficacia docente para vanar el modo politico de morir ó vivir España en lo venidero. Por este derrotero 
llevaria yo la Vanguardia si fuera asi lugar el de V. Mis Afectos. A. Maura”. A.A.M., Leg. 45, carp. 29. Letter 




“the need to counterweight them”.1000 Godó’s determination to make his opinions correspond 
with those of his newspaper was made evident on repeated occasions. In 1913, for instance, 
Godó sent a letter to Paris in which he directly required Havas to “abstain from providing 
comments and to confine itself to providing information”.1001 Likewise, when in October 
1913 Godó discussed expanding La Vanguardia’s contract with Havas [see Table 2] he made 
it conditional upon receiving more news from Germany, Austria and England. The reason for 
this, Godó argued, was that “many readers of La Vanguardia are of Saxon nationality (sic) 
and they have protested, not without reason, about the scarcity of information concerning 
their countries.”1002 
 Still, Ramón Godó’s boldest move to break with France’s monopoly of information 
took place in the run-up to the war. Thus, in March 1914, before the First World War started, 
Godó secretly contacted the German consulate in Barcelona to explore the possibility of 
obtaining news directly from the country. According to the historical documents of this 
operation that have been preserved, and which are held in the German Foreign Ministry 
Archives, in Berlin, Godó’s self-confessed attempt was to “free his newspaper from the 
excessive dependence on Havas” and to “seek new information sources, preferably from 
German origins”. 1003  These two statements, reported by the German representative in 
Barcelona, reveal to what extent Godó sought to make the opinions of La Vanguardia reflect 
his own, regardless of the “independent” orientation of this newspaper and its much 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1000 “En resumen, que, sin ser apasionados, ya que todo el servicio de informacion viene de Francia y por lo 
tanto, con una parcialidad, á veces, irritante, conviene contrastarlo con esos articulos prudentes.” 
1001 “La Vanguardia” nous prie de nous abstenir dans les dépêches de tous commentaires et de nous limiter 
exclusivement aux information”. ANF, 5 AR/95, “La Vanguardia”, p. 5. 
1002 “Observo, que en dicho servicio, hay alguna deficiencia, por su escasez, en el procedente de Alemania, 
Austria é Inglaterra, que yo creo no ha de faltar materia importante para darlo mas estensivamente. 
Naturalmente, que no entra en mi criterio ponerlo al nivel del de la Nación Francesa ya que comprendo que el 
de esa ha de ocupar por muchas razones, que huelgan exponer, el primer lugar. Hay entre los lectores á “La 
Vanguardia”, muchos de nacionalidad sajona, que han exteriorizado, he de confesar que con cierta razón, la 
deficiencia que llevo apuntada.” ANF, 5 AR/424, p. 42 (letter of Ramón Godó to the Director of Havas, 
09/10/1913).  
1003 Luis Álvarez Guitiérrez, “Intentos alemanes para contrarrestar la influencia francesa sobre la opinión 
pública española en los años precedentes a la Primera Guerra Mundial”, dins de VVAA, Españoles y franceses 
en la primera mitad del siglo XX, Madrid, CSIC, 1986, pp. 1-22; and “Proyectos alemanes para crear un servicio 
permanente de noticias en España durante los primeros lustros del siglo XX”, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y 






 The classic literature on the crisis of liberal politics has traditionally assumed that the 
First World War became a decisive step in the renewing of elites.1004 In the case of 
parliamentary representatives, quantitative research has shown that this was very much the 
case for much of Europe (even when substantial differences existed between countries).1005 
However, the adoption of a micro-analysis, based on the study of singular case studies, 
reveals that the takeover of elites was often a more complex and protracted affair than is 
often assumed.  
 This chapter has argued that besides the official channels of political participation, 
like political representation, alternative channels existed for the “notables” to reinvent their 
position in the new mass society. Turning La Vanguardia into the top-selling newspaper in 
Barcelona, during the First World War, had put Godó in a privileged position to promote his 
own views through the press. The letters he exchanged with Maura reveal the close 
connections between liberal politicians and press proprietors. Besides the friendship the two 
men appear to have enjoyed, what made Godó a political actor was his capacity to influence 
the 100,000 readers of La Vanguardia. For a politician like Maura, whose attempt was to 
“mobilise the neutral masses”, having Barcelona’s top-selling newspaper on his side was a 
significant boon; especially as the readers of this newspaper were mostly educated upper-
middle class men. Moreover, this capacity to influence did not go unnoticed by other 
politicians either. Thus, there is evidence that Godó was offered various political positions 
during his life.1006 Likewise, in 1916 he was granted a title of nobility in recognition for his 
work as a newspaper proprietor.1007 Although the information at our disposal makes it hard to 
ascertain if there were political interests behind the concession of this noble title,1008 it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1004 Daniel Halévy, La fin des notables, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1972 [1st ed. 1930]. 
1005 Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta, “Transformations of the Original Parliamentary Establishment between 
the 1880s and 1920s”, in: H. Best and M. Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000. 
Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries, Oxford, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2000, p. 513. 
1006 As was commented on in an obituary for Ramón: “Nunca quiso el Sr. Godó tomar parte activa en la política 
ocupando cargos que reiteradamente le fueron ofrecidos. No aspiró más que a orientar patrióticamente a la 
opinión desde las prestigiosas páginas de su importante periódico.” ABC, 22/09/1931, p. 38. 
1007 Namely, the title of “Count of Godó” (“Conde de Godó”, in Spanish). This title has been passed from 
generation to generation until today. 
1008 The fact that the title was granted by a Liberal government, led by the Count of Romanones, adds further 
interest to this concession (since Godó had harshly criticised this party in the past). The concession of the noble 
title was made official in the Royal Decree of September 18th 1916. Among the reasons that were put forward to 
justify the concession of the title was Ramón’s position as newspaper’ proprietor: “Propietario del importante 
diario La Vanguardia. Ha consagrado á esta publicación todas sus energías é invertido en ella cuantiosas sumas, 




nevertheless an example of the wide influence Ramón Godó had achieved in society — 
regardless of his retirement from active politics. 
 Still, the transformation of La Vanguardia into a newspaper with a mass circulation 
should not be seen as something that was pre-determined, or as being driven solely by 
politics. Instead, the changes occurring in this newspaper should be seen, above all, as the 
long-term consequence of the reform plans that had started in 1888 when Carlos and 
Bartolomé Godó sought to expand La Vanguardia beyond the limits of the Liberal Party. The 
plan for new reforms, in 1903, symbolised the continuity of the same strategy by the second 
generation of the same family. The fact that Carlos and Bartolomé’s faces were sculpted onto 
La Vanguardia’s new headquarters is very revealing, in this respect, of how Ramón saw his 
father and uncle as the originators of the family tradition in journalism. In parallel, linking the 
name of La Vanguardia to that of the Godó family was a strategy aimed at securing the 
family control over the newspaper. This reveals the importance of tradition (or its invention) 
as one of the strategies elites designed to secure and legitimise their sources of influence; and 
of the importance of displaying – and thus reinforcing – this tradition in public. 
 If the year 1888 redefined La Vanguardia’s identity – from the mouthpiece of the 
Liberal Party to a politically independent newspaper – the year 1903 symbolised its ambition 
to specialise in providing information. An editorial published in 1903 made it very clear what 
Godó and his team hoped to achieve with their new “modern journalism”: namely, “to keep 
up with the times and avoid crystallizing” (“hay que marchar al compás del tiempo, 
rehuyendo de cristalizarse”). This motto encapsulates an understanding of journalism as a 
living organism that must be capable of adapting to change. Additionally, it reveals an 
understanding of the press as something whose survival ultimately depends on its capacity to 
satisfy the readers’ needs. In line with this, providing abundant information and providing it 
quickly was identified as a growing necessity in society. At this point, we might question if 
this “need” really was felt by all the social classes in Barcelona (like the working classes), or 
whether it reveals La Vanguardia’s attempt to target an educated upper-middle class 
readership. In any case, the First World War became an exceptional event capable of 
attracting deep interest throughout Spanish society, as different contemporaries noted. The 
installation of telegraphic machinery in La Vanguardia’s newsroom (the first in Spain), and 
the undisputed growth in its use of Havas’ services, reveals to what extent Godó was 
committed to making his newspaper one of the most informed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
gabinete telegráfico, linotipias, cajas, estereotipia y rotativas.” Gaceta de Madrid, 15/11/1916, p. 598. In the 




 However, and contrary to what the literature has taken for granted, the adoption of an 
informative journalistic model did not necessarily imply a more “neutral” type of news. The 
crucial role that news agencies played in distributing the international flow of news rapidly 
turned them into the target of governments wishing to spread propaganda more effectively. 
Additionally, the case of Godó reveals that press proprietors, despite their dependence on 
these agencies, still had some room for manoeuvre. This is important to note, for it highlights 
that the growing presence of communicative technologies in journalism did not replace the 
agency of actors. To put it in more prosaic terms, while assuring that La Vanguardia 
provided the most abundant information possible, Godó spoke about the necessity of 
counteracting the French point of view. This capacity to choose the sources of information, 
combined with the possibility of combining them with editorials addressed to a very specific 
audience (the conservative classes in Barcelona), were two elements that symbolised Godó’s 
capacity of influence. If public opinion did not necessarily prove to be receptive to these 
messages, politicians certainly were. It was in this power to turn public opinion into a form of 













 The main contribution of this thesis has consisted in offering a new perspective on the 
crisis of liberal politics in Europe by focusing on the links between clientelism and the press. 
The analysis of two generations of the Godó family has made it possible to examine this 
process over a long time span, and to see how the relationship between the press and politics 
was successively redefined. In so doing, this thesis has revealed the importance of the public 
sphere for the social reproduction of elites. In fact, the public dimension of power is a subject 
that still needs further research, especially in countries where political representation was 
structured according to patron-client relationships. Because elections were manipulated on a 
systematic basis, in the case of Spain, Italy, and Portugal, and because patronage mechanisms 
remained important, in the case of France, it is often assumed that controlling the 
mechanisms of favour assured the dominant position of elites. The case of the Godó family 
challenges these assumptions, and demonstrates that even in those societies where wide 
segments of the population were de-mobilised and clientelism was a persisting feature, the 
public sphere was decisive for the societal position of elites. 
 Indeed, this thesis has moved beyond the depiction of local elites according to their 
capacity to rig elections (as “caciques”) to reveal an added cultural dimension that 
contributed to their legitimation in society (as “notables”). Examples of this were the 
attempts that different generations of the Godó family made to portray themselves as the 
natural representatives of the local community. This image was the combined result of 
various important ingredients: the persistence of the Godó surname; the existence of a family 
memory that was transmitted across generations (e.g. the family household); the family’s 
deep-rooted economic interests in the territory; and their efforts to be seen as champions of 
the vulnerable. This image reveals the importance that traditional forms of authority (like 
patronage) still played in local communities. It does not imply, however, that clientelism and 
prestige were two separate dimensions. The rigging of elections was not just something that 
liberal elites relied on to control public office, but was also a socially embedded practice 
from which a considerable part of the population benefited. Consequently, clientelism and 
public prestige must be seen, above all, as two complementary and deeply interwoven 
elements in the social legitimation of elites.  
 The image of the notable contained a symbolic dimension that was cultivated in the 




repeatedly emphasised that he was Carlos’ son is very revealing in this respect. Instead of 
running for elections as a new candidate, Ramón presented himself as the natural successor of 
a long and fruitful association between the Godó family and the constituency of Igualada. 
While this reveals how symbolic power constituted a form of capital that elites sought to pass 
down along family generations, the case of Ramón also shows that location was not 
necessarily an obstacle for its transmission. As a matter of fact, Ramón had been born in 
Bilbao and never lived in Igualada, but, nonetheless, he was a familiar face in this town. This 
reveals that in reality what mattered was not just the individual, but also the source of 
authority that invested his position (e.g. tradition).  
 Indeed, the case of Ramón shows to what extent the capacity to manipulate elections 
was important, but not sufficient to assure the position of elites. His resignation from politics 
demonstrates the importance of the public sphere as a dimension where different actors 
competed for the sources of legitimation. The heated climate that local politics had in 
Igualada’s constituency, and the active use the new actors made of the press, are central to 
understanding what appears to be a relatively singular scenario in Restoration Spain: the 
voluntary resignation of a “cacique”. The fact that a second family member resigned under 
similar circumstances, in 1916, provides further evidence about the constraints of context in 
the agency of individuals. 
 From a different perspective, the Godó’s case has also permitted the examination of 
two issues that have traditionally been neglected in the literature on clientelism. First, the 
question of how clientelism is redefined in periods of transition; and second, how these 
changes forced the elites to reinvent their power strategies. These questions have often been 
neglected in the literature because even though clientelism is being increasingly studied for 
new periods – that is, besides the last quarter of the 19th century – an intra-party perspective 
is rarely adopted. This thesis, in contrast, has embraced two different political systems (the 
Democratic Sexennium and the Restoration) with the aim of examining the changing nature 
of clientelistic procedures. The result is a picture that reveals that the rigging of elections also 
existed in competitive and pluralist party systems like the Sexenio, where political rights were 
considerably extended (e.g. universal manhood suffrage). By illuminating this intra-party 
system frame, this thesis has challenged the view that clientelism was a “pre-modern” 
practice doomed to disappear with the widening of the franchise and the rise of competitive 
politics. Likewise, the comparison between France and Spain reveals the limitations of 




being said, significant differences existed in terms of the procedures and actors that 
clientelism involved, as the comparison between the two mentioned countries has illustrated.  
 The case of La Vanguardia has been used to illuminate the functions newspapers 
played in the structure of cadre parties. At a time when political organisations lacked a 
permanent structure, newspapers provided a physical forum for their members, reinforced the 
sense of community, and acted as the source of delegated power of the party. Equally 
important was the role of the press as an instrument elites used to compete for the sources of 
authority of liberal parties. Although the skirmishes between the Rius and Collaso factions 
lasted for many years, for the latter the establishing of their own newspaper made a crucial 
difference. From being regarded as rebels, they became legitimate interlocutors in the eyes of 
Sagasta thanks to the efforts and support of La Vanguardia. In other words, the press made it 
possible to gain public notoriety and to compete for the sources of legitimacy within the 
structure of cadre parties. All this reveals a political culture in which the mission of the press 
was not to serve the “common good”, but rather to appeal to the numerically restricted 
members of a political community. The high number of duels that were motivated by cases of 
defamation in the press provides further evidence of the advocacy function that print culture 
still retained in much of Europe. 
 Official records maintain the account that Carlos and Bartolomé Godó were the 
founders of La Vanguardia. The absence of a family archive has prevented historians from 
confirming this point; but, in practice, this has contributed to making this the most 
widespread explanation. Drawing on a wide range of alternative sources (like press accounts, 
private correspondence and notarial documents) this thesis has demonstrated that the origins 
of the most popular newspaper in Barcelona today were, in reality, more complex. The birth 
of La Vanguardia was, above all, the collective effort of the faction of Collaso to dispute the 
leadership of Rius in Barcelona’s Liberal Party branch. Within this faction, the Godó brothers 
did not seem to be the leaders, but the decision of Bartolomé Godó to be the investor-partner 
granted him ownership of La Vanguardia and therefore the power to change the editorial line 
of this newspaper.               
In a family of manufacturers that never saw journalism as a personal vocation, but 
rather an instrument to promote their private agenda, the power to dictate the editorial line 
became fundamental. Moreover, this thesis has argued that this attribution became the 
Godó’s lifeboat once clientelism was no longer feasible. The capacity to position La 
Vanguardia in favour of one politician or another, and to influence the views of thousands of 




new mass society ultimately resided. To a considerable extent, the Godó family were 
responsible for the ascension of La Vanguardia. The members of this family were never 
journalists, but they could envisage the returns that addressing a wider audience beyond the 
political community could provide for their interests. This possibility became a reality in 
1888, when the Godó brothers decided to radically alter the newspaper’s orientation. 
 Indeed, the transformation of this newspaper has been used to tackle the transition 
from an advocacy press model towards an independent and commercial one, this being a 
broader historical phenomenon that took place across Europe and the United States during the 
19th and 20th centuries. In so doing, the case of La Vanguardia has been used to argue against 
the liberal tradition, which depicts the transition from an advocacy press model towards an 
independent one as a teleological history of progress. Likewise, it has also challenged the 
economic perspective, which identifies the growing commercialisation of newspapers and the 
emphasis on communication technologies (like news agencies and the telegraph) with the 
depoliticisation of news. In contrast to the two mentioned narratives (liberal and economic), 
the case of La Vanguardia shows that the birth of the new mass press was a more complex 
and contradictory process, which requires taking into account the broader changes in political 
culture and the historical context; as well as reflecting on the intimate circumstances that 
conditioned (and motivated) the decisions of newspaper editors. 
 The reform plans of 1888, it has been argued, conformed to the Godó’s wish to 
reorient their strategies of influence. This need stemmed from two factors: first, there was a 
new political context, which was the result of the death of the family’s traditional protector 
(Collaso); and second, the family had understood that this drawback could only be overcome 
if their sphere of influence was expanded to new publics. Until that moment, the partisan 
orientation of La Vanguardia had provided priceless benefits to various Godó family 
members, especially to reach Congress and to promote local concerns. However, the lack of 
consensus between liberal parties on state affairs, like economic and foreign politics, implied 
that the interests of local elites were heavily dependent on their capacity to pressure central 
government. In the case of Catalan elites, the historiography has illustrated this need through 
the development of lobbying strategies (the so-called “diputació catalana”). This thesis has 
shown that public opinion was another sphere in which corporate action expanded through 
the press. The War of Melilla (1893) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895) 
underscored the increasingly strong links between the views of the Godó family and those of 




of La Vanguardia from the organ of a political party into a prominent mouthpiece of the 
Catalan bourgeoisie. 
 If the Godó’s managed to do so effectively it is because the reform plans of 1888 
became decisive to radically transform La Vanguardia’s reader profile. In sharp contrast to 
its initial readership of around 1,400, mostly from the Liberal Party, by the time of the First 
World War the Godó’s newspaper was the undisputed leader in Barcelona with more than 
100,000 readers. However, it is important to note that the structural features of the press in 
Mediterranean countries remained very modest. Newspapers in other countries, like France or 
England, had reached a circulation of millions of readers long before the war broke out. 
However, and in contrast to the traditional perspective among communication scholars, who 
tend to evaluate the history of the press according to the liberal narrative, and more recently 
according to media systems theory, this thesis has adopted a transnational perspective.  
 In so doing, it has shown that the structural differences between European countries – 
still important in so many ways – were not an impediment for the circulation of journalistic 
practices across national boundaries. In fact, the situation proved to be rather the opposite: 
the wish to emulate – what contemporaries perceived as – a more “modern” type of 
journalism fostered these cultural transfers. This point has been illustrated through the cases 
of La Vanguardia and Il Corriere della Sera, two newspapers that saw The Times as the 
model to emulate in order to expand their influence in society. However, by the end of the 
19th century this English newspaper was no longer the successful newspaper it had once been, 
and it was being outstripped by the popular-oriented newspapers of the New Journalism. 
Still, both in Spain and Italy The Times continued to be regarded as the best example of 
quality journalism, and therefore as the best model to spread their influence among the 
bourgeoisie of Barcelona and Milan, respectively. 
 Indeed, the attempt of Sánchez Ortiz to emulate the English newspaper was much 
more than simply trying to increase its readership: it evoked the changes that journalistic 
culture was experiencing in Europe, and how the circulation of knowledge across national 
boundaries became decisive in shaping this. In this regard, Sánchez can be considered as one 
of the first advocates for the professionalisation of journalism in Barcelona. His book “El 
Periodismo” –one of the first theoretical works published in the country about journalism – 
summarised this new occupational ethic with the following motto: journalism should be both 
“priesthood and magisterium” (“sacerdocio y magisterio”). This approach towards 
journalism was not a very extended practice in Mediterranean countries where, as Daniel 




tight. In fact, as late as 1917, La Vanguardia would still deplore the fact that the content in 
most of the Spanish press was still dedicated to “theatre, bullfighting and politics”. In 
contrast to this, in 1888 La Vanguardia started championing an informative press model, 
where hard information (“facts, facts and facts”) and the neutral delivery of news (the ideal 
of impartiality), were regarded as the formula to expand the newspaper’s circulation; and 
consequently, the influence of its editors too. 
 If this model of qualitative journalism had considerable success (as the growing 
circulation of La Vanguardia demonstrates) it was not because this was pre-determined; nor 
because the Godó brothers were especially prophetic men. In fact, in this thesis, when 
explaining the transformations of La Vanguardia, special attention has been made not to rely 
on the great men narrative that is still present in several biographies on “press barons”. Of 
course this does not mean that the Godó’s agency has been ignored or downplayed. After all, 
if La Vanguardia adopted an informative press model it was only because its owners were 
committed to spending their money on so doing. The motto of Ramón Godó to “keep up with 
the times and avoid crystallizing” is very revealing in this respect. Similar to his father and 
uncle before him, he never wrote a single article for the newspaper he had come to inherit. 
But, and also like them, he did not hesitate in making important investments. The chapter on 
the First World War has shown his determination – one is tempted to say obsession – to make 
his newspaper the best informed in Barcelona. The empirical evidence gathered in the 
archives of the French news agency Havas, in Paris, show that to a considerable extent he 
succeeded in this endeavour. 
  Still, apart from the agency of the newspaper’s proprietors, this thesis has argued that 
La Vanguardia became “successful” because, above all, it adapted its content to satisfy the 
changing tastes of a considerable part of Barcelona’s reading public. This implies that the 
relation between newspapers and their readers was not a sender-receiver relationship, but 
rather a multidirectional one. That is to say, readers were not passive actors, but had the 
autonomy to choose to buy one newspaper over another; and therefore the capacity to punish 
or reward the business model of a given newspaper. 
 This perspective of press history “from below” is present in different chapters of this 
thesis. In the case of Morocco, the Republican press demonstrated that, under the surface of 
an ostensibly unanimous wave of support for the war, there were some readers that remained 
emotionally immune to the efforts of the press propaganda; and on some other occasions 
jingoism was used to criticise the liberal parties. A second example of the importance of 




against the United States, the press suffered a serious crisis of credibility. This crisis became 
particularly intense in the case of Madrid, where some newspapers lost as much as 40% of 
their circulation. A perception that the newspapers had been decisive in fostering popular 
jingoism produced a general disenchantment with the press, reflected by the fall in sales, 
even though their consequences were felt very differently in each city. One hypothesis to 
explain this difference in consumer patterns is the lack of integration of the press market 
nationally. Most of newspapers continued to have a local, and at best, regional distribution, 
which was a feature that was common to other Mediterranean countries too. 
 While pessimism and decay could be said to be widespread feelings in fin de siècle 
Europe, national peculiarities nevertheless remained important. At first sight, liberal 
politicians in Spain seemed better able to overcome their particular colonial drawback when 
compared, for example, with Italy or Portugal. In practice, however, the Disaster of 1898 did 
mark a turning point, for it contributed – among other things – to intensifying the discredit of 
the political system. This thesis has shown how the growing criticism of caciquismo became 
entangled with a rich controversy over the ideal function that journalism ought to play in 
society. The feeling of national degeneration is what led contemporaries, like Joaquín Costa 
and the other witnesses quoted in his book, to criticise the collusion between the press and 
politicians; and to implicitly argue in favour of the professionalisation of journalism (even if 
none of them ever explicitly used this expression). Still, other contemporaries held the 
opposite view, and argued that the new commercial orientation of the press is what had 
ultimately led to the loss of the colonies – thus exposing a hidden nostalgia for the partisan 
press. 
 Yet paradoxically, and despite the different views held by these contemporaries, they 
all evoked the sense of unease that resulted from the emergence of a new mass society. 
Regardless of their opinion, they all shared the conviction that the press exerted a strong 
influence over society. This perception is particularly striking for a mostly rural country like 
Spain, where a large part of the population was still illiterate and lived in small villages. Still, 
it was precisely this lack of development – rather than the high circulation of newspapers – 
that ultimately led contemporaries to see the press as a power with great ascendancy over the 




 For the case of Germany, historian Bernhard Fulda has observed a similar pattern of 
behaviour in the Berlin of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933).1009 Contemporaries tended to 
regard the press as having great power of persuasion among their fellows. This perception 
that contemporaries had about the press – a phenomenon media scholars refer to as the “Third 
Person Effect” – was particularly present among the elites (e.g. politicians and intellectuals). 
According to Fulda, this was because politicians were still not used to handling the numerous 
audiences prompted by the new mass politics. As a result of this, they tended to assign great 
power of manipulation to the press; this being a perception that implicitly assumed that media 
consumers were passive. In this regard, what makes the examples of Germany and Spain 
interesting is that despite being very different countries, contemporaries were gaining 
awareness about the mediatisation of society. This “perception”, it has been argued, was the 
result of the newspapers’ transformation into the new main form of mass communication.  
 The last part of this thesis has examined the demise of the Godó’s political career in 
order to tackle a broader European phenomenon: the birth of mass politics and the 
consequences this implied for the social composition of elites. Quantitative analysis 
(prosopography) has demonstrated that during the period between the 1880s and 1920s the 
composition of Europe’s elected representatives was significantly redefined. National 
differences remained important, but in most countries a substantial change in the composition 
of elected representatives took place during this period. The turnover in the composition of 
elites proved to be, in reality, a long and slow process. Rather than an earthquake, the 
presence of traditional elites (landowners, nobles, state officials) remained important until the 
First World War. Quantitative analysis has thus provided the empirical background for the 
so-called “end of the notables” in Europe, and has illustrated that it was a protracted process. 
 The contribution that prosopography has made to our understanding of historical 
change is beyond question, and it has not been the aim of this thesis to underestimate its 
merits. Yet in giving priority to the quantitative perspective, historians have nurtured a 
narrative of decline and fall to explain the crisis of liberal politics. This narrative presents two 
significant problems: first, it provides a static picture of elites, based on their modal features 
(namely, the capacity of traditional elites to be re-elected or not); and second, it associates the 
loss of weight of this social group in elected bodies with their loss of influence in society. 
This thesis has sought to challenge these two assumptions by adopting a qualitative approach 
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based on the Godó’s agency. Hence, through this family it has been possible to analyse the 
crisis of liberal institutions from a micro perspective, and to show how the transformation of 
the political scenario posed a serious threat to the social cohesion of elites.  
 Indeed, along two generations the Godó family had managed to build a solid political 
career based on kinship cooperation. While one family member would run for Congress, 
another would run for the Provincial Government. This collective strategy provided fruitful 
benefits: on one hand it allowed them to control key decision-making positions (like the 
promotion of local infrastructures); on the other hand it expanded the family’s range of 
influence to Madrid. This strategy was transmitted to the second generation of the family, and 
was eventually enhanced when a third family member was appointed mayor of Igualada. 
However, the discredit of liberal parties – which intensified after the Disaster of 1898 – and 
the emergence of new party movements galvanised the cooperation strategies the Godó 
family had employed for 30 years (1880-1910s). Their response to the challenge of mass 
politics was ultimately to separate the two spheres (press and politics) that had traditionally 
been so closely entwined in the family strategies. 
 Hence, the owner of La Vanguardia (Ramón Godó Lallana) abandoned his 
involvement with the Liberal Party and resigned from active politics. From that moment 
onwards, he decided to concentrate exclusively on his role as newspaper proprietor. In 
contrast, his cousin in Igualada (Juan Godó Llucià) reacted very differently to the threat of 
mass politics: he continued with the family’s traditional affiliation to the Liberal Party, and 
continued to see clientelism as the way to maintain the family’s political domain in Igualada. 
The case of this family thus reveals that, when studied from a micro-perspective, the 
responses of the elites to the birth of mass politics was a complex and nuanced episode in 
Europe’s history. 
 Moreover, and contrary to the narrative about the “end of the notables”, the case of 
Juan Godó Llucià demonstrates that the “notables” were neither helpless victims in the face 
of the new mass politics, nor were they simply opposed to democratisation by sticking to 
“autocratic means”. Drawing on the line of research that historians Jean Briquet and Renato 
Camurri have opened for the case of France and Italy, this thesis has used the case of the 
Godó family to examine the notables’ strategies of adaptation. The launching of an electoral 
campaign, where public meetings were organised and a caravan of cars visited all the villages 
in the constituency, reflected the new attempt to win the vote through legal means – albeit in 
combination with clientelism. Another novelty was the introduction of a new discourse based 




also started championing a dual conception of identity (Spanish and Catalan) in the local 
sphere — this being an image that his cousin Ramón Godó contributed to publicise through 
the pages of La Vanguardia. These self-fashioning strategies can only be understood by 
combining different scales of analysis (local, regional and national). As in other parts of 
Europe, identity and anticlericalism were two elements that featured in the realignment of 
political debate in Spain, and therefore inspired the adaptation strategies of traditional elites. 
 If the case of Joan Godó exemplifies the attempt of some notables to professionalise 
their sources of authority, his resignation from politics is equally revealing. The family’s 
thirty-year monopoly of public office in Igualada’s constituency was not an impediment for a 
heterogeneous – and often divided – opposition to challenge the Godó’s political domain. 
Examining the actions of this political opposition has enabled the Godó family to be seen 
from an alternative (or de-centred) perspective, and also makes it possible to draw 
comparisons with other anti-corruption movements in Europe. Indeed, historians have 
stressed the importance of anti-corruption movements in discrediting liberal politics. Jens Ivo 
Engels, for instance, has explained that in the case of England and France, the battle against 
electoral corruption was fought more intensely by the elites than by the voters. In the case of 
England, bribery became too expensive for political parties to bear, whereas in France, 
Republican elites denounced bribery to express their opposition to the Second Empire.1010  
 In the Spanish case, anti-corruption movements did not emerge as a result of scandals 
(as was mostly the case in the above-mentioned countries) but rather consisted in the 
instrumentalization of clientelism to promote a political agenda. In consequence, a tentative 
hypothesis – that still requires further research – is that Spain’s case was more similar to that 
of France, since in both countries the non-governmental elites were the ones who tried to 
overthrow (and sometimes transform) the political system by exposing corruption in public. 
Through the Godó family it has thus been possible to examine the functioning of these anti-
corruption movements from a micro-perspective. In a highly politicised local context, both 
the Republicans and the Catalan nationalists made intense use of newspapers to politicise 
larger segments of society, and to launch smear campaigns to undermine the Godó’s prestige. 
While this indicates the aspiration of these new movements to politicise growing segments of 
society, the new competitive and plural character of elections did not remove clientelism. In 
fact, the criticising of liberal politics did not prevent the new political movements from 
employing, on some occasions, the same fraudulent methods they censured. In a highly 
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competitive scenario, where electoral turnout even reached 80% of the population, the old 
and new elites combined the appealing to voters through legal methods with the traditional 
fraudulent method of rigging the elections. This indicates a new mutation of clientelism, 
where this was no longer the sole proceeding that liberal parties used to rotate in power, but 
also constituted an alternative strategy of the new parties to battle for elected bodies. 
 Nevertheless, the demise of the Godó’s political career did not put an end to the 
influence of this family in society. Next to elected bodies, alternative spaces for political 
participation existed. Public opinion became one of these alternative dimensions where 
traditional elites sought to redefine their sources of influence. The correspondence between 
Ramón Godó Lallana and the conservative politician Antonio Maura reveals to what extent 
the former was committed to continuing to influence politics; and to support his relatives in 
Igualada. Yet not from public office, but through the subtler channel the new mass press 
represented. In Godó’s own words, his goal was to make La Vanguardia the “lighthouse of 
the conservative masses”. The fact that he was offered various political positions, and granted 
a title of nobility in 1916, proves to what extent newspaper editors were important as political 
actors. The case of Ramón Godó thus neatly encapsulates the main argument of this thesis 
with regard to the role of the press in relation to the crisis of liberal politics in Europe. That 
is, that the transformation of the press not only fostered democratisation (in so far as it 
contributed to making the corrupt practices of liberal elites more visible) but also opened new 
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Date of the elections 
/ appointment / 
resignation 
 









Elections 20/03/1870 1015 14/04/1870 – 
06/01/1874 
     Calaf         ----- 
Appointment by 
the Civil Governor 











     -----    Igualada        ----- 
Elections 4/03/1877 1018 06/03/1877 – 
03/11/1878 
   Igualada “Fomento” 
 
Juan Godó Llucià 
(1851-1935) 
Elections 09/09/1894 1019 03/11/1894 – 
31/10/1898 




  Elections 11/09/1898 
 
 03/11/1898 – 
20/04/1903 
 Igualada-    
Vilafranca 
“Fomento” 
  Elections 
 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1013 Sources: Arxiu Històric de la Diputació de Barcelona (AHDPB), Llibres d’Actes and Llibre de Registre de 
diputats (1812-1890), R-12-178, pp. 247-249; and R-12-179, pp. 131-132 and p. 223. Borja de Riquer (ed.), 
Història de la Diputació de Barcelona, Barcelona, La Diputació, 1983, vol. 3, pp. 154-197. 
1014  The Provincial Council was divided into different commissions: “Hacienda” (“Public finance”), 
“Gobernación” (“Governance”) and “Fomento” (in charge of promoting economic activities and 
infrastructures). B. de Riquer (ed.), op. cit., p. 266.  
1015 First provincial elections by universal manhood suffrage. According to the Royal Decree of 10 February 
1877, the province of Barcelona was divided into 16 judicial districts and 30 constituencies. Igualada was one of 
the judicial districts and contained two constituencies (Calaf and Igualada). Ibidem, p. 246. 
1016 On 6 January 1874 the Civil Governor dissolved the “Republican” Provincial Council and appointed a new 
one integrated by liberal-conservatives and liberal progressives. B. Riquer, op. cit., p. 158. 
1017 Shortly after the coup d’état of General Martínez Campos of 26 December 1874, which would mark the 
beginning of the Bourbon Restoration (1874-1923), the liberal progressives attached to the leadership of Sagasta 
submitted their resignation. Bartolomé’s was accepted on 4 January 1875. 
1018 On 10 September 1878 the Provincial Council was partially renewed. Bartolomé’s position was filled by 
Ramón Catarineu Castells (no partisan affiliation). 
1019 Partial renewal of the Provincial Council. 
1020 The persisting interest of Juan Godó Llucià in participating in the commission of the “Fomento” is an 
example of the interest of the Godó family in using the Provincial Council to promote inland connections (the 
traditional lack of infrastructures in Igualada). In his capacity as provincial deputy, Joan Godó participated in 
the construction of different inland roads: Igualada-Sitges; Vilafranca-Tarragona (1894); Carme-Pobla de 
Claramunt (1896); Igualada-Santa Coloma de Queralt (1897); Carme-Pobla de Claramunt (1899 and 1901); 
Vilafranca-Aguiló; Igualada-Sitges (1903); Igualada-Santa Coloma de Queralt (1906). AHDPB, Llibre de 
Registre de diputats (1812-1890), R-12-179, pp. 131-132 and p. 223. 









5. MEMBERS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY ELECTED AS DEPUTIES TO CONGRESS 1022  
      
      Period 
 
Date of the 
elections 
 
Party in  
power 
 

















Manuel Camacho Fernández 
(C) 
 












Bartolomé Godó Pié (L) 
 













Francesc Gumà Ferran (C) 
 






























Josep Mª Rius Badia (C) 
 
Carlos Godó Pié (L) 













Carlos Godó Pié (L) 
 
 
Josep d'España d'Orteu 













Carlos Godó Pié (L) 
 




























Ramón Godó Lallana (L) 
 








































Ramón Godó Lallana (L) 
 













Frederic Rahola Trèmols 
(Lliga R.) 
 
Juan Godó Llucià (L) 













Juan Godó Llucià (L) 
 














Manuel González Vilart (C) 
 
































Villart (C)  
 
 
76. 91 % 
 
50.86 % 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1022 Source: Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (ACD); Albert Balcells et al., Les eleccions generals a Catalunya 
de 1901 a 1923. Relació dels resultats electorals de 1869 a 1899, Barcelona, Fundació Jaume Bufill, 1982, p. 521 and 
p. 628; Jordi Planas i Francesc Valls-Junyent, Cacics i rabassaires. Dinàmica associativa i conflictivitat social. Els 
Hostalets de Pierola (1890-1939), Vic, Eumo, Centre d’Estudis Comarcals d’Igualada, 2011, pp. 41-42. 
1023 Republican and Federal, and Minister of War (11/06/1873-28/06/1873). 

















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1025 Maria Gemma Rubí Casals y Josep Armengol Segú, “Cataluña”, José Varela Ortega (ed.), El poder de la 
influencia. Geografia del caciquismo en España (1875-1923), Madrid, Marcial Pons, Centro de Estudios 
Políticos y Constitucionales, 2001, p. 281. The characteristics of the constituencies went in line – with few 
exceptions – with those of the judicial districts. Barcelona contained a total of 18 constituencies, while each of 








7. THE BUSINESS OF THE GODÓ FAMILY IN THE JUTE INDUSTRY 1026 
 
Picture 1. Location of the “Els Sachs” factory in Poblenou (Barcelona), Street of Wad-Ras, nº192.  
 
 
Picture 2. Advertisement “Godó Hermanos y Cª”  
                   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1026 J. Roca y Roca, Barcelona en la mano. Guía de Barcelona y sus alrededores, Barcelona, Enrique López, 
Editor, 1895, p. 347. [E. T.]: “Jute spinning mill and bags for America”. See Chapter 4. In Picture 1 the Street of 








8. ADVERTISEMENT OF THE TEXTILE FACTORY OF JUAN GODÓ LLUCIÀ, NAMED “LA 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









9. “LA COTONERA IGUALADINA” AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY 1028 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








10. EDITION OF THE NEWSPAPER “EL IGUALADINO”, ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVELY COMBATIVE 
AGAINST THE GODÓ FAMILY, DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN OF 1907 1029 
 
                 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













       
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1030 General elections held on 10 November 1905 under the Government of Eugenio Montero Ríos (Liberal 
Party); and on 21 April 1907 under the government of Antonio Maura (Conservative Party). Conservative Party 
(green); Liberal Party (yellow); Carlists (blue); Lliga Regionalista (purple); “independents” (grey); Republicans 
(red). Source: Gemma Rubí / Josep Armengol, Vots, electors i corrupció. Una reflexió sobre l’apatia a 
Catalunya (1869-1923), Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Biblioteca Serra d’Or, 2012, 
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